Kurdistan Region of Iran (Rojhelat)
September 2026 saw a renewed security crackdown across Rojhelat, centered heavily on the fourth anniversary of Zhina Amini’s death and the September 16 general strike. Arrests extended from shopkeepers and civil activists to journalists, cultural figures and children, while executions, death-penalty cases and lethal shootings along the Kurdish border continued.
Kurdish Political Parties and Opposition Activity
Kurdish political parties increased their joint activity during September, particularly through the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan, which includes the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), Komala factions and Khabat. The coalition’s main action was its call for a general strike across Rojhelat on September 16, marking the fourth anniversary of Jina Amini’s death and the beginning of the Jin, Jiyan, Azadi uprising. Businesses closed in Saqqez, Senna, Mahabad, Bukan, Shinno, Marivan, Kamyaran and other Kurdish cities in response to the call. KDPI Secretary-General Mustafa Hijri separately issued a September 15 message supporting the general strike, calling on people across Rojhelat to participate and presenting the action as a continuation of the Jina uprising and the Kurdish political struggle against the Iranian regime. PJAK separately issued a statement marking the fourth anniversary of the Jin, Jiyan, Azadi uprising on September 13, while the Eastern Kurdistan Women’s Defense Forces (HPJ), affiliated with PJAK, held a September 16 commemoration for those killed during the uprising. September focused largely on joint political action, anniversary events and party responses to pressure from the Iranian regime, with little publicly announced armed activity inside Rojhelat.
September 16 General Strike and Security Crackdown
The largest political development of the month came on September 16, when shopkeepers and market traders joined a general strike across Kurdish cities marking four years since the death of Zhina Amini and the beginning of the Jin, Jiyan, Azadi protests. Businesses closed in Saqqez, Senna, Mahabad, Bukan, Shinno, Divandarreh, Marivan, Kamyaran and Qorveh following a call by a coalition of Iranian Kurdish political parties. Security forces increased their presence in several cities, while some shopkeepers received warnings that their businesses could be sealed if they participated.
Pressure began before the strike. In Senna, shopkeepers Jalal Khoda-Moradi, 46, and Mohsen Hossein-Panahi, 37, were summoned after being instructed to sign pledges not to close their businesses. They were arrested on September 14 after reporting to the authorities, and their whereabouts were initially undisclosed.
Shinno became another center of arrests. Abdolbaset Bapiri, Soran Bayazidi, Rahim Arshadi, Reza Rashidnia and Fakhraddin Ebrahimi were among residents detained during raids around September 15. Ebrahimi is the son of executed Kurdish political prisoner Mohieddin Ebrahimi. Ahmad Hajipour was detained the following day. In Mahabad, civil activist and martial-arts coach Hiwa Abdollahi was also arrested. Seven Kurdish men were documented detained in Shinno and Mahabad.
The pressure continued after September 16. Security agencies summoned or detained shopkeepers who had joined the strike, while businesses in Senna and Saqqez were temporarily sealed. In Kamyaran, several shopkeepers were summoned and required to sign pledges against participating in future strikes; at least six were detained, according to the Kurdistan Human Rights Network. Dozens of Kurdish traders faced summonses, arrests or shop closures.
Children Drawn Into Security Cases
Children were again subjected to security pressure. Authorities in Shinno summoned and interrogated at least 20 Kurdish children under the age of 18 over social-media activity. Their phones and electronic devices were confiscated, and they were reportedly questioned over accusations of “propaganda against the state” before being released on bail guarantees.
The most serious case involved Arjin Jondi, a 16-year-old from Kuper village near Piranshahr. Jondi was detained on September 12 following the killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) member Eslam Kak-Darvishi. A group calling itself Khori Hiwa(Sun of Hope) had claimed responsibility for the killing, but authorities subsequently released a video presenting statements attributed to Jondi. The 16-year-old remained without access to a lawyer or family visits as concerns grew over the possibility of a capital case. Allegations that he had been tortured or coerced came from human-rights sources and have not been independently verified.
