Kurdistan Region of Iran (Rojhelat)
May 2026 brought a broad security crackdown across the Kurdistan Region of Iran (Rojhelat), with arrests, incommunicado detention, prison pressure, secret executions, cultural restrictions, and militarized street control.
Mass Arrests, Incommunicado Detentions, and Security Raids Across Rojhelat
Arrests were one of the clearest features of the month. In Bukan, 67-year-old Asti Mohammadi was arrested during a night raid on May 11 after Ministry of Intelligence agents entered her family home without a warrant, confiscated personal belongings, and transferred her to a security detention facility in Urmia. She was denied family contact, legal representation, and medication, while her family was left without information on charges or her condition. In the same city, Seyyed Ali Ghoreishi, a 66-year-old Kurdish folk singer known for preserving Kurdish traditional music, was arrested on May 11 after security forces raided his home without a warrant. Days later, he remained incommunicado, without access to a lawyer or even a brief phone call with family. Additionally, another Kurdish man named Amir Yousofi, from the village of Salamat in Bukan County, was arrested on May 9 by Intelligence Department agents and transferred the next day to an Intelligence Department detention center in Urmia for interrogation, with no disclosed charges or confirmed place of detention.
Piranshahr also saw repeated arrests and disappearances into security custody. Mani Abdollahzadeh was violently arrested in the village of Darbakeh after security forces raided his family home without a warrant and moved him to an undisclosed location. Another Kurdish citizen, Abdollah Nabizadeh, was arrested on May 4 during a raid on his home in Chiane village, also without a warrant, and was transferred to an unknown location while his family’s efforts to learn his fate failed. Shahram Pasupish, also from Chiane, was arrested on May 13 after government forces raided his family home; his health condition, legal status, and place of detention remained unknown. On May 14, Sabah Bivareh, a 23-year-old from Kelekin village, was violently arrested by intelligence forces during a raid on his family home and transferred to an undisclosed location, with no charges announced. Vahed Soltani, a 21-year-old from Khorenj village, was arrested on May 8 and held without access to a lawyer, family visits, or even a brief phone call.
In Ilam Province, security forces targeted several Kurdish civilians. Mohammad-Reza Faryadi, from Sarableh, was arrested by Intelligence Ministry forces on May 13 without a warrant, and repeated family efforts to learn his place of detention or health condition produced no answer. Arshia Qeysarbeigi, also from Sarableh, was arrested during a May 5 raid on his family home and held in solitary confinement under severe physical torture. Reports said he suffered fractures to his jaw, nose, and teeth during the arrest, was denied medical treatment, and later faced “enmity against God” and “corruption on earth” accusations based on alleged forced confessions, charges that could place him at risk of a death sentence. In Dehloran, Abbas Mamousi was arrested on May 14 without a warrant and transferred to the quarantine ward of Ilam Central Prison; the arrest was reportedly linked to what authorities described as “expressing joy following the death of Khamenei.” On May 21, Ali Eskandari, a 41-year-old Kurdish man from Ilam, was violently arrested when Intelligence Ministry forces raided his family home without a court warrant and moved him to an unknown location.
Mahabad and Naqadeh cases showed the same pattern of detention without legal clarity. Siavash Azizi Aghdam, a Kurdish resident of Mahabad, remained out of reach for more than three weeks after his early-May arrest during a warrantless raid; he was denied legal counsel, while prosecutors and security offices refused to answer family inquiries. In Kuseh Kahriz village near Mahabad, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) intelligence forces detained 17-year-old Ehsan Khorramabad and 40-year-old Mikaeil Dudkanlou Milan, known as Shouresh, after armed agents stormed their homes without warrants and used intimidation and violence. Mamand Khodadadi, from Naqadeh, was held incommunicado after an early-May arrest, denied lawyer access, phone contact, and family visits, while the detaining authority and charges remained unclear. Alan Hekmatirad, a Kurdish English teacher from Mahabad arrested in April, was transferred in May to Naqadeh Prison after a period in a security facility in Urmia; authorities had searched his family home and confiscated his laptop, hard drives, and books, while he remained deprived of family visits and access to a lawyer of his choosing.
