Kurdistan Region of Iran (Rojhelat)
October 2026 brought another broad wave of arrests, new death sentences against Kurdish political prisoners and protesters, and a significant expansion of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps military activity across Rojhelat. Cross-checking reports from Kurdish human-rights organizations indicates that roughly 50 Kurdish citizens were arrested between October 1 and 25, with the real number likely higher because some security operations, including a mass case in Malekshahi, involved detainees whose names were not disclosed. At least five Kurdish defendants received new death sentences during the month, while at least two Kurdish prisoners were executed.
Roughly 50 Kurds Detained as Arrests Spread Across Rojhelat
Security operations were reported across Saqqez, Baneh, Mahabad, Bukan, Shinno, Kamyaran, Dehgolan, Senna, Kermanshah, Ilam and other areas. A review of named cases documented by several organizations produces approximately 45 individually identified arrests or detentions during October, while an additional 11 unnamed people were reported detained in Malekshahi alone, putting the documented month-to-date total at roughly 50 or more after allowing for overlap between sources.
One of the largest coordinated operations occurred in Saqqez on October 8, when Ministry of Intelligence forces carried out simultaneous raids and arrested seven members of two independent mountaineering groups: Mohammad Saleh Hosseini, Abdollah Amini, Rahim Haghparast, Mohammad Hakimpour, Mostafa Ghaderi, Khaled Rahimi and Hossein Abdollahi. Two were released after interrogation, while five remained without family contact or access to lawyers for days afterward.
Baneh also saw repeated arrests. Hassan Mostafaei, a well-known philanthropist, Khosrow Karampouri, Mohieddin Banehrizi and Shirzad Chawshini were among those detained during separate operations. Mostafaei was arrested while taking his child to hospital and was eventually released on five-billion-toman bail. Later in the month, 17-year-old Saro Sadeghzadeh was detained, followed by 18-year-old Mohammad Faraji and 17-year-old Jiyar Rasouli, who were arrested by IRGC intelligence on October 20 while travelling from Armardeh to Baneh.
The arrest wave also reached athletes and cultural figures. Kurdish MMA athlete Rozhan Ebrahimi and swimming coach Aida Ghaderi were detained in Saqqez, veteran karate coach Yadollah Mataei was arrested in Dehgolan, football player and coach Mohsen Mowloudpour was detained in Shinno, and bodybuilding coach Sina Parvizi was summoned and questioned in Kamyaran. Kurdish singer Shoresh Aboubakri was arrested after appearing at the Sardasht prosecutor’s office, while Zhina Ahmadi, founder of the Zhilemo Music House, remained imprisoned in Senna Women’s Prison.5y
At least several minors were among October detainees. Fifteen-year-old Mohammad Ebadi was arrested in Takab, 16-year-old Alireza Rashidi was detained in connection with the January protests, while Saro Sadeghzadeh and Jiyar Rasouli, both 17, were arrested in Baneh. A final-year high-school student, Diyari Abdi, was also seized near Mardukh Bridge in Senna on October 19 and taken to an undisclosed location.
The pressure extended to Shinno. Environmental activist Soleiman Rasouli was arrested without a warrant on October 19 and denied contact with his family. Nineteen-year-old Ahad Mihan-Khah was separately transferred to Naqadeh Central Prison to begin a five-year sentence for alleged collaboration with the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran.
Ilam Province remained another major center of repression connected to the January 2026 protests. On October 17, the Ministry of Intelligence announced the arrest of 11 people in Malekshahi, accusing them of acting as protest leaders and alleging connections to the United States and Israel. Their identities and detention locations were not publicly disclosed. Kurdish rights organizations raised concern because detainees in similar Ilam cases have previously been held without lawyers or family contact and appeared in televised confessions.
Other October arrests in Ilam included Daniel Bashi, Amir Parviz-Zadeh, Erfan Karam-Veysi, Ali Moradian and 23-year-old Reza Tij. Several had previously been detained in connection with the January protests.
At Least Five Kurdish Defendants Receive Death Sentences
Death-penalty pressure intensified sharply during October. On October 1, a Tehran Revolutionary Court sentenced three Kurdish men from Kermanshah to death: Khosrow Mohammadnia, Masoud Toushmalani and Sirwan Shabani. All three were arrested during the January 9 protests and convicted of moharebeh, or “waging war against God.” Hengaw reported that they had spent months in solitary confinement and had been subjected to forced confessions.
