Kurdistan Region of Iran (Rojhelat)
As of April 2026, reporting from Kurdish human-rights monitors showed a continued pattern of state repression across Rojhelat, Iranian Kurdistan, including arbitrary arrests, secret detention, prison pressure, death sentences, executions, kolbar shootings, and expanded militarization of Kurdish-majority areas. The cases included here are documented examples from April reporting, not a complete list of every arrest or abuse reported during the month. Several Human Rights Organizations such as Kurdistan Human Rights Network, Hengaw, Hana Human Rights Organization, and Kurdpa reported abuses in Bukan, Saqqez, Senna, Baneh, Abdanan, Naqadeh, Orumiyeh, Kermanshah, Marivan, and surrounding border areas.
Arrests and incommunicado detentions remained a central feature of April. KHRN reported the warrantless April 3 detention of Yousef Karimi in Bukan, while Hengaw documented the April 4 arrest of Sheyda Sheikhi in Saqqez, the detention of Mohyeddin Maroufnia and Behnam Maroufnia in Piranshahr, the April 22 arrest of Abubakr Qaderboukani in Bukan, and the April 22 arrest of Behrouz Hemmati, a Kurdish healthcare worker from Abdanan. Kurdpa separately reported the April 19 arrest of Masoud Abdollahzadeh in Naqadeh, the April 16 detention of Sahar Mehdi in Saqqez, and the April 20 arrest of Maryam Davoudian, a 58-year-old Kurdish woman from Bukan with serious medical needs. Additional April reporting documented continued detention and denial of information in cases involving several Kurds across Rojhelat, including Zeynab Azizi and Sirwan Amini, Diako Ayazi, and Sobhan Azizi and Omid Khorshidi.
Prisons were another major front. In Orumiyeh Central Prison, 49 political prisoners in the Ershad security ward refused prison food on April 14 over poor quality, returning meal containers in protest. KHRN said food quality and quantity had worsened during wartime conditions, forcing prisoners to rely more heavily on prison shops despite rising prices and family hardship. This adds to wider concerns that Kurdish and political detainees are being pressured through isolation, restricted visits, poor prison conditions, and limited outside communication.
The death penalty remained central to the repression. On April 7, KHRN reported that Mohsen Eslamkhah, a Kurdish protester from Bukan, had been sentenced to death by Branch One of the Revolutionary Court in Mahabad on “enmity against God” charges. KHRN also warned on April 2 that several Kurdish political prisoners, including Pakhshan Azizi, Hatem Ozdemir, Yousef Ahmadi, Mehrab Abdollahzadeh, Nasser Bakerzadeh, Rauf Sheikh-Maroufi, and Mohammad Faraji, were at risk of execution or renewed death sentences after unfair trials.
Executions were also carried out. Hengaw reported that two Kurdish prisoners, Mohammad Heydari and Abed Sharafi, were executed on April 15 in Kermanshah Central Prison, also known as Dizelabad Prison, in qisas cases; the executions were not publicly announced by state media or judiciary-linked outlets. Separately, on April 13, Hengaw reported that four protest detainees had been sentenced to death by Branch 26 of Tehran’s Revolutionary Court, citing forced confessions, lack of individualized evidence, and denial of fair-trial protections.
Kolbars remained exposed to lethal border enforcement. Hana Human Rights Organization reported on April 15 that Sirwan Rasouli, a kolbar, was severely wounded in the leg by military gunfire at the Baneh border and transferred to a hospital in Tabriz. Another April 20 Hana report described a further kolbar injured by military forces’ shooting. These April cases fit the broader, long-running pattern of Kurdish border porters being treated as security targets rather than impoverished workers operating in an economy shaped by unemployment, sanctions, and state neglect.
