Kurdistan Region of Iran (Rojhelat)
In November 2025, Iranian authorities intensified a campaign of repression against the Kurdish population in Iranian Kurdistan (Rojhelat). Across the month, human rights organizations documented numerous atrocities – from deadly violence against kolbars (cross-border porters) to waves of arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, and summary executions – all targeting Kurds. These abuses form part of a broader pattern of state brutality. By late November, the Oslo-based Hengaw Organization reported over 1,500 executions in Iran since January 2025, including at least 231 Kurdish prisoners: a disproportionate share of victims given Kurds comprise roughly 12% of Iran’s population.
Violence Against Kolbars and Border Killings
Kurdish kolbars – semi-legal porters who carry goods across the mountainous Iran-Iraq border – continued to face lethal risks from Iranian security forces and landmines during November. In mid-month, Asad Karimi, a Kurdish kolbar from Nodsheh (Pawa district), was shot and seriously wounded when Iran’s border regiment forces opened fire on him in the Teh-teh mountain area near Sarvabad on November 20. Karimi had been traversing the border trails when troops directly targeted him without warning; due to the severity of his gunshot injuries, he had to be rushed to a hospital in Senna for urgent treatment. This incident was not isolated as earlier, on 10 November, a 40-year-old kolbar named Ebrahim Abdollahi from Jwanru (Kermanshah province) was maimed by a landmine explosion in the Tak Derakht border zone of Nowsud. The blast severed Abdollahi’s right leg at the ankle and left him in critical condition.
Arbitrary Arrests and Crackdown on Civil Activism
Throughout November, Iranian security forces carried out sweeping arbitrary arrests of Kurds across Rojhelat, often targeting activists and ordinary citizens without due process. The Kurdistan Human Rights Network (KHRN) recorded at least 35 Kurdish citizens arrested by the Ministry of Intelligence or the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the four weeks leading up to late November. Most of those detained were held incommunicado in detention centers in Senna or Urmia, denied access to lawyers and barred from contacting their families. In many cases, security agents made arrests violently or without any warrant, indicating a blatant disregard for legal norms. For example, on 5 November, IRGC intelligence officers in Saqqez rounded up a group of seven Kurdish men, identified as Mansour Soltani, Mahmoud Amani, Khalil Shabani, Mehdi Majidi, Fardin Salehi, Farzad Rahimzadeh, and Zahed Moradi, and hauled them away with no judicial warrants and no explanation. The mass arrest took place in a single day, and authorities refused to inform the families of the men’s whereabouts or the reasons for their detention.
This wave of repression explicitly targeted Kurdish civil society and anyone deemed a dissident. On 9 November, Ministry of Intelligence agents in Saqqez arrested two respected environmental activists, Mohammad Ali Veysi and Sirwan Khoda-Karami, without presenting any legal authorization. Veysi was detained at his workplace and Khoda-Karami at home; both men, known for their wildlife conservation work, were promptly taken to undisclosed locations. Despite their families’ urgent inquiries, officials refused to divulge where the two activists were being held or what charges, if any, they faced. The next day, on 10 November, security forces raided a home in Kamyaran to arrest Ramin Mohammadi, a Kurdish man who was a former member of the Komala opposition party. Mohammadi had actually resigned from that party and returned to Iran in 2018 under an amnesty, even enduring weeks of interrogation by intelligence officers in Senna at the time. Nevertheless, IRGC agents burst into his village home on 10 November and forcibly detained him without a warrant. His renewed arrest, despite prior cooperation with authorities, sent a chilling message that even Kurds who had ostensibly been pardoned or remained non-political could be swept up again at any moment. Rights groups also reported that Kurdish community leaders and clerics were not spared: on 3 November, security forces in Jwanruin Kermanshah province carried out a pre-dawn raid to arrest Mamosta Zana Hosseini, a prominent Sunni Kurdish cleric and village imam, without stating any charges. Hosseini, a 59-year-old religious activist, was in poor health and yet was dragged from his home at 3:00 a.m., illustrating the breadth of the crackdown, extending even to religious figures and community elders.