Cultural Figures and Teachers Among Those Arrested
The crackdown also affected Kurdish cultural and educational figures outside the immediate Kurdish provinces. Forouzan Nojavan, an English teacher, blogger, and director of the Nojavan language academy in Urmia, was arrested on May 13 without a warrant and later transferred to the women’s ward of Urmia Central Prison after interrogation. Her detention was extended, bail was refused, and she was denied access to a lawyer of her choosing and in-person family visits. In Tehran, Majid Karimi, a Kurdish writer, poet, and volunteer Kurdish-language teacher from Quchan, was detained on May 14 after intelligence forces raided his home, searched the residence, and confiscated his phone and laptop. He was accused during interrogation of collaborating with Kurdish political parties. In Javanrud, Amir Sobhani, a Kurdish singer, was arrested on May 18 after agents stormed his family home without a warrant, searched the residence, and later transferred him to Kermanshah Central Prison, also known as Dizelabad, under a 10-day temporary detention order.
Cultural repression also intensified. In Bukan, artists, singers, musicians, and music-center owners were reportedly threatened by security institutions after the arrest of Seyyed Ali Ghoreishi and warned not to perform Kurdish epic or identity-oriented songs. Security officials reportedly described such works as “counter-revolutionary” and warned that artists could face arrest, prosecution, and security confrontation if they continued using them. The pressure on Kurdish music and language activity connected several May cases, including the arrests of Ghoreishi in Bukan, Sobhani in Javanrud, Karimi in Tehran, and Nojavan in Urmia.
Prison Pressure and Medical Neglect
Prison pressure and denial of medical care remained central to the repression. Peshawa Aghapour, a 22-year-old former detainee from the “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising, was transferred from Urmia Central Prison to an Intelligence Ministry detention center in Urmia, raising concerns about renewed interrogation, torture, or a new case against him. He had been violently arrested in March, and his father reportedly suffered broken ribs during the raid. Ebrahim Mardani, a 48-year-old Kurdish man from Bukan, remained in legal limbo nearly five months after his December 2025 arrest, with security bodies blocking temporary release on bail; he had previously been prosecuted after guests at his child’s wedding wore traditional Kurdish clothing. Mojtaba Hajian, a 21-year-old Kurdish youth from Abdanan living in Tehran, remained disappeared into detention four months after his January 26 arrest without a judicial warrant, with no information on his location, charges, or condition.
Secret Executions and Death Penalty Escalation
The death penalty also escalated sharply. Mehrab Abdollahzadeh, a Kurdish political prisoner arrested during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising, was secretly executed at Urmia Central Prison without prior notice to his family or lawyers, and security bodies refused to return his body. His case included allegations of 38 days of physical and psychological torture, pressure to confess, denial of lawyer access during early detention, and serious procedural flaws raised by his lawyer. On May 21, Ramin Zaleh and Karim Maroufpour were secretly executed at Naqadeh Prison after being sentenced to death on “armed insurrection” charges linked to alleged membership in the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI). Their families and lawyers received no prior notice, final visits were denied, and their bodies were not returned at publication time. Wider reporting documented at least 36 political executions in Iran over the previous two months, including four Kurdish political prisoners, Mehrab Abdollahzadeh, Nasser Bakerzadeh, Ramin Zaleh, and Karim Maroufpour, while six other Kurdish political prisoners, Pakhshan Azizi, Hatem Ozdemir, Yousef Ahmadi, Mohammad Faraji, Rauf Sheikh-Maroufi, and Mohsen Eslamkhah, remained under death-sentence risk.
Security activity in Saqqez reflected a broader militarized atmosphere. Reports described the reopening of old outposts, creation of new checkpoints, searches of citizens, vehicles, and mobile phones, and deployment of masked forces using private vehicles with covered license plates. Some checkpoints reportedly used semi-heavy weapons mounted on Toyota vehicles, including DShK and PKC weapons, while security and military equipment was moved into the homes of local pro-government operatives. Separate field reporting from Saqqez described nightly government-backed gatherings organized with municipal support, street blockades, forced shop closures, pressure on students to attend for “Defense Readiness” course grades, and reported financial incentives for some participants who joined nightly pro-government patrols.