April also brought evidence of expanded military and proxy-force deployment in Kurdish areas. Hengaw reported on April 7 that the Iranian-back Iraqi militias of Hashd al-Shaabi had expanded their presence in Kermanshah, Ravansar, Jawanru, and Marivan, with some forces reportedly housed in mosques and sports halls. It also reported tanks and armored vehicles near military bases and border villages around Marivan, while identifying the wider deployment of Zeynabiyoun, Fatemiyoun, and Hashd al-Shaabi forces as part of a state strategy to create fear, suppress protests, and restrict civic mobilization.
Reuters’ April 8 investigation added the strategic reason: Iran’s Revolutionary Guards viewed Kurdish areas as a possible front during the regional war and sought to deter any Kurdish uprising or cross-border mobilization. Reuters reported that Iranian intelligence sent warning messages to Kurdish citizens, conducted digital monitoring for satellite connections, and followed this with IRGC house raids. It also reported that local sources described IRGC reinforcements arriving “by the busload” to prevent an uprising, while Kurdish commanders said forces were positioned in forests, mosques, schools, and even a hospital.
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Bashur)
April 2026 placed the Kurdistan Region of Iraq at the center of overlapping security, political, and economic pressures. The main issue was the continuation of Iranian and Iranian attacks after the April 8 ceasefire between the United States and Iran. According to Community Peacemaker Teams–Iraqi Kurdistan, the Kurdistan Region faced 647 attacks from February 28 to the ceasefire announcement, followed by 48 more attacks between April 8 and April 24, bringing the total to 695. The same tally recorded 123 casualties, including 22 killed and 101 injured, with at least 24 civilians among the affected.
After the ceasefire, the pattern shifted. CPT-IK reported that 37 of the 48 post-ceasefire attacks targeted Iranian Kurdish opposition camps and bases, while seven hit civilian areas and Peshmerga facilities and four struck U.S. diplomatic or military sites. The IRGC’s direct role rose to 75 percent of attacks during this period, compared with 31.8 percent before the ceasefire. This showed that the truce reduced some U.S.-Iran confrontation but did not stop violence inside the Kurdistan Region.
Several April incidents illustrated the continued danger. On April 14, a drone strike hit an Iranian Kurdish opposition site, killing one female Peshmerga and wounding several others of the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, known as Komala. The female fighter, Ghazal Mawlan, died from injuries sustained in the strike. On April 17, attacks on Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) sites in Erbil province killed three members identified as Neda Miri, Samira Allah-Yari, and Shahin Azarbarzin, while others were wounded. On April 22, the Kurdistan Freedom Party said an Iranian drone strike near Erbil wounded three PAK fighters only hours after President Trump extended the ceasefire.
The Alliance of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan and its member parties, including the KDPI, Kurdistan Free Life Party, and Komala factions, condemned Iran’s continued drone and missile attacks on Iranian Kurdish opposition camps and civilian refugee areas inside the Kurdistan Region of Iraq after the U.S.–Iran ceasefire. Their statements described the strikes as violations of Iraqi sovereignty, the Kurdistan Region’s authority, international humanitarian law, and refugee protections, especially after attacks on PDKI’s Azadi Camp, Komala-related camps near Sulaimaniyah, and other Kurdish opposition sites killed and wounded party members and civilians. The alliance urged Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government, the United States, the United Nations, European governments, and human rights bodies to move beyond statements of concern and take practical steps to stop further attacks and investigate the targeting of Kurdish political refugees.
Kurdish officials also responded with calls for de-escalation and protection of the Region. President Nechirvan Barzani welcomed the April 8 ceasefire as a step toward de-escalation, civilian protection, and constructive dialogue, urging all sides to uphold it in good faith. On April 15, his office said he and the French ambassador hoped the ceasefire would hold and open the door to lasting peace. Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani also said at the Delphi Economic Forum that Kurdistan’s priority was stability, prosperity, and development, that the war had affected the Region economically, psychologically, and in security terms, and that “we have said from day one we are not part of this war.”