Enforced Disappearances and Incommunicado Detention
A disturbing hallmark of the November repression was the number of Kurdish detainees who effectively disappeared into state custody, with families receiving no information on their fate. Iranian authorities routinely held Kurdish arrestees incommunicado, refusing to acknowledge their location or well-being for weeks on end. One early case was Salar Khalifehzadeh, a 33-year-old Kurdish man from Mahabad. He was arrested by plainclothes Intelligence Department agents at his workplace on 27 October; twelve days later, as of mid-November, there was still “no information regarding his fate or whereabouts,” according to Hengaw’s investigation. Khalifehzadeh’s family repeatedly pleaded with local authorities for news, but officials flatly refused to say why he was taken or where he was being held. Similarly, on 12 November, two Kurdish men, Mohammad Rashidzadeh of Baneh and Mostafa Qawsi,were detained by security forces while traveling together on the Piranshahr–Mahabad road, and swiftly transferred to an Intelligence Ministry detention center in Urmia. In the nearly two weeks that followed, no details at all emerged about their condition or legal status: Rashidzadeh’s family received no information about what had happened to him, despite their repeated inquiries. By 24 November, twelve days into his custody, Rashidzadeh’s situation remained entirely opaque: authorities had disclosed no charges and had granted no contact with a lawyer or relatives. Qawsi’s fate was equally unknown ten days after the arrest, underscoring that these two men had effectively vanished within Iran’s detention system.
In Saqqez, the seven men arrested on 5 November were all held at undisclosed locations with their “whereabouts unknown” long after their detention. In Jwanru, after the arrest of cleric Zana Hosseini on 3 November, his family and followers learned only that he had been moved to a security facility in Kermanshah – but no official would provide information on why he was arrested or how he was being treated. Hosseini’s ongoing health issues made the silence even more alarming, as he was unlikely to withstand lengthy interrogation or imprisonment.
Executions of Kurdish Prisoners
November 2025 also witnessed an alarming spate of executions of Kurdish prisoners, as Iran’s judiciary continued its nationwide execution surge. In several instances, Kurdish inmates convicted on dubious charges were put to death in secrecy. On 19 November, for example, Iranian authorities carried out the execution of Mohammadreza Hosseini, a Kurdish prisoner, at Ilam Central Prison. Hosseini had been sentenced to death for alleged “premeditated murder,” and his execution was implemented at dawn without prior public notice. The very next day, Farshid Jamiari, a Kurdish man from Kermanshah, was executed in Qazvin Central Prison on drug-related charges. Jamiari’s case, like many others, had drawn concern because he was tried and condemned far from his home province, raising questions about due process. Later in the month, on 29 November, Mohammadkarim Moradi, a Kurdish prisoner from Kermanshah, was hanged in Kermanshah’s Dizelabad Central Prison after spending four years on death row. Moradi had originally been arrested on a murder charge and sentenced to death by an Iranian revolutionary court.
None of these executions were officially announced in Iranian state media at the time, a common practice as the government seeks to avoid scrutiny. According to data compiled by Hengaw Organization for Human Rights, Kurds have been disproportionately affected by Iran’s 2025 execution binge, accounting for roughly 15% of all executions countrywide, with at least 231 Kurds executed out of about 1,503 total by late November. This is higher than the Kurdish share of Iran’s population and far exceeds the numbers for other minorities, indicating that Kurdish inmates are often singled out under Iran’s capital punishment system
Observers note that many of the Kurdish executions in 2025 followed periods of unrest, such as the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests of 2022 or the flare-up of conflict with Israel in mid-2025 – suggesting the regime may be using the death penalty as a tool to intimidate the Kurdish community.
