Kurdistan Region of Iran (Rojhelat)
June 2026 brought another sustained campaign of political and security pressure across the Kurdistan Region of Iran, with Kurdish human-rights monitors documenting warrantless arrests, incommunicado detention, forced confessions, prison abuse, executions, restrictions on Kurdish cultural activity, and continued shootings of kolbars along the border.
A case-by-case review of June reporting by several human rights organizations identified at least 26 named Kurdish citizens who were arrested or detained between June 1 and June 28. The figure rises to 27 when one additional probable June arrest without a precisely published date is included. At least 18 of the confirmed detainees were initially held at undisclosed locations or without reliable information being provided to their families about their whereabouts.
Kurdish Alliance Expands Its International Political Campaign
The Alliance of Political Parties of Iranian Kurdistan continued efforts to establish a more coordinated Kurdish position on Iran’s political future. The alliance includes the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Komala Party of Kurdistan, Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan, Kurdistan Free Life Party, and Kurdistan Freedom Party.
On June 22, representatives participated in a meeting at the United Kingdom Parliament organized with the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Iranian Kurdistan. The delegation presented common positions on Kurdish national rights, political transition in Iran, and the need for a democratic and decentralized system that recognizes the political status of Kurdistan.
Kurdish representatives also participated in a European Parliament discussion concerning the future of Kurdistan and the role of women in political change. The alliance’s June activity showed that Kurdish parties were attempting to move beyond separate party diplomacy and present European institutions with a more unified position on the Iranian regime, Kurdish rights, and any future political transition.
Recently, in an interview on the Persian-language Voice of America program, Mustafa Hijri, the leader of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) argued that Iran is entering a period of profound political uncertainty and that the Islamic Republic has lost much of its domestic legitimacy. He said the Kurdish opposition is seeking a democratic, federal future for Iran rather than separation, emphasizing that Kurdish parties are coordinating their political efforts with other opposition groups while remaining prepared to defend Kurdish areas if instability increases. Hijri rejected reports that Tehran had approached the KDPI for negotiations, stating that no such contact had occurred.
At Least 26 Kurdish Citizens Arrested or Detained
The June arrests extended across Kurdistan, West Azerbaijan, Ilam, and Kermanshah provinces and affected activists, teachers, children, cultural figures, former political prisoners, justice-seeking families, and citizens who had criticized government officials.
In Kamyaran, intelligence agents raided the Rahmani family home without a warrant and arrested Kajal Rahmani and her brother Danyal Rahmani. Their relative Isa Feyzi was detained after visiting the Intelligence Ministry office to ask about them. Kajal Rahmani was later transferred to Senna Women’s Prison, where she began a hunger strike that lasted 18 days. She reportedly suffered serious weight loss, low blood pressure, hand tremors, reduced mobility, and a dangerously low heart rate before ending the strike following a family visit. Her case illustrated the use of detention and isolation against entire justice-seeking families.
Children were also among those detained. Heresh Sharifian, a 17-year-old from Palangan village near Kamyaran, was arrested after reporting to the Intelligence Ministry with his father following a raid on the family home. He was denied access to a lawyer and family visits, while authorities refused to disclose where he was being held. In Ilam Province, Arvin Hosseini, a 16-year-old from Sarableh, was arrested without a judicial warrant and transferred to an unknown location, with no charges publicly announced.
Violence during arrests was another recurring feature. Pouria Valizadeh, a 22-year-old resident of Bijar, was confronted by armed forces in the street, severely beaten, and forced into a vehicle without a warrant. His detention was reportedly connected to accusations that he had participated in the January 2026 protests. Authorities did not disclose his location or physical condition after the arrest.
In Bukan, retired teacher and labor activist Yousef Amini was arrested during a late-night raid on his home. Intelligence agents entered without presenting a warrant and transferred him to an undisclosed location. His family received no clear information about his legal status or the charges against him.
In Mahabad, Saman Zendepil, a 40-year-old graduate in philosophy and sociology, was arrested without a warrant and taken to an unknown location. More than a week later, he remained without access to a lawyer, family visits, or telephone contact. His family’s attempts to obtain information about his condition did not produce a clear response.
