Kurdistan Region of Iran (Rojhelat)
Developments related to tensions involving Iran influenced the political context in Rojhelat from the beginning of March, including renewed attention to Kurdish political actors in the region.
During this period, reports indicated that President Trump held contact with Mustafa Hijri, leader of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI). The reported contact was seen as part of broader international engagement related to regional developments. Analysts noted that such developments raised ongoing questions regarding the role of Kurdish-majority areas in the context of regional dynamics. At the same time, positions among Kurdish groups in Rojhelat differed. While Hijri and the KDPI were increasingly referenced in reporting, the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) was described as maintaining a neutral stance and not participating in the broader regional conflict.
The political response from opposition groups in Rojhelat was more pronounced than developments on the ground. The leader of the KDPI called on military and security personnel affiliated with the Iranian regime to leave their posts, warning that remaining within the state’s security structure carried increasing risks. The appeal came during the early phase of the conflict, when strikes had already targeted security sites and authorities were tightening control across Kurdish-majority areas.
Throughout March, Iranian regime forces redeployed personnel and equipment from established military bases into civilian locations, including schools, dormitories, mosques, sports halls, and parts of medical facilities. In Mahabad, a sports hall near several schools was reportedly used for military purposes. In Sardasht, troops and equipment were positioned in schools, around university areas, and in a mosque and school in Bivaran village, with additional movement across the city in civilian vehicles. In Senna, reports indicated that upper floors of Kowsar Hospital were cleared for military use while patients remained on lower levels. In Baneh, hospital facilities and other public buildings were also affected as part of wider security measures.
The military presence was visible across roads, neighborhoods, and village entrances. Around Kamyaran, checkpoints were established on main access routes, with reports of security forces searching civilians’ phones. In the Shaho area, forces moved out of fixed positions and into village mosques, drawing objections from residents concerned that such sites could become targets once used for military purposes.
Similar incidents were reported elsewhere. In Marivan, residents protested the use of a neighborhood sports complex, while in Mazhgeh village near Sardasht, locals opposed plans to station forces in a mosque. In Gogje, also near Marivan, villagers confronted incoming troops after a nearby base was struck and forced them to withdraw from a mosque, school, and surrounding areas. By mid-March, authorities had issued warnings in border districts including Paveh, Marivan, Baneh, and Sardasht, cautioning residents against approaching frontier zones, with reports indicating that violators could be shot without warning. Overall, the region saw increased checkpoints, military movement, and the placement of security forces in close proximity to civilian areas.
Strikes across Rojhelat in March largely targeted security and military sites, but their impact extended into civilian areas as Iranian regime forces had already embedded such positions within populated settings. In Mahabad, a site near the prison was hit, followed by unrest inside the facility and tighter security measures. In Senna, strikes targeted intelligence and IRGC-linked locations. In Urmia, a police station was among the most prominent targets, with damage affecting nearby urban areas.
Elsewhere, attacks were reported in and around Marivan, Naqadeh, Kamyaran, and Salas-e Babajani. By that stage, the regime had shifted personnel and equipment into towns and public spaces, including clinics, schools, and mosques.
Based on Hengaw reports published in March 2026, arrests in Iranian Kurdistan were concentrated across the region, with Mahabad appearing most often.
Shwaneh Alizadeh, 37, was arrested on March 22 after forces raided his family home and used violence during the operation. On March 21, arrests of Hoyar Zahabi, 21, and Jalal Alavi, with Zahabi detained during a raid on his grandmother’s home and Alavi arrested in the village of Kuseh-Kahriz. On March 20, Vahab Hosseinzadeh was arrested during a search operation. Another civilian, Anwar Moloudi, a real estate agent from Mahabad, was detained on March 8 and taken to an unknown location. In another March 20 case, Awat Sargoli from Kuseh Kahriz was arrested in Mahabad during a raid on his home.