Suppression of Protests and Civil Life
Finally, the Iranian regime’s hostility toward Kurdish political expression and protest was evident in the continued persecution of those linked to last year’s anti-government uprisings or other civic initiatives. Kurdish detainees from the 2022–2023 “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests remained behind bars in November 2025 and faced new hardship. A notable case is Mohammad Sohrabi, a 32-year-old Kurdish man from Piranshahr who was arrested during the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising. By late November, Sohrabi had spent 310 days in detention, nearly eleven months, in Naqadeh Prison, and despite his family posting bail multiple times, the Ministry of Intelligence has blocked his release at every turn.
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Bashur)
Khor Mor gas field, the first concrete oil export cargoes from Ceyhan, and the political fallout from Iraq’s 11 November parliamentary elections.
Khor Mor under fire: Kurdistan’s energy lifeline targeted again
On 26 November, a drone struck the Khor Mor gas field in Chamchamal, one of the Kurdistan Region’s most strategic energy assets, sparking a large fire, injuring several workers, and forcing a complete shutdown of gas supplies to power stations across the Region. Security sources told Reuters that the attack hit a key facility and caused serious damage.
The attack caused a suspension of operations, resulting in an estimated 80% reduction in electricity production across the Kurdistan Region. Millions of citizens faced blackouts as the grid lost approximately 2,800 megawatts of power. While no direct casualties were reported, the strike inflicted severe damage on gas storage tanks and ignited a fire that took hours to control.
The attack drew immediate and forceful responses from Kurdish leadership and international partners, highlighting the geopolitical sensitivity of the KRI’s energy independence.
Prime Minister Masrour Barzani issued a strongly worded statement condemning the assault. In his address, he characterized the perpetrators as enemies of the region’s progress: “I condemn the cowardly attack on the Khor Mor gas field in the strongest terms and urge the federal government to find the perpetrators and bring them to justice.” said Barzani.
Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani also condemned the strike, labeling it an act of terrorism designed to destabilize the region’s economy and calling for immediate federal intervention to secure the area.
The international community’s reaction was notably sharp, reflecting growing impatience with the unchecked militia activity in Iraq.
The United States, a key partner in the region’s stability, pointed the finger at Iran-backed factions. Mark Savaya, the U.S. Special Envoy to Iraq, stated:” The United States will fully support efforts to track, confront, and hold accountable every illegal armed group and supporter.”
The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) also weighed in, emphasizing the threat to Iraq’s federal structure. In a statement released on November 28, UNAMI noted: “UNAMI condemns in the strongest terms the attack against Khor Mor gasfield… The attack not only harms the economic infrastructure of the Kurdistan Region and all of Iraq but also sends negative messages, primarily against the Iraqi federal system.”
According to a report by Kurdistan24, Kurdistan’s oil and gas infrastructure has suffered 151 air strikes since 2022, with Khor Mor hit at least eleven times. The latest strike alone caused the loss of roughly 3,000 megawatts of electricity and a production drop of 1,200 megawatts, leaving households across the Region with around ten fewer hours of power per day.
Iran, the main suspect, took the unusual step of publicly condemning the attack as “unacceptable,” with the Iranian consul in Erbil telling Rudaw that it targeted “the security of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the well-being of its people.”
Taken together, the November strike on Khor Mor deepened concerns that militias are using energy infrastructure as leverage in wider Baghdad–Erbil and regional power struggles, even as Kurdistan’s oil exports to Ceyhan are finally restarting under a federal framework.
Election results: Record Kurdish turnout, fragmented Iraqi parliament
Iraq’s 11 November 2025 parliamentary elections reshaped the national political map, with Kurdish parties again emerging as key power brokers. The Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) announced final results on 17 November, confirming that Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition (RDC) placed first with 46 seats in the 329-member Council of Representatives.