Kurdish protest detainee Borzou Rezaei received another death sentence on October 6. The most prominent political case came on October 14, when Kurdish political prisoner Verisheh Moradi was sentenced to death for a second time. Iran’s Supreme Court had overturned her previous death sentence in December 2025 because of investigative and procedural deficiencies. Her lawyers said the retrial did not address the problems identified by the Supreme Court.
Other Kurdish defendants received lengthy prison terms during the month. Psychiatrist and writer Nasser Hemmati began serving three years and six months, while Mohammad Lotfifar of Mahabad was transferred to prison to serve five years and five months. English-language instructor Mona Dabbagh was also transferred to Senna Women’s Prison to begin a three-and-a-half-year sentence.
Executions continued as the national death toll rose; at least two Kurdish prisoners were confirmed executed during October through October 25. Mostafa Sharifi, a 45-year-old father of three from Piranshahr, was executed in Urmia Central Prison on October 3 after five years in detention on drug-related charges. His execution was not announced by Iranian state media.
On October 15, authorities executed 23-year-old Kurdish prisoner Reza Rajabian in Shirvan Prison following a murder conviction stemming from an altercation when he was around 18 years old. His cousin had already been executed in the same case, while another relative remains under a death sentence.
The broader national execution rate also remained high. Iran Human Rights documented 604 executions through September 30 and at least 652 by around October 20, indicating roughly 48 additional executions nationwide during the first three weeks of October. By October 10, at least 43 Kurdish prisoners had been executed across Iran during 2026.
Prison conditions became another significant October issue. Twelve Kurdish political and religious prisoners in Bukan Prison began a hunger strike on October 5 after security agencies blocked access to furlough, work-release arrangements and open-prison privileges. The prisoners included Ardalan Mineh, Behrouz Barakhas, Esmail Atash-Mard, Kaveh Rahimi, Hamed Maroufi and others. Authorities subsequently moved the group to quarantine and suspended their telephone calls and family visits.
IRGC Expands Military Operations Across Rojhelat
October also saw one of the largest recent military deployments inside Rojhelat. During the middle of the month, the IRGC used artillery and one-way attack drones against the Shaho Mountains, the Kalatarzan area near Senna and mountainous territory near Marivan. Strikes around Niyava and Barqo caused forest fires, while additional bombardments were reported around Sarvabad and Paveh.
By October 22, the IRGC had deployed large military convoys and heavy weapons to Senna, Kamyaran, Sarvabad, Marivan and Baneh. Sources reported hundreds of special forces around villages near the Shaho Mountains, reconnaissance units transferred from Urmia and artillery deployed around the Surin Mountains near Baneh.
PJAK said the operations targeted its fighters in the Shaho region and warned that it would respond in self-defense if IRGC attacks continued. No casualties were reported from the mid-October operations.
Kurdish political parties and opposition activity during October was centered more heavily on political coordination and diplomacy than publicly announced armed operations. KDPI spokesperson Khalid Azizi said on October 12 that the party would not deploy Peshmerga from Bashur into Iran for military operations and said the party had pledged not to use Iraqi Kurdistan as a rear base for attacks against Iran.
Inside Rojhelat, PJAK’s confrontation with the IRGC in the Shaho region was the most visible armed-party development of the month. Otherwise, Kurdish parties largely emphasized political coordination, international advocacy and responses to the continuing arrest and death-penalty campaigns.
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Bashur)
October 2026 kept the Kurdistan Region under pressure from its unresolved financial relationship with Baghdad, a widening dispute over the 2027 federal budget, and the continuing failure to form a new regional government two years after elections. Oil exports through the northern route increased sharply, but Baghdad’s demand for substantially higher Kurdish production opened another dispute over investment and payments to international oil companies. Security concerns also intensified immediately after the end of the US-led coalition mission, with at least six drones striking Iranian Kurdish refugee or opposition sites inside Erbil Province during three separate attacks. In the disputed territories, Kurdish farmers again faced legal claims to land confiscated during the Baathist Arabization campaigns.