Civil, Cultural and Political Activists Arrested
Arrests extended well beyond the anniversary strike. In Urmia’s Margavar area, Farhang Dehghan, Majid Ebtehaj, Vahed Shabani, Behdar Asadi and Saleh Darboubeh-Chichak were detained during operations around September 16–17 and taken to undisclosed locations. Mehran Ebrahimzadeh was arrested at his workplace in Mahabad, while Mohammad Mohammadzadeh, a 37-year-old father of twins, was detained in Divandarreh.
In Baneh, Ministry of Intelligence forces arrested civil activist Azad Rahmati on September 23 after raiding his family home. The same day, cultural activist Yousef Rahimi, head of the Hazha Cultural and Literary Association, was arrested and his home searched; personal belongings, including books and computer equipment, were confiscated. Their locations and formal charges were not disclosed at the time of reporting. Rahimi’s detention followed the arrest of Rahmati earlier that day.
Executions and Death-Penalty Cases
At least two Kurdish prisoners were executed during September in cases documented by multiple Kurdish human-rights organizations. Farzad Ahmadpour, a 35-year-old man from Saqqez and father of two, was executed in Jiroft Prison on September 13 after a conviction on drug-related charges.
Two days later, Fereydoun Akbarzadeh of Sarableh was executed at Ilam Central Prison under qisas following a murder conviction. He had been transferred to solitary confinement shortly before the execution.
Political prisoner Yousef Ahmadi also remained under threat of execution. One of two death sentences against him was overturned in September and replaced with ten years’ imprisonment and blood-money payment, but a second death sentence connected to a baghi (“armed rebellion”) conviction remained in force. Ahmadi has spent more than six years imprisoned.
Killings and Kolbar Violence
On September 17, Ali Osloub, 35, from Piranshahr, was shot dead while riding a motorcycle near Jaldian. The Ministry of Intelligence later described the person killed in the operation as connected to a Kurdish opposition party. Human-rights groups identified him as Osloub and said his family was informed that his body would not be returned.
Kurdish border workers also continued to face lethal force. On September 23, Mohammad Seddiq Owli, a 28-year-old father of two from Salas-e Babajani, was shot dead near the Sheikh Saleh border area. Earlier, 20-year-old Arvin Azizi from Saqqez was seriously wounded by gunfire while working as a kolbar near Baneh.
That same week, four United Nations human-rights experts called on Iranian authorities to end unlawful lethal force against Kurdish kolbars and Baloch fuel carriers. Their September 23 statement cited reports that at least 12 kolbars had been shot dead during 2026 and called for independent investigations into deaths caused by security forces.
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Bashur)
September 2026 brought movement on salaries and the 2027 federal budget, continued negotiations over oil and customs revenues, and further talks between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) without formation of the tenth Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) cabinet. The month also saw repeated missile and drone attacks inside the Kurdistan Region, formal completion of the Peshmerga unification process, and renewed pressure over Kurdish land rights in the disputed territories.
Baghdad Transfers August Salaries as 2027 Budget Dispute Takes Shape
The federal government approved payment of the Kurdistan Region’s August public-sector salaries in mid-September. On September 14, Baghdad deposited approximately 957.7 billion Iraqi dinars into the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) Finance Ministry’s account at the Central Bank branch in Erbil after deducting 120 billion dinars as the federal share of the Region’s non-oil revenues. The KRG subsequently began distributing August salaries, including payments to contract teachers and employees appointed after July 2024.
Attention then shifted to the 2027 federal budget. A KRG delegation led by Finance and Economy Minister Awat Sheikh Janab and acting Natural Resources Minister Kamal Mohammed traveled to Baghdad for negotiations with the federal finance, planning and oil ministries. The KRG demanded regular salary guarantees, investment funding and a population-based share of federal spending. On September 16, the KRG rejected a proposed 12.67 percent allocation and demanded approximately 14 percent based on the latest census.
Customs revenues also remained contested. Baghdad had sought full transfer of customs income collected at Kurdistan Region border crossings, while Erbil rejected surrendering 100 percent of those revenues. Federal Finance Minister Faleh al-Sari later proposed alternatives centered on a 50-50 division between the federal government and the Kurdistan Region as both sides prepared for implementation of the UN-backed ASYCUDA customs system.