A breakdown shows the five biggest winners in terms of seats as:
- Reconstruction and Development Coalition (RDC) – 46 seats
- State of Law Coalition – 29 seats
- Progress Party (Taqaddum) – 27 seats
- Sadiqoun Bloc – 27 seats
- Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) – 27 seats
Other Kurdish parties, including the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) secured 18 seats, with the State Forces Alliance on 16 and Azem on 15. Nationwide turnout exceeded 56%, a sharp jump from 2021. Within Kurdistan, results consolidated the KDP’s position as the dominant Kurdish party:
- The KDP won 9 seats in Erbil, 9 in Duhok, and 5 in Nineveh.
- The PUK captured 8 seats in Sulaimani and 4 in Kirkuk, maintaining its core territorial base and emerging as the first-place list in Kirkuk.
Kurdish parties collectively remain essential in the upcoming government-formation talks, particularly in selecting Iraq’s president, a post traditionally held by a Kurd. However, no bloc holds a majority, the government formation is expected to form in months of bargaining, echoing earlier cycles in which coalition talks stretched well into the following year.
Oil exports: From legal deal to real barrels at Ceyhan
On the economic front, November marked the moment when the September oil deal between Baghdad, Erbil, and international oil companies (IOCs) translated into actual export cargoes. On 17 November, Gulf Keystone Petroleum and other operators confirmed the first loading of Kurdistan crude at Turkey’s Ceyhan terminal since flows restarted in late September. Reuters reported that the company expected payment for its share within 30 days and planned a second lifting at the end of November.
Industry reports, including coverage by Egypt Oil & Gas, describe these shipments as a critical test of the new arrangement, under which the federal marketer SOMO sells Kurdistan’s oil while IOCs are compensated via an escrow-style mechanism. According to a report by Rudaw, SOMO’s exports notes that an average of roughly 188,000 barrels per day of Kurdistan crude has reached international buyers through the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline since the September restart.
Disputed territories back in focus: Kirkuk census tensions
As November drew to a close, long-standing disputes over Kirkuk and other “disputed territories” resurfaced. The KRG Board of the Kurdistani Areas Outside the Region’s Administration issued a stark warning about “irregularities” in Iraq’s new census procedures for Kirkuk, accusing federal authorities of ignoring the 1957 census as the agreed baseline and thereby legitimizing decades of demographic engineering. The statement, reported by Kurdistan24, cautioned that the issue could escalate into a constitutional confrontation if not corrected.
With census results feeding into budget allocations and future electoral boundaries, warnings from Erbil suggest that the battle over federalism, territory, and identity is far from over, just as energy infrastructure and oil exports are again becoming jointly managed under a fragile Baghdad–Erbil framework.
Kurdistan Region of Syria (Rojava)
November 2025 was a month of intense diplomacy and mounting pressure on the Kurdish-led authorities in Rojava. While the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) tried to secure a balanced settlement with Damascus and maintain their strategic partnership with the United States, they continued front-line operations against Da’esh cells and faced entrenched abuses by Turkish-backed factions in Afrin, as well as a worrying wave of anti-Kurdish rhetoric in regime-aligned celebrations. Together, these developments underscored both the central role of Syrian Kurds in stabilizing the country and the scale of the threats still directed at their hard-won gains.
In mid-November, SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi used a detailed interview with Enab Baladi to restate Kurdish priorities in the negotiations with Damascus. Abdi emphasized that the SDF is a multi-ethnic force that has fought alongside the U.S.-led Global Coalition for more than a decade and is now “the largest organized force in Syria,” stressing that any integration into the Syrian Arab Army must respect the sacrifices of SDF fighters and protect the political and security achievements of Rojava. He linked military arrangements to broader questions of decentralization, recognition of the Kurds as an indigenous people and guarantees for the safe return of displaced residents to areas such as Afrin and Ras al-Ain, highlighting that Kurdish rights and the right of return are non-negotiable foundations for any settlement.