Civilian danger in Kurdish areas also remained tied to military contamination. Peyman Rahmanpour, a 21-year-old man from Khorkhoreh village in Saqqez, was killed on May 7 after triggering a landmine in the highlands near the village. Landmines left from the Iran-Iraq War and from the Islamic Republic’s military campaigns in Kurdistan continue to kill and maim civilians in West Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, and Ilam provinces.
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Bashur)
May 2026 placed the Kurdistan Region of Iraq under overlapping political and security pressure, with stalled government formation in Erbil, renewed mediation between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), continued Iranian and Iran-aligned attacks on Iranian Kurdish opposition groups inside the Region, and a new federal government taking shape in Baghdad.
KIU Mediation and the Push to End the KDP–PUK Deadlock
The main internal political development was the new mediation effort led by Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) leader Salahaddin Bahaaddin, who launched an initiative aimed at reactivating the Kurdistan parliament and opening a path toward forming the next Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) cabinet. On May 17, Bahaaddin met with Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) President Bafel Talabani in Sulaymaniyah and presented what his office described as a “national and comprehensive initiative” to end the political deadlock and restore dialogue between Kurdish parties. Talabani welcomed the initiative, saying the PUK supported any sincere effort serving the interests of the people of Kurdistan.
The initiative gained further weight after Bahaaddin held meetings with Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani, Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani. On May 24, Masoud Barzani received Bahaaddin in Erbil, with the discussion focused on obstacles facing the Region’s political process and the need to reactivate parliament. KIU said both ruling parties had welcomed the initiative. The stalemate has continued since the October 2024 parliamentary election, in which the KDP won 39 seats and the PUK won 23 seats in the 100-seat parliament, leaving no party with a majority.
The recent agreement between the PUK and New Generation has created a coalition holding 38 seats against the KDP’s 39 seats, further exacerbating the competition and disputes between the KDP and PUK over cabinet shares.
A PUK leadership member, Rebaz Berkoty, said a KDP–PUK meeting was expected within days and described the PUK’s response to the KIU initiative as positive. He said both parties had a “historical responsibility” to move forward and added that the PUK opposed any return to a dual-administration system. The dispute remains centered on power-sharing, governance structure, and key posts, with the PUK demanding what it calls a “true partnership” in the next government.
The wider political thaw also reached opposition parties. On May 20, senior KDP officials met the Kurdistan Justice Group (KJG), which had boycotted the current parliament after alleging election fraud. KJG officials said they still favored an active parliament and an effective government despite maintaining their objections to the election outcome. The meeting came as Bahaaddin’s KIU initiative was being presented as a broader attempt to lower tensions and restart the political process.
Iranian Attacks Continue Despite the US–Iran Ceasefire
Security remained the most urgent issue. Iranian and Iran-aligned attacks continued against Iranian Kurdish opposition groups inside the Kurdistan Region despite the April 8 Pakistan-mediated ceasefire between the United States and Iran. On May 20, two drones launched from Iran hit a base of Komala Toilers of Kurdistan near Banagawra, southeast of Sulaimani. Komala said the drones came from Iran and that its positions had been targeted with more than 78 missiles and drones since the wider war began in late February. No injuries were reported in that strike, but the attack followed a separate May 18 missile strike on another Komala base southwest of Sulaimani that injured at least two people.
The attacks continued later in the month. On May 24, Rudaw reported that two Iranian Kurdish armed groups said Iran had targeted their bases in Erbil province with drones. The Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan said its base in Khalifan district was struck by at least four attack drones, while the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) said its bases in the Darashakran area were also targeted by four Iranian drones. No casualties were initially reported in those Erbil attacks. Komala official Amjad Panahi said Iran had targeted Komala bases with 79 missiles and drones since February 28.
The broader statistics show the scale of the campaign. Iraqi National Security Advisor Qasim al-Araji said a joint Baghdad-Erbil security delegation would travel to Tehran to investigate the drone and missile attacks. Rudaw’s tracking counted 855 drone and missile attacks on the Kurdistan Region from February 28 through May 22, causing 20 deaths and 128 injuries. Araji said the delegation would include himself, KRG Interior Minister Rebar Ahmad, and other members of the High Security Committee.
