Kurdistan Region of Iran (Rojhelat)
July 2026 brought another month of concentrated pressure on Kurdish society in the Kurdistan Region of Iran, with arrests, incommunicado detention, prison restrictions, executions, border killings, and expanded pressure on Kurdish political parties. The Iranian regime continued to use security agencies, courts, border forces, and transnational legal pressure to target Kurdish civilians, activists, prisoners, kolbars, and opposition movements.
Kurdish Parties Respond to Escalating Pressure
The Alliance of Iranian Kurdistan Political Parties used July to present a more unified response to the Iranian regime’s attacks and repression. After a July 23 meeting, the alliance issued a joint statement saying that Iran’s internal crisis had been accompanied by intensified repression, terrorism, and military attacks against Kurdish parties and the people of Rojhelat. The alliance condemned missile, drone, and ground attacks against Kurdish political forces, saying the losses affected the entire Kurdish national movement and made unity among Iranian Kurdish parties a strategic necessity.
The statement emphasized that the Kurdish struggle for national and political rights could not be crushed through repression and violence. It also called for expanded international work to highlight human-rights violations in Kurdistan and said the alliance would strengthen joint political and field activity in pursuit of a democratic future for Iran.
July also brought a new form of pressure against exiled Kurdish opposition figures. Iran sought INTERPOL Red Notices and extradition requests against leaders and members of Iranian Kurdish opposition parties, including the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI), the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), Komala, and other Kurdish political figures. Kurdish leaders rejected the move as a politically motivated tool of transnational repression, warning that Tehran was trying to extend the same campaign of intimidation beyond Iran’s borders.
Komala also issued a separate statement after the July 17 missile attack on its Zargwezila camp, where nine Peshmerga recruits were killed and three others wounded. The party said the Iranian regime had targeted Komala camps and bases more than 40 times during the 39-day war and described the attacks as part of Tehran’s effort to break the will of the Kurdish freedom movement.
At Least 32 Kurdish Citizens Arrested or Detained
Arrests remained one of the clearest features of the July crackdown. A review of July reporting by Hengaw, Kurdpa, and the Kurdistan Human Rights Network organization identified at least 32 named Kurdish citizens who were arrested, detained, or transferred to prison in July 2026 reporting. Like previous months, the arrests affected activists, teachers, cultural figures, athletes, women, religious figures, charity workers, justice-seeking families, former political prisoners, and ordinary civilians.
In Mahabad, security forces arrested several Kurdish citizens in early July. Mostafa Ebrahimi was arrested on July 7 after security forces raided his family home without a warrant, while Matin Faramarzi, a Kurdish cultural activist, was violently arrested the next day at Sheikh Shaltut Park and transferred to an undisclosed location. Other Mahabad cases included Kamal Piranpour, Sardar Ostad-Ahmadi, and Peyman Mohammadi Moradi, who was arrested after being summoned to the Intelligence Office under the pretext of retrieving his confiscated phone. Families were left without clear information on charges, legal status, or places of detention.
In Sardasht\, Mamosta Abubakr Yousofi and Younes Mousapour were violently arrested in Nalas on July 5 after intelligence forces raided a family garden-house. Reports said security agents used physical violence and degrading treatment during the operation before transferring both men to an Intelligence Department detention facility in Urmia. Days later, their families still had no information about the charges or conditions of detention.
In Paveh, Sabah Valad-Beygi, a retired teacher, environmental activist, and head of the Noor Mountaineering Group, was arrested during a raid on his family home in Nuryab village and moved to a security detention facility in Kermanshah. His brother Nawzad Valad-Beygi was also detained later, with his whereabouts undisclosed. The same city also saw the arrest of Kurdish artist Rashid Emami and his wife, Shler Modirzadeh, after intelligence forces raided their home and later returned to detain Modirzadeh. Their family could not obtain information about their location or legal status.
The crackdown also targeted civic and environmental activists. In Ravansar, IRGC Intelligence forces arrested Khalil Parandak, Shahab Soleimani, and Idris Golmohammadi on July 17 without warrants. Parandak is a civil and environmental activist from a justice-seeking family, Soleimani is a lawyer and civil-rights activist, and Golmohammadi is an environmental and civic activist. Their families’ inquiries to security and judicial authorities produced no information about charges or detention sites.