Despite these moves, Kurdish officials warned at the end of November that Damascus was stalling and trying to weaken the Kurdish position. A senior PYD figure Aldar Khalil said that all SDF–Damascus talks had been halted without explanation, after Syrian officials verbally agreed to key measures such as forming an SDF division, integrating the Asayish into the Interior Ministry, and appointing a Kurdish chief of general staff, only to refuse signing any written document. Khalil argued that a binding deal must be reached while U.S. forces remain in the region, accusing Damascus of pressuring AANES areas by closing major roads, shutting Qamishli Airport, and blocking key civil services in an attempt to “push us out of Syria.” He also noted that efforts to stir Arab–Kurdish tensions in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor had largely failed, reflecting the resilience of the local social contract under AANES rule.
Security Landscape: The Fight Against ISIS
The anti-ISIS (Da’esh) mission in November 2025 remained a critical function of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), heavily backed by the United States, yet this mission was increasingly intertwined with complex political maneuvering. Da’esh sleeper cells continued to pose a significant threat, primarily within the regions of Deir ez-Zor and Hasakah, areas where security incidents have historically been concentrated. The SDF, supported by the International Coalition, maintained continuous operations against a resurging Da’esh. On November 22, 2025, the SDF, with the support of Coalition forces, carried out a specific raid in the Zalzala neighborhood of Marat town, northeast of Deir ez-Zor, highlighting ongoing, targeted efforts to dismantle Da’esh infrastructure. Reports from mid-November confirmed that the SDF was committed to operations against the group, which had exploited instability to increase its attacks. SDF-supplied figures indicated a significant rise in attacks in northeastern Syria, with 117 attacks recorded between January and August 2025, compared to 73 in all of 2024, demonstrating the necessity of the SDF’s continued role.
Later in the month, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) documented a joint operation by the SDF and internal security forces in the Hasakah countryside, where dozens of suspected Da’esh members were arrested and weapons seized, highlighting the scale of clandestine networks still operating in and around Rojava. Parallel SOHR reporting from Al-Bukamal in eastern Deir Ezzor recorded fresh Da’esh graffiti threatening that “the Islamic State is coming,” part of a pattern of intimidation aimed at destabilizing areas administered either by the caretaker government or the SDF. For Kurdish officials in Rojava, these incidents reinforced their argument that sustained international cooperation with the AANES and SDF is indispensable if Syria is to avoid a new cycle of jihadist resurgence.
Occupied Territories: Violations in Afrin
The most severe abuses this month were once again reported from Afrin, still under Turkish occupation and controlled on the ground by Ankara-backed factions. On November 3, SOHR reported that Turkish-backed groups had seized and burned roughly 5,000 olive trees belonging to displaced Kurdish villagers and were imposing arbitrary “taxes” on the olive harvest, a key source of livelihood for Afrin’s original population. A follow-up report on November 5 described how these factions were forcing farmers to surrender up to half of their olive production under various pretexts, amounting to systematic looting of Kurdish property. Together, the reports painted a picture of economic strangulation designed to break the link between Kurds and their land, reinforcing long-standing Kurdish claims that the Afrin occupation constitutes demographic engineering and a slow-motion dispossession of an indigenous community.
SOHR also documented more direct coercion against Kurdish civilians. On November 22, members of a “National Army” faction arrested a Kurdish man from Borj al-Qas village in the Afrin countryside because his son had worked as a teacher for the AANES and was now in hiding. The father was transferred to Azaz Military Prison, and the family was reportedly told to pay 10,000 USD for his release. For Kurdish human-rights advocates, this case epitomized how Turkish-backed groups use arbitrary detention and ransom to punish families with even minimal ties to Rojava’s institutions, while sending a message that Kurdish civic engagement will carry a personal cost.
Within regime-controlled Syria, November also witnessed an alarming wave of anti-Kurdish rhetoric that Kurdish actors interpreted as a warning sign for the transition’s direction. On November 30, North Press reported that the Syrian Kurdish National Council (ENKS) issued a statement condemning hate speech and racist slogans heard at celebrations and rallies called by Transitional President Ahmad al-Sharaa. ENKS said it was following these developments “with deep concern,” warning that platforms at these gatherings were used to incite hostility against “the Kurdish people and other components of Syrian society.”
