Washington Kurdish Institute | July 9, 2025
Iraq’s Kurdish population has endured a tragic history of persecution at the hands of central authorities. During the 1980s, Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime unleashed the infamous Anfal campaign – a brutal military offensive aimed at depopulating Kurdish areas. This genocidal campaign killed at least 100,000 Kurds (with some estimates of 180,000 fatalities), wiped out thousands of villages, and sought to eradicate Kurdish presence in northern Iraq. In March 1988, Iraqi forces carried out the Halabja chemical attack, bombing the Kurdish town of Halabja with mustard gas and nerve agents. Approximately 5,000 people – mainly women and children – were killed in this single chemical strike. These atrocities, recognized by rights organizations as a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing and genocide, epitomize the extreme injustices suffered by Iraq’s Kurds.
The legacy of these massacres deeply scarred the Kurdish nation but also steeled their resolve for self-rule. After the 1991 Gulf War, a Western-enforced no-fly zone gave the Kurds breathing room to establish the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq. For the first time, the Kurds enjoyed de facto autonomy, governing their own region and building their own institutions. This hard-won freedom followed decades of genocide, massacres, and chemical attacks inflicted upon them by Baghdad. Yet even as Saddam’s dictatorship fell in 2003, the Kurds were wary – their past had shown that promises made by Iraqi regimes could easily be broken when it came to Kurdish rights.
The New Iraq and Kurdish Hopes: Constitutional Promises vs. Reality
The U.S.-led invasion of 2003 toppled Saddam Hussein and offered a chance to redefine Iraq on new, democratic terms. Kurdish leaders, encouraged by the United States and the international community, agreed to remain part of a “New Iraq” rather than seek immediate independence. The 2005 Iraqi Constitution was the cornerstone of this new political order, and it formally recognized the Kurdistan Region as a federal entity with significant autonomy. Kurdish officials took on prominent roles in Baghdad, and the Kurdish and Arab populations were meant to share power in a federal republic. In principle, the constitution guaranteed Kurdish language rights, allowed regional law-making, recognized the Peshmerga (Kurdish security forces), and outlined a just sharing of oil revenues and authority between Baghdad and the KRG.
In practice, however, these constitutional promises to the Kurds were never fully implemented by Baghdad. Kurdish leaders soon found that the letter of the law meant little if Iraq’s federal government was unwilling to follow it. In fact, since 2005, successive Iraqi cabinets have violated the constitution’s special arrangements for Kurdistan, undermining the autonomy and rights that were supposed to be protected. Key provisions – from power-sharing in disputed territories to revenue allocation – were ignored or actively subverted. As Ambassador Peter Galbraith noted, the constitution had envisioned a decentralization of power: “as new oil fields came online, regions would control the resources and keep the revenues,” shifting Iraq from a centralized state to a truly federal one. Yet in critical areas Baghdad never implemented the constitution as designed. The high hopes Kurdish officials held in 2005 gradually gave way to frustration as they watched Baghdad re-centralize authority that was supposed to be shared.
Violations of Kurdish Rights in the Iraqi Constitution
Despite the Kurdistan Region’s good-faith participation in the Iraqi state, the central government in Baghdad has repeatedly reneged on constitutional commitments, especially those meant to safeguard Kurdish rights and autonomy. Three issues stand out: the status of disputed territories, the management of oil and gas resources, and the allocation of the federal budget.
Disputed Territories and Article 140: One of the most important guarantees the Kurds secured in the 2005 constitution was Article 140, which provided a roadmap to resolve the status of historically Kurdish-majority areas like Kirkuk. Article 140 required Baghdad to “hold a referendum in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine their administrative status” by December 31, 2007, after a process of normalization and a census. This referendum was intended to let the people of Kirkuk decide whether to join the Kurdistan Region or remain under Baghdad’s administration. However, successive Iraqi governments blatantly failed to fulfill this obligation, and the deadline came and went with no referendum. Now, nearly two decades later, these Kurdish territories remain in limbo, still referred to as the “disputed territories” because Article 140 was never implemented. In short, Baghdad has flouted its constitutional duty on this issue, perpetuating instability and injustice. Rather than undoing Saddam-era Arabization of these areas, Iraq’s post-2003 governments often upheld or revived discriminatory policies. For example, instead of restoring Kurdish farmers and residents who were displaced under Ba’athist rule, Baghdad has at times continued to empower settlers and even stripped tens of thousands of Kurds in these areas of their voting rights. The federal government’s failure to carry out Article 140 and achieve normalization means the disputes persist, with Kurds denied a fair say over the governance of their home regions. This persistent violation has been “ignored for seventeen years” and remains a major point of contention fueling Arab–Kurdish tensions.
Oil and Gas Rights: Control of natural resources lies at the heart of Kurdish autonomy. The constitution (notably Articles 111–115) states that Iraq’s oil and gas belong to all the people of Iraq, but it also guarantees regions a role in managing new fields and mandates revenue-sharing arrangements. In fact, the constitutional design anticipated that regional authorities like the KRG would take the lead in developing new oil fields in their areas, retaining revenues to ensure prosperity and autonomy for their people. Baghdad, however, has never honored this bargain. No nationwide oil and gas law was ever passed to formalize the sharing of authority. Instead, Baghdad insisted on central control, and when the Kurdistan Region moved ahead with developing its own oil resources, the central government treated it as a threat rather than a right. “Baghdad never implemented the Constitution” in this regard – the KRG’s constitutionally enshrined right to develop and profit from regional oil was effectively blocked.
Tensions came to a head in February 2022, when Iraq’s politically-influenced Federal Supreme Court issued a shock ruling against the KRG. Citing a vague interpretation of the law, the court claimed the KRG’s Oil and Gas Law was unconstitutional and ordered the Kurds to hand over all oil production to the federal government. Baghdad used this judicial tool – a court whose very legitimacy has been questioned – to invalidate oil contracts the KRG had signed with foreign companies, aiming to bring Kurdish oil under its exclusive control. The KRG rejected the ruling, rightly pointing out that Iraq’s constitution allows regions to explore, produce, and sell natural resources within their territories. By failing to adopt a fair national oil law and by using the courts to grab KRG oil, Baghdad has blatantly disregarded the compromise enshrined in 2005. Even international arbitration has been weaponized: in March 2023, Baghdad won a case to halt the KRG’s independent oil exports via Turkey, after which it still refused to resume oil exports, inflicting billions of dollars in damage on the Kurdistan Region’s economy. The result is that constitutional clauses (such as Article 112, which calls for joint management of existing fields like Kirkuk and equitable sharing of revenues) have been treated as dead letters by Iraq’s rulers. Kurdish autonomy – meant to be buttressed by control over natural wealth – has instead been steadily eroded.
Budget and Revenue Sharing: Another recurrent violation is Baghdad’s manipulation of the federal budget to pressure the Kurds. The constitution guarantees the Kurdistan Region a proportional share of Iraq’s national revenue, in theory around 17% based on population. Yet time and again, Baghdad has withheld budget funds to the KRG in order to bend it to Baghdad’s will. The most extreme instance occurred in 2014 under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki: as disagreements grew over oil policy, Baghdad cut off all budget transfers to the Kurdistan Region and even stopped paying the salaries of Kurdish civil servants and Peshmerga forces. This financially strangling move plunged the Kurdistan Region into an economic crisis – a crisis compounded by the war against ISIS that erupted that same year. Denied its budget and facing a brutal enemy, the KRG resorted to what it termed “economic independence,” exporting oil on its own just to generate revenue to pay its people. Baghdad castigated the Kurds for these independent oil sales even though it was Baghdad’s own unconstitutional budget cut that necessitated them.Budget payments have been delayed or used as leverage since 2014. In 2023, the Iraqi parliament passed a three-year budget law that Kurdish officials slammed as unconstitutional – it introduced new mechanisms to constrain the KRG’s finances and even divided the Kurdistan Region’s funding among its provinces, seemingly treating the Kurdish region not as a single federal unit but as subordinate provinces under Baghdad’s control. Such stipulations violate both the spirit and letter of Iraq’s federal constitution. The KRG has protested these moves, noting that Baghdad’s unilateral changes to budget and finance laws directly contravene prior agreements and constitutional provisions. In short, the Iraqi government has often used the purse strings to punish the Kurds – starving the region of funds and thereby attempting to weaken the Kurdish self-governing model whenever disputes arise.