Naqadeh was also repeatedly mentioned. Kaveh Abdollahzadeh, 39, from Khalifan village, was stopped on the Mahabad–Naqadeh road on March 20 and transferred to Naqadeh Central Prison. In a separate case, brothers Mansour Abdollahzadeh, 41, and Manouchehr Abdollahzadeh, 27, were arrested on March 14 when forces raided their home in Khalifan village, breaking doors and windows and confiscating phones and laptops. Manouchehr was released after two days, but Hengaw said Mansour remained in custody with no clear information on his condition or legal status.
In Saqqez, Sobhan Azizi and Omid Khorshidi were arrested on March 14 during raids on their homes. It also reported the violent arrest of Sheikh Zahed Shahabi, a Kurdish religious figure and activist, saying his family home was later searched in what sources described as an aggressive and destructive raid.
Kermanshah was another focus, including on March 17 when the authorities arrested a Kurdish writer and cultural activist Moslem Zarei in front of his workplace, followed by a raid on his home and the confiscation of personal items and digital devices. It also reported the March 18 arrest of Manouchehr Aghabeigi, a board member of the Kermanshah Teachers’ Trade Association, and noted concerns about his health because of cardiovascular disease.
Prisons in Rojhelat became another front in March. After a nearby Basij site was bombed in Mahabad, prisoners protested their continued detention under wartime conditions, and the regime answered with tear gas and a security crackdown inside the prison. Within days, Kurdish political prisoners were transferred from Mahabad to Miandoab, followed by larger prisoner movements under heavy guard. By mid-March, prison conditions had worsened across Orumiyeh, Mahabad, Miandoab, Saqqez, Senna, Kermanshah and Ilam: visits were blocked, medical access narrowed, food shortages worsened, and special forces were deployed inside or around prison compounds.
In Urmia, NOPO special forces were brought into the prison after ward evacuations linked to nearby strikes, and prisoners’ families feared inmates were being turned into human shields by proximity to a growing military presence. At the same time, families of detainees held by intelligence agencies were left with no reliable information after bombed intelligence centers damaged or destroyed detention sites.
Since last week and continuing toward the end of the month, the internet shutdown entered its twentieth consecutive day, cutting communications across the country and severely limiting the ability of families, journalists, and human rights monitors to track developments in Kurdish cities. The blackout was not treated as a byproduct of the conflict, but as part of the Iranian regime’s approach.
In Baneh, reports described military deployments in public spaces, the clearing of hospital areas for security use, prisoner transfers, and selective releases taking place amid the lack of information. Elsewhere, families searching for detainees received little to no answers and were directed between offices, while strikes on detention sites and intelligence facilities added to the uncertainty.
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Bashur)
March 2026 turned Iraqi Kurdistan into one of the decisive arenas of the wider war around the Iranian regime. Bashur was not only forced to absorb a rolling drone-and-missile campaign, it was also pushed to the center of Iraq’s political calculations and economic survival. While Erbil and Sulaimanyah were taking hits, Kurdish leaders were being drawn into direct contact with Washington, Kurdish positions and coalition-linked sites were coming under repeated attack, and the region’s pipeline network suddenly became critical again as Iraq searched for a route to Ceyhan after the southern export system was badly disrupted.
In early March, Axios reported that President Donald Trump held separate phone calls with Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) leader Bafel Talabani, underscoring the Kurdistan Region’s strategic relevance in the conflict. Talabani later said the call focused on clarifying Washington’s objectives and discussing support for a stronger U.S.-Iraq partnership. Barzani’s office did not publicly confirm the conversation, though it was widely reported in Kurdish media.
Within the Kurdistan Region, authorities sought to maintain a cautious position. During a high-level security meeting on March 10, President Nechirvan Barzani said the region would not be drawn into regional conflicts or serve as a source of threat to neighboring states, while officials also emphasized that the federal government in Baghdad was responsible for preventing armed groups from carrying out attacks on the region.