These developments unfolded against a broader backdrop in which debates over decentralization and minority rights were spreading beyond Kurdish areas. Late-November protests on the Syrian coast demanding a federal or decentralized system prompted warnings from Damascus about “attempts to spark sectarian strife,” underscoring how Kurdish calls for constitutional recognition now intersect with wider demands from other communities.
By the end of November 2025, Syrian Kurds in Rojava faced a familiar triple challenge: securing a fair political settlement with Damascus, maintaining an indispensable but fragile partnership with the United States and its allies, and defending their communities against Da’esh cells, occupation-era abuses in Afrin and resurgent hate speech from regime-aligned actors.
Yet the month’s reporting also made clear that Kurdish institutions remain central to any plausible path toward a stable, democratic Syria. Through continued negotiation, persistent counter-terror operations, and a consistent message of decentralization and equal citizenship, Rojava’s Kurdish-led authorities are still positioning themselves not as spoilers, but as key architects of a more inclusive post-war order.
Kurdistan Region of Turkey (Bakur)
November 2025 was one of the most consequential months in decades for the Kurdish question in Turkey. Ankara spoke of a “new phase” in the peace process, parliament moved to engage directly with Abdullah Öcalan on İmralı, the PKK continued implementing its disarmament and withdrawal decisions, and Kurdish actors insisted that any real peace must include Öcalan’s freedom, constitutional recognition, and an end to everyday repression in Bakur.
Öcalan back at the center of Ankara’s peace discourse
Early in the month, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan addressed his party and the public with language that clearly framed November as a turning point. He described Turkey as standing at a “crossroads” on the path to a country “free of terrorism,” and he linked this to the ongoing parliamentary process that treats Abdullah Öcalan as the key interlocutor in ending the armed conflict.
The political infrastructure for this shift had already been set in August with the creation of the National Solidarity, Sisterhood/Brotherhood and Democracy Commission in parliament. In a detailed briefing, Human Rights Watch and partner organizations urged the commission to use its mandate to deliver structural reforms: rolling back abusive anti-terror provisions, ending politically motivated prosecutions of Kurdish elected officials, guaranteeing the right to protest, and recognizing the “right to hope” for prisoners serving aggravated life sentences.From a Kurdish perspective, this was a reminder that peace cannot just be disarmament; it has to mean dismantling the legal architecture that has criminalized Kurdish political life for decades.
Parliamentary committee moves to meet Öcalan, followed by historic İmralı visit
On 21 November, the parliamentary commission overseeing the peace process voted to send a formal delegation to meet Abdullah Öcalan on İmralı Island. Bianet reported that this was the first time a parliamentary body, not just intelligence officials or individual MPs, would officially visit Öcalan, describing the vote as a “major step” in a process that has been underway for over a year. The motion passed with support from the ruling AKP, its nationalist MHP ally, and the pro-Kurdish DEM Party, while the CHP chose not to participate. For many Kurds, this was the clearest institutional acknowledgment yet that no serious peace is possible without speaking directly to the man they regard as their national leader.
The visit itself took place on 24 November, when a multi-party delegation traveled to İmralı to meet Öcalan under tight secrecy. International coverage, including Reuters, noted that the delegation was tasked with gauging Öcalan’s views on the disarmament process, the return of PKK fighters from Iraq, and the broader roadmap for normalizing Kurdish, Turkish relations. Subsequent reporting underlined Öcalan’s enduring authority inside the movement: despite years of isolation, he is still treated as the final reference for strategic decisions, including the call to end the armed struggle and dissolve the PKK organization.
The move towards direct parliamentary engagement coincided with growing international and diaspora pressure. In Cologne, tens of thousands marched on 8 November under the banner “Freedom for Abdullah Öcalan and a Political Solution to the Kurdish Question,” as documented by ANHA and the international Öcalan vigil campaign.