Oil Exports Through Ceyhan Remain Central to Baghdad-Erbil Talks
Oil remained another major part of September negotiations. By September 7, crude exports through the northern route were running at around 220,000 barrels per day, with approximately 70,000 barrels coming from Kurdistan Region fields and 150,000 from Kirkuk. During meetings in Baghdad, federal Oil Minister Basim Mohammed Khudair and KRG acting Natural Resources Minister Kamal Mohammed Salih discussed continued coordination, the proposed federal oil and gas law and arrangements for Kurdistan Region crude to be marketed through the State Organization for Marketing of Oil (SOMO).
The northern route became increasingly important as Iraq sought alternatives to vulnerable Gulf shipping lanes. Beginning September 13, Baghdad launched a trial operation using 209 tanker trucks to move southern crude toward Kirkuk for eventual export through Turkey. More than six million liters, roughly 38,000 barrels, were moved during the first two days.
KDP-PUK Negotiations Continue Without a New Cabinet
The Kurdistan Region remained without its tenth cabinet nearly two years after the October 2024 parliamentary election. Negotiations continued during September, but disagreements remained over both the distribution of authority and the PUK’s alliance with the New Generation Movement.
By September 22, KDP official Ari Harsin said the two parties had made substantial progress in their negotiations. The PUK, however, maintained that it would enter negotiations together with New Generation as a 38-seat parliamentary bloc, while the KDP continued to insist that government-formation negotiations be conducted directly with the PUK as a separate party.
President Nechirvan Barzani also said on September 19 that meetings between the two parties were continuing. No agreement on the prime ministership, deputy prime ministership, parliamentary leadership or full distribution of cabinet responsibilities had been announced by September 27.
Missile and Drone Attacks Continue Inside Bashur
The Kurdistan Region again faced repeated drone and missile attacks during September. On September 2, Kurdistan Region counterterrorism authorities said coalition forces intercepted 10 explosive drones over Erbil and surrounding areas. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) separately claimed attacks against US facilities in Erbil, although Kurdish and American authorities did not confirm the damage and casualties claimed by Tehran.
Iranian Kurdish opposition camps inside Bashur were also targeted. Three drones struck the Surdash refugee camp in Sulaymaniyah Province on September 7 without causing casualties. On September 14, three missiles hit a camp housing families connected to Komala in Zirgwez, while additional missiles landed elsewhere in Sulaymaniyah Province. Komala official Ali Ranjbari blamed Tehran, but Iran did not publicly claim responsibility for that attack.
The following day, an unidentified drone fell inside a Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI) camp in the Balisan area of Khalifan district. No casualties or material damage were reported.
Peshmerga Unification Formally Completed
One of September’s most important internal developments came with completion of the long-running Peshmerga reform process. Peshmerga Affairs Minister Shoresh Ismail announced on September 10 that Units 70 and 80 had been integrated under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. A formal ceremony on September 21 marked the completion of the new structure, placing the forces under unified operational, command, training, communications and administrative systems.
The restructuring came shortly before the planned September 30 end of the US-led coalition’s existing military mission in Iraq. US officials said the change would not end cooperation with the Peshmerga or Iraqi security forces, but would shift the framework through which that partnership operates.
Kurdish Land Rights and Article 140
Kurdish land rights and the continued failure to implement Article 140 remained prominent across Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Khurmatu and other disputed territories during September. Article 140 requires normalization of demographic changes introduced under former Iraqi governments, followed by a census and referendum to determine the administrative status of disputed areas. Although its original implementation deadline expired in 2007, Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court ruled in 2019 that the provision remains in force until its requirements are completed. The Kirkuk and disputed-territories framework identifies Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Khurmatu and Shingal among the principal areas affected by the unresolved legacy of Arabization.
Khanaqin became an early focus during September. On September 1, representatives of Kurdish political parties, local politicians and activists presented Iraqi President Nizar Amedi with 12 demands concerning Khanaqin and other Article 140 territories. The delegation called for the Article 140 office to be reactivated, disputed agricultural ownership decisions to be frozen, and transfers of national ID, ration and residency records into the area to be suspended. It also opposed plans to upgrade Qara Tapa and Jalawla into separate districts, called for greater Kurdish representation in Diyala’s administration and demanded that Kurdish political parties be allowed to reopen offices in Jalawla, Saadiya and other areas. The delegation also sought a joint civilian mechanism for security affairs and restrictions on interference by forces outside official security institutions.