Women were also caught in the July arrest wave. Mona Maleki, a 27-year-old Kurdish woman from Senna, was arrested on July 14 by Ministry of Intelligence forces and transferred to solitary confinement in Senna Women’s Prison. She was denied access to a lawyer and family visits. In Ilam, Zahra Mohammad-Vali, arrested earlier, continued her protest inside prison through a dry hunger strike against arbitrary detention, legal limbo, and repeated interrogations, showing how women detainees remained under pressure even after the initial arrest period.
Athletes and young Kurdish men were also targeted. Hamid Mohammadzadeh, a well-known Kurmanji Kurdish Choukha wrestling champion from Ashkhaneh, was arrested on July 4 after security forces raided his home without a warrant. In Saqqez, 23-year-old footballer Fereydoun Mostafaei remained incommunicado after being detained in late June or early July. In Ilam, Kiomars Hasanbeigi was violently arrested on July 22, injured during the operation, and transferred to an unknown location without access to a lawyer or family visits.
Security forces also moved against Kurdish religious and community figures. Emad Mostafaei, a 19-year-old Sunni religious activist from Javanrud, was arrested on July 25 and transferred to a security detention facility in Kermanshah. In Kamyaran, Esmail Khatari and Fouad Shadi, two members of the Shayni Charity Foundation, were arrested on July 24 and 25 and taken to undisclosed locations. Their families were unable to obtain information about their whereabouts, charges, or condition.
Some July detentions were tied to earlier protest cases and sentence enforcement. Ribwar Marabi, a 26-year-old Kurdish man from Kamyaran arrested during the January 2026 protests in Tehran, was taken into custody on July 25 after appearing before an enforcement office and transferred to Greater Tehran Prison to serve a six-year sentence. Arman Ebrahimi, from Oshnavieh, was also transferred to Urmia Central Prison to serve a one-year sentence. These cases showed that the July crackdown was not limited to new arrests; it also included the activation of prison sentences against earlier protest detainees.
Executions and Death-Penalty Pressure
Executions remained one of the regime’s most severe tools of intimidation. On July 14, Mohyedin Abdullahi and Hossein Palani Jafi, two Kurdish prisoners from Sarpol-e Zahab, were secretly executed at Kermanshah Central Prison. They had been arrested in connection with a 2017 armed clash and were executed without final family visits. Rights reporting described torture, long periods of solitary confinement, denial of lawyers, and conviction on “armed uprising” charges.
On July 22, Iraj Ebrahimzadeh, a Kurdish prisoner from Ilam, was executed in Ilam Central Prison despite fundraising efforts to secure blood money after the victim’s family had reportedly agreed to pardon in exchange for compensation.
Other July cases included the execution of Sardar Qaderi in Urmia Central Prison and Salman Kakeh-Khani, a prisoner from Saqqez, in Tabriz Central Prison. At Ghezel Hesar Prison, at least five death-row prisoners were transferred to solitary confinement in preparation for execution, prompting hundreds of prisoners in Unit 2 to launch a hunger strike.
Kolbars and Border Civilians Killed
July was especially deadly along the border. On July 9, Border Regiment forces killed Sam Hassani, a 15-year-old boy, and wounded his father Ahsan Hassani after firing without warning on their private vehicle near Daraki village in Sarvabad. The shooting came amid increased military deployments and restrictions on villagers’ access to orchards and grazing land.
On July 22, Rasoul Qalandari, a 21-year-old kolbar and father of two from Balajuk in Khoy, was shot and wounded by border guards in the Qotur border highlands. According to a source cited by Kurdpa, border guards then approached him and fired fatal shots to his head despite his pleas that he had two young children.
The following day, Soheyl Ferdowsi, an 18-year-old kolbar from Dezavar village in Paveh, was killed by direct fire from IRGC forces. KHRN reported that border guards had killed four kolbars over three weeks in Nowsud, Marivan, and Sarvabad, along with two other civilians, including the 15-year-old child.
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Bashur)
July 2026 kept the Kurdistan Region of Iraq under pressure from three directions: unresolved Erbil–Baghdad financial disputes, a stalled Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) cabinet formation process, and renewed Iranian missile and drone attacks on the Region. The month showed technical movement on salaries, customs, fuel, and security coordination, but no final political settlement. Inside the Region, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the New Generation Movement continued to disagree over whether electoral weight or post-election bloc strength should guide the formation of the next cabinet.
Erbil–Baghdad Salary and Revenue Disputes Continue
The salary file remained one of the most sensitive issues between Erbil and Baghdad. In early July, a KRG delegation traveled to Baghdad for talks with the federal Finance Ministry and Board of Supreme Audit, with discussions focused on public-sector salaries, non-oil revenues, customs procedures, taxes, exemptions, quality control, and the ASYCUDA customs system. The delegation’s purpose was to reduce disputes over how local revenues should be calculated and how salary payments should be released to Kurdistan Region employees. Kurdistan24 reported that the KRG was seeking progress on both salaries and customs differences and the salary file as part of a larger dispute over revenue transfers and federal oversight.