Baghdad Transfers September Salaries as Erbil Pushes for Permanent Guarantees
Baghdad transferred approximately 835.553 billion Iraqi dinars on October 8 for the Kurdistan Region’s September public-sector salaries. The federal Finance Ministry deducted 120 billion dinars as Baghdad’s share of the Region’s non-oil revenues and another 4.961 billion dinars for outstanding civilian and military pension payments. Salary distribution began on October 11, with approximately 1.016 million employees and retirees receiving salaries through bank cards and around 100,000 still requiring cash payments.
The larger dispute shifted rapidly toward the 2027 federal budget. The KRG continued to demand a 14.14 percent share of federal spending based on the most recent census, while Baghdad’s draft placed the Region at approximately 12.7 percent. High-level KRG delegations traveled repeatedly to Baghdad during October, including another round of negotiations beginning October 23. Erbil also demanded that salaries be legally protected from future political and financial disputes, that Peshmerga funding be treated alongside federal security expenditures, and that the Region receive appropriate investment, operational and sovereign expenditure allocations.
Oil Exports Rise, but Baghdad’s 400,000-Barrel Demand Creates New Dispute
The Kurdistan Region became increasingly important to Iraq’s national export strategy during October as Baghdad expanded use of the northern route to Turkey. By October 4, approximately 450,000 barrels per day were moving toward Ceyhan through the northern system, with roughly 200,000 barrels per day coming from Kurdistan Region fields. Baghdad’s wider goal is to increase use of the route toward its approximately 750,000-barrel-per-day capacity. Northern oil exports expanded sharply during the opening days of October.
The draft 2027 budget, however, would require the KRG to provide approximately 400,000 barrels per day for export, roughly double current Kurdish export volumes. KRG Deputy Natural Resources Minister Ahmed Mufti said the target would be difficult to reach unless Baghdad guarantees payments and new investment for international producers. The companies have argued that years of delayed payments and interruptions have limited their ability to drill new wells and increase output. Baghdad took an important step on October 15 when SOMO began compensating international oil companies for previous export-payment shortfalls by allocating additional crude cargoes.
The northern pipeline’s importance extends beyond the Kurdistan Region. Iraqi oil exports exceeded 3.4 million barrels per day during October through the Strait of Hormuz, Ceyhan and alternative tanker routes, making the Kurdish-controlled northern corridor an increasingly important alternative during continuing regional instability.
Two Years After Elections, Parliament and Tenth Cabinet Remain Frozen
October 20 marked exactly two years since the Kurdistan Region’s parliamentary election, yet the sixth parliament had still met only once and had not elected its leadership or begun normal legislative work. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) won 39 of 100 seats in the 2024 election, followed by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) with 23 and the New Generation Movement with 15. Two years after the vote, the tenth KRG cabinet remains unformed.
Expectations in September that parliament would reopen during October were not realized. The KRG’s Deputy Prime Minister, Qubad Talabani, said on October 10 that some obstacles had been resolved and expressed hope that the government could still be formed during the autumn. Two days later, PUK leader Bafel Talabani said the remaining differences with the KDP were relatively small and called for formal negotiations to restart. By October 12, however, Kurdistan Islamic Union officials said the next serious KDP-PUK meeting was expected in early November. Government formation therefore moved into a third year without an agreement.
The deadlock remains focused partly on the distribution of senior positions and control of important ministries, including the Interior Ministry. The PUK has also maintained its political alliance with New Generation, although New Generation has said it intends to remain outside the next government.
At Least Six Drones Strike Opposition and Refugee Sites in Erbil Province
October brought another concentrated series of drone attacks inside Bashur. At least six drones struck three Iranian Kurdish refugee or opposition locations in Erbil Province between October 8 and 17.
On October 8, two explosive drones struck a camp housing Iranian Kurdish refugees in Kawrgosk in Khabat district. No casualties were reported. Four days later, two drones hit the KDPI’s Azadi camp in Koya, causing material damage but no injuries. The camp had reportedly been evacuated before the attack.
On October 17, two additional drones launched from Iranian territory struck a Komala base in Balisan. One hit the main base and another struck a guard position, damaging buildings without causing casualties.
The attacks occurred immediately after the international coalition ended its military mission in Iraq at the end of September, removing a major layer of foreign military and air-defense presence from Erbil.
Post-Coalition Security Raises ISIS and Air-Defense Concerns
October was the Kurdistan Region’s first full month without the previous US-led coalition military deployment. The United States said the transition would continue through bilateral training and intelligence cooperation, while Iraqi and Peshmerga forces assumed primary responsibility for counter-ISIS operations.
Concern quickly emerged over security gaps in the disputed territories. On October 10, Iraqi parliament Security and Defense Committee member Mazen Gharib said ISIS movements had increased around Daquq and Hawija, particularly in areas between Iraqi Army and Peshmerga positions. The problem reflects a long-standing security gap across parts of Kirkuk, Diyala and Salahaddin where neither side exercises continuous control.
The October drone attacks also reinforced concern over air defense. The Peshmerga Ministry had warned before the coalition departure that the Kurdistan Region would not receive an equivalent replacement for coalition air-defense capabilities, leaving Baghdad responsible for protecting Iraqi and Kurdistan Region airspace.
Kurdish Land Rights and Article 140
Land disputes intensified again in the disputed territories. In Khurmatu, Kurdish farmers from Tapa Sawa faced lawsuits over more than 2,000 dunams of agricultural land between their village and Haliwa. The Baath regime confiscated the land from Kurdish owners, later distributing it to Arab settlers through agricultural contracts. Kurdish families returned after 2003, but some Baath-era contracts have since been renewed. At least 26 Kurdish farmers now face related legal cases, while several said security forces repeatedly prevent them from cultivating their property. A court and surveying team inspected the disputed land on October 5.
The same problem remains widespread in Khanaqin. An October review found that more than 2,700 agricultural parcels in lower Khanaqin face ownership disputes, confiscation threats or conversion into commercial and residential projects, within an agricultural area totaling roughly 500,000 dunams. Kurdish farmers continue to challenge claims rooted in Baath-era Arabization policies.
Kirkuk also remained contested. On October 24, Kurdish lawmakers said federal authorities had stopped several investment projects planned on disputed land after complaints that the projects could alter the legal status of areas covered by Article 140. The Article 140 committee was reported to have ordered projects on disputed land halted until ownership questions are resolved. Article 140 itself, nearly two decades past its original implementation deadline, remained unimplemented by the end of October.
Kurdistan Region of Syria (Rojava)
October 2026 pushed Rojava further into the difficult implementation phase of its agreement with Damascus. Military and administrative integration continued, but the central Kurdish demands increasingly concerned what would survive that integration: constitutional recognition, Kurdish-language education, meaningful representation in state institutions, local security and the return of displaced families to their property. Roughly 2,000 to 2,100 displaced families returned toward Sere Kaniye in four organized convoys during October alone, yet Kurdish families continued to face particular difficulties reclaiming homes inside the city. Hasakah also experienced its most serious Kurdish-Arab tensions in months, while the kidnapping and killing of a Kurdish teacher raised new concerns over civilian security.
Integration Nears Completion, but Kurdish Political Guarantees Remain Unfinished
The January 29 agreement continued moving from military integration toward civilian administration. During an October 9 meeting with residents and community leaders in Tel Tamr, Mazloum Abdi said the integration process had entered its final stages and that Kurdish personnel were now serving within Syrian military, security and civilian institutions. He also announced a specialized committee to address missing persons and emphasized protection of mother-tongue education and coexistence among the region’s communities.
Administrative integration also continued at the local level. On October 19, personnel affiliated with the Democratic Islam Conference entered the Syrian Ministry of Endowments structure in Hasakah, placing mosque administration, imams and religious affairs under the provincial directorate while allowing the organization to continue separately as a civil and intellectual body.
Integration nevertheless remained incomplete in major areas. Kurdish officials continued to argue that transferring institutions into the Syrian state must be accompanied by constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity, language and political participation. Kurdish representation in senior ministries and national institutions remained limited, while the permanent constitutional status of agreements reached between Damascus and Rojava had not been settled by October 25.
Kurdish-Language Education Remains a Central Dispute
Education remained one of October’s most important Kurdish rights issues. Presidential Decree No. 13 recognized Kurdish and introduced it into the Syrian educational system, but Kurdish students, teachers and families continued to reject limiting the language to only a few lessons per week.