Similar concerns emerged in Khurmatu. On September 2, Fahmi Barhan, head of the General Board for Kurdistani Areas Outside the Kurdistan Region Administration, warned that land disputes and continuing Arabization pressures in Khurmatu remained unresolved. He linked the disputes to Baath-era land decisions and said reconstruction of Kurdish villages, Kurdish-language education and political representation remained outstanding issues. Barhan also pointed to a sharp decline in Kurdish representation in the local administration, claiming that only a handful of Kurdish officials remained while hundreds of positions were held by members of other communities. He described current demographic and administrative changes in parts of the disputed territories as a form of “soft Arabization.”
Kirkuk’s agricultural disputes also returned to court. Mohammed Amin, a representative of Kurdish farmers in Sargaran, filed an appeal on September 15 against a two-million-dinar fine imposed following his confrontation with Iraqi security forces over farmland in Shanakha. Amin had previously accused an Iraqi soldier of assaulting him while forces prevented him from plowing land claimed by Kurdish farmers. By September, the disputes between Amin, the Joint Operations Command and Iraqi soldiers had resulted in 12 court hearings. The case has become closely associated with the wider struggle by Kurdish farmers in Sargaran to regain or continue cultivating agricultural property affected by Baath-era land policies.
The 2025 Property Restitution Law was intended to address part of this legacy by cancelling former Revolutionary Command Council decisions used to confiscate agricultural property. Kurdish parliamentary factions supported the legislation, which could return more than 300,000 dunams of confiscated land in Kirkuk to Kurdish owners. Implementation, however, remained stalled during September. On September 26, Barhan said the necessary administrative instructions had still not been completed and warned that delays in implementing the property restitution law were preventing affected farmers from resolving their claims. He said the absence of a clear federal approach to Article 140 remained the larger obstacle to settling the status of Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Shingal and other disputed territories.
Kurdistan Region of Syria (Rojava)
September 2026 shifted Rojava’s post-integration struggle increasingly toward political, linguistic and institutional rights. Syrian state security structures expanded their presence in Hasakah Province, new interim local councils were appointed in Qamishlo and Sere Kaniye, and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) moved closer to an agreement over their future. The most visible dispute was Kurdish-language education, which triggered demonstrations across Rojava. The month also brought a serious crisis in Kobani, renewed returns to Sere Kaniye, and continued demands for the restoration of Kurdish homes in Afrin.
Integration Moves Into Security and Local Government
Implementation of the January 29 agreement moved deeper into local institutions during September. On September 1, hundreds of Syrian Interior Ministry personnel began a security deployment across Hasakah Province, including personnel from the Kurdish Internal Security Forces, known as Asayish, who had entered the state structure. Forces were positioned at al-Talaea camp and around Qamishlo, while plans were made to reopen police stations and deploy traffic, highway and tourism police.
Local government also began changing. On September 7, Hasakah Governor Nour al-Din Issa Ahmed appointed interim executive offices for Qamishlo and Sere Kaniye until municipal elections can be held. Brin Sami al-Mohammad was appointed to head the Qamishlo office, while Anwar Mohammad Mulla Matar headed the Sere Kaniye office. On September 22, Syria’s Defense Ministry also opened a Military Police branch in Hasakah as military integration continued.
Kurdish-Language Education Becomes the Main Political Dispute
Kurdish-language education became the most visible dispute between Kurdish society and Damascus in September. The new education arrangement recognized Kurdish but limited it to three classes per week, while core subjects would largely be taught in Arabic. For students who had received most of their education in Kurdish since 2012, the change represented a major reversal. Students protested across Qamishlo, Tirbespi, Derik, Amuda and Kobani during the opening days of the school year, with some refusing to enter classrooms.
The protests grew during the month. On September 22, students, teachers and families traveled from Derik, Amuda, Dirbesiyeh, Chilaxa, Tel Tamr, Tirbespi, Girke Lege, Hasakah and other areas for a large demonstration in Qamishlo demanding full Kurdish-language education. Protesters called for Kurdish to remain a language of instruction rather than being reduced to several weekly lessons.
A potential breakthrough came the following day. Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa said Damascus and Kurdish representatives had reached an agreement on Kurdish education and that Education Ministry technical teams were working on implementation. He publicly described Kurdish linguistic and cultural rights as legitimate. The exact curriculum, number of Kurdish-language subjects and legal status of Kurdish as an official language had not yet been publicly settled by September 27.
YPJ Reaches Initial Understanding With Damascus
The future of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) also moved forward. YPJ spokesperson Ruken Jamal said on September 7 that Damascus had approved in principle a proposal for the YPJ to join the Interior Ministry as a special mission force. The proposal would preserve the YPJ as an organized formation with its fighters, commanders and institutional structure intact rather than dispersing its members individually across different units.
The arrangement was not yet final. The YPJ had originally sought incorporation into the Defense Ministry, but Damascus rejected the establishment of a separate women’s formation there. The Interior Ministry option emerged as the principal compromise under discussion.
Killing of Sipan Hizni Triggers Kobani Crisis
Kobani experienced the month’s most serious internal security crisis following the killing of Kurdish fighter Sipan Hizni, whose real name was Sami Sheikhmous Hiso. Hizni was a former Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighter who had joined the Syrian Army’s Hasakah Brigade after integration. He was abducted and killed near Sere Kaniye on September 10, prompting demonstrations demanding accountability.
Tensions intensified when security forces moved to disperse a protest in Kobani and detained several participants. During subsequent unrest at Kobani prison, a fire broke out after detainees were informed that they could be transferred to Aleppo. Nine prisoners initially died and 17 were injured. By September 17, the death toll had risen to 10. Mazloum Abdi later met residents and Kurdish political representatives in Kobani and said a special investigative committee had been established to determine responsibility for the deaths.
Afrin Property Rights Remain Unresolved
In Afrin, returning Kurdish families continued struggling to recover homes and rebuild livelihoods. Kurdish journalists and activists launched the “My Home Is My Right” campaign on September 17 after receiving complaints that hundreds of homes remained occupied and had not been returned to their original owners.
Economic conditions added another obstacle. By September 24, Kurdish returnees were reporting high rebuilding costs, unemployment and weak local markets despite the return of thousands of displaced residents. Families were spending much of their savings repairing damaged homes rather than rebuilding normal livelihoods. Mazloum Abdi and Ilham Ahmed also met Aleppo Governor Azzam Gharib during September to discuss integration and arrangements for the return of residents to Afrin, Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah.
Kurdistan Region of Turkey (Bakur)
September 2026 pushed the Kurdish peace process further from declarations toward questions of implementation. The framework law adopted in August remained the legal foundation for disarmament and returns, while Abdullah Öcalan, the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) and Kurdish civil society pressed for political and legal measures beyond the security dimension. Kurdish-language education returned strongly to the public agenda in Amed, Mardin remained under state-appointed trustee administration despite expectations that elected officials could return, and former Amed co-mayor Selçuk Mızraklı was released after nearly seven years in prison. At the same time, arrests and police operations against Kurdish political and cultural activity continued.
Peace process moves into the implementation stage
The main political question during September was how the peace process would move from the framework law passed by parliament in August into practical implementation. That legislation established mechanisms for disarmament, returns and the legal treatment of people prosecuted or convicted in connection with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), but it did not resolve wider Kurdish demands concerning language, local democracy, political prisoners or Abdullah Öcalan’s legal status. Reuters described the August legislation as a major step in the process while noting that broader Kurdish political and cultural demands remained outside its immediate scope.
On September 13, DEM Party İmralı delegation members Pervin Buldan, Mithat Sancar and Özgür Faik Erol held a new meeting with Abdullah Öcalan on İmralı Island. The delegation said discussions covered the democratic resolution of the Kurdish question, concrete measures required to advance the process and wider regional developments. Öcalan said the period following passage of the law required reciprocal practical steps and activation of the bodies established to oversee implementation. He also argued that the peace process needed legal and political guarantees rather than remaining dependent only on political commitments.
By September 22, DEM Party spokesperson Ayşegül Doğan said the party expected further developments concerning disarmament and argued that Öcalan should have a defined coordinating role in the transition from armed conflict to democratic politics. The following day in Van, Pervin Buldan told members of the Barış Anneleri that more concrete and practical steps were expected in the coming period. No comprehensive new package addressing Kurdish language rights, trustee municipalities or political prisoners had been announced by September 27.
DEM Party reorganizes around peace and democratic reform
DEM Party held its fifth ordinary congress in Ankara on September 6, keeping Tülay Hatimoğulları and Tuncer Bakırhan at the center of the party leadership while beginning a new organizational period. The congress placed the democratic resolution of the Kurdish question, peace and political transformation among the party’s principal priorities. Bakırhan and Hatimoğulları argued that ending armed conflict needed to be accompanied by changes affecting political rights, local government and democratic participation.
The party also continued raising the question of past abuses connected to the Kurdish conflict. On September 2, DEM Party lawmaker Özgül Saki called for a parliamentary truth and confrontation commission to investigate serious rights violations committed during the conflict and to establish a formal mechanism for examining unresolved cases.
Kurdish-language education returns to the streets
Kurdish language rights became one of September’s clearest public demands in Bakur. On September 14, DEM Party’s Language, Culture and Arts Commission issued a call for mother-tongue education to receive constitutional and legal protection. The commission said the existing system of limited elective Kurdish classes did not amount to education in the mother tongue and called for Kurdish to become a language of instruction.
The demand moved directly onto the streets of Amed four days later. On September 18, hundreds of people joined a demonstration organized by the Democratic Institutions Platform calling for education in Kurdish and formal status for the Kurdish language. Participants marched from Bayramoğlu to Koşuyolu Park, where Mezopotamya Language and Culture Research Association co-chair Şükran Yakut addressed the gathering. DEM Party Amed lawmaker Serhat Eren also participated and linked recognition of mother-tongue education to the wider peace process.
Mardin remains under trustee administration
The trustee system remained unresolved despite the peace process. On September 3, Turkey’s Interior Ministry extended Mardin Governor Tuncay Akkoyun’s tenure as state-appointed trustee of Mardin Metropolitan Municipality for another two months, keeping him in control until November 4. The extension of trustee administration in Mardin prevented elected co-mayors Ahmet Türk and Devrim Demir from returning to office.
Ahmet Türk had won the March 2024 local election with 57.4 percent of the vote before being removed in November 2024. Expectations of his possible reinstatement had increased after his acquittal in a related court case and public comments from Nationalist Movement Party leader Devlet Bahçeli suggesting that Türk should return to office. The September extension showed that trustee rule remained in place despite those signals and continuing negotiations over democratic reform.
Selçuk Mızraklı released after nearly seven years
September also brought one of the most visible releases of a Kurdish elected politician in recent years. Former Amed Metropolitan Municipality co-mayor Selçuk Mızraklı was released from Edirne F-Type Prison on September 8 after spending nearly seven years in prison. Mızraklı had been elected in 2019 before being removed from office by the Interior Ministry and replaced by a trustee. DEM Party MPs and officials gathered outside the prison for his release, and he later returned to Amed.
Mızraklı used his first public remarks to call attention to former Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş, who remained imprisoned in Edirne. On September 21, DEM Party Ağrı MP Sırrı Sakık visited Demirtaş and said his release and that of other imprisoned politicians should not be made dependent on implementation of the framework law. Sakık called for existing European Court of Human Rights and Constitutional Court decisions to be applied.
Arrests and pressure on Kurdish political activity continue
Security operations continued alongside the peace talks. On September 3, a Diyarbakır-centered investigation led to the detention of Kurdish political and association activists over memorial gatherings for PKK members killed in previous clashes. Among those identified were Sibel Kaya, Arzu Karaman, Rozerin Kurt, Hasan Karsu, Yunus Emre Ergin, Baran Çınar, Murat Sönmez, Mervan Konur, Azad Kılınç and Süleyman Yıldız. The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey recorded at least 14 detentions in the wider investigation, including nine in Amed.
The following day police also searched the Amargi Culture and Arts Association in Amed’s Sur district without prior notice to the association’s administrators, according to the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey. The September arrests demonstrated that negotiations over peace and political normalization continued alongside security investigations involving Kurdish political, cultural and commemorative activity.