The KRG position remained that salaries should not be used as leverage in broader political or technical disputes. Erbil argued that public employees have legal salary entitlements and that disagreements over non-oil revenues, customs automation, or oil exports should be resolved through auditing and negotiation rather than delayed payments. Baghdad’s position remained focused on federal financial supervision, revenue transparency, and implementation of nationwide customs and accounting systems.
Fuel Shortages Add Daily Pressure
Fuel shortages became one of the clearest ways that Baghdad–Erbil disputes reached ordinary people. In early July, Erbil approved fuel imports to ease shortages and curb rising prices after reduced supplies and market pressure caused long queues at gasoline stations. Shafaq News reported that the Kurdistan Region’s Ministry of Natural Resources authorized imports as part of emergency measures to stabilize supply.
By late July, the KRG asked Baghdad to raise the Region’s daily crude allocation from 50,000 barrels to 126,700 barrels, saying the higher figure better reflected the Kurdistan Region’s population share and was necessary to ease gasoline shortages. Shafaq News reported the request as part of the government’s effort to address long queues and fuel pressure.
The KRG also moved toward direct market controls. Authorities launched an electronic card and coupon system for subsidized gasoline distribution in Erbil, with officials saying the goal was to regulate access and reduce chaos at stations. Drivers had waited for hours at stations before supplies ran out. The fuel crisis showed that the oil and revenue dispute is not only a government-level negotiation; it affects transport, electricity, business costs, generators, and household life.
Customs, Oil, and Security Guarantees Remain Linked
Customs remained another core technical file. Erbil and Baghdad had previously agreed on a framework for implementing the ASYCUDA customs system, which is designed to digitize and standardize customs procedures across Iraq. The agreement covered unified tariffs, company registration, Kurdish-language inclusion, and committees to address border-crossing disputes. Rudaw reported that the system was intended to improve transparency while preserving a role for Kurdish institutions.
In July, the practical question became whether implementation could proceed without weakening the Kurdistan Region’s constitutional and administrative role at border crossings. Baghdad views ASYCUDA as a tool for federal transparency and revenue control. Erbil argues that it supports modernization but not centralization that erases the Region’s authority.
Oil-sector security also became more urgent. Baghdad and Erbil continued discussing guarantees for oil fields and international companies, especially after drone and missile threats forced some firms to suspend activity. A statement from Iraq’s government spokesperson said energy companies operating in the Kurdistan Region are part of Iraq’s economy and should be protected. Rudaw reported that HKN Energy suspended operations at Sarsang after explosive drone attacks, while Dana Gas and Pearl Petroleum shut down main production at Khor Mor due to threats.
PUK and New Generation Formalize a Joint Bloc
Inside the Kurdistan Region, the biggest political development was the July 2 agreement between the PUK and New Generation. The two parties signed the “Balance and Prosperity Agreement” in Sulaimani, presenting it as a platform for reform, institutional balance, transparency, public services, salaries, and stronger parliamentary oversight. Rudaw reported that the agreement focused on restoring balance and reorganizing power in the Region’s political landscape.
PUK media described the agreement as “historic,” with PUK leader Bafel Talabani and New Generation leader Shaswar Abdulwahid saying it aimed to serve the people of the Kurdistan Region and Iraq while introducing a new approach to governance. Talabani also said the alliance remained open to other parties, including the KDP.
The agreement changed the negotiating balance but did not create a governing majority. The KDP holds 39 seats in the 100-seat parliament, while the PUK holds 23 and New Generation holds 15. Together, the PUK and New Generation hold 38 seats, one fewer than the KDP. The PUK–New Generation argument is that their combined bloc carries major parliamentary weight and should be reflected in cabinet formation, parliament leadership, and institutional reform. The KDP’s argument is that it won the most votes and seats, so post-election alliances should not override the party that came first.
KDP–PUK Talks Resume Without a Breakthrough
The political deadlock continued despite renewed mediation. The Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) said the KDP and PUK had responded positively to Salahaddin Bahaaddin’s initiative to end the impasse, with a meeting expected soon. Mediation came amid renewed accusations between the KDP and PUK over who was delaying the next cabinet.
Later in the month, the KDP and PUK held talks in Erbil to discuss government formation. The meeting came after the PUK–New Generation agreement increased tension and created a new bloc in the parliament. No final agreement was announced.
The dispute remains both procedural and political. The KDP wants parliament reactivated and argues that cabinet formation should reflect the election result. The PUK says the next cabinet must be based on genuine partnership and institutional balance, not one-party dominance. New Generation presents its alliance with the PUK as a reform platform, while critics argue that moving from opposition into a power-sharing bloc complicates its earlier anti-establishment position.
Iranian Attacks Escalate Against Kurdish Opposition Groups
Iranian attacks made July one of the most dangerous months for the Region’s security. On July 17, missiles struck positions of the Komala Toilers of Kurdistan in the Zargwez area south of Sulaymaniah and at least nine members of the Iranian Kurdish opposition group were killed and several others wounded. Security officials said multiple missiles hit locations in Zargwez, Qasradi, and near Grdi Kopani.
The attack was one of the deadliest Iranian strikes on Iranian Kurdish opposition groups in the Kurdistan Region during the renewed regional escalation.
The attacks continued beyond Sulaimani. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) targeted Komala positions in the Alana Valley in Erbil’s Choman area on July 20 and later struck the party’s camp in Surdash with drones. These attacks showed that Iranian pressure was not limited to one front or one province.
The Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) also said its positions were attacked near Erbil. PAK accused Iran of using white phosphorus in one drone attack, citing eyewitness accounts, medical examinations, and fire damage. The claim requires independent verification, but it reflected the seriousness of the accusations being made by Iranian Kurdish opposition parties.
Multiple incidents in late July, including drone interceptions over Erbil, explosions heard in the city, and attacks that wounded members of Iranian Kurdish parties near Erbil. These incidents increased public concern because they occurred close to civilian, airport, and energy-related areas. The attacks also hit the economy. Dana Gas halted Khor Mor output after security threats.
Kurdistan Region of Syria (Rojava)
July 2026 showed that the Kurdish question in Syria remains far from resolved. Damascus moved ahead with parts of the integration process, in Hasakah, but the political foundations demanded by Kurds in Rojava remained incomplete. Kurdish identity, language, women’s military role, university recognition, property restitution, local self-administration, and security guarantees all remained contested.
For the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the central concern was that Damascus was advancing administrative control faster than political guarantees. Rojava’s position remained clear: integration cannot be reduced to security deployments and government offices if the new Syria does not constitutionally recognize Kurdish rights, decentralized governance, and the achievements of the Autonomous Administration.
Integration Advances, but Political Guarantees Remain Unclear
The integration process continued in July, especially in Hasakah. The submission of 40 judges’ names to Damascus was presented as part of restoring provincial courts and integrating local judicial structures into Syria’s official system. The same file also included efforts to reopen agricultural banking services in Hasakah and Qamishlo so farmers could receive wheat payments.
The judicial file gained additional momentum as northeast Syrian judges began interviews with the Justice Ministry in Damascus, a step aimed at resolving delays that had blocked the reopening of courts in Hasakah. The process followed earlier expectations that around 100 judges connected to the Autonomous Administration would be reviewed before being approved to serve inside Syria’s unified judicial system.
These developments showed that parts of the January agreement were being implemented. But the legal and political meaning of integration remained disputed. The current phase of official Kurdish-Damascus negotiations has been framed by Rojava-linked voices as a historic opportunity to reshape the Kurdish question through governance, constitutional rights, political partnership, and democratic decentralization, not only through security arrangements.
Kurdish Identity Faces New Pressure
July also exposed how identity issues remain unresolved. In Kobani, residents protested after a sign using the Arabic name “Ayn al-Arab” was installed at the city’s entrance. The Kobani identity campaign, launched under the slogan “Kobani is identity, Kobani is not Ayn al-Arab,” reflected public rejection of attempts to replace the Kurdish name of a city that became a symbol of resistance against ISIS.
The university file created another political dispute. Earlier in July, efforts to secure official recognition for Rojava University were presented as a way to allow graduates from Qamishlo to access public-sector jobs and postgraduate study outside the region. Article 11 of the January agreement includes recognition of diplomas issued by Rojava educational institutions, making the university file a direct test of whether Damascus will respect institutions built under the Autonomous Administration.
Later in the month, Damascus moved toward renaming or merging the university into a national structure. The proposed Rojava University merger with al-Furat University raised concern because it appeared to replace recognition with absorption. For Kurds, the university issue is not only academic. It is about whether Damascus will recognize institutions built during years of war and self-administration, or absorb them under central structures while removing their Kurdish and Rojava identity.
YPJ Recognition Remains a Major Unfinished File
Women’s organizations in Rojava continued to insist that the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) must be recognized within Syria’s future defense structure. The issue remains one of the clearest tests of whether integration will protect Rojava’s gains or dismantle them.
The campaign launched in Qamishlo under the slogan “We are all YPJ, the YPJ represents us” demanded recognition of the YPJ as a regular armed force within the Syrian Ministry of Defense while preserving its structure as part of Rojava’s defense system. The campaign also called for women’s gains to be protected, female detainees to be released, and the fate of missing women to be revealed.
This demand is central to the Kurdish women’s movement. The YPJ is not viewed only as a military force; it is seen as a symbol of women’s self-defense, the anti-ISIS struggle, and the social revolution built in Rojava. Any settlement that sidelines the YPJ would be seen by many Kurdish women as a retreat from the principles that made Rojava distinct.
Afrin Returns Continue, but Property Seizures and Fear Remain
Afrin remained one of the most painful files for Syrian Kurds. July brought the return of the last organized convoy of displaced Afrin families from Hasakah. The final convoy from Hasakah included about 1,000 families, bringing the total number of returned families to nearly 10,000 after years of displacement.
The return was important, but it did not end the crisis. Many Kurdish returnees found that their homes were still occupied by families linked to armed factions. The issue of occupied Afrin homes remained a major obstacle, with some residents saying they were asked to pay money to recover their property. In one case, a returnee said he was asked to pay $2,500 to recover his home.
Property violations also continued in rural Afrin. The documented seizure of civilian property and illegal levies included homes, lands, shops, olive groves, and oil presses belonging to Kurdish residents, especially in Rajo. Some residents were reportedly forced to pay between $1,000 and $10,000 to recover property or protect crops, while local security and judicial bodies failed to stop the abuses.
Displacement remained visible beyond Afrin. The planned return of displaced people from Ras al-Ain showed that authorities were trying to move some families back after years of displacement, but conditions remained difficult. The situation inside Sere Kaniye camp also reflected the wider humanitarian pressure facing displaced Kurdish families, including poor services, insecure living conditions, and uncertainty over safe return.
Water, Services, and Public Pressure
The reopening of the Allouk water station was one of July’s important service developments. The Allouk station reopening was expected to gradually restore water to more than half a million people in Hasakah province after years of repeated disruption since Turkey and allied factions took control of Sere Kani in 2019.
The reopening was positive, but still incomplete. Only part of Hasakah province had received water at the time of the update, and residents said they had been buying unsafe water for years. The water file shows how Kurdish areas continue to face punishment through infrastructure breakdown, contested control, and slow implementation of service promises.
ISIS Threat and Security Gaps Continue
ISIS remained a serious threat during the transition. The July record of five ISIS attacks added to a broader pattern of at least 64 attacks in Syria since the start of 2026, mostly in northern and eastern Syria, especially Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, Aleppo, and Hasakah.
A later update raised the figure to at least 65 ISIS attacks since the start of the year, warning that sleeper cells continue to exploit security gaps despite military and security campaigns. This remains a major concern for Kurds in Rojava. The SDF and YPJ carried much of the burden of the anti-ISIS war, but the new integration process risks weakening experienced local security networks if it is implemented too quickly or without clear command structures.
Kidnappings and Civilian Insecurity
Civilian insecurity also remained visible. In late July, the family of a Kurdish father of six appealed for help after he and his driver were abducted near Menajir and Sere Kani while working in Hasakah province. The ransom demand of $60,000 raised renewed concern over kidnappings, extortion, and weak state control in rural areas.
The abduction of two Kurdish civilians near Manajir and Ras al-Ain reinforced fears that civilians remain vulnerable in areas where criminal groups and armed factions continue to operate. The case showed how insecurity in the countryside remains tied to the wider failure to establish accountable local protection and reliable rule of law.
Political Organizing for a Democratic Syria
Despite pressure, Rojava-linked political actors continued to build alliances around a pluralistic future for Syria. The memorandum signed by the Syriac Union Party and the Syrian Democratic Alliance in Damascus emphasized Syria’s ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity, equal participation, democratic partnership, and the rights of all communities, including Syriac-Assyrians. The agreement reflected the Rojava-linked vision of a Syria based on pluralism rather than centralized rule.
This kind of political work matters because Kurds in Rojava are not demanding isolation from Syria. Their demand is for a democratic Syria that recognizes all components, protects local self-administration, preserves women’s gains, and constitutionally guarantees Kurdish language and identity.
Kurdistan Region of Turkey (Bakur)
July 2026 moved the Kurdish peace process in Turkey closer to a legal phase, but major questions remained unresolved. Kurdish political actors argued that peace cannot be limited to PKK disarmament and must also address Abdullah Öcalan’s role, democratic participation, political prisoners, trustee policies, Kurdish language rights, and laws used to criminalize Kurdish politics.
The government signaled that a framework law was being prepared, while the DEM Party pushed for broader guarantees. At the same time, mass arrests, pressure on journalists, limits on Kurdish language, and continued legal pressure on opposition politics raised doubts about whether Ankara was ready for a genuine democratic settlement.
Öcalan Calls for a Legal Foundation
The main political development came after the DEM Party İmralı Delegation held a five-hour meeting with Abdullah Öcalan on July 20. The following day, the delegation released Öcalan’s message, in which he said the process had reached the threshold of a legal foundation and that narrow approaches should be abandoned in favor of building a common life.
The message placed law at the center of the peace process. Öcalan argued that conflict and weapons must be removed from political life and that the Kurdish-Turkish relationship should be transformed into a permanent legal basis for equal coexistence. The same July 21 statement emphasized that the proposed legal process should take mutual sensitivities into account and open a new chapter in democratic politics.
For Kurdish society, the significance of the message was that Öcalan again framed the issue as political and legal, not only military. His call was not simply for an end to armed conflict; it was for a transition in which Kurdish existence, democratic rights, and political participation are protected by law.
Framework Law Debate Becomes the Center of the Process
The expected framework law became the most important issue of the month. The proposed law debate centered on whether the legislation would be broad enough to create a real transition or narrow enough to cover only disarmament, reintegration, and state verification.
DEM Party officials warned that a limited law could damage the process if it excluded Öcalan, senior Kurdish movement figures, political prisoners, or the broader democratic reforms needed for peace. The party’s position was that the law should not divide people into categories or leave key actors outside the political settlement.
A later 15-article draft discussion suggested that the government was preparing to bring a text first to the Justice Commission and then to parliament. But the contents were still unclear, and Kurdish political actors continued to argue that the process should not be shaped behind closed doors or limited to technical security language.
DEM Party Pushes for Öcalan’s Status and a Broad Peace Mechanism
The DEM Party played the central public role in July by meeting state officials, opposition parties, and parliament leadership while pushing for Öcalan’s status to be included in the legal framework. On July 16, the DEM Party İmralı Delegation said its meetings with political actors focused on the current stage of the process, the need to implement the legal framework quickly, and the goal of visiting Öcalan again as soon as possible.
On July 21, after meeting parliament speaker Numan Kurtulmuş, DEM said the framework law must function as a root law for the democratic solution of the Kurdish question and Turkey’s democratization. The party also said Öcalan’s status, free working conditions, and communication channels are vital for the success of the process.
DEM’s argument is that peace cannot be left to state discretion alone. A credible process requires parliament, legal guarantees, monitoring mechanisms, and the inclusion of all relevant political actors. DEM Group Deputy Chair Gülistan Kılıç Koçyiğit later called for a parliamentary peace monitoring board, saying the framework law should be treated as a beginning rather than an endpoint. She also said democratic reforms would have to reach the Turkish Penal Code, Anti-Terror Law, and sentence-enforcement system.
Bakırhan Warns Against Categorical Exclusion
DEM Party Co-Chair Tuncer Bakırhan used late July speeches to emphasize that the framework law should not create categorical exclusions. In Mersin, Bakırhan said the expected framework law should move the Kurdish question from violence and conflict onto a political and legal ground. He described the moment as historic and argued that the opportunity should not be missed.
His message reflected the Kurdish concern that Ankara may try to produce a limited security law while delaying the democratic side of the process. For DEM, the issue is not whether a law is passed, but whether the law creates a genuine path to peace, return, political participation, and legal protection.
Political Crackdown Weakens Trust
The peace process developed alongside a wider crackdown on opposition politics. DEM Co-Chair Tülay Hatimoğulları warned that the ongoing crackdown on the Republican People’s Party (CHP) was damaging public confidence in the Kurdish peace process. Her argument was that democratic politics cannot be narrowed by court interventions, police pressure, and attacks on opposition parties while the state claims to be building peace.
This concern matters for Kurdish politics because the Kurdish question has long been tied to Turkey’s broader democratic crisis. Kurdish parties argