Washington Kurdish Institute
By: Hemin Hassib May 5, 2020
Day after day, America’s current allies in Iraq are becoming more dissatisfied with the US policies in the country and having second thoughts of remaining close to the US – even considering moving closer to America’s enemy, Iraq’s other major power broker, Iran. These thoughts are a result of both Iran’s presence in Iraq and their influential role in decision making, and America’s abandonment of allies in critical times, “leaving them to the wolves.”
The policy of abandoning allies has been witnessed several times over the course of the past 17 years, that is, since the fall of the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Since this momentous event, the Kurds and Sunni Arabs of Iraq have experienced various setbacks which have benefited Iran. Thus, now those groups closer to the US are opening different communication channels to establish relationships with Iran. Naturally, such a move will once benefit Iran as they will enjoy an even stronger grip on Iraq, not only via the large Shi’ite blocs, but also through alliances with the Kurds and Sunni Arabs.
The Kurdish experience with the US after 2003
The Kurdish alliances with the US in 2003 have made them a target by Iran and their allies in Iraq, who have constantly attempted to weaken the Kurdistan region. One of the first major hostile moves targeting the Kurds was the refusal to implement Article 140 of Iraq’s constitution, which calls for the normalization of areas that underwent forcible demographic change prior to 2003. Another tool was decreasing and withholding the budget of the Kurdistan region, which was to be 17% of Iraq’s budget, a percentage that the UN had first designated for the Kurds during implementation of the Oil–For–Food program in 1995. However, the 17% share was not delivered in full. For example, after 2005 the Iraqi government designated 30% of its main budget as “sovereign budget” which included the food rations budget, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the budget of the three presidencies (President, Prime Minister, and the Speaker of Parliament). Kurdistan’s 17% was taken from the rest of the 70% of the budget, not from the total of Iraq’s budget. In recent years, the Kurdistan region’s 17% allocation has officially decreased to 12.7%.
In July 2008, the Iraqi Parliament passed a controversial bill signed by the Shi’ite and Sunni Arab nationalists in the absence of the Kurds. The law mainly concerned provincial elections, and one of its articles was to reallocate seats on Kirkuk’s provincial council to be divided into thirds, with 33% going to Kurds, 33% to Arabs, and 33% to Turkmens, regardless of voting results, though Kurds have always been the majority in the province. These are just a few prominent examples of injustices faced by the Kurds in Iraq since 2003. The US considered these to be “internal affairs” and played the role of silent observer as these occurred.
America is repeating its mistakes
The recent US withdrawal from several bases to protect its forces from the Iranian-backed militias has granted the power to Iran and their proxies on the security level, especially in the disputed territories including Kirkuk. The disputed territories have significant importance for the Kurds and the US, and indeed for international security.
Previously in 2011 by pulling out of Iraq, the US in effect handed over Kirkuk and the disputed territories to destiny. Soon thereafter, tensions flared between Iraqi forces who wanted to impose a sort military rule on the area, and the Kurds who refused increased militarization of Kirkuk. Recently, the US troops withdrew from the K–1 Air Base in Kirkuk, leaving a security vacuum worse than in 2011 as now there is no substantial presence of Kurdish security forces. Over the last 10 years, the Kurdish forces have proven effective in fighting the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) and other terrorist groups in the region. Kirkuk, long a main target for these groups, is now unfortunately vulnerable.
Prior to the recent US withdrawal, the Kurds expected the US to pressure Baghdad to allow Peshmerga forces to return to Kirkuk and create a joint security command with the Iraqi forces to protect the region. However, the US left without any notice or insurance for the Kurds of Kirkuk.
The Shi’ite parties export crisis to America allies
Today the dominant Shi’ite parties, which have played a major role in Iraq since 2003, are suffering several divisions amongst themselves and are unable to agree on the formation of a new government in Baghdad. This instability in Baghdad affects the rest of the country – the crisis is exported to the Kurdistan region and the disputed territories, where the Kurdish population will pay a serious price. Many of these groups hold the view that the Kurds are America’s allies and they should face difficulties. This strategy has two major aspects:
First: Since US withdrawal from the disputed territories, Baghdad has neglected to provide proper security, and ISIS presence and terror attacks have increased. The security of the region should have been much tighter after the US withdrawal to ensure that ISIS could not take advantage of the vacuum in an area in which they had been operating since at least 2014.
Second: The issues between Baghdad and the Kurdistan region are a result of policies pursued by the main Shi’ite bloc, the Fatah Allaince, headed by Hadi al-Amiri. This includes Baghdad’s decision to cut the salaries of public sector employees in Kurdistan. This move was designed to instantly create an economic crisis in the region and to cause protests among the Kurds against their regional government. According to the 2019 budget bill, Iraq would not under any circumstances stop the payments of the employees. This has been ignored by Baghdad, with the aim of exporting crisis and instability to the Kurdistan region.
In recent weeks, there have been lots of talks among the Iraqi civilian activists on social media to resume protests that started last October. The calls to hold more anti-government protests have increased as the dominant Shi’ite forces have been unable or unwilling to enact reforms, and have not even been able to form a government since then. Since this wave of protests, curfews and lockdowns due to the ongoing coronavirus pandemic have resulted in more unemployment and poverty throughout Iraq. Now the Shi’ite parties are using the decrease of the oil prices and the pretext of Kurdistan’s refusal of handing over the oil production and return the revenue to Baghdad as a tool to export a similar crisis to the Kurdistan region. As a result, the Kurdistan region could be in the same position as the rest of the country – a situation that could give Baghdad further leverage over the Kurdistan region. Such a scenario would help realise many goals of the pro-Iranian Shi’ite blocs:
- Bringing the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the Shi’ite front together in facing street protests
- Deflecting some of the international pressure felt by the Shi’ite blocs in Baghdad due to the Kurds
- Pro-Iranian Shi’ite blocs, under significant pressure, agreed on Mustafa al Kadhimi as the new Prime Minister-Designate, tasking him with forming a new government. However, cutting Kurdistan’s budget will result in Kurdish opposition to Kadhimi and create obstacles for him, making him more dependent on Iran
- Pressure the Kurds to get closer to Iran. This is likely to succeed because the Kurdistan region cope with another prolonged economic crisis and additional delays in the payment of public sector salaries, which have caused rising anger month after month
The Federal government is much stronger economically than the Kurdish region
First: Despite the dramatic decrease in oil prices and the domestic income, Iraq has approximately $162 billion which can be used and is enough for a year of salaries before circumstances. Iraq’s extra cash is divided as follows:
- $81 billion in reserves from the central bank of Iraq
- $25 billion of profits from government-owned banks al–Rashid and al-Rafidain
- $17 billion of debt that companies owe the Iraqi government
- About $9 billion domestic income expected (only half of the previous year due to the pandemic)
- About $20 billion of oil income at current oil prices
- About $10 billion from local crude sales
The Iraqi government needs $90 billion to pay its employees for one year.
Second: If the Kurdistan region handles not only 250,000 barrels of oil to Baghdad daily but one million barrels alongside all the domestic income, it would still would not be enough to cover the 12.7% of the Kurdish budget which is estimated to 12 trillion Iraqi dinars (over $10 billion).
Third: If the Kurdistan region handles all of the above income, Baghdad still would not send the 12.7% of the budget but only the salaries of 682,000 employees recorded with the federal government. For example, from January to April 2015, the Kurdistan region handed over 250,000 barrels of oil daily to Baghdad, and in return they received the salaries of employees only without other budget due such development and investment budget, etc. The Iraqi explanation was that they would only release salaries, not other budget allocations.
In conclusion, the essence of the issue is political and has nothing to do with economic reforms. The Shi’ite–led Iraqi government seeks to include the Kurdistan region as part of Iraq’s problem, especially after the Kurds recently did not cooperate with the Shi’ite blocs. For example, the Kurds did not vote with the Shi’ite blocs when they passed a resolution calling for the expulsion of US forces from Iraq.
