Kurdistan Region of Iran (Rojhelat)
August brought another sustained escalation of pressure on Kurdish society in Rojhelat as the Iranian regime combined mass arrests, incommunicado detention, heavy prison sentences, flogging, executions, and lethal border enforcement.
The Iranian regime arrested or detained at least 66 Kurdish citizens during August. The crackdown reached well beyond organized political activity, targeting environmental and civil activists, charity workers, women, children, village council members, cultural figures, singers, media activists, former political prisoners, relatives of opposition figures, and other civilians.
At Least 66 Kurdish Citizens Arrested or Detained
The Iranian regime arrested or detained at least 66 Kurdish citizens during August, with operations concentrated across Rojhelat, including, Mahabad, Bukan, Marivan, Kamyaran, Piranshahr, Oshnavieh, Urmia, Sardasht, Senna, Divandarreh, Takab and Ilam.
One of the first major operations unfolded around Marivan and Kamyaran. On August 4, Jamal Rostami, a 57-year-old founding member of a local charitable organization, was detained in Kamyaran. Two days later, regime security forces surrounded Ney village near Marivan and arrested Saman Khosravi, Hawre Parvazeh, Arya Maroufi, Zanyar Asvar, Poshtivan Tatar and Saro Roshani. Several of the men were involved in environmental or community activity.
In Mahabad, Shirzad Payaniani, 32, was arrested on August 3 after Ministry of Intelligence (Ettela’at) forces raided his family home without presenting a warrant. His location was not disclosed after the arrest. The following day, Bahman Modirzadeh, a member of the Qotur city council, was detained by IRGC Intelligence forces. His arrest followed online activity opposing executions.
The Hengaw Organization for Human Rights also reported the arrest of Zanyar Fathi in Marivan, while Rahim Hassanpour was arrested in Sardasht and transferred to an IRGC Intelligence detention facility in Urmia. Environmental activist Awat Karami, known for work connected to protection of the Zagros forests, was violently detained at his home in Negel near Senna. Seyed Latif Sabri was subsequently arrested in Mahabad.
The crackdown also reached Kurdish activists outside Rojhelat. Shahriar Shams, a former political prisoner and student activist, was arrested in Tehran on August 11. In Ilam Province, 21-year-old Arian Tarvand was violently detained by IRGC Intelligence forces in Mehran on August 12. Tarvand’s arrest followed an IRGC Intelligence operation at his home.
By mid-August, the regime had widened the crackdown across Bukan, Miandoab, Mahabad and Oshnavieh. The Kurdistan Human Rights also reported that at least 11 Kurdish citizens were arrested across the four areas between August 13 and 15, including Sediq Karimi, Masoud Alani Kohneh-Ghaleh, Hadi Azizi, Omid Chavbazi, Amir Soleimani, Mohammad Hajizadeh, Shwana Divazi, Loghman Ghorbani, Rahman Khouzan, Esmaeil Badsar and Zakaria Badsar.
The Badsar case showed the regime extending pressure directly into families. Security forces initially detained Esmaeil Badsar, the father of Zakaria Badsar, after failing to locate his son. His detention was used to pressure Zakaria into surrendering himself. Amir Soleimani, arrested in Mahabad during the same broader wave, is also the brother of a Kurdish political activist living abroad.
Children were also drawn into security operations. On August 16, IRGC Intelligence forces raided Kachaleh village near Urmia and detained Eyvaz Behnamoun, Shaban Ahmadvash and Ebrahim Ahmadvash. Bafrin Ahmadvash, a Kurdish child, was also detained during the operation. Their whereabouts remained undisclosed in the immediate aftermath. The Kachaleh arrests included Bafrin Ahmadvash and three relatives.
In Piranshahr, Nazanin Hosseinpour, a 34-year-old mother of two, was arrested on August 16 after being summoned to the Ministry of Intelligence office. She was denied access to a lawyer and family visits. Her father was reported to be affiliated with a Kurdish opposition party outside Iran, placing her case among several August arrests in which relatives of political figures were themselves subjected to regime pressure.
A separate family was targeted in Divandarreh. Maryam Moradian, Sirous Hamidi and their 16-year-old daughter Kurdia Hamidi were arrested on August 14 and transferred into detention. Kurdia was released four days later, while her parents remained in custody without access to a lawyer or family visits at the time their case was documented. The arrest of the Divandarreh family included their 16-year-old daughter.
The regime also moved against local civic and community figures. In Mahabad, village council member Karim Rasouli was detained, while Farzin Khediripour and municipal engineer Mohammad Vatmani were arrested in separate operations. Civil activist Shirin Masoudi was violently arrested at her workplace on August 19 and transferred to a Ministry of Intelligence detention facility in Urmia, where she was denied access to a lawyer and family contact. Masoudi was seized at her workplace in Mahabad.
Cultural and media activity also came under pressure. Abed Alizadeh, a Kurdish media activist from Takab, was arrested after years of public activity involving social issues, protest movements and Kurdish language and culture. In Mahabad, blogger Seyran Arabi was detained by cyber police after publishing a video connected to Kurdish singer Mohammad Mamli, and her social-media page was taken offline.
Another wave followed on August 23 and 24. In Piranshahr and Naqadeh, regime forces detained Soran Mahmoudi, Mohammad Danesh-Mayeh, Loghman Seyyideh and former political prisoner Salam Azari and transferred them to undisclosed locations. Mahmoudi and Azari had previously faced cases tied to alleged connections with the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan. .
In Oshnavieh, Sanan Farasati, Saadoun Dastari and Rahman Azarakhsh were arrested on August 23 and 24 by Ministry of Intelligence forces and taken to unknown locations. Moloud Roosta and Kamran Jangoli were also detained amid the late-August operations in the area.
The crackdown reached Ilam Province again on August 23 and 24. Kurdish singer Amin Naseri was arrested after being shot in the leg during a security operation. Younes Bakri, Yaser Havasizadeh and Rouhollah Gholami were detained the following day without warrants, with no immediate access to lawyers or family contact.
Mass Sentencing, Flogging and Judicial Pressure
One of August’s largest judicial cases came in Mahabad, where 16 Kurdish residents were sentenced to more than 77 years in prison combined. Abdullah Houshmand and Abdulrahman Qoveh each received seven years and one month. Twelve other defendants received five-year sentences, while Nazanin Elyasi, also known as Golaleh, received two years and Kamal Masoudi received five months. The charges included “assembly and collusion,” alleged membership in the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), “propaganda against the state,” and social-media activity supporting Kurdish opposition parties.
The defendants had been arrested by regime security forces in Mahabad between October and December 2024 and transferred to an Intelligence Ministry detention facility in Urmia for interrogation. They were denied access to lawyers, telephone calls and family visits during detention. The August verdicts extended an earlier wave of security arrests into years of imprisonment.
In Bukan, Rahim Shilani and Azad Rasouli-Fard were each sentenced to two years in prison for the purchase and sale of Starlink satellite equipment. Both men had been arrested on January 30 and transferred to an Intelligence Ministry detention facility in Urmia, where they were held for 52 days. During detention they were denied access to lawyers and family visits and were subjected to physical and psychological torture.
The Starlink convictions showed the regime extending security prosecutions into access to communications technology capable of bypassing state-controlled internet restrictions. The case was also documented independently as a combined four-year prison sentence against the two Kurdish men.
In another Bukan case, Manijeh Khoshnoud, a 58-year-old Kurdish activist, was sentenced to three months in prison on the charge of “propaganda against the state.” She had been arrested at her family home on May 26 after regime security forces raided the residence without a warrant and confiscated her laptop, mobile phone and books. She had previously received a 10-month prison sentence in 2024 on the same broad accusation.
The regime also continued to use corporal punishment alongside imprisonment. On August 22, Neda Dadejani and Setayesh Sarabi, two Kurdish women from Qorveh, were summoned to court and immediately taken into custody. Authorities then carried out 31 lashes against each woman before transferring them to the women’s ward of Senna Central Prison to begin serving their prison sentences.
Each woman had previously been sentenced to one year in prison, 31 lashes and two years of internal exile to Nikshahr on charges of “disrupting public order and tranquility.” They were also each sentenced to two additional years in prison for “assembly and collusion” against internal security. Their flogging and imprisonment were carried out despite pending requests for electronic monitoring.
Mehdi (Sikan) Roshani, a Kurdish political prisoner from Malekshahi in Ilam Province, also faced the possibility of a death sentence.Following his rearrest in July, he was formally charged with moharebeh and efsad-e fel-arz, or “enmity against God” and “spreading corruption on earth.” The charges can carry the death penalty.
Roshani remained in Ilam Central Prison while the new case was handled by Branch Six of the Investigation Office of the Ilam Public and Revolutionary Prosecutor’s Office. As of August 12, no indictment had yet been issued and the case remained under investigation. He had previously been arrested during the January protests in Malekshahi and sentenced to three years in prison, later reduced to nine months.
Executions and Death-Penalty Pressure
The Iranian regime continued executing Kurdish prisoners throughout August, including prisoners convicted in national-security, qisas, and drug-related cases.
Among the most politically sensitive cases was Omid Behzad, a 21-year-old Kurdish university student from Urmia. Behzad was executed at Urmia Central Prison on August 3 alongside Pouria Safvat after the two men were accused of espionage for Israel. Behzad was a student at Islamic Azad University of Urmia and had been arrested in March 2026.
The execution proceeded despite information that Behzad’s lawyer had secured the annulment of his death sentence by the Supreme Court on August 1, only two days before he was put to death. His family was summoned for a final visit on August 2. The regime’s judiciary presented a conflicting account, maintaining that the espionage convictions had received final judicial approval. Behzad was nevertheless executed at dawn the following morning, leaving a direct contradiction over the status of his Supreme Court appeal at the time he was put to death.
On August 8, Payam Pakzad, a 41-year-old Kurdish prisoner from Bojnord and father of four, was executed at Zanjan Central Prison under qisas following a murder conviction. Pakzad had been arrested approximately three years earlier after a killing at the construction site where he worked and was subsequently sentenced to death. His execution was not publicly announced by the regime’s state or judiciary-affiliated media.
On August 18, Kaveh Refousheh, a 35-year-old Kurdish man from Senna, was executed at Senna Central Prison despite a public effort to stop the execution. He had been sentenced to death under qisas following a killing during an altercation approximately three years earlier. On the evening before his execution, residents and civil-society activists gathered outside the prison, called for clemency and chanted against executions. The regime carried out the sentence early the following morning.
The following day, Donya Mohammadi, a 20-year-old Kurdish woman from Eyvan-e Gharb who was 18 when arrested, and Khodadad Mohammadi, a retired Kurdish teacher and father of five from the same area, were executed at Ilam Central Prison in separate qisas cases. Both had been imprisoned for approximately two years before their executions on August 19. Neither execution had been publicly announced by the regime’s state media or judiciary at the time the cases became known.
Also on August 19, Mohsen Darabi, a Kurdish prisoner from Kermanshah, was executed at Isfahan Central Prison on drug-related charges. He had been transferred to solitary confinement before the execution and was put to death alongside several other prisoners convicted in separate drug cases. His execution was not publicly announced by the regime.
On August 23, Ardalan Sabzi Balkhkanlou, a 38-year-old Kurdish prisoner and father of one, was executed at Maku Prison after approximately four years of imprisonment. He had been sentenced to death under qisas following a killing during a group altercation. The execution was carried out at dawn and had not been announced by the regime’s official media.
The cases arose from different criminal and national-security proceedings, but August again showed the scale with which the Iranian regime continues to use capital punishment against Kurdish prisoners. Behzad’s execution was particularly severe because his death sentence had reportedly been overturned only two days before he was put to death, while several other executions were carried out without public announcement and after prisoners had been moved into solitary confinement shortly before their deaths.
Kolbars and Kurdish Border Civilians Killed
The western border remained deadly during August as regime border forces continued to use live ammunition against Kurdish kolbars and civilians dependent on cross-border work.
On August 10, regime border guards shot and killed Mohammad Towhid-Panah, a 25-year-old kolbar from Saqqez, in the Hangeh-ye Zhal border area of Baneh. Border forces opened fire on a group of kolbars at close range and without prior warning, killing Towhid-Panah at the scene. He had married approximately four months earlier and his wife was pregnant.
Three days later, Musa Zibapour, a Kurdish kolbar from Piranshahr and father of three, was killed by direct regime gunfire near Baneh. Border forces opened fire without warning at approximately 4 p.m. on August 13, killing him at the scene. Zibapour had previously been seriously wounded by regime forces while working as a kolbar in the Piranshahr border region in 2021.
Other kolbars were seriously wounded during the opening days of August. Goran Khedri was shot by border guards on August 4, while Hassan Mostafazadeh was shot the following day in the same Hangeh-ye Zhal border area and required transfer to a medical facility in Tabriz because of the severity of his injuries. Bakhtiyar Amini, a father of three from Baneh, was severely wounded in the leg by a landmine explosion in the same border zone.
On August 18, Milad Tabad, a 28-year-old kolbar from Marivan and father of one, died from injuries inflicted when regime border forces shot him in the head nearly a year earlier. Tabad had been shot on August 25, 2025, in the Tateh border highlands while carrying no goods. He spent months in intensive care and remained in poor physical condition before dying from the injuries on August 18.
On August 19, regime border forces killed Yousef Mamehpour in the Barda Spian border area near Sardasht. Mamehpour, a 30-year-old Kurdish man from Vardeh village and father of a young son, was transporting livestock toward the Kurdistan Region of Iraq when forces opened fire. A bullet struck him around the kidney and abdominal area and he died from his wounds. Another Kurdish civilian was seriously injured in the same shooting.
Mamehpour’s killing reflected the economic reality of Kurdish border communities, where kolbar work, livestock movement and small-scale cross-border trade frequently overlap. For families in these areas, such activity remains an important source of income, yet regime forces continue to treat these routes as security zones in which unarmed Kurdish civilians face the risk of lethal gunfire.
Violence also reached Kurdish civilians away from the border. On August 20, Pouria Naderi, a 29-year-old Yarsani Kurd from Kermanshah who had previously been detained during the Jin, Jiyan, Azadi uprising, was killed during an operation by Intelligence Ministry forces in Kermanshah. Naderi had previously spent months in security detention and had remained under pressure from security agencies. An armed confrontation broke out after intelligence forces surrounded him, leaving Naderi dead and two intelligence personnel wounded.
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Bashur)
August 2026 kept Bashur under pressure from delayed salary transfers, persistent fuel shortages, disrupted oil production, an unresolved government-formation crisis, and another wave of drone and missile attacks. Baghdad eventually released funding for July salaries and Erbil submitted its demands for the Kurdistan Region’s share of the 2027 federal budget, but the underlying financial dispute remained unresolved. Inside the Region, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) resumed quieter negotiations without forming the tenth Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) cabinet. Security concerns intensified sharply after two explosive drones targeted Prime Minister Masrour Barzani’s private office and the residence of the Kurdistan Region’s intelligence chief near Erbil.
Baghdad Releases July Salaries as Erbil Pushes for 2027 Budget Guarantees
The salary dispute remained one of the most immediate issues between Erbil and Baghdad. After weeks of delay, the federal government transferred 830.782 billion Iraqi dinars on August 17 to finance July salaries for public employees and retirees in the Kurdistan Region. The federal Finance Ministry deducted 120 billion dinars as Baghdad’s share of the Region’s July non-oil revenues, while another 3.326 billion dinars connected to earlier civilian and military pension entitlements was not included in the transfer. The KRG moved to cover the remaining salary shortfall from its internal revenues.
The delay was partly tied to a broader liquidity problem inside Iraq. On August 10, federal officials said the July payroll would be released once sufficient cash became available, and by August 16 Baghdad said it had assembled roughly 840 billion dinars and overcome the immediate liquidity shortage. The transfer was completed the following day.
Later in the month, the KRG shifted attention toward the next federal budget. The Finance and Economy Ministry submitted the Kurdistan Region’s proposed share of the 2027 federal budget after reviewing payrolls, expenditures and public revenues. The proposal seeks full funding for civil and military salaries, retirees, wounded veterans, political prisoners and families of martyrs, as well as healthcare spending, assistance for low-income families and an investment budget for public-service projects.
A major Kurdish demand in the proposal is equal treatment for Peshmerga salaries and financial entitlements with those of Iraqi federal security forces. It also seeks equalization of Kurdistan Region pensions, restoration of employee promotions suspended during years of financial crisis, resolution of problems involving workers outside the Unique Personal Number system, permanent status for contract employees, and federal funding for new positions in the health and higher-education sectors. The KRG called on Kurdish representatives in the Iraqi parliament to adopt a common position during the 2027 budget negotiations.
The KRG also submitted its August payroll list and the July financial trial balance to Baghdad before the end of the month, allowing the federal Finance Ministry to begin auditing the next salary cycle rather than waiting for another prolonged dispute to develop.
Fuel Shortages Continue Despite Higher Subsidized Supply
Fuel shortages continued to affect Erbil and Duhok throughout August, with long queues at filling stations and sharp differences between subsidized and commercial gasoline prices.
The Kurdistan regional Government ( KRG) maintained subsidized regular gasoline at 750 Iraqi dinars per liter and by August 16 was distributing about 3.5 million liters of subsidized gasoline each day. The government covered the gap between the market cost and subsidized price while expanding designated filling stations and tightening distribution controls.
The shortage remained closely tied to the broader oil dispute with Baghdad. The Kurdistan Region has been receiving approximately 50,000 barrels per day for local consumption, while KRG officials say actual regional demand is approximately 126,700 to 140,000 barrels per day. The difference forced Erbil to rely increasingly on imported fuel and subsidized commercial supplies as regional refinery and crude allocations failed to meet demand.
By August 25, Erbil authorities increased the capital’s subsidized gasoline allocation by about 82 percent, raising deliveries from 22 tanker trucks to 40 per day. Each tanker carries about 36,000 liters, bringing Erbil’s subsidized daily supply to approximately 1.44 million liters. Vehicles were allocated 40 liters per week at the subsidized price.
The measures eased some pressure but did not resolve the underlying supply imbalance. Commercial gasoline prices had risen sharply during the shortage, while the KRG continued pressing Baghdad for a crude allocation more closely aligned with the Kurdistan Region’s population and consumption needs.
Northern Oil Route Gains Importance as Kurdish Production Remains Vulnerable
The Kurdistan Region’s oil infrastructure became increasingly important to Iraq during August as Baghdad sought alternatives to Gulf export routes affected by the crisis around the Strait of Hormuz.
On August 1, Iraq and Turkey signed a one-year extension for the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline running to Ceyhan. The agreement preserved approximately 750,000 barrels per day of pipeline capacity while Baghdad and Ankara continued negotiations over a longer-term arrangement. The route has taken on greater national importance because Iraq’s southern exports remain vulnerable to disruptions around the Strait of Hormuz.
Actual northern exports, however, remained far below the pipeline’s potential. By August 13, exports through the Kirkuk-Kurdistan-Ceyhan route had fallen to approximately 120,000 to 135,000 barrels per day, down from nearly 300,000 barrels per day around a month earlier. Production suspensions at Kurdistan Region fields accounted for much of the decline, alongside the halt of roughly 90,000 barrels per day of Basra crude that had previously been routed north. Security-related suspensions at Kurdish fields reduced production by another estimated 60,000 barrels per day.
International operators remained reluctant to return fully while missile and drone threats continued. By August 11, oil production in the Kurdistan Region remained at very low levels because several foreign companies had suspended activity over security concerns. KRG officials said production could recover if companies received credible security guarantees.
The separate agreement governing exports between the KRG, Baghdad and international oil companies also remained unsettled during the middle of the month. The previous arrangement required approximately 230,000 barrels per day from Kurdistan Region fields to be handed to Iraq’s State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO) for export through Ceyhan. On August 12, oil companies and federal officials were still giving conflicting accounts over whether the arrangement had been formally renewed.
Conditions improved later in August. Gulf Keystone Petroleum resumed operations at the Sheikhan field on August 16 after a precautionary shutdown lasting almost a month. By August 25, Sheikhan production was approaching 40,000 barrels per day, and the company said temporary export arrangements between international oil companies, Baghdad and Erbil had been extended for six months through January 2027.
KDP and PUK Resume Talks but the Tenth Cabinet Remains Unformed
The Kurdistan Region entered August still without a new government nearly two years after the October 2024 parliamentary election. The KDP remains the largest party with 39 seats, followed by the PUK with 23 and the New Generation Movement with 15. The PUK-New Generation parliamentary alignment established earlier in the summer gives the two parties 38 seats combined, one fewer than the KDP.
On August 8, the KDP said efforts had intensified to form the tenth KRG cabinet and reactivate the Kurdistan Parliament. The parliament has remained largely paralyzed while the parties negotiate the distribution of senior posts and the structure of the next coalition government.
By August 16, the tone between the KDP and PUK had become less confrontational. Senior officials said the parties had held several meetings away from public attention and were preparing for another high-level round of negotiations. KDP officials described the private talks as producing progress and continued to present the PUK as the preferred partner in the next cabinet.
The underlying dispute nevertheless remained unresolved. The KDP continues to argue that the October 2024 election result, which left it with the largest number of seats, must be reflected in the distribution of authority. The PUK has continued to demand a coalition based on genuine partnership and institutional balance. No final agreement on the cabinet, parliament leadership or distribution of major institutions had been announced by August 26.
The political deadlock has increasingly affected more than cabinet positions. Parliament has been unable to resume normal legislative work, while the Region is simultaneously negotiating salaries, the 2027 budget, oil exports, security arrangements and relations with Baghdad during one of the most unstable periods since the defeat of ISIS.
Iranian Drone and Missile Attacks Intensify Across the Kurdistan Region
Drone and missile attacks remained one of the most serious security threats facing the Kurdistan Region during August. Between August 1 and 14 alone, the Region was hit by 16 drones and three missiles. Eight drones and all three missiles struck or entered Erbil Province, while another eight drones targeted areas of Sulaymaniyah Province.
The attacks began almost immediately. On August 2, drones entered the airspace over Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, with air-defense systems intercepting the incoming aircraft and no casualties reported. One drone was intercepted over Erbil while two entered Sulaymaniyah airspace.
Iranian Kurdish opposition organizations were again among the principal targets. On August 11, three missiles struck Komala positions in the Alana Valley in Erbil Province, wounding two Peshmerga members. The following day, the Iranian regime launched further missile and drone attacks against positions associated with Komala and the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) across Alana, Soran, Khalifan and Harir. At least one drone struck a civilian home in Soran, while another caused a fire on Mount Bani Harir.
Three more explosive drones were intercepted over Erbil on August 14, bringing the number of recorded missile and drone attacks against the Kurdistan Region during the first two weeks of August to 19.
The security crisis escalated further on August 17 when two explosive-laden Hadid-110 drones targeted the private office of KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani and the residence of the head of the Kurdistan Region Security and Intelligence Agency in Pirmam. The Kurdistan Counter-Terrorism Unit said the two drones had been launched across the border from Iranian territory at approximately 12:28 a.m.. No casualties were reported.
The attack marked a direct strike against the senior political and security leadership of the Kurdistan Region rather than against an Iranian Kurdish opposition camp or a foreign military facility. Prime Minister Barzani described it as a dangerous escalation and a direct threat to the Region’s security. The Peshmerga Ministry condemned the attack as a violation of Iraqi and Kurdistan Region sovereignty.
Baghdad responded by forming an investigative committee to determine the source and perpetrators of the attack. Federal Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi subsequently called Barzani and condemned the strike, while Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein sought an official explanation from Tehran and described the targeting of the Kurdistan Region’s prime minister as a dangerous precedent.
The Iranian regime denied responsibility for the attack. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi condemned the strike and suggested that it may have been intended to create hostility between Kurds and Tehran. The denial stood against the KRG Counter-Terrorism Unit’s finding that the drones had crossed from Iranian territory.
The attack also drew condemnation from the United States, United Kingdom, European Union and United Nations, with international responses emphasizing the Kurdistan Region’s security and Iraq’s sovereignty.
Coalition Drawdown Raises New Security Concerns
The intensifying drone campaign coincided with a major reduction in the international military presence around Erbil.
At the beginning of August, reports emerged that American and allied forces were reducing personnel and air-defense assets at Erbil International Airport as part of the planned transition away from the US-led coalition mission. CENTCOM declined to confirm or deny reports that Patriot systems had been removed from Erbil, citing operational security, but confirmed that forces and military assets were being repositioned across the region.
The timing increased concern because new drones entered Erbil and Sulaymaniyah airspace almost immediately after parts of the coalition drawdown. Kurdish security remained dependent on interception systems against missiles and explosive drones at the same time that the international force responsible for much of that protection was preparing to leave.
On August 26, Germany formally ended its military advisory mission in the Kurdistan Region during a ceremony at Camp Stephan near Erbil International Airport. German forces had operated in the Region since 2015, training, advising and providing logistical assistance to the Peshmerga during and after the war against ISIS. Around 30 German personnel remained in Kurdistan shortly before the mission ended.
The German withdrawal was the first major departure from the Kurdistan Region ahead of the coalition’s scheduled September 30 transition. The Peshmerga Ministry credited Germany with helping develop Peshmerga military capabilities and infrastructure, while German officials indicated that cooperation with the Kurdistan Region would continue through other channels.
ISIS activity has not disappeared. On August 18, Kurdistan Region security forces arrested seven suspected ISIS members in Sulaymaniyah and surrounding areas, with the suspects later transferred to federal authorities under Iraq’s anti-terrorism law. The arrests came as Baghdad and Erbil prepared to assume greater responsibility for counter-ISIS operations following the coalition drawdown.
Federal Court Dismisses Challenges Against KRG Property Authority
On August 19, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court dismissed several lawsuits filed against the KRG by the federal Finance Minister and senior officials from the National Insurance Company, Rafidain Bank and Rasheed Bank. The cases challenged a 1992 decision governing the registration and transfer of government buildings and properties in the Kurdistan Region to the KRG Ministry of Finance and Economy.
The Federal Supreme Court dismissed the cases for lack of jurisdiction, leaving the challenged property arrangements in place without issuing a substantive ruling on their constitutionality. The decision prevented the lawsuits from becoming another federal mechanism for reopening control over government properties administered by the KRG.
Article 140 and Kurdish Land Rights Return to the Forefront in Kirkuk
The status of Kirkuk and other disputed territories returned to the political agenda during August after Turkish-backed Kirkuk Governor Mohammed Samaan Agha argued that Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution had expired and that its inclusion in the constitution had been a mistake.
Kurdish institutions rejected that position. The KRG’s General Board for Kurdistani Areas reaffirmed on August 6 that Article 140 remains the constitutional framework for resolving the status of Kirkuk and other disputed territories. The provision establishes a three-stage process of normalization, census and referendum to determine the final administrative status of areas disputed between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region. Although its original implementation deadline expired at the end of 2007, the process was never completed.
The dispute over Kurdish land rights also resurfaced through the case of Mohammed Amin, a Kurdish farmer from Shanakha village in the Sargaran area of Kirkuk. On August 23, a Kirkuk court fined Amin two million Iraqi dinars in two cases connected to a confrontation with Iraqi security forces. The confrontation dated to February 2025, when a soldier was filmed pulling Amin from his tractor by his traditional Kurdish neck-wrap during a dispute over agricultural land.
The case developed against the unresolved legacy of land seizures and demographic engineering in Kirkuk. Kurdish farmers in Sargaran and other disputed areas have repeatedly faced competing land claims involving Arab settlers, federal security forces and property arrangements dating to the Baathist period. The continuing absence of Article 140 implementation has left many of those disputes without the constitutional settlement originally intended to resolve them.
Kurdistan Region of Syria (Rojava)
August 2026 marked the most consequential stage yet in Rojava’s negotiations with Damascus. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) formally ended its existence as an independent military force on August 25 after Mazloum Abdi announced that military integration with Syrian state institutions had been completed. The shift ended more than a decade in which the SDF operated as the principal Kurdish-led military force in northeast Syria, but it did not settle the Kurdish political question.
Kurdish-language education, constitutional guarantees, local administration, the future of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), the return of displaced families, property restitution, and Kurdish representation inside the Syrian state remained central unfinished files. The challenge for Rojava moved increasingly from preserving a separate military structure to securing the political, cultural, educational, and local-governance rights built during years of self-administration.
SDF Ends Independent Military Role as Integration Reaches a Historic Turning Point
The integration process moved decisively forward in late August. During Qamishlo’s centenary celebrations on August 20, Mazloum Abdi announced that the integration of Rojava’s military, security, and administrative institutions into Syrian state structures had been completed. He said the next stage would focus on political work and securing Kurdish rights in Syria’s constitution, including protection for Kurdish identity and mother-tongue education.
Five days later, Abdi traveled to Damascus with Ilham Ahmed and senior military, security, and administrative officials. After meetings with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and other government figures, Abdi announced the dissolution of the SDF as an independent military force. Speaking from the presidential palace, he declared the end of the SDF’s mission and said the Kurdish-led force had completed its merger with the Syrian military.