In Hasakah, residents and educators said that three weekly Kurdish classes were insufficient for a generation that had studied primarily in Kurdish for more than a decade. They called instead for a complete Kurdish-language curriculum alongside Arabic. Similar demands continued in Kobani and villages around Tel Tamr during the second half of October.
Implementation was also uneven in Afrin. Kurdish-language teachers reported that some schools offered two Kurdish lessons each week and others three, while shortages of qualified teachers and delays in recognizing Kurdish-language teaching specializations disrupted implementation. Educators called for a unified Kurdish curriculum and clearer employment status for Kurdish teachers rather than leaving implementation to individual schools.
The education issue therefore remained larger than the number of weekly classes. Kurdish institutions continued to press for Kurdish to function as a language of education in Kurdish-majority areas rather than simply becoming another subject within an Arabic-language system.
Hasakah Tensions Erupt and Three Kurdish Brothers Are Injured
Hasakah experienced serious communal and political tension in early October. Pro-government Arab demonstrators held several protests demanding complete Syrian government control over the province. On October 9, demonstrators attempted to move toward predominantly Kurdish neighborhoods, but internal security forces blocked their advance. During the unrest, protesters damaged Kurdish symbols, including a memorial image connected to Kurdish women fighters, while security forces used tear gas to disperse crowds.
The situation turned violent when three Kurdish brothers were attacked while travelling in a vehicle displaying the Kurdistan flag. Nazir Mohammed Siraj Sheikho, 20, Diyar, 16, and Mohammed, 19, were wounded. Nazir and Diyar suffered gunshot wounds, while Mohammed was beaten. Diyar required surgery after being shot in the pelvic area, and Nazir was shot in the neck. Kurdish residents subsequently organized counter-protests.
The confrontation demonstrated that political integration had not eliminated communal tensions over the future character of Hasakah. Security forces attempted to keep rival groups apart, while the United States publicly called for restraint and warned against violence and incitement.
More Than 2,000 Families Return Toward Sere Kaniye During October
The return of people displaced by Turkey’s 2019 offensive accelerated substantially during October. Four organized return convoys departed during the month. About 500 families returned on October 5, roughly another 500 on October 8, around 400 to 450 on October 13, and approximately 645 families departed from the Washokani and Newroz camps on October 21. Taken together, around 2,000 to 2,100 families returned during October alone.
By October 21, local officials estimated that approximately 3,500 families had returned since the process began in August. The sixth convoy alone included about 4,084 people from 642 families, with many returning to villages including Sude, Erishe and Um Khere.
The numbers, however, concealed a major difference between returning to the countryside and recovering homes inside Sere Kaniye itself. More than 14,000 displaced people were still waiting to return in early October, and Kurdish families from the city center faced some of the greatest obstacles because many of their homes remained occupied.
Kurdish Families Continue Struggle to Recover Sere Kaniye Homes
Property restitution became inseparable from the return process. Mohammed Hajo, a member of the Sere Kaniye displaced persons committee, said some occupants were demanding payments of as much as $10,000 to leave homes belonging to displaced Kurdish residents. Authorities subsequently began compensating some current occupants and ordering others to leave seized homes so their original owners could return.
The imbalance was visible in the October 13 convoy. Of approximately 450 families returning that day, only around 10 were Kurdish, according to Rudaw reporting. The limited Kurdish participation was linked largely to continued occupation of Kurdish-owned homes in the city center.
By October 22, local security authorities said they were intensifying efforts to remove occupants from properties belonging to returning families. Kurdish returnees nevertheless continued to describe cases in which people living in their houses refused to leave.
Afrin Returnees Face Economic and Property Problems
Afrin’s return process had reached a more advanced stage, with around 16,000 families reported to have returned during 2026 by late summer. October reporting showed that physical return had not ended displacement-related hardship.
Following a visit to Afrin, United Nations Special Rapporteur Paula Gaviria Betancur said returning Kurdish families still lacked adequate healthcare, roads, infrastructure and economic livelihoods. Many returnees had regained access to their communities but remained unable to rebuild stable lives because homes required repair, employment was scarce and public services remained weak.