Early incidents set the tone for the month. Harir air base was struck twice on March 1. About a week later, an attack near Erbil International Airport killed Welat Tahir, an airport security employee, and injured three others after debris from an intercepted drone fell near personnel. The same wave of attacks also affected targets in Sulaimani, including areas near Unit 70 Command, the vicinity of the UN office, and a Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan site south of the city, where one fighter was killed and another wounded. Militia claims of targeting U.S. interests were frequently associated with incidents that occurred in Kurdish-populated areas and affected local personnel and infrastructure.
By mid-March, the scale of the campaign had become intense. An independent monitoring tally published on March 18 recorded 307 attacks and 59 casualties in the Kurdistan Region since February 28, including 8 killed and 51 injured. In the preceding week alone, it documented 111 attacks, comprising 76 suicide drone strikes, 24 missile attacks, 10 artillery strikes, and one shooting incident. Of those, 39 targeted sites linked to the United States—bringing that total to 97—while 43 struck Iranian Kurdish opposition camps and party headquarters, raising that category to 86. A further 124 attacks hit other locations, including Kurdish security positions, civilian homes, public areas, oil fields, and diplomatic facilities.
Individual incidents reinforced the pattern. A drone strike on a joint French-Peshmerga base near Erbil killed a French soldier and wounded six others. The UAE consulate in Erbil was struck twice within a week, with the second attack injuring two guards and damaging the building. On March 18, drone attacks on two Peshmerga Ministry positions in Erbil and Sulaimani wounded three fighters. Additional reports from the same day indicated that more than ten drones were launched toward Erbil province and more than five toward Sulaimani within roughly 24 hours. The sustained frequency of attacks affected a wide range of sites, including bases, airfields, diplomatic compounds, camps, and infrastructure.
On March 24, the Iranian regime carried out two separate strikes early Tuesday, firing six ballistic missiles at Peshmerga positions in Soran, killing six fighters and wounding 30 others, the Peshmerga Ministry said. The ministry said it “condemns in the strongest terms this attack and all other terrorist attacks carried out against the Kurdistan Region,” stressing that “we have every right to respond to any aggression against our people and our land.” It added that it “never expected” the Region’s peaceful stance to be met “in such a treacherous and inhumane manner,” while calling on Baghdad, the international community, and allies not to remain silent and to “set a limit to this brazen aggression.”
The economic sector was also significantly affected. On March 5, operations at Khor Mor were suspended, with Kurdish officials citing security concerns linked to drone threats launched from within Iraq by non-state actors. The impact was immediate: authorities said electricity supply would drop by 2,500 to 3,000 megawatts, reducing availability in many areas from continuous service to roughly five to eight hours per day. By March 15, the Ministry of Natural Resources said repeated attacks by Iranian-backed militias and other armed groups on oil, gas, and energy infrastructure had effectively halted production. The ministry also accused Baghdad of adding commercial pressure through customs measures under the ASYCUDA system and restrictions on dollar transactions, which disrupted trade.
On March 17, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) reached an agreement with Baghdad to export crude from the Kirkuk fields alongside Kurdish oil through the Kurdistan egion–Ceyhan pipeline. Under the arrangement, revenues would be transferred to the federal treasury, and a joint technical committee was established to oversee implementation. Exports resumed the following day through the Kurdish network toward Fishkhabour and onward to Ceyhan, with initial flows reported at around 170,000 barrels per day and plans to increase to 250,000 bpd.
Separately, a senior Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) official said the escalation in military activity had delayed negotiations on forming the next KRG cabinet, extending the post-election deadlock.
Kurdistan Region of Syria (Rojava)
March in Rojava was not defined by one single battlefield shock. Kurdish rights remained symbolic while it moved further into Syria’s formal political language only. At the same time, Kurdish civilians still paid the price of being visibly Kurdish. The month brought a real integration step in Damascus, a loose return process for displaced Afrin families, a widening prisoner exchange, and the first openly official Newroz celebrated across Syria. But the same month also ended with attacks on Kurdish civilians and symbols in Afrin and Aleppo, proving that legal recognition and security on the ground are still far apart.