The attacks became one of the issues raised by Prime Minister Masrour Barzani during his May 23 visit to Baghdad. Barzani met Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi and Parliament Speaker Haibat al-Halbousi, describing the talks as “good” and focused on federal-KRG relations, the Kurdistan Region’s constitutional rights, salaries, budget allocations, and ongoing security concerns. The KRG said both sides stressed resolving disputes through the constitution and respecting the federal status of the Kurdistan Region.
Iraq’s New Government and Kurdish Ministerial Selections
At the federal level, May brought the formation of a new Iraqi government. On May 14, Iraq’s parliament approved Ali al-Zaidi as prime minister, passed his government program, and approved 14 ministers, while votes on nine remaining ministries, including defense and interior, were delayed. The session included 266 lawmakers out of 329. Most Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish blocs attended, while several Kurdish opposition parties and one Shiite party stayed out.
Kurdish parties finalized their ministerial selections before the vote. The KDP nominated Fuad Hussein for another term as foreign minister and selected Rebaz Hamlan as its nominee for housing and reconstruction. The PUK secured agreement for the justice ministry, with Khaled Shwani discussed for another term. The New Generation Movement (NGM), the largest opposition party in the Kurdistan Region, said it would receive the environment ministry and named Srwa Abdulwahid as its candidate.
The cabinet vote also created new disputes in Baghdad. Kurdistan24 reported that the al-Azm Alliance and State of Law Coalition challenged the procedures used during the confidence vote and threatened legal action through the Federal Supreme Court. Only 14 of 23 ministers were approved, leaving key portfolios unresolved and raising the risk that the new government would begin work without a complete cabinet.
Kurdistan Region of Syria (Rojava)
May 2026 placed Syrian Kurds at the center of Syria’s unfinished transition, with parliamentary elections held in Hasakah, Qamishlo, Derik, and Kobani, continuing disputes over Kurdish representation, unresolved military integration between Damascus and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and renewed concern over Islamic State (Da’esh) sleeper-cell activity in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor. The month showed a clear split between Damascus’s claim that the electoral process advanced national reintegration and the dominant Rojava-linked Kurdish position that the process remained limited, pre-arranged, and politically insufficient.
Hasakah, Qamishlo, Derik, and Kobani Elections
The central political event was the delayed selection of members for Syria’s People’s Assembly in Kurdish-majority areas. Syria’s Higher Committee for People’s Assembly Elections had announced subcommittees for Hasakah Governorate’s electoral districts of Hasakah, Derik, and Qamishlo on May 11, then designated polling centers on May 22: the Hasakah Governorate Administration building for Hasakah, the Old Cultural Center near the Engineers Syndicate for Qamishlo, and the Cultural Center in Kobani for the Kobani district.
The vote was held on May 24 and covered the remaining 11 seats left vacant from Syria’s earlier parliamentary process. Associated Press (AP) described it as follow-up parliamentary elections in Hassakeh province and Kobani, areas reintegrated under Damascus control after January fighting. The AP also noted that the broader system was not a full direct election: most seats were chosen through electoral colleges, while interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa directly appoints one-third of the 210-member assembly.
The announced results gave Qamishlo four representatives, Hasakah three, Kobani two, and Derik two by acclamation. Hawar News Agency reported that Radwan Sayed, Abdel Halim Ali, Kim Ibrahim, and Mahmoud Madi were selected for Qamishlo; Ibrahim al-Habash, Omer al-Hayis, and Fasla al-Youssef for Hasakah; and Ferhad Anwar Shahin and Shawakh Ibrahim al-Assaf for Kobani. The process was conducted through limited electoral bodies, with 200 members in Qamishlo, 198 in Hasakah, and 100 in Kobani.
Rojava Reaction: Limited Representation and “Pre-Appointment” Claims
The strongest Rojava-linked reaction was critical. Kurdish political forces argued that the mechanism did not reflect fair or transparent representation and that the Kurdish share in the new parliament remained far below the community’s demographic and political weight. Several Kurdish parties criticized the process as “nothing but an appointment process,” objecting that only four of the 210 assembly seats were allocated to Kurds and calling for representation that better reflects Syria’s Kurdish population, estimated at around two million people.
Azzam al-Dandah, a People’s Assembly candidate from Qamishlo, described the selection process in Hasakah as an “electoral farce,” saying voters were handed slips with pre-selected names and directed by a government-affiliated political committee. Hawar also reported claims that the process mixed selection and appointment, with some names effectively imposed before voting began.
The Democratic Union Party (PYD) and other Kurdish parties treated the outcome as part of a wider representation problem, not only a technical electoral dispute. Hawar reported that 24 Kurdish political parties and blocs condemned the seat-distribution mechanism, saying the reduction of Kurdish representation in Hasakah Governorate did not match the region’s demographic and political reality and continued exclusionary policies.
Minority parties also challenged the process. The Armenian Union Party called for Armenian representation in the People’s Assembly from Hasakah, Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, Damascus, and Aleppo, while also pointing to the absence of Assyrian representation and the marginalization of Kurds and other national groups. The Syriac Union Party also criticized the Hasakah election mechanism, adding another Rojava-area component voice against the process.
Kurdish Language, Identity, and Public Protest
The election dispute developed alongside a separate but connected issue: Kurdish language recognition. In early May, protests erupted in Hasakah after Syrian authorities removed a Kurdish-Arabic sign from the Justice Palace and replaced it first with Arabic-English signage, then with Arabic-only signage. Kurdish residents removed the replacement signs, while SDF commander Mazloum Abdi said the Arabic-only signboard had been temporarily accepted to avoid disrupting the broader integration process, even though Kurdish demands to include the language were legitimate.
The issue became a symbol of whether Damascus intended to recognize Kurdish identity in practice, not only in statements. The PYD said adding Kurdish alongside Arabic on state institutions would strengthen Syria rather than weaken it and called for movement toward a democratic national state that is neutral toward Syria’s ethnic, national, religious, and cultural components.
Inside Hasakah, Governor Nour Eddin Ahmed stated on Kurdish Language Day that Kurdish is not only cultural heritage but an inherent right and an essential part of identity and existence. Kurdish language teachers, public demonstrators, and seminar participants in Hasakah also called for constitutional recognition of Kurdish and for its use in education, culture, higher education, and state institutions.
SDF–Damascus Integration Remains Slow and Unresolved
The military and administrative integration file remained the most important strategic issue behind the elections. On May 2, Siban Hamo, Deputy Minister of Defense for Syria’s Eastern Region and a former SDF-linked commander, said four SDF brigades had been formally integrated into the Syrian military structure: one in Kobani and three in Hasakah, Qamishlo, and Derik. He said the Eastern Region Command covers Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, and Hasakah, but added that the total number of SDF personnel exceeds the forces already absorbed and that more work is needed on battalions, attachments, brigades, or regiments.
The January agreement accelerated integration through the appointment of an SDF-linked governor for Hasakah, a deputy defense minister for former SDF-held areas, and a deputy head of internal security forces in the province. But the same reporting noted continued mistrust: Damascus has pushed for centralized authority, while Kurdish leaders have sought meaningful autonomy for Rojava.
Ahmad al-Hilali, spokesperson for the presidential team tasked with implementing the January 29 agreement, said the integration of institutions in northeast Syria was continuing but moving slowly because of the number of files tied to institutions and provinces. He also said a new group of SDF-linked detainees would be released and that Kurdish rights and the rights of all local communities would remain protected.
The detainee file remained tied to the integration track. Around 1,070 SDF-linked individuals had been held by Damascus, around 800 had already been released, about 250 were being prepared for release, and roughly 300 remained in custody. The same report linked the releases to the January 29 agreement and the wider integration of Rojava’s civil and military institutions into the Syrian state.
YPJ Recognition and Women’s Role in the New Syria
Women’s organizations in Rojava continued to focus on the future of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ). Kongra Star members showcased that women’s rights in Syria are directly linked to recognition of the YPJ, saying the force represents women’s will and identity after years of fightingDa’eshand other extremist forces. They rejected any plan that would dissolve or reduce the YPJ into ordinary internal security structures and called for constitutional and legal recognition of the YPJ as an independent women’s force within Syria’s future military structure.
This issue remains one of the clearest differences between Damascus’s centralizing model and Rojava’s political model. The January agreement may have created a path for integration, but Rojava women’s organizations and political actors continued to argue that integration without recognition of women’s military and political achievements would weaken one of the core structures built during the anti-Da’esh war.