The announcement was significant, but the practical integration remained more complicated than the formal dissolution suggested. SDF fighters are being incorporated into Syrian military formations, while Asayish and other local security structures are being integrated into Interior Ministry institutions. Questions over command structures, deployments, local security authority, and the treatment of former SDF formations remained under implementation after the August 25 announcement.
Abdi also made clear that military integration did not end Kurdish political demands. He said the political struggle for Kurdish constitutional rights would continue and emphasized that Kurdish identity, language, and the rights of the different communities of northeast Syria must be protected inside the new Syrian system.
Kurdish Language and Education Become a Central Post-Integration Battle
Kurdish-language education emerged as one of the most important unresolved issues between Rojava and Damascus. Kurdish has developed from a suppressed language under previous Syrian governments into a language of instruction extending through university level in Rojava, making its status under the new state structure a major test of the integration agreement.
Mazloum Abdi said in August that Damascus had formed a committee with decision-making authority to address Kurdish-language education. The Kurdish position rejects reducing Kurdish to an optional school subject and instead calls for it to remain an official language of instruction in Kurdish areas, with Arabic taught alongside it so students become proficient in both languages.
Abdi said the Kurdish side had shown flexibility on bilingual education but would not accept reversing 15 years of Kurdish-language schooling. He said progress had been made in discussions with Damascus and that Kurdish education remained one of his highest priorities.
The issue took on greater importance after the August 25 Damascus meetings, when information emerged that new understandings had been reached concerning the Kurdish language and Kurdish participation in senior state positions. The details had not yet been formally issued by Damascus by August 26, leaving the extent of those guarantees unclear.
At the same time, developments inside Hasakah renewed concern over Kurdish visibility in public institutions. On August 24, authorities began changing identification signs and removing Kurdish symbols from streets and public areas in Hasakah as part of preparations connected to the January 29 agreement. New murals were planned around the city’s history and multiethnic character, but the removal of Kurdish signs came while the future status of the Kurdish language was still being negotiated nationally.
YPJ Future Remains an Unfinished Part of the Agreement
The future of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) remained one of the most sensitive parts of the integration process. While the wider SDF formally dissolved, the status of the women’s force had still not been fully resolved by August 26.
Early in the month, the YPJ said negotiations with Damascus were continuing without a final agreement on the force’s future structure. The YPJ had proposed maintaining an organized role within Syria’s security architecture and had discussed possible integration as a distinct force involved in counterterrorism and women’s security.
The disagreement centered partly on whether YPJ fighters would remain within the Defense Ministry as military personnel or be redirected toward Interior Ministry and policing roles. The YPJ has insisted that its fighters are experienced military personnel whose role was built through years of combat against ISIS, while Damascus had resisted establishing a separate women’s military formation within the army.
On August 25 when YPJ commander Newroz Ahmed met Ahmed al-Sharaa in Damascus to discuss the role of the YPJ and arrangements for the next phase.
Talks were expected to continue on August 26 with Syria’s Interior Ministry. The absence of a final public settlement left the YPJ file open even after the formal dissolution of the SDF. For Kurdish women in Rojava, the outcome carries significance beyond military organization because the YPJ has become closely tied to women’s participation in public life, self-defense, and the political identity developed under the Autonomous Administration.
Sere Kaniye Return Begins, Then Stops After Kurdish Families Are Attacked
The return of displaced residents to Sere Kaniye became one of August’s most serious failures in implementing the January 29 agreement.
After years of displacement following Turkey’s 2019invasion, the first organized convoy carrying more than 400 displaced families returned to Sere Kaniye on August 10. Families departed from the Washokani area in Hasakah in what was intended to become the first stage of a broader return process.
The return quickly turned violent. Kurdish families were assaulted, threatened, and intimidated after arriving in Sere Kaniye, including confrontations involving people occupying homes belonging to displaced residents. Videos showed returnees being attacked, while elderly members of the convoy were among those reportedly assaulted.
The attacks triggered demonstrations across Rojava. Residents in Qamishlo, Hasakah, Derbesiyeh, Tel Tamr, Derik, Girkê Legê, Tirbespiye and Kobani protested in support of the returnees, demanding protection for Kurdish families, accountability for those responsible, and guarantees that displaced residents could recover their homes and property safely.
Kurdish political parties also condemned the attacks and accused armed factions and people occupying Kurdish homes of attempting to obstruct the return and preserve demographic changes imposed after the 2019 displacement.
Preparations for further convoys were subsequently suspended until security and legal guarantees could be established. By August 26, the return process had not fully resumed, leaving tens of thousands of displaced Sere Kaniye residents without a clear timetable for returning home.
Shahba Families Face New Displacement Pressure Inside Qamishlo
The displacement crisis also deepened for families from Shahba who remained in Rojava.
By late August, 210 displaced families were living inside 17 schools in Qamishlo, creating a conflict between the need to reopen schools for the new academic year and the absence of alternative housing for displaced residents. The families were told that the school buildings needed to be vacated as students prepared to return to classrooms in September. The evacuation dispute involved 17 schools housing 210 displaced families.
The Shahba Civil Council said the families could not leave without alternative accommodation or a safe route back to their original areas. Around 1,350 Shahba families remain displaced across Qamishlo, Hasakah, Kobani, Amuda and Derik, including families uprooted during several different waves of conflict.
A meeting on August 26 between local authorities, education officials, and the Shahba Civil Council failed to produce a solution for the 210 families. The dispute left Kurdish families caught between another forced move and the continuing inability to return safely to their homes.
Afrin Returns Continue, but Many Families Face Severe Shortages
Afrin continued to receive Kurdish families returning after years of displacement, but conditions remained difficult long after the organized convoys reached the region.
By August 22, approximately 16,000 families had returned to Afrin since the beginning of 2026. Many were rebuilding homes, returning to villages, and attempting to restore lives disrupted by years of displacement, but families in temporary shelter centers continued to face shortages of drinking water, healthcare, bread, cash assistance, waste collection, and other basic services.
A separate development on August 9 opened the possibility of further returns when Turkish forces withdrew from Jalbara village in Afrin countryside after more than eight years. The village had been used as a military position and residents had been unable to access it during that period. Internal security forces subsequently entered to search for mines and unexploded war remnants before residents could begin returning.