The only political development came with the appointment of Sipan Hamo, a senior Kurdish military figure in Syria, as deputy defense minister for the eastern territories. The move placed a Kurdish commander within the state structure but left broader questions unresolved, including the extent to which Kurdish military and administrative institutions will be integrated, diluted, or brought under centralized control. It also remained unclear whether Kurdish areas would be treated as partners or simply reintegrated into state authority. The appointment signaled limited progress from negotiation to formal governance, without resolving the underlying disputes.
The detainee file also stayed at the center of Kurdish-Damascus dealings throughout the month. A first exchange was set in motion with 100 detainees on each side, and a later third phase raised the total March exchange to 600 prisoners, 300 from Damascus and 300 from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) side. KurdishFamilies protested because many Kurdish fighters were still not included, and Mazloum Abdi used a visit to Kobane to acknowledge that comrades remained in captivity and that the prisoner issue wasn’t fully resolved.
Afrin carried that same tension in an even sharper form. The month opened space for the first organized return convoy of around 400 displaced families, a symbolic development after years of exile. But the return issue immediately ran into the reality that many Kurdish homes remain occupied by Arab families since the Turkish invasion in 2018. Property seizure, demographic change, fear, and the basic question of whether a Kurdish family can go home remain unanswered. Kurdish officials continued to frame the dignified return of Afrin’s displaced as a top priority in their contacts with Damascus, but without success yet.
On March 20, Syria prepared for the first official national Newroz in its modern history, and in Afrin local coordination moved ahead for celebrations under a formal legal framework. Kurds who had been driven out of Afrin began returning to celebrate openly, many for the first time since their exile. Politically, this mattered because it showed what Kurdish recognition looks like when it takes the form of public space, public language, and public memory rather than remaining only words in a decree.
After the Newroz celebrations, Kurdish civilians were attacked in Afrin and Aleppo. Vehicles were vandalized. Kurdish men and women were beaten. Kurdish symbols were insulted. In separate, video-documented incidents, the Kurdistan flag was burned, thrown to the ground, and used for humiliation, while Kurdish women in traditional clothing were assaulted and Kurdish youth were beaten for raising the flag. Authorities in Afrin eventually imposed a curfew. In Hasakah and Qamishlo, displaced residents from Afrin joined local communities in the streets to condemn the attacks and insist that Kurds are an integral part of Syria, while some lowered the Syrian flag from a security building.
The constitutional struggle also advanced in March, though more through pressure than concession. In Qamishlo, a major women’s conference called for the gains of the women’s revolution and the political model developed in North and East Syria to be enshrined in the country’s future constitution. Its recommendations emphasized women’s direct participation in the drafting process and demanded legal guarantees strong enough to prevent a return to authoritarian centralization. At the same time, Kurdish and Syrian political voices continued to warn that the Kurdish–Damascus agreement still faced significant obstacles, including disagreements over the structure of the state and the role of external actors.
On the anti-ISIS front, March appeared quieter in public than earlier phases of the war, but the issue never disappeared. In his Newroz message, Mazloum Abdi linked political stability, the detainee file, and ongoing cooperation with international partners into a single framework—an unmistakable signal that the Syrian Democratic Forces still view themselves as a central force preventing an ISIS resurgence.
While some administrative files moved forward during the month, the constitutional track left the most consequential Kurdish questions unresolved: recognition, decentralization, education, language rights, local governance, and safeguards against rollback.
Kurdistan Region of Turkey (Bakur)
March 2026 in Bakur was largely defined by ongoing tensions over the future of the Kurdish peace process, particularly whether political rhetoric would translate into concrete legal reforms.
Abdullah Öcalan remained a central figure throughout the month, as discussions surrounding the peace process continued. The process itself remained active, with the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) advocating for formal legal guarantees to support negotiations.
Public demonstrations during Newroz drew large crowds in cities including Diyarbakır (Amed) and Istanbul, where participants expressed support for peace efforts and Kurdish political rights.