Da’esh Activity and Security Concerns
Security concerns remained active in areas that had shifted toward Damascus or interim-government control. On May 15, two members of the Internal Security Forces affiliated with the interim government were wounded in Raqqa when unidentified gunmen attacked a patrol near the Women’s Union building. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), reported that Da’esh sleeper cells were likely behind the attack and said it came amid increasing Da’esh-cell activity in areas under interim-government control.
On May 16, footage circulated showing Da’esh members moving through the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor on motorcycles with Da’esh flag. Hawar said the timing of the footage could not be verified and no official statement had been issued, but it also reported that Da’esh claimed responsibility for targeting a member of the interim government’s Ministry of Defense, Amer Ibrahim al-Shalash, on May 10 near al-Zubari in eastern Deir ez-Zor.
Despite the political and military integration process, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) still oversees civil institutions in parts of the northeast while the United States-backed SDF continues security operations against Da’esh cells.
Kurdistan Region of Turkey (Bakur)
May 2026 marked a fragile stage in Turkey’s Kurdish peace process, as dialogue continued amid uncertainty over negotiations. The month saw DEM Party efforts to revive momentum, renewed debate over Abdullah Öcalan’s role, and Öcalan’s call for a legal framework, democratic reconstruction, and greater parliamentary responsibility. Meanwhile, pressure on Kurdish political rights persisted through prison restrictions, unresolved trustee appointments, legal cases against former Kurdish lawmakers, and limits on Kurdish language rights.
Peace Process Enters a Stalemate but Remains Alive
The central political issue in May was whether the Turkey–Kurdish peace process had stalled or simply entered a difficult transition phase. At the beginning of the month, DEM Party Co-Chair Tülay Hatimoğulları used a rally in Van, to acknowledge that the process had reached a deadlock but insisted that DEM would work to overcome it. She said the peace and democratic society process had begun more than a year earlier and that the party was making every effort to remove obstacles. Her remarks came as Kurdish political actors increasingly criticized the lack of concrete legal steps after the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) had already declared an end to armed struggle and taken symbolic disarmament steps.
The same dispute appeared in sharper form through the month. The PKK side argued that it had fulfilled its part “beyond expectations” and called on Ankara to take legal measures, while also insisting that Öcalan must be granted a clearly defined legal and political status allowing him to participate fully in the process. Two senior PKK figures, Mustafa Karasu and Sozdar Avesta, said progress could only be discussed once Öcalan’s status was clarified and he had the conditions to work freely.
Ankara’s side continued to frame the process through disarmament first, legal reform later. Reporting from mid-May described the process as nearly stalled because the Iran war had increased regional uncertainty, with Ankara reluctant to move on amnesty or legal reforms before full disarmament, while the Kurdish side argued that disarming without legal guarantees would leave militants exposed. DEM lawmaker Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit described the situation as a “pause, but not a complete halt,” and said the government’s demand for immediate full disarmament was unrealistic without democratic reforms.
Öcalan’s Latest Message: Legal Framework and “No Time to Lose”
The most significant May development was the DEM Party İmralı Delegation’s May 24 visit to Abdullah Öcalan. The delegation included Pervin Buldan, Mithat Sancar, and lawyer Faik Özgür Erol. Öcalan’s message, released the next day, described democratization as a “vital necessity” and warned that prolonging uncertainty would create risks. He argued that the process must be placed on a legal foundation and that a framework law could become the “stem cell” of democratization.
Öcalan tied the Turkish peace file to the wider regional crisis, warning that the Middle East remained open to dangerous possibilities, especially as Iran and Israel hardened their positions. His message rejected nationalism and fragmentation as paths that would harm the region, while emphasizing that the process should prevent new bloody confrontations and move Turkey toward democratic reconstruction. He also called on the Grand National Assembly of Turkey to act with historic responsibility.
A separate report on the same message highlighted Öcalan’s warning that legal delays would “generate risk” and that “we have no time to lose.” He also linked the peace process to Turkey’s broader democratic crisis by criticizing the police raid on the Republican People’s Party (CHP) headquarters, asking whether breaking into a political party office with force was compatible with democracy. In that sense, Öcalan’s May message framed the Kurdish question not as a narrow security issue, but as part of Turkey’s wider democratic breakdown.
DEM Party Pushes Parliament, Legal Guarantees, and Direct İmralı Channels
On May 18, party spokesperson Ayşegül Doğan said a new İmralı visit was expected and called for acceleration of dialogue, stronger parliamentary involvement, and direct communication channels for Öcalan. She said the first phase had been completed and that the next stage required concrete political and legal mechanisms. She also argued that long interruptions in meetings with Öcalan created the public impression of crisis and that direct access to İmralı was necessary to end speculation and disinformation.
Meral Danış Beştaş, another senior DEM figure, similarly argued that legal guarantees had become essential. She said the process had not reached the desired level but continued, and she emphasized that there were no insurmountable barriers if political will and courage existed. She also described Öcalan’s February 27 call and the PKK congress decision as historic developments that should now be matched by legal steps before parliament goes into recess.
DEM also tried to connect the peace process to wider democratic opposition. After the court-backed removal of CHP leader Özgür Özel and a police raid on CHP headquarters, a DEM delegation led by Co-Chair Tuncer Bakırhan visited Özel in parliament. The visit showed DEM positioning itself not only as a Kurdish party in the peace file, but also as part of a broader democratic front against judicial and police pressure on elected opposition politics.
Bahçeli’s Öcalan Proposal Opens a New Debate
May also brought a notable intervention from Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), who proposed a formal role for Öcalan as a “coordinator for the peace process and transition to politics.” Bahçeli said the process could not move forward properly by pretending Öcalan’s status did not exist and that the next stage should include political and legal steps. Later reporting described Bahçeli’s framework as a “Peace Process and Politicization Coordinatorship” tied specifically to the disarmament and organizational liquidation of the PKK, while preserving Öcalan’s conviction status and not recognizing him as a Kurdish political representative.
Turkish institutions were discussing a possible “Social Integration and National Harmony Law Proposal” to regulate reintegration and disarmament, but that Kurdish political demands continued to include ending trustees, releasing political prisoners, and defining a legal status for returnees.
Kurdish Language Rights Remain a Core Test of the Process
May’s Kurdish-language file showed why many Kurdish actors view the peace process as incomplete without cultural and legal recognition. DEM Party Şirnex MP Newroz Uysal Aslan said the status granted to the Kurdish language would determine the status of the process itself. She said DEM had submitted motions to remove restrictions on Kurdish newspapers, books, music, universities, hospitals, courthouses, prisons, cultural funding, and public services.
Aslan argued that Kurdish was still treated in parliamentary records as “a language other than Turkish” or reduced to three dots, which she described as proof that denial remained active. She also said Kurdish-language rights could not be reduced to TRT Kurdî broadcasts or limited elective courses, because mother-tongue education and official recognition remained unresolved.
The issue was not only parliamentary. In Ankara’s Sincan No. 2 High Security Closed Penal Institution, prisoners reported that Kurdish letters had been blocked unless they paid translation fees. Ramazan Çeper said outgoing Kurdish letters had not been sent and incoming Kurdish letters had not been delivered for months. The Civil Society in the Penal System Association filed applications with monitoring and human-rights bodies, warning that blocking correspondence further weakens one of the last communication channels for prisoners already held under heavy isolation.
Legal Pressure on Kurdish Politics Continues
May also brought another European Court of Human Rights ruling against Turkey over the treatment of Kurdish political figures. The court found that Turkey violated the rights of former Kurdish lawmaker Ayla Akat Ata by holding her in pretrial detention in 2016 without reasonable suspicion and by interfering with her freedom of expression. The case was based on her political activity, speeches, social media posts, and involvement in Kurdish civil and political organizations.
The ruling mattered beyond Ata’s individual case because it fit a broader pattern. Turkish authorities have for years pursued terrorism-related investigations against Kurdish politicians, former lawmakers, party executives, and mayors, while elected Kurdish mayors have repeatedly been removed and replaced with government-appointed trustees. The ruling reinforced Kurdish and rights-based criticism that prosecutions and trustee appointments remain major barriers to democratic politics and any durable peace process.