Forced Confessions and Security Charges
Some June cases went beyond detention and included public accusations and alleged forced confessions before trial. Mehdi Karimi, a young Kurdish man from Malekshahi in Ilam Province, was violently arrested on June 18. State media later broadcast statements attributed to him while he remained without access to a lawyer or an independent court hearing.
Human-rights monitors described the statements as coerced and raised concerns that Karimi had been tortured during interrogation. Authorities also claimed that 17 people had been arrested in the wider case, although only Karimi was independently identified. The remaining unnamed detainees were not included in the confirmed total of 26.
In Dehloran, Mostafa Mohammadi was arrested after publicly raising allegations of corruption and land seizure involving local officials. Mojtaba Yavar was later detained inside a courthouse when he attempted to follow the case and support Mohammadi’s family. Mohammadi reportedly faced accusations of connections to hostile governments, while Yavar was accused over critical social-media posts. Both were transferred to Ilam Central Prison.
Prison Sentences and Pressure on Kurdish Culture
The crackdown also extended to Kurdish cultural and language activity. Mohammad Rezaei, a member of the Nozhin Socio-Cultural Association, was summoned and transferred to Senna Central Prison to serve a one-year sentence for “propaganda against the state.” His activities included Kurdish-language education and cultural work.
Kurdish artist and singer Mehdi Pakmehr was sentenced to six years in prison and flogging. Pakmehr had been wounded during the December 2025 and January 2026 protests and had previously faced pressure over his music, including the Kurdish song “Biji Kurdistan.” His prosecution showed how Kurdish cultural expression and protest participation continued to be treated as security offenses.
In Bukan, local security and municipal institutions reportedly began a campaign to remove Kurdish names from shops and public signs. Names such as Kurdistan, Nishtiman, Peshwa, Qandil, and Rasan were reportedly identified for replacement, reflecting continued pressure on the public expression of Kurdish language and identity.
Executions and Prisoners Facing Death Sentences
Executions continued throughout June. Zakariya Khezernezhad, a Kurdish prisoner from Maku, was executed on June 10. Aram Zarei was executed in Senna on June 15, followed by 23-year-old Mohammad Ahmadi on June 16. Other Kurdish prisoners, including Karim Karami from Kermanshah, were also executed during the month.
Two politically significant cases involved Ashkan Maleki and Mehrdad Mohammadinia, Kurdish prisoners from Qorveh who were secretly executed at the beginning of June. Both had been arrested during the December 2025 and January 2026 protests. Their cases included allegations of torture, forced confessions, accelerated court proceedings, and denial of effective access to independent lawyers.
Concerns also increased for Ali Fattah and Mohammad Naghizadeh, two prisoners sentenced to death in connection with the winter protests. Their transfer to Ghezel Hesar Prison was interpreted as preparation for implementation of their sentences.
Kolbars Killed and Wounded by Border Forces
Kolbars remained exposed to lethal force along the borders of Baneh and Marivan. On June 11, Matlab Kheyberi, a married father of two from Baneh, was shot in the head and killed by Iranian forces near the Choman border. Reports stated that he was not carrying contraband when he was shot.
On the same day, Naseh Khodaei, a young married kolbar with one child, was severely wounded in the leg when forces opened fire without warning near the Surkeo border.
Later in the month, Mohammad Naderi and Ako Salehi were wounded in separate shootings near Marivan and Baneh. Naderi was shot in the leg, while Salehi, a father of two, suffered a gunshot wound to his hand.
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Bashur)
June 2026 brought a mixed political and economic picture across the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Erbil and Baghdad reported progress on oil exports, customs administration, financial auditing, and security coordination, but the salary dispute remained unresolved and vulnerable to renewed political pressure. Inside the Region, efforts to form the tenth Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) cabinet made little visible progress as the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the New Generation Movement continued to disagree over the meaning of the 2024 election result, the distribution of senior posts, and the structure of future negotiations. Iranian attacks against Iranian Kurdish opposition groups also continued, despite ceasefire arrangements intended to reduce regional hostilities.