Beyond these areas, Baghdad’s pattern of undermining Kurdish rights extends to other fields as well. The constitution envisions the Peshmerga as part of Iraq’s overall defense forces, but efforts to integrate and support them have lagged; instead, Kurdish forces are sometimes treated with mistrust or sidelined. Meanwhile, Iranian-backed militias (the Hashd al-Shaabi or Popular Mobilization Forces) operate on Kurdistan’s periphery with Baghdad’s approval, and have even fired rockets into KRG territory with little response from Baghdad. Laws from past regimes that discriminated against Kurds (such as those enabling Arabization) were never properly annulled – in fact, Baghdad has at times upheld outdated laws that perpetuate Arabization policies in places like Kirkuk. All these actions send a clear message: even in “New Iraq,” old injustices against Kurds persist in new forms. The cumulative effect has been to convince many Kurds that the federal system is being hollowed out and that their people’s rights and security can only be guaranteed by taking a different path.
Pushing for Independence: The 2017 Referendum and Its Aftermath
Facing years of unkept promises, Kurdish frustrations culminated in a historic decision: a referendum on independence. On September 25, 2017, the Kurdistan Region (and Kurdish-majority disputed areas under its de facto control) held a popular vote on whether to secede from Iraq. The result was an overwhelming “yes.” More than 92% of Kurdish voters endorsed independence, a reflection of their desire to chart a new course after so many setbacks. For the Kurds, this moment was the expression of a century-old dream of self-determination – one that had been deferred repeatedly, from the post-World War I era through the end of Saddam’s reign. The referendum was carried out peacefully and democratically, with a high turnout and jubilant rallies in cities like Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Duhok in the lead-up to the vote.
However, the response from Baghdad – and indeed most of the world – was swift and punitive. The Iraqi government rejected the Kurdish referendum as “illegal” and refused any dialogue on independence. Backed by its neighbors Turkey and Iran, who vehemently opposed Kurdish statehood (fearing it would embolden their own Kurdish minorities), Baghdad moved to isolate the KRG. Within days, Iraqi authorities banned international flights to Kurdistan’s airports, choking a lifeline of the semi-autonomous region. Then in mid-October 2017, Iraqi forces — including Iranian-backed Shiite militias of the PMF — launched an operation to seize the disputed territories that had been held by the Kurds.The world watched as Iraqi armored units pushed into Kirkuk and Kurdish Peshmerga forces, vastly outgunned due to political pressure, largely withdrew rather than spark an all-out war. Baghdad thus invaded and reasserted control over Kirkuk and other areas, expelling the elected Kurdish governor of Kirkuk and dismantling Kurdish administrative presence there. In the span of a few weeks, the territorial gains the Kurds had made (often liberating those areas from ISIS with their blood) were reversed by their own ostensible countrymen.
International powers, unfortunately, did little to shield the Kurds from this backlash. The United States – long the Kurds’ close partner – opposed the referendum from the start and declined to recognize its result, aligning instead with Baghdad’s position of maintaining Iraq’s unity. Turkey and Iran not only condemned the Kurdish vote but also threatened military and economic retaliation, conducting joint military drills on Kurdistan’s borders and, in Iran’s case, even firing missiles near Kurdish territory as a warning. European countries and the EU issued statements against the referendum timing, effectively siding with the argument that Iraq’s territorial integrity should not be altered. In the run-up to the vote, Kurdish leaders were pressed by Western diplomats to cancel or postpone it. After the vote, when Baghdad moved in militarily, Western powers largely stood by. The U.S. government, while urging restraint, did not intervene to stop Baghdad’s offensive, despite the fact it was American-supplied tanks being used to roll back the Kurds. This sense of betrayal was keenly felt in Kurdistan: the same Kurds who had helped fight ISIS alongside American troops just months before were now left to fend for themselves under Iraqi and Iranian pressure.
From the Kurdish perspective, the lesson of 2017 was bitter: even in the “New Iraq,” the old dynamics of repression remained. The Kurds had been urged in 2003 to trust in Iraq’s unity and a federal constitution, rather than opting for secession. In 2017, when they tried to exercise the very right of self-determination enshrined in the UN Charter, they found themselves standing virtually alone. The episode reinforced a stark reality that Kurdish intellectuals often voice: because the Kurds lack a fully independent state of their own, they are at the mercy of larger states and international geopolitics – and regional powers will typically “come together and unite to keep the Kurds from gaining full independence or autonomy” in any one country. Despite the setback, the desire for freedom has not faded among Iraqi Kurds; if anything, Baghdad’s harsh response only deepened Kurdish cynicism about ever achieving true equality within Iraq.
The Case for International Support: Rights, Autonomy, or Independence
Today, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq stands at a crossroads. On paper, it remains an integral part of the Iraqi federation, and its autonomy is recognized by Iraq’s constitution and by the international community. In practice, however, the erosions of the past decade pose an existential threat to the region’s self-rule. Powerful factions in Baghdad – often influenced by an expansionist Iranian agenda – appear intent on chipping away at the Kurdistan Region’s powers, finances, and territory until Kurdish autonomy is Kurdish in name only.
At the same time, the region is increasingly destabilized by external interventions. Iranian-backed militias operate with impunity near the Kurdish border, launching attacks and threatening Kurdish leaders with Baghdad’s tacit approval. Turkey, too, has conducted frequent airstrikes and military incursions into KRG territory under the pretext of targeting the PKK, often destabilizing rural Kurdish communities and undermining the region’s security and sovereignty. These interventions from both Iran and Turkey have turned Kurdistan into a geopolitical battleground, with the Iraqi state either complicit or incapable of defending the Kurdish people.
And yet, paradoxically, this may be the most opportune time for Kurdish independence in decades. Despite Turkey’s long-standing opposition to a Kurdish state in Iraq, recent developments suggest a possible shift. As Kurdish–Turkish relations warm — particularly in light of pragmatic security coordination and a pause in domestic Turkish–Kurdish conflict — Ankara may no longer view an independent Kurdistan as a red line. Some Turkish policymakers now quietly acknowledge that a stable, pro-Ankara Kurdish state in Iraq could serve as a buffer against both Iranian influence and Baghdad’s dysfunction, especially if such a state respects Turkey’s security concerns. This emerging dynamic provides a rare diplomatic window that the international community should recognize.
Faced with this reality, the Kurds are once again appealing for global support to secure their rights and future. It is an appeal rooted not only in fairness and justice, but also in the Kurds’ undeniable contributions to regional stability and Western interests.