More than 70 houses remain in Jalbara, many damaged during years of fighting. The withdrawal removed one obstacle to return, but mine contamination, destroyed property, and the need to restore basic infrastructure continued to stand between displaced Kurdish families and permanent resettlement.
Kurdish Land Seizures Continue Around Tel Abyad
Property rights remained contested outside Afrin and Sere Kaniye as well.
In the Tel Abyad countryside, armed groups continued to hold approximately 300 hectares of agricultural land belonging to Kurdish farmers. The land lies near Qart Sharaf village in an area where fighters formerly affiliated with the Turkish-backed Hamzat and Amshat factions remain influential after their incorporation into Syrian Defense Ministry structures.
Kurdish landowners attempting to reclaim the farms were threatened and fired upon to prevent them from entering their property. The seized land was subsequently plowed and replanted by those controlling it, increasing concern that temporary wartime seizures were being transformed into permanent loss of Kurdish property.
Most Kurdish residents of the area were displaced during Turkey’s 2019 offensive and have remained unable to recover full access to their villages and farmland. The continuing seizures placed property restitution alongside security guarantees as one of the major obstacles to meaningful return.
Kurdish Civilian Arrest in Tabqa Raises New Rights Concerns
A separate August case in Tabqa raised concern over treatment of Kurdish civilians under the new security structures.
Kurdish civilian Mazkeen Dawood Hassi was arrested after filing a complaint over gunfire directed at his family home. Surveillance footage reviewed by his family reportedly showed an armed man threatening the household and firing at the building and a family vehicle before Hassi later approached security authorities.
Instead of receiving protection after submitting the complaint, Hassi was detained and taken to an undisclosed location. The case added to concerns that Kurdish civilians in areas outside the core Rojava cities remain vulnerable to arbitrary detention and weak protection against armed actors.
ISIS Threat Continues During the Security Transition
ISIS (Da’esh) remained active during August even as Rojava’s military and security structures were being integrated into Syrian state institutions.
By August 8, at least 68 Dae’sh attacks had been recorded across Syria since the beginning of 2026, with Deir ez-Zor remaining the center of activity. Thirty-five of those attacks had occurred in Deir ez-Zor, while additional incidents were recorded in Raqqa and Hasakah.
On August 11, unidentified gunmen attacked a post belonging to the Qamishlo Brigade of the Syrian Army’s 60th Division, a formation that had previously been part of the SDF. Two fighters were killed and two others wounded, prompting a joint security operation by the Defense Ministry and local internal-security forces against suspected ISIS positions in Hasakah countryside.
One of the wounded fighters died from his injuries on August 19, bringing the toll from the attack higher. The identity of the attackers had not been conclusively established, but the incident came amid continuing ISIS activity and broader security tension during the transition from SDF structures to integrated Syrian formations.
Kurdistan Region of Turkey (Bakur)
August 2026 moved the Kurdish peace process in Turkey into its most concrete legal phase since Abdullah Öcalan’s 2025 call to end armed conflict. Parliament approved the long-awaited framework law governing disarmament, return, suspended prosecutions and reintegration, giving the process a legal mechanism that had been missing for more than a year. But the law stopped well short of resolving the Kurdish question itself. Kurdish language and cultural rights, constitutional recognition, the trustee system, political prisoners, anti-terror legislation, and Öcalan’s legal and physical status remained outside its core provisions.
Parliament Passes the Framework Law
The decisive development came on August 10, when parliament approved the “Milli Dayanışma ve Toplumsal Bütünleşmenin Güçlendirilmesine Dair Kanun” with 467 votes, giving overwhelming parliamentary backing to the legal phase of the peace process. The law received support from the AKP, MHP and DEM Party alongside lawmakers from several other parties.
The 12-article law establishes procedures to be activated after security institutions verify that the PKK/KCK and affiliated structures have ended their organizational existence and surrendered weapons. It allows investigations, prosecutions and prison sentences to be suspended in a range of PKK-related cases, including organization membership, leadership, assistance, propaganda and certain offenses committed within organizational activity.
The legislation also creates a six-month application process for people seeking to return from abroad and provides mechanisms for former PKK members and others covered by the law to move through the judicial system and reintegrate into civilian life. A coordination structure headed by the vice president and a parliamentary monitoring mechanism are intended to oversee implementation. Intentional homicide and several categories carrying life or aggravated-life sentences remain outside parts of the arrangement.
The law became the first major legal instrument produced by the current peace process. Yet its wording is deliberately narrow. It primarily regulates the consequences of disarmament and return rather than Kurdish political or cultural rights, changes to the Anti-Terror Law, decentralization, mother-tongue education, constitutional reform or Öcalan’s status.
Öcalan Backs the Legal Step and Calls for a Democratic Phase
Abdullah Öcalan placed his support behind the emerging legal process during an August 2 meeting with the DEM Party İmralı Delegation. After the three-hour meeting, his message described the legislation as a key capable of opening the way for the next stage of the process and linked it to a broader transition toward what he calls a democratic republic.
Öcalan presented the law as the beginning rather than the conclusion of the Kurdish settlement. His message argued that the transition should serve not only Kurds but the entire population of Turkey and said democratic law, political participation and social organization would have to develop alongside the end of armed conflict.
His message came days before the bill was formally submitted to parliament and placed Kurdish political support behind a legal transition while leaving open the larger question of what would follow once armed structures were dismantled.
Following the law’s passage, DEM Party representatives continued pressing for Öcalan to remain directly involved. After meeting President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on August 13, the İmralı Delegation said the peace process would continue with a shared commitment and that another meeting with Öcalan should follow quickly. The meeting with Erdoğan lasted approximately an hour and a half and focused on implementation of the new law and the next stages of the process.
Kurdish Movement Welcomes the Step but Warns the Law Does Not Resolve the Kurdish Question
Support for the legal breakthrough was accompanied by sharp criticism of its limitations.