Iranian Attacks Against Kurdish Opposition Groups Continue
Iranian Kurdish opposition groups based in the Kurdistan Region continued to face cross-border attacks during June. On June 7, the Kurdistan Freedom Party said one of its bases in Erbil province was targeted by a drone. Two other drones were intercepted over the Akre area of Duhok province without casualties. Earlier that week, the Komala Toilers of Kurdistan reported that two Iranian missiles had struck its headquarters northeast of Erbil.
On June 16, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan reported another drone attack on its Zewiya Sipi camp near Koya. The party described the site as a residential camp housing members and their families. It said its camps, medical facilities, and educational centers had been targeted with more than 138 missiles and drones since the regional war began in late February.
The Kurdish parties maintain that Iran has repeatedly struck residential areas and camps containing families. The attacks have continued despite security arrangements among Iran, Baghdad, and the KRG concerning the relocation and disarmament of opposition groups.
The month ended with a separate and more uncertain security case. On June 28, Kurdistan Freedom Party member Soran Mohammadzadeh was found dead in an Erbil hotel. Party officials alleged that he had been assassinated by an Iranian-linked two-person team, pointing to reported gunshot and stab wounds. The allegation had not been independently established, and an investigation was continuing.
Salary Dispute Returns to the Center of Erbil–Baghdad Relations
Public-sector salaries remained the most immediate issue affecting families across the Kurdistan Region. The dispute intensified on June 8 when Iraqi parliament First Deputy Speaker Adnan Faihan al-Dulaimi called for federal transfers to Erbil to be suspended until outstanding non-oil revenue obligations were settled.
Dulaimi argued that the KRG had not transferred the full amount required under previous agreements. Kurdish representatives rejected the proposal to stop salary funding. Iraqi parliament Second Deputy Speaker Farhad Atrushi described the salaries of Kurdistan Region employees as a “red line” that could not be used as a bargaining tool. He argued that a Federal Supreme Court ruling had separated employee salaries from political and financial disputes between the two governments and said the KRG had consistently transferred the previously agreed 120 billion dinars.
The KRG Finance Ministry issued a separate response, saying the Region had fulfilled its legal obligations and transferred Baghdad’s share of non-oil revenue from January through May. It acknowledged that revenue declined during March and April but attributed the reduction to regional instability, disrupted trade, and delays in implementing the federal customs system.
The two sides therefore continued to disagree not only over how much money had been transferred, but also over how the Region’s actual revenue should be calculated during periods of economic disruption.
A Permanent Mechanism Proposed for Erbil–Baghdad Disputes
Despite the public salary dispute, June also brought an attempt to place Erbil–Baghdad negotiations on a more permanent institutional foundation. During a June 10 cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Masrour Barzani proposed creating a high-level permanent coordination committee composed of ministers and senior officials from both governments.
Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani supported the proposal, describing it as a way to institutionalize dispute resolution rather than allowing every disagreement to become a political crisis. The KRG Council of Ministers approved the plan and submitted it to the federal government for consideration.
KRG officials subsequently said negotiations were approaching agreement on three major files: oil exports, financial auditing, and non-oil revenues. The stated objective was to establish predictable mechanisms for calculating revenue and paying salaries, reducing the repeated public disputes that have affected relations between Baghdad and Erbil for years.
Progress remained preliminary, however. Announcing that the issues were close to resolution did not itself produce a permanent salary agreement, and implementation continued to depend on federal approval, joint auditing, and compliance by both governments.
Customs Agreement and Oil-Sector Security
One of the clearest technical developments came on June 18, when officials from Erbil and Baghdad signed a 16-point agreement on the ASYCUDA customs system. The system is designed to digitize and standardize customs procedures across Iraq’s border crossings.
The agreement included unified customs tariffs, authority for the Kurdistan Region to register companies in the system, the addition of the Kurdish language, and the formation of a joint committee to address border crossings that Baghdad has not formally recognized. It would also give businesses in the Kurdistan Region access to foreign currency at the Central Bank of Iraq’s official exchange rate after completing the required customs procedures.