At the same time, state actions highlighted ongoing tensions. Reports of police interventions, detentions, the appointment of government trustees to municipalities, and the continued imprisonment of Kurdish political figures underscored criticism that authorities are maintaining existing security measures despite renewed dialogue.
The month began with Kurdish political representatives calling for the peace process to move from general statements toward concrete legal and institutional measures. On March 3, a delegation from the DEM Party met imprisoned politicians Selahattin Demirtaş and Selçuk Mızraklı. According to statements released after the meeting, Demirtaş expressed willingness to contribute to the process if issues related to his case were addressed and reiterated calls for the implementation of European court rulings.
The delegation also visited Figen Yüksekdağ on the same day. The meetings highlighted the continued detention of Kurdish political figures as part of the broader context of the process.
On March 12, DEM Party spokesperson Ayşegül Doğan addressed public discussions regarding Abdullah Öcalan, stating that the issue concerns legal conditions rather than administrative adjustments.
Throughout this period, statements from Kurdish political representatives focused on legal frameworks, judicial processes, and institutional arrangements related to the peace process.
Public attention to these issues increased during Newroz celebrations in Diyarbakır (Amed) on March 21. Large crowds gathered under the slogan “Newroz of Freedom and Democracy,” with the DEM Party estimating attendance at approximately one million.
The event included political speeches and messages from Kurdish figures. A message attributed to Abdullah Öcalan was read aloud, and statements from Kurdish representatives in the region were shared.
During the gathering, DEM Party co-chair Tuncer Bakırhan said that current conditions presented an opportunity for renewed progress in the peace process. He called for legal measures related to the process, including the release of political prisoners, changes to the system of state-appointed trustees, and arrangements concerning individuals in exile. He also referred to the legal status and conditions of Öcalan. Bakırhan additionally stated that conditions should allow Öcalan to engage more directly with the public.
Meanwhile, Öcalan’s message described 2026 as a potential “year of freedom” for the peoples of the Middle East.The message was read during Newroz celebrations in Amed, where participants responded with applause and chants. Visual materials from the event showed Öcalan’s portrait and Newroz fires among the crowd.
Similar themes were reflected in Istanbul, where large crowds gathered in the Yenikapı area on March 22 as part of Newroz events.
During the gathering, Tülay Hatimoğulları, co-chair of the DEM Party, linked messages expressed in Amed with broader political demands in Istanbul. She called for legal steps related to the peace process, including changes to the system of state-appointed trustees, the reinstatement of elected mayors, and the release of imprisoned politicians such as Demirtaş and Yüksekdağ. She also referred to the conditions of Öcalan.
In separate Newroz-related remarks in Van, DEM Party co-chair Tuncer Bakırhan outlined additional points, including discussions on Öcalan’s legal status, constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity, language rights, and local governance.
Similar messages were reported at Newroz gatherings across multiple locations in Bakur. In Şırnak, speakers referred to support for a negotiated resolution while linking the issue to discussions surrounding Abdullah Öcalan, Kurdish political status, and language rights. In Varto, local representatives called for legal and constitutional measures and raised the issue of formal recognition of Kurdish identity.
However, crackdowns continued on the Kurdish population by the Turkish government. In Nusaybin, a Newroz-related youth march on March 14 was met with police intervention, including the use of water cannons and detentions. In Kocaeli, police intervened in a Newroz event on March 21, detaining eight individuals and reporting injuries, including that of a local co-chair of the DEM Party.
In Istanbul, authorities detained 26 people following the Yenikapı gathering, including two minors. According to legal representatives, the detentions were linked to slogans and clothing associated with the event. One individual from Rojava was reported to remain in custody pending deportation procedures.
That contradiction also shaped DEM’s official stance throughout the month. On March 18, Hatimoğulları said a peace law, the end of trustees, prison-related changes, and broader democratization were no longer abstract wishes but concrete demands. She said Kurdish actors had already taken steps toward ending armed conflict, while the government had not moved at the same pace.