The attacks also carried economic consequences. Energy infrastructure remained one of the most sensitive areas. Khor Mor, the Region’s strategic gas field, resumed operations on April 13 after weeks of intermittent production linked to the Iran war and attacks on regional infrastructure. Earlier disruptions had contributed to electricity shortages and broader instability. DNO also restarted Kurdistan operations on April 9, resuming workovers and drilling at Tawke and Peshkabir after suspending activity following the start of the war.
At the same time, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) continued promoting electricity reform. On April 23, the Ministry of Electricity said nearly 5.5 million people, more than 85 percent of the Kurdistan Region’s population, had access to 24-hour electricity under the Runaki initiative. The expansion included Soran, Zakho, Raparin, Koya, Pirmam, Akre, and Simel. This was an important governance development, although it unfolded against the background of attacks on energy sites and continuing budget uncertainty. Since 1991, Iraq, including Kurdistan, has struggled with power shortage.
Politically, April also exposed division between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) over Iraq’s presidency. Before the April 11 vote, the two parties had not agreed on a single Kurdish candidate. The PUK backed Nizar Amedi, while the KDP backed Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein. Rudaw reported that the disagreement had stalled government formation, while The New Region quoted a KDP lawmaker saying talks had stalled because of the war.
On April 11, Iraq’s parliament elected Nizar Amedi, the PUK’s candidate, as president after two rounds of voting. Amedi received 227 votes in the second round. The election ended a five-month presidential deadlock but did not resolve Kurdish unity over the office. The KDP rejected the process, saying it did not represent the Kurdish majority and recalling representatives for consultations. This division should be presented as a political dispute between Kurdish parties, not as a settled question of legitimacy.
Budget and salary issues between Erbil and Baghdad remained unresolved. Iraq entered late April without an approved 2026 budget because government formation was still incomplete. On April 26, Iraqi economic officials warned that budget delays could damage both the public and private sectors, stall investment, and deepen uncertainty. The problem also affected Erbil-Baghdad relations, where salaries, oil exports, and revenue-sharing remained central points of dispute.
Kurdistan Region of Syria (Rojava)
In April Rojava remained in a fragile transition rather than a settled political settlement. The main issue was the ongoing implementation of the January 29 SDF-Damascus agreement: military integration, administrative absorption, border-crossing control, prisoner releases, judicial disputes, and the return of displaced Kurds to Afrin all moved forward, but each file exposed unresolved questions over Kurdish rights, local authority, and security guarantees.
The most visible political moment came on April 16, when SDF commander Mazloum Abdi and senior Rojava official Elham Ahmad met Syrian interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa in Damascus to discuss completing the integration of Kurdish-led forces and institutions into the Syrian state. The agreement being implemented calls for a permanent ceasefire, the withdrawal of SDF forces from major urban centers such as Hasaka and Qamishli into designated military bases, the creation of SDF-linked brigades within the Syrian army, and the integration of Asayish into the interior ministry through joint patrols and limited central security deployments. It also covers key assets such as Semalka crossing, Qamishli airport, oil and gas fields, and ISIS detention facilities.
Despite public claims from Damascus that the process was advancing quickly, Kurdish officials described it as slow and unfinished. Elham Ahmad said the integration of civilian and military institutions was “proceeding slowly,” and stressed that Syria’s new constitution must include representatives from all components. The unresolved files included the status of the YPJ, the structure of local administration, the exchange of detainees, and the broader question of decentralization.
Military integration remained one of the most sensitive files. The agreement mandates a division under the Syrian defense ministry for Hasaka province, with SDF forces incorporated into three brigades, but Kurdish officials continued to push for the Women’s Protection Units, or YPJ, to receive formal status. On April 26, women’s organizations and activists in Rojava called for the YPJ to be recognized as a regular armed force, to maintain its structure, and to operate in Rojava. The same report noted that Damascus-linked officials had suggested YPJ fighters could “volunteer” in police forces rather than join the army as an independent military structure.