The moral and strategic case for supporting Kurdish rights is strong. The Kurds of Iraq have transformed their region into a relative oasis of stability, pluralism, and pro-Western orientation in a tumultuous Middle East. They have built a vibrant civil society and economy (despite Baghdad’s constraints) and have consistently been allies to the United States and Europe – from sheltering over 1.5 million refugees and IDPs during the ISIS war, to providing the ground forces that defeated ISIS’s caliphate with coalition air support. Kurdistan’s Peshmerga fighters famously held the line when the Iraqi Army collapsed in 2014, arguably saving Iraq itself from collapse. For decades, the Kurds have paid the price for being a trusted ally to the US in Iraq, suffering retaliation and hardship in the hope of a democratic, pluralistic Iraq. This loyalty has often gone unrequited. It is telling that Kurdish officials today warn that anti-Kurdish policies by Baghdad (egged on by Tehran) ultimately undermine Western interests too. A stable Iraq is impossible if a key pillar – the Kurdistan Region – is continually under attack politically, economically, or even militarily.
From a legal standpoint, the Kurds are simply asking that Iraq’s original deal be honored. Full implementation of the constitution – resolving Kirkuk’s status, fairly sharing oil revenue, funding the KRG, integrating Peshmerga, and respecting federalism – would address most Kurdish grievances.
American diplomats at times acknowledge that Baghdad’s anti-Kurdish rhetoric and actions are counterproductive, but there must be consistent pressure to translate that into policy changes. Support could include mediation on disputed territories, guaranteeing budget agreements are kept, and conditioning aid to Iraq on its treatment of the Kurdistan Region. Europe, which has energy and investment interests in Kurdistan’s oil and gas sector, can likewise insist that Baghdad stop trying to monopolize resources contrary to the constitution. Enforcing Iraq’s existing laws would strengthen moderates on both sides and refute hardliners who claim that coexistence is impossible.
At the same time, the international community must be prepared to acknowledge that the Kurds’ right to self-determination cannot be postponed indefinitely. The Kurdish nation, divided among four countries, is the largest stateless ethnic group in the world. In Iraq, the Kurds entered a voluntary union on the basis of constitutional guarantees that are now in tatters. If Baghdad continues on its current course – effectively dismantling the only Kurdish autonomy recognized in the Middle East – then the argument for Kurdish independence will only grow stronger. Already in 2017, nearly three million Iraqi Kurds voiced their clear preference to form an independent state. Their will was stymied by force, not by persuasion.
Given the current regional dynamics — Iranian encroachment, Baghdad’s dysfunction, and a cooling of Turkish hostility — the prospect for Kurdish statehood no longer rests solely on historical grievance. It now also aligns with strategic logic for regional stability, energy security, and international partnerships.
The U.S. and EU, which in 2003–2005 encouraged the Kurds to cast their lot with Iraq, have a responsibility to ensure that the Kurds are not relegated once again to second-class status or worse. Supporting Kurdish independence outright has long been a taboo for world diplomats, but supporting Kurdish rights and security should never be. The time has come for a re-evaluation: either the Kurdistan Region’s rights within Iraq are robustly protected and expanded in line with the constitution, or the Kurds must be assisted in a peaceful process to achieve independence as a last resort if Baghdad remains intransigent.
The story of the Kurds in “New Iraq” has become one of injustice and broken promises. What began with optimism in 2005 has devolved into yet another chapter of struggle for a people who have endured genocide and tyranny. The Kurds proved their goodwill by helping build Iraq and fighting its enemies, but they have not received reciprocal good faith from Iraq’s leaders. It is imperative for Washington, Brussels, and other international actors to stand up now and prevent further backsliding. A clear message must be sent to Baghdad that the era of brushing aside Kurdish rights is over. If the U.S. and the international community do not stand firmly behind the KRG and the Kurdish people, Baghdad may well succeed in demolishing the only Kurdish autonomy recognized in the country – undoing a hard-fought achievement that has also been a bulwark of regional stability. Instead of allowing that outcome, the world should support either a real enforcement of Iraq’s federal principles or a peaceful path to independence for Kurdistan. The Kurds have waited long enough for justice. Backed by genuine international support, they can either secure their rightful place within a truly federal Iraq, or finally take their place among the free nations of the world. The time for decisive action – to uphold Kurdish rights or endorse Kurdish independence – is now.