Mustafa Karasu, deputy chairman and one of the founders of the PKK said the legislation had moved the process onto a new political and legal track but did not itself constitute a solution to the Kurdish question. He argued that implementation would be difficult unless Öcalan was able to participate effectively in directing and coordinating the transition.
Murat Karayılan, another founder of the PKK, similarly described the law as an important new step but pointed to one of its most politically revealing omissions: the law does not contain the word “Kurd”. His criticism focused on the difference between legislation designed to dismantle an armed organization and legislation designed to resolve the political problem that produced decades of conflict.
Demirtaş, Yüksekdağ and Political Prisoners Remain at the Center of the Peace Debate
The framework law immediately reopened the question of Kurdish political prisoners, particularly former Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) co-chairs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ.
From Edirne Prison, Demirtaş and former Amed Metropolitan Municipality Co-Mayor Selçuk Mızraklı sent a message to parliament ahead of the final vote, urging lawmakers to move the process forward without creating a sense of victory for one side or defeat for another. They called for the legislation to open a new political period based on cooperation and peace.
Whether Demirtaş can directly benefit from the new law quickly became disputed. Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz said the courts would determine who qualifies under the framework law and stressed that the legislation had not been drafted around individual figures. MHP Deputy Chair Feti Yıldız subsequently said Demirtaş falls within the scope of the legislation.
Demirtaş’s lawyers argued that he could qualify under the new framework, but maintained that the more fundamental issue is the continued failure to implement binding European Court of Human Rights judgments concerning his detention. Legal experts likewise argued that discussing whether Demirtaş should benefit from a new law risks obscuring the fact that existing international court judgments already require his release.
DEM Party officials renewed demands on August 13 for the release of both Demirtaş and Yüksekdağ, saying their freedom does not require another new law and that existing court decisions should simply be implemented. Two days later, the İmralı Delegation visited Demirtaş and Mızraklı in Edirne Prison and again called for their release.
The continued imprisonment of prominent Kurdish politicians remained one of the strongest contradictions inside the peace process: parliament had created a mechanism to return former armed actors to civilian life while politicians imprisoned for years over political cases remained behind bars.
Trustee System Remains Unresolved Despite Calls for Elected Mayors to Return
The future of state-appointed trustees remained another unresolved democratic issue.
Bahçeli’s August 5 call for the “Ahmets” to return to office again raised expectations surrounding Ahmet Türk, the elected co-mayor of Mardin, and Ahmet Özer, the elected mayor of Esenyurt. Both had been removed from office and replaced under Interior Ministry authority.
A significant development came on August 24 in Ahmet Özer’s case. He was acquitted of the principal charges in the case against him, although he received an eight-month-and-ten-day sentence for “neglect of duty,” with the announcement of the judgment deferred. Özer said the outcome left no legal obstacle to his return to office and announced that he would challenge the remaining sentence.
No corresponding reinstatement had taken place by August 26. The issue also remained unresolved for Kurdish municipalities already under trustee administration. Discussions held by the İmralı Delegation after passage of the framework law indicated that no explicit commitment had yet been received from Erdoğan on restoring trustee-run municipalities to their elected administrations.
Kurdish Language Rights Remain Outside the Framework Law
The framework law did not resolve the status of Kurdish language rights, leaving one of the oldest Kurdish demands outside the immediate peace legislation.
After the law passed, DEM Party officials acknowledged that fundamental rights and freedoms were not directly included in the new legislation. The party described the law instead as a mechanism for moving from armed conflict toward democratic politics, with broader rights expected to require subsequent political and constitutional reforms.
Kurdish language institutions in Van renewed that demand on August 20, arguing that lasting peace requires concrete legal protection for Kurdish language and culture. They called for mother-tongue rights to be treated as part of the political settlement rather than as a cultural concession detached from the Kurdish question.
The issue remains especially sensitive because Kurdish is still not constitutionally guaranteed as a language of education. Kurdish political representatives have consistently called for removal of legal restrictions that prevent mother-tongue education and for Kurdish to have normal institutional use in schools, municipalities, courts and public services.
At the local level, Kurdish-led municipalities continued expanding multilingual practices. In Amed, municipal activities and public communications were being published in Kurdish alongside Turkish, while August programs included Kurdish-language municipal announcements, cultural activities and bilingual public initiatives. The contrast between growing Kurdish-language use in locally elected institutions and the absence of national legal guarantees remained visible throughout the month.
Arrests and Security Practices Continue During the Peace Process
The legal breakthrough did not bring an immediate end to security operations in Kurdish areas.
In Van, police detained seven young people, including a child, during operations on August 14. The reason for the detentions had not been disclosed to their families in the initial days following the operation, and one detainee was reported to suffer from epilepsy.
Prison conditions also remained contested. In August, Kurdish prisoner Nevzat Öner filed a criminal complaint after alleging that gendarmes assaulted him when he refused a handcuffed medical examination following his transfer from Van F-Type High Security Prison to hospital. His complaint again raised the issue of coercive medical procedures and treatment of prisoners.
These cases continued alongside longstanding Kurdish demands for reform of the Anti-Terror Law, sentence-enforcement practices, high-security prisons and legal provisions that have allowed political activity, speeches, demonstrations and media work to become grounds for prosecution.
Restrictions on Kurdish Media Continue
Press and digital-media restrictions also continued despite the new political atmosphere.
On August 21, authorities blocked access inside Turkey to the X account of the Kurdish-focused Mezopotamya news agency alongside the accounts of journalist Fırat Fıstık and commentator Nasuh Bektaş. The restrictions were imposed under Article 8/A of Law No. 5651 on grounds of national security and public order, without public identification of the specific posts that triggered the measures.
The action followed repeated blocking of Kurdish-oriented news websites and social-media accounts and showed that digital censorship remained active even as parliament was attempting to move the Kurdish conflict onto a legal and political track. For Kurdish journalists and media institutions, freedom of reporting remains closely tied to the wider democratic reforms that have yet to follow the framework law.