Administrative integration also advanced, but not without disputes. On April 20, Kurdish authorities were reported to be preparing candidate lists for possible positions in the Syrian interim government, with selections based on specialization, competence, and experience. SDF-linked figures had already assumed some state roles, including a deputy defense minister, a deputy local security chief in Hasaka, and mayoral posts. At the same time, the absence of a fixed timeline and Kurdish concerns over meaningful representation kept the process uncertain.
The judiciary became another flashpoint. On April 23, a Rojava official said Kurdish authorities would not hand over the Qamishli court because Damascus was seeking to appoint former Baathist state judges and exclude Kurds from judicial authority. A Syrian justice ministry delegation had reportedly tried to enter the court as part of the integration process, but was prevented. Kurdish officials said judicial integration must be negotiated and based on expertise, not imposed through loyalist appointments.
Rojava’s participation in Syria’s political system also began to take shape through preparations for indirect legislative elections. Election officials visited Hasaka and Kobane to form local electoral bodies. The system described by election officials would use committees of experts and local dignitaries, with women’s representation set at 20 percent or higher. Voting had already taken place in much of Syria in October 2025, but had been delayed in Rojava due to tensions between Damascus and the Kurdish-led administration. The Kurdish National Council said it had not been included in designing the mechanism but was not boycotting the vote.
Semalka crossing became a practical symbol of the new balance between local needs and central control. On April 18, Syrian authorities waived entry and exit fees for Syrian travelers after bringing the crossing under central government authority. Officials said the move was part of standardizing procedures across Syria and did not make Semalka an international crossing. A new administration under the General Authority for Border Crossings and Customs was installed, with some former employees retained, while repair work continued on the damaged floating bridge.
Afrin remained unstable as on April 4, supporters of the Syrian Interim Government prevented a Kurdish young man from raising a Kurdish flag during a gathering welcoming returning families; Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) said he was immediately arrested while terrorists flags of the radical groups such as HTS flags were raised. The same day, SOHR reported that Afrin residents demonstrating in solidarity with the Kurdistan Region and the Kurdish cause were insulted with racist slogans by young men loyal to the transitional government, while security forces did not intervene.
The pressure on returnees continued later in the month. On April 15, SOHR reported that Afrin’s general security service summoned dozens of young Kurdish men who had recently arrived from Hasaka, all former Asayish members, and ordered them to report to security branches. Residents viewed the summons and ID checks as harassment despite official promises of safe and dignified return. No arrests were reported in that SOHR item, but the incident deepened fear and mistrust among returnees.
Internal security in Rojava also remained tense. On April 19, Asayish arrested an Arab tribal leader in Qamishli after he was filmed firing at the flag of TEV-DEM, a Kurdish-led political umbrella. The Asayish said the arrest was conducted in close coordination with Damascus-linked security authorities and framed the act as an attempt to destabilize the region and create discord among local communities.
In Aleppo’s Kurdish neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh, April reporting showed a post-combat crisis rather than a return to normal life. Rojava Information Center reported that after the January takeover by Syrian Transitional Government forces, residents faced checkpoints, inspections, identity checks, individual arrests, damaged housing and infrastructure, irregular services, rising prices, unemployment, and uncertainty over detainees. RIC reported that around 148,000 people had fled during the January assault, with returns limited by damaged homes, security fears, and economic instability.
Kurdistan Region of Turkey (Bakur)
April 2026 in Bakur was shaped by a tense political contradiction: the peace process remained publicly alive, but Kurdish political actors repeatedly warned that it lacked the legal guarantees needed to become durable. The Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) statements throughout the month placed the Kurdish issue at the center of Turkey’s wider democracy debate, arguing that peace and democratic reform could not be separated. In its April 13 party council statement, DEM said Turkey’s future was “in peace, not war” and “in democracy, not repression,” while calling for legal reforms, an end to trustee appointments, the return of elected mayors, release of political prisoners, and conditions allowing Abdullah Öcalan to work freely and effectively.
The main peace-process question in April was whether Ankara would move from political messaging to lawmaking. On April 20, DEM Group Deputy Chair Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit said legal steps had been expected after Ramadan and Eid, but no concrete development had been shared. She argued that delaying legal arrangements would not help the process and that parliament and all parties had to take responsibility. (Four days later, Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş said the legal basis for people laying down arms had to be clarified, that parties should prepare draft laws, and that the parliamentary commission’s report would serve as a road map, though he did not give a calendar.
High-level political signals continued late in the month. During an April 23 parliamentary reception, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, DEM Party co-chair Tuncer Bakırhan, and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahçeli exchanged brief remarks that were presented as support for continuing the process. Erdoğan reportedly told Bakırhan that the process should continue without stopping, while Bakırhan said DEM Party’s proposals were ready and that a special legal framework was now on Turkey’s agenda. Bahçeli also emphasized the importance of inter-party dialogue and repeated that his earlier position regarding Selahattin Demirtaş remained unchanged. Still, pro-Kurdish legal voices described the process as uncertain because expected legal regulations had not yet been enacted.
Öcalan remained central to April’s political debate. On April 26, Öcalan sent a message to a Diyarbakir (Amed) conference on Kurdish national unity, saying democratic unity was a historical necessity and that a comprehensive democratic unity congress was an urgent task. The message, read at the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality’s Ali Emiri Conference Hall, framed the coming period around democratic unity, democratic politics, and negotiation. Earlier in the month, Medyascope reported new remarks attributed to Öcalan warning that sabotaging the peace process would bring serious destruction, showing how his position continued to be treated as politically decisive inside the process.
Kurdish movement figures also continued to frame the peace process around Abdullah Öcalan’s role and the need for legal guarantees. At an April 12 Kurdish National Congress meeting in Brussels, Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) Executive Committee member Zübeyir Aydar said the process initiated by Öcalan had reached an important stage and “needs to be given a legal framework.” He said the process had opened new political and organizational space, even if not at the desired level, and added that Kurdish actors were preparing for different possibilities while keeping the stated goal of building peace. His remarks reinforced the wider Kurdish position in April that dialogue alone was insufficient without legal steps, political recognition, and conditions allowing Öcalan to participate meaningfully in the process.
The DEM party also linked the Kurdish question to the rule of law, municipal democracy, economic hardship, and May Day organizing. On April 7, Bakırhan criticized the use of trustees and removals against opposition-run municipalities, asking why legal action was applied differently depending on party identity. He argued that DEM municipalities faced trustees and CHP municipalities faced removals, while similar accusations involving AKP municipalities did not produce the same result. On April 13, DEM’s party council also tied the peace process to the economic crisis, workers’ rights, and May Day, saying peace and democracy were part of the same struggle.
Arrests and detentions remained part of the April picture. On April 17, Mezopotamya Agency reported that Cahide Töre, a DEM Party district official in Gever/Yüksekova, was called to the police station and detained. On April 16, Bianet reported DEM criticism of the arrest of Sezin Uçar, deputy co-chair of the Socialist Party of the Oppressed, after she was detained at the airport; DEM described the case as another example of law being used as a political tool.
In Urfa, journalist Mehmet Yetim was detained on April 18 and arrested on April 19 pending trial on a “spreading disinformation” accusation, after reporting on a deadly school shooting case.
April also saw a major racist incident connected to Amedspor. On April 19, before and after Amedspor’s away match against Bandırmaspor, racist and physical attacks targeted Amedspor officials and supporters. The report said Amedspor president Nahit Eren, Amed Chamber of Commerce and Industry president Mehmet Kaya, and Kurdish politician Leyla Zana were insulted, and that some Amedspor supporters were injured after the match. A separate April parliamentary follow-up also addressed an earlier armed attack on Kurdish seasonal workers in Niğde, with DEM MP Ömer Öcalan submitting questions to the Justice Ministry about impunity and prevention of similar violence. That incident itself was not from April, but the parliamentary intervention occurred in April.