Kurdish officials had previously raised concerns that implementing the measure could diminish the Kurdistan Region’s administrative control over its border crossings. The June agreement attempted to address both concerns by integrating the Region into the federal system while preserving a role for Kurdish institutions.
Oil discussions also advanced. KRG Interior Minister Reber Ahmed said Erbil and Baghdad had reached an understanding on security guarantees for oil fields, one of the conditions demanded by international energy companies before expanding production and resuming exports.
The Iraqi prime minister established a federal security, military, and intelligence delegation that visited the Kurdistan Region and inspected oil facilities. Energy companies were seeking guarantees for both the physical security of their operations and the protection of their contractual financial rights. While the agreement represented progress, the companies were still waiting for a detailed federal protection plan. Since April 2022, Iranian-backed militias have repeatedly targeted oil facilities in the Kurdistan Region.
PUK and New Generation Present a Joint Negotiating Position
The formation of the next KRG cabinet remained stalled throughout June. The KDP holds 39 seats in the 100-seat Kurdistan parliament, the PUK holds 23, and New Generation holds 15. The PUK and New Generation together control 38 seats, leaving their combined strength one seat behind the KDP but giving neither side the 51 seats required for a parliamentary majority.
At the beginning of June, PUK spokesperson Karwan Gaznay said the PUK and New Generation would enter government-formation negotiations as “one package”. He said the two parties had developed a similar political vision and intended to formalize their agreement.
The PUK’s argument is that the combined 38-seat bloc represents a legitimate parliamentary balance that should be reflected in negotiations over the cabinet, parliament leadership, and senior government positions. PUK leaders have called for what they describe as genuine partnership, institutional balance, governance reform, and equal implementation of government decisions across the Region.
The PUK also said its planned agreement with New Generation was part of an effort to produce political and economic change. Later in June, Gaznay said the parties expected to sign their formal agreement in early July.
The KDP has reportedly declined to recognize the PUK and New Generation as a single negotiating package, preferring separate discussions with each party. From the KDP’s perspective, coalition-building after the election should not override the fact that it received the highest number of votes and won the largest number of parliamentary seats.
KDP and PUK Exchange Accusations Over the Delay
The political disagreement became more public during the second half of June. The KDP accused the PUK of delaying the tenth cabinet and blocking parliament’s activation. KDP spokesperson Mahmoud Mohammed said government positions and political entitlements should reflect the election result and the level of public support received by each party.
The KDP maintains that its 39 seats give it the clearest electoral mandate to lead the government. It argues that the PUK’s alliance with New Generation cannot be used to disregard the KDP’s first-place result or impose demands unsupported by the distribution of seats.
The PUK responded that the dispute was not simply about dividing posts. Its representatives accused the KDP of attempting to dominate the next administration and said policies based on exclusion or unilateral control would weaken the Region. The PUK said it wanted the government formed quickly but would not surrender its demands for institutional reform, political balance, and meaningful participation in decision-making.
Disagreement reportedly continued over senior positions and powerful ministries, particularly the Interior Ministry. The PUK has sought greater authority in security and administrative institutions, while the KDP has argued that control of major posts must remain connected to electoral weight.
The KDP renewed its call on June 27 for parties to reactivate the Kurdistan parliament. Although lawmakers were sworn in after the October 2024 election, repeated attempts to hold effective sessions have failed because the required quorum was not reached. Parliament has therefore remained unable to elect its permanent leadership, pass legislation, or provide normal oversight of the caretaker government.
Kurdistan Region of Syria (Rojava)
June 2026 brought progress in integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into Syrian state institutions, with thousands of fighters joining state structures, displaced families returning to Afrin, and citizenship applications from stateless Kurds under review. However, major issues remained unresolved, including the future of the YPJ, SDF command arrangements, Kurdish political rights, detainees, and local governance. SDF leaders also sought international support in Europe, while the United States continued operations against ISIS and Kurdish communities in Afrin reported ongoing property seizures, extortion, and limited accountability.
Afrin Families Return, but Abuses and Property Disputes Continue
June brought a major development for displaced Kurds from Afrin. On June 10, the eighth and final organized convoy left Hasakah, completing the return process for approximately 8,720 displaced families. The final convoy reportedly included around 1,700 families.
The return was one of the clearest positive outcomes connected to the January agreement. Many Afrin families had been displaced since Turkey and Turkish-backed armed groups captured the area in 2018, while others experienced repeated displacement during later fighting.
However, returning home did not mean that all property and security problems had been resolved. A June report by the Afrin Human Rights Organization documented continuing property seizures, illegal levies, theft, armed disputes, and agricultural land confiscation.
The organization accused members of Turkish-backed factions that were later incorporated into the Syrian Defense Ministry of continuing to occupy Kurdish-owned homes and exploit privately owned land. It also said local security authorities failed to investigate complaints or recover stolen property in several cases.
Afrin therefore reflected both sides of the June integration process. Thousands of Kurdish families were able to return, but the Syrian government had not yet established a reliable property-restitution process, effective accountability, or full protection from armed groups operating under official state structures.
Military and Security Integration
A new development was the continued incorporation of SDF and Internal Security Forces, known as the Asayish, into Syrian government structures. A senior SDF official told Rudaw that approximately 5,000 fighters had joined newly formed military brigades in Rojava, while another 4,000 had entered internal security institutions under the Syrian Interior Ministry.
Another 1,000 fighters reportedly returned to Afrin, with plans for around 2,000 additional fighters to return and join a military formation there. However, the same official said approximately 8,000 SDF fighters had not yet been integrated, largely because the number of available positions in the new brigades was smaller than the total number of SDF members.
The unresolved fighters remained one of the most important obstacles facing the agreement. Discussions continued over where they would serve, how their ranks would be recognized, who would command the new formations, and whether the integrated units would retain a distinct regional character or be dispersed through the Syrian military.
Progress was also reported in Kobani. Amin Saleh, a senior Asayish commander, said applications for approximately 1,000 members of the Kobani internal security forces had been submitted to a joint integration committee. That represented around 60 to 70 percent of the city’s estimated 1,500 to 1,600 Asayish members.
Saleh said the remaining applications were being processed, but he identified the failure to integrate Kobani’s courts into Syria’s judicial structure as a continuing problem. Security institutions cannot operate normally without functioning courts, prosecutors, and agreed legal procedures. This showed that administrative integration was moving at different speeds, with security files advancing faster than judicial and political arrangements.
Hasakah Governor Nour Eddin Ahmed said meetings with Damascus had resolved several practical obstacles affecting public institutions and the integration process. He presented the talks positively and said new steps would follow. However, the reopening of the Nusaybin border crossing between Qamishlo and Turkey remained postponed, and major questions concerning local authority and constitutional recognition were still under negotiation.
Detainees and Missing Fighters Continue to Undermine Trust
The detention file remained one of the deepest sources of mistrust between the Kurdish-led administration and Damascus. On June 26, the Syrian interim government released another group of SDF detainees under the prisoner-release provisions of the January agreement. Diyar Hussein Mahmoud and Hassan Nawaf were among those who arrived in Qamishlo and were welcomed by their families.
The releases represented partial implementation of the agreement, but they did not resolve the wider issue. Families continued to demand information about people who disappeared during the January fighting and subsequent SDF withdrawals from areas taken by Damascus-aligned forces.
Hundreds of people demonstrated in Qamishlo over the fate of missing relatives. Kurdish officials and family representatives said nearly 2,000 civilians and fighters remained unaccounted for, although that figure has not been independently confirmed. Many were reportedly SDF members who surrendered or disappeared while withdrawing under ceasefire arrangements.
The families accused armed factions aligned with Damascus of violating withdrawal guarantees. The Syrian government has released several batches of detainees, but it has not provided a complete, publicly verified list accounting for everyone captured, missing, released, transferred, or killed during the fighting. Until that information is produced, the detainee issue will continue to weaken confidence in the integration process.
Mazloum Abdi Takes the Kurdish File to Europe
Mazloum Abdi began his international activity in June with a meeting in Erbil involving Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani and United States envoy Tom Barrack. The meeting addressed SDF–Damascus cooperation, Kurdish rights, regional stability, and counterterrorism coordination.
Barzani stressed the need to protect the rights of Kurds and other Syrian communities, while Barrack reaffirmed American support for dialogue and stability. The meeting again showed the Kurdistan Region’s role as a political channel between Rojava, Damascus, and international mediators.
Abdi then traveled to Italy before continuing to France with Ilham Ahmed, co-chair of the Autonomous Administration’s Department of Foreign Relations. According to a Syrian Democratic Council official, the purpose of the European diplomatic tour was to ask European governments to press Damascus to implement the January 29 agreement and include Kurdish political rights in the emerging settlement.
In Paris, Abdi and Ahmed met French foreign affairs officials to discuss the Syrian political process, security developments, and Europe’s role in supporting implementation.
The visit was important because the disagreement is no longer limited to military integration. Kurdish officials want guarantees covering language rights, political participation, decentralized administration, women’s institutions, local policing, constitutional protections, and representation in state institutions. Damascus has taken some steps, but the Kurdish leadership argues that formal state control cannot substitute for a negotiated political settlement.
YPJ Status Remains Unresolved
The future of the Women’s Protection Units remains one of the most sensitive unresolved issues. YPJ General Commander Rohilat Afrin said the all-women force must be formally recognized within Syria’s military structure, arguing that women’s rights would lack institutional protection if the YPJ were dissolved or reduced to a policing role.
The YPJ played a central role in the war against ISIS and became one of the most visible symbols of Rojava’s political and social system. Kurdish women’s organizations argue that its military status represents more than battlefield organization. They view it as a guarantee protecting women’s participation in political, security, and public institutions.
Damascus has taken a different position. Syrian officials have said the national army does not have a separate female combat component and have proposed that women enter specialized police or internal security formations under the Interior Ministry.
The disagreement therefore concerns both military organization and the future of the women-led institutions created in Rojava. The January agreement provided for several SDF brigades to enter the Syrian military, but it did not clearly define the YPJ’s position. Negotiations continued without a final arrangement guaranteeing either a separate women’s formation or a dedicated YPJ regiment within the new brigades.
Anti-ISIS Cooperation Continues During the Transition
The anti-ISIS mission remained a central security concern even as responsibility shifted among the SDF, Damascus, the United States, and Iraq. Abdi’s June meeting with Barrack and Barzani included discussions about continuing counterterrorism coordination and addressing the threat posed by sleeper cells.
The most prominent publicly confirmed American operation during June was a June 19 airstrike in northwestern Syria that killed senior ISIS leader Ali Husayn al-Ulaywi. United States Central Command (CENTCOM) said the strike was part of continued efforts to disrupt ISIS networks capable of threatening American forces, allies, and interests.
In its June posture statement, CENTCOM also said it had transferred 5,704 ISIS detainees from Syria to Iraqi custody after the security situation around detention facilities became unstable during the January fighting. The United States said the transfer was necessary to reduce the danger of a mass prison escape and a large-scale ISIS reconstitution.
The movement of detainees illustrates how the anti-ISIS mission is changing. The SDF remains an important security actor with years of intelligence and operational experience, but Damascus is seeking national control over prisons, borders, and military forces. The success of the transition will depend on whether integration preserves experienced counterterrorism units and prevents political disputes from creating security gaps that ISIS cells could exploit.
Citizenship Process Advances but Is Not Yet Complete
Damascus also reported progress on the long-standing issue of stateless Kurds. The Interior Ministry announced that it had completed receiving applications and begun reviewing citizenship claims under Decree No. 13.
The measure is intended to address the consequences of the 1962 Hasakah census, which deprived an estimated 200,000 Kurds of Syrian nationality and left many of their descendants without full civil rights. Citizenship would provide access to education, formal employment, property ownership, inheritance, healthcare, and official identity documents.
The review represented an important administrative step, but the process had not yet resulted in completed naturalization for all applicants. Kurdish political actors therefore continued to seek guarantees that the measure would be fully implemented and would not remain limited to applications and administrative review.
Economic Pressure Produces Public Protests
Political negotiations unfolded alongside deteriorating living conditions. Residents in Hasakah protested fuel-price increases and electricity cuts, saying the shortages had affected households, shops, transportation, and access to basic services.
Similar demonstrations took place in Zerkan, where residents demanded the reversal of higher fuel prices and called for measures to reduce service costs. Protests were also reported in Qamishlo over prices, electricity, fuel availability, and declining public services.
These demonstrations showed that Rojava’s population is judging the integration process not only through political agreements and official appointments, but through salaries, electricity, fuel, security, education, and the daily functioning of public institutions.
Kurdistan Region of Turkey (Bakur)
June 2026 marked a pivotal but unresolved stage in Turkey’s Kurdish peace process. Discussions shifted toward the legal framework needed to transform the end of armed conflict into a political settlement. While Ankara announced that legislation was being prepared, Kurdish leaders questioned whether it would address the broader Kurdish issue or simply oversee the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) dissolution. Meanwhile, continued prosecutions, mass arrests, trustee appointments, torture allegations, and restrictions on Kurdish political and cultural rights undermined confidence in the process despite progress in negotiations.
Öcalan Presents a Three-Part Roadmap
The most important peace-process development came through details released in June from the DEM Party İmralı Delegation’s May 24 meeting with Abdullah Öcalan. Delegation member Mithat Sancar said Öcalan had presented a three-part roadmap focused on the nature of the required legislation, the institutionalization of the process, and the definition of the roles and positions of the participating actors.
Öcalan reportedly argued that parliament should adopt a framework law before entering its summer recess and warned that there was no time to lose. He described the proposed law as resembling a “stem cell,” capable of both repairing the damage caused by decades of conflict and opening the way for political and democratic renewal.
The proposal was not limited to regulating disarmament. It called for a transition from armed conflict to democratic politics, legal guarantees for those affected by the process, and institutions capable of preventing negotiations from depending entirely on temporary political decisions. From the Kurdish perspective, the difference is fundamental: ending the PKK’s armed structure cannot by itself resolve the Kurdish question if the political, linguistic, legal, and administrative conditions that produced the conflict remain unchanged.
DEM Party Co-Chair Tülay Hatimoğulları said on June 9 that Öcalan was making an intensive effort to establish the legal foundation of the process. She said the İmralı delegation had discussed a special law with representatives of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and stressed that legislation should be adopted before parliament recessed.
Hatimoğulları argued that the framework must be broad and inclusive rather than designed only as a technical mechanism for dissolving the PKK. She said it should move the Kurdish issue away from a security-centered approach and place it on the grounds of peace, equality, democratic participation, and law.
DEM officials also worked on their own legal proposal and continued consultations with political parties. The party’s position was that the law should address reintegration, political participation, prisoners, legal protections, and the transition from conflict to civilian politics. This contrasted with the narrower language frequently used by government officials, who continued to describe the next stage mainly as the liquidation of the PKK’s remaining organizational structure.
Government Promises Legislation but Doubts Remain
On June 24, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said the government was preparing a legal framework to be submitted to parliament. He said the regulation would accelerate the PKK’s dissolution and would be presented after consultations were completed.
The announcement represented the clearest government commitment of the month, but no final draft had been made public by June 28. Erdoğan also said regional developments, including the war involving Iran and the integration of Syrian Kurdish forces into Syrian state institutions, had slowed progress.
Kurdish political actors welcomed the recognition that legislation was necessary but remained cautious about its content. Their concern was that Ankara could produce a limited law focused on disarmament and individual returns while postponing demands involving Kurdish identity, local democracy, political prisoners, anti-terror legislation, the trustee system, and mother-tongue rights.
DEM Party Expands Öcalan Campaign and International Advocacy
The DEM Party continued to treat Öcalan as the central political interlocutor in the process. On June 5, Co-Chairs Hatimoğulları and Tuncer Bakırhan sent a letter to the Council of Europe concerning the European Court of Human Rights ruling on Öcalan’s “right to hope.”
The letter called for the principle to be implemented in accordance with European human-rights standards and argued that Öcalan’s legal position was directly connected to the success of the peace process. Kurdish parties and rights organizations maintain that Öcalan cannot be expected to direct a historic transition while remaining under exceptional imprisonment conditions and without regular access to political actors, lawyers, and wider communication.
Public pressure increased during the final weekend of June. DEM, the Democratic Regions Party (DBP), the Free Women’s Movement (TJA), and other Kurdish organizations held freedom rallies in Amed, Istanbul, Wan, and Mersin. Speakers called for Öcalan’s conditions to be improved, his legal status to be clarified, and the peace process to receive binding legal guarantees.
DEM spokesperson Ayşegül Doğan argued that the public should not fear Öcalan’s freedom and said improving his conditions was one of the most important requirements for a lasting peace. The rallies showed that Kurdish organizations were attempting to turn the process from an elite political dialogue into a wider public campaign.
Heavy Sentence Against Kurdish Woman Politician
The language of peace continued alongside severe judicial pressure on Kurdish politicians. On June 19, a Diyarbakır (Amed) court sentenced Kurdish politician and women’s-rights defender Ayşe Gökkan to 19 years and six months in prison in a retrial involving terrorism-related charges.
Gökkan, a former Nusaybin mayor and former spokesperson for TJA, delivered her defense in Kurdish. She said the proceedings targeted her identity as a Kurdish woman and her commitment to the “Jin, Jiyan, Azadî” philosophy. Her lawyers argued that the evidence consisted mainly of police reports, that earlier verdicts had repeatedly been overturned, and that defense requests had been ignored.
The sentence reinforced Kurdish criticism that the state was discussing peace while continuing to treat years of legal political and women’s activism as evidence of criminal organization membership.
Torture Allegations and Continuing Impunity
June also brought renewed documentation of alleged torture. A Kurdish university student identified as Diyar Koç was released at his first hearing after being held since January over protests near the Nusaybin–Qamishlo border.
Koç said he had been tortured after detention. Although he had initially been publicly accused of lowering a Turkish flag, his lawyer said no such charge appeared in the indictment and no evidence linking him to the act was presented. He had previously been hospitalized in intensive care because of the risk of a brain hemorrhage.
The DEM Party’s Legal Commission also highlighted the case of two Kurdish men detained near the Rojhelat border in Şemdinli, who reported severe abuse and sexual violence. The party said the officials accused in the case had not been suspended or placed in pretrial detention and argued that continuing impunity encouraged further torture.
Mass Arrests Deepen Concerns Over the Political Climate
Ahead of the July NATO summit in Ankara, security forces detained 209 people in large-scale operations targeting journalists, lawyers, academics, unionists, environmental activists, and other opposition figures. By June 27, courts had placed 181 people in pretrial detention.
These operations were not directed exclusively at Kurds, but DEM strongly condemned them as part of the wider authoritarian environment surrounding the peace process. The party argued that criticism of NATO, opposition activity, journalism, and public protest should not be transformed into terrorism charges.
For Kurdish political actors, such operations raise a basic credibility problem. A durable settlement requires an expansion of democratic politics, while mass arrests and broad terrorism prosecutions continue to narrow the same political space into which former armed actors are expected to integrate.
Kurdish Language Rights Remain Unresolved
A Kurdish-language conference held in Amed on June 27–28 brought language rights into the center of the peace debate. Politicians, lawyers, academics, and cultural figures called for constitutional protection for Kurdish, education in the mother tongue, and the removal of legal barriers restricting Kurdish in public institutions.
Speakers argued that the Kurdish question cannot be resolved while Kurdish remains outside formal education and lacks protected legal status. They also called for municipalities to receive greater authority to provide public services and cultural programs in Kurdish.
The June debate followed a continuing pattern in which Kurdish cultural expression has faced prosecution. Duvar previously documented the 30-month sentence imposed on musician Kasım Taşdoğan for performing three Kurdish songs, illustrating the wider legal environment surrounding demands for linguistic recognition.
Veteran Kurdish politician Ahmet Türk connected language rights to the trustee system. Speaking in Istanbul, he noted that he had been elected mayor of Mardin three times and replaced by a government-appointed trustee each time. He said the absence of recognized identity and language was itself at the center of the Kurdish question.