The Kurds are paying for their alliance with the US
Currently, the Kurds have been under Iran’s close watch especially after the refusal to vote for the US withdrawal. At the same time, the Kurds not benefiting from any clear policies by the US to ensure their protection. For example, the US officials have told the Kurds that if they leave Iraq, that would include the Kurdistan region. This point has shocked the Kurds, who are now left by the US to be squeezed by Iranian pressure and Baghdad, to say nothing of other hostile regional forces.
America is betting on a dead horse
Prior to the fall of Saddam Hussein, the US tried on several occasions to topple the regime using Sunni Arabs, attempting to ensure the Sunni Arabs would remain in power after Saddam Hussein’s downfall. The US worked with this plan for a decade without any results but failures. For example, in 1990 the coup attempt in Iraq by a military member of the Sunni Jabouri tribe failed. Furthermore, in 1994 another coup attempt by Mohammed al Shahwani, the head of the Intelligence Service of Iraq also failed, an attempt the CIA supported. Other attempts were also made, including one led by Nizar al Khazraji who was the Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army and was once the most senior military defector from Saddam’s regime.
Now the US is trying to influence the parties that comprise Iraq’s current ruling elite, the Shi’ite blocs, and this is also destined to fail. These parties will not be removed from Iran’s orbit for a number of reasons, including:
- Iran’s influence on these parties and their leaders goes back to the opposition days in the 1970s and 1980s
- The Shiites do not want the power to slip away from them, which is what happened with the establishment of Iraq through to 2003
- The Shi’ite leaders realize that any attempt to weaken the Shiites will result in the return of the Sunni Arabs to power. For example, in 2011, Baha al–Araji, a prominent member of Sadr’s movement, explained, “The vote of no confidence against Maliki is not to hand over the power to the Sunnis. If that is the case, we would rather have Maliki than the most democratic Sunni power.” It was at this time when Massoud Barzani, Ayad Allawi, and Muqtada al–Sadr had attempted to remove Maliki his post as prime minister
Therefore, the US attempts to influence the Shi’ite blocs is a bet on a dead horse.
The Kurdistan region is on the verge of collapse
The Kurdistan Region is a semi-autonomous entity within Iraq that is considered to be an important center for the US and the western powers. Since 2003, it has been remarkably stable and secure. However, currently, the region is facing yet another dire economic crisis due to the aforementioned economic pressure by Baghdad, the coronavirus pandemic, and the decline in oil prices. Baghdad’s provision of the salaries to the region is 453 billion Iraqi dinars while entire Iraq’s salaries totals 5,436 trillion Iraqi dinars – meaning that one month of Iraq’s employee salaries equals the entire year of Kurdistan’s. It is clear that Iran’s goal is to demolish the region and give Baghdad full and unchecked control over the region rather than see pro-US entity in Iraq which welcomes US forces exist. On October 16, 2017, the US chose not to take sides between the Kurds and Baghdad, resulting in the loss of 51% of Kurdish lands to the federal government and Iranian-backed militias, including the loss of Kirkuk, the source of half of the region’s oil income.
The Kurds will hug Iran soon
The Kurds have enough cash to whether the economic crisis for maybe two months at most. America’s attitude toward the Kurds will force them to move closer to Iran, and this might be the only solution left for the Kurds to obtain their budget from Baghdad, as Iran can easily direct the Shi’ite–led the government to release the allocated budget to Kurdistan. To date, the US has never intervened on a senior level to pressure Baghdad to deliver the Kurds what they owe, and now the Kurdish population of Iraq, the most pro-American group in the country, is paying the price.
Hemin Hassib is a political and economic analyst focusing on Iraq and the Kurdistan region. In the past two decades, he worked for several Kurdish news outlets including Aso, Chawdir, Hawal and Amro. Mr. Hassib is a member of the High Committee of Coordination between the International Criminal Court (ICC) and Kurdistan’s Non-Governmental Organization. He has participated in ICC’s seminars and conferences about Human Rights and Genocide. He is also a member of the Human Rights Board in Kurdistan.
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