Property ownership also entered the national legislative debate. On October 19, Syria’s parliament referred Law No. 41 of 2004 for committee review. The legislation and subsequent amendments placed extensive restrictions on buying, selling and registering property in border regions, affecting Kurdish communities in Hasakah, Kobani and Afrin. Kurdish parliamentarians were among those seeking its repeal. The proposed review could remove long-standing restrictions on Kurdish property transactions, although the separate issue of property confiscated under Syria’s Arab Belt policies would still require its own legal settlement.
Kidnapping and Killing of Kurdish Teacher Raises Security Concerns
A particularly serious civilian case emerged in Girke Lege. Kurdish teacher Hasan Kelesh, 56, was abducted by unidentified gunmen in early October. His vehicle was left behind, and his family later received a photograph of him and a demand for $300,000 in ransom. His relatives filed a complaint and local security forces opened an investigation.
Kelesh’s body was subsequently found burned, turning the abduction into one of October’s most serious cases involving a Kurdish civilian in Rojava. The perpetrators had not been publicly identified by October 25. The killing added to concern over kidnapping, extortion and the ability of newly integrated security structures to protect civilians during the transition.
Kurdistan Region of Turkey (Bakur)
October 2026 brought the Kurdish peace process to a critical implementation stage. The Turkish government continued to condition the framework law on formal verification of disarmament, while the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) pressed Ankara to begin the political side of the process, including greater access to Abdullah Öcalan, the release of political prisoners, restoration of elected Kurdish mayors and constitutional guarantees for Kurdish language and identity. At the same time, court cases involving Kurdish music, journalists and political activists continued, underscoring the gap between the language of peace and restrictions still affecting Kurdish political and cultural life.
Peace Process Reaches Its Most Important Implementation Test
The peace process dominated Kurdish politics during October. At DEM Party’s first parliamentary group meeting of the new legislative year on October 6, co-chair Tuncer Bakırhan said that even relatively straightforward confidence-building measures remained unfinished. He specifically pointed to government-appointed municipal trustees, public employees dismissed by emergency decrees and restrictions surrounding Abdullah Öcalan as areas where Ankara could act without waiting for the entire disarmament process to conclude. Bakırhan’s October 6 call for concrete measures.
DEM Party spokesperson Ayşegül Doğan followed on October 9 by calling for parliament to establish the monitoring mechanism envisaged under the peace framework. The party argued that the process needed to move beyond declarations and into functioning institutions capable of overseeing implementation. DEM Party’s call for a parliamentary peace-monitoring body
Ankara, however, continued to place security verification first. Parliament Speaker Numan Kurtulmuş said on October 15 that provisions of the framework law would not take effect until Turkish security agencies verified that the PKK had ended its armed activities and the National Security Council confirmed that determination. He also said a parliamentary monitoring commission involving parties represented in parliament would be established. Kurtulmuş on implementation of the framework law.
By October 16, Bakırhan described the armed-conflict phase as approaching completion and said the next stage should concentrate on political prisoners, the return of Kurdish exiles and broader Kurdish political and cultural rights. DEM Party’s proposed priorities for the second phase.
Öcalan’s Role Moves to the Center of the Political Debate
Abdullah Öcalan’s position became increasingly central to October discussions. On October 2, Nationalist Movement Party leader Devlet Bahçeli, whose October 2024 initiative helped launch the current process, sent greetings to Öcalan through DEM Party politician Pervin Buldan during the opening of parliament. The interaction was symbolically significant given Bahçeli’s long-standing nationalist politics and his role in initiating the current dialogue. Bahçeli’s October message to Öcalan
DEM lawmaker Cengiz Çandar argued on October 10 that Öcalan would need a direct role if the framework law was to be implemented successfully. Çandar also identified Articles 42 and 66 of Turkey’s constitution as particularly important to the Kurdish question because they concern mother-tongue education and the constitutional definition of citizenship. Çandar on Öcalan’s role and constitutional Kurdish rights
The issue was raised again at DEM Party’s Van provincial congress on October 23. Pervin Buldan argued that Öcalan’s political and legal status needed clarification for the process to advance, while co-chair Tülay Hatimoğulları said Kurdish society expected the commitments discussed through the İmralı process to produce practical results. DEM Party’s October 23 Van congress and peace-process demands.
Kurdish Language Moves From Cultural Demand to Municipal Policy
Kurdish-language rights produced one of October’s more concrete political initiatives. On October 19, DEM Party instructed municipalities under its administration to begin the legal process of creating language departments in metropolitan municipalities and language directorates in smaller municipalities. The proposed offices would promote Kurdish and other local languages through municipal services, cultural programs and public activities. DEM Party’s October circular on Kurdish-language municipal services.
Legal restrictions prevent municipalities from simply creating the new departments independently, so they were instructed to submit formal applications to the Ministry of Environment, Urbanization and Climate Change while continuing existing mother-tongue programs. The initiative represents an attempt to institutionalize Kurdish-language services through local government rather than relying only on cultural associations.
At the national level, DEM politicians continued pushing for constitutional change. Çandar specifically highlighted Article 42, which restricts the use of languages other than Turkish as a mother tongue in education, and Article 66, which defines citizenship through Turkish identity. October debate over Articles 42 and 66.
Kurdish Musician Sentenced Over Songs
The tension between the peace process and cultural restrictions was illustrated by the case of Kurdish musician Cesim Başboğa. On October 6, the Bitlis Second Heavy Penal Court sentenced him to 10 months in prison for “making propaganda for an organization” because of Kurdish songs he performed at a cultural festival in Tatvan in 2025.
The prosecution cited three songs, “Serhildan Jiyan e,” “Lê Amedê” and “Zana û Andok,” as evidence. Başboğa told the court that sentencing artists for performing music in their mother tongue was incompatible with a period in which peace was being publicly discussed. Cesim Başboğa’s 10-month sentence over Kurdish songs
Trustee Municipalities Remain Unresolved
The government-appointed trustee system remained one of the principal Kurdish political grievances during October. Thirteen DEM-controlled municipalities had been placed under trustees during the post-2024 election wave, and elected Kurdish mayors had not been collectively restored by October.
Bakırhan raised the issue directly in parliament on October 6, arguing that returning elected municipal administrations would be an immediate confidence-building step in the peace process. The issue was again raised at the October 23 DEM Party congress in Van, where Hatimoğulları criticized continued trustee administration and linked restoration of elected local government to democratic normalization. Hatimoğulları’s October remarks on trustees and the peace process.
The issue is particularly sensitive in Van and Mardin, where elected DEM administrations had received substantial electoral mandates before their removal. No broad government decision restoring the removed Kurdish mayors had been announced by October 25.
Political prisoners remained another unresolved part of the process. In an October 5 submission to the Council of Europe, the Turkish government confirmed that former Peoples’ Democratic Party co-chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ remained imprisoned while their convictions were under appeal. Both had submitted requests for release, but no decision had yet been delivered. Turkey’s October submission on the Demirtaş and Yüksekdağ cases.
On October 16, DEM Party lawmaker Sırrı Sakık called for their immediate release along with other political prisoners and questioned why their cases should depend on a future National Security Council determination concerning disarmament. Sakık also said two requests he had submitted to visit Öcalan had been rejected by the Justice Ministry. Sakık’s call for the release of Demirtaş and Yüksekdağ.
Political Detentions and Pressure on Kurdish Media Continue
Security and judicial cases against Kurdish political activity continued during October. Four members of the DEM Party Mardin Youth Assembly, Mahsum Çalhan, Serhat Akpınar, Abdulkadir Elmas and Bilal Elmas, were detained during home raids on October 16 over allegations connected to putting up a banner. All four were released the following day under judicial supervision after being questioned over alleged “organization propaganda.” October detention of four DEM Party youth members in Mardin.
Former HDP parliamentarian Alican Önlü was also briefly detained in Dersim’s Ovacık district on October 1 because an unpaid judicial fine had been converted into imprisonment. He was released the same day after paying the fine.
Journalists working in Kurdish-majority areas continued facing judicial pressure. In Yüksekova, journalist Rabia Önver was questioned in an investigation concerning her social-media posts, while the trial of former Dicle News Agency reporter Abdullah Kaya continued in Ağrı on charges of membership in and assistance to an organization. On October 20, journalist Bircan Değirmenci also appeared again before an Amed court in a case arising from a social-media post. October cases involving journalists in Bakur.