PKK’s implementation of disarmament and its new political stance
November also saw intensified discussion of how far the PKK has already gone in implementing Öcalan’s instructions. Earlier this year, Öcalan called for the party to hold a final conference, dissolve itself, end its armed struggle and withdraw forces from Turkish territory. November’s coverage repeatedly noted that the PKK had publicly accepted this line, held a symbolic disarmament ceremony in July, and announced a withdrawal from Turkey as part of the process.
International media highlighted that guerrilla units have been leaving forward positions near the Turkish border, including parts of the Zap region in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, as part of the phased withdrawal. The Jerusalem Post While some commentators framed this as a “boost” to the peace process, Kurdish voices stressed that this was not surrender but a strategic move aimed at opening a political phase, on the condition that Ankara respects Kurdish rights and honors its commitments.
By the end of the month, the PKK leadership sharpened its public position. In an interview from the Qandil Mountains, senior commander Amed Malazgirt told AFP that every step initiated by “Leader Apo” had been carried out and that the movement would not take further actions without concrete moves from Ankara. The PKK set out two non-negotiable conditions for progress: physical freedom for Öcalan and constitution, and official recognition of the Kurdish people in Turkey.
That position was reinforced on 30 November, when the People’s Defense Forces (HPG) commander Amed Malaz Kurd addressed fighters in the Medya Defense Zones on the 47th anniversary of the PKK’s founding. In a speech carried by Hawar News (ANHA), he traced the movement’s decades-long struggle to defend Kurdish language, culture and identity, and stressed that the PKK had “fulfilled the role that was entrusted” to it by Öcalan: convening the party conference, agreeing to dissolve the organization, withdrawing forces from North Kurdistan (Bakur), and even symbolically destroying some weapons. He underlined that the movement is now watching the state “to see if it will take serious initiatives,” and he explicitly tied any talk of “brotherhood” between Kurds and Turks to two concrete steps: Öcalan’s freedom within a clear legal framework and constitutional status for Kurds.
Ankara’s legislative plans and the limits of the state’s approach. On 7 November,Reuters revealed that Turkey is drafting a special law to allow thousands of PKK fighters and civilians to return from bases in northern Iraq. According to the report, the law would protect returnees from some prosecutions but would stop short of a general amnesty, with different procedures for civilians, rank-and-file fighters and commanders. Some mid- and
DEM Party, local repression, and contradictions on the ground
On the ground in Bakur, November exposed the gap between high-level dialogue and everyday realities for Kurdish politicians and communities. On 30 November, The New Region reported that Turkish security forces blocked two DEM Party co-mayors from attending the International Mullah al-Jaziri Symposium in Cizre, despite the event focusing on a celebrated Kurdish poet and being attended by the former president President of the Kurdistan Region, Masoud Barzani. DEM denounced the incident as an “unlawful” and “systematic attack,” noting that police allegedly spoke to the co-mayors in a threatening and sexist manner and physically prevented them from entering the venue.
Footage from the scene showed security forces also clashing with locals who attempted to greet Barzani and carried the Kurdistan flag; the party described the violence as evidence of a planned crackdown rather than an isolated incident. For many Kurds, it was a stark reminder that even as Ankara negotiates with Öcalan and drafts laws on PKK fighters, the state’s reflex at street level remains to police Kurdish symbols, humiliate elected Kurdish officials, and control public space.
From a pro-Kurdish vantage point, November did not resolve the Kurdish question in Turkey, but it clearly re-centered it. Öcalan is once again treated, even by Ankara, as the indispensable architect of a post-conflict order; the PKK has shifted its leverage from armed struggle to political conditions; and Kurds in Bakur and the diaspora are using this opening to push for a settlement based on dignity, legal equality, and recognition, rather than temporary security arrangements. Whether the Turkish state matches words with binding reforms will define whether the “new phase” of 2025 becomes a genuine peace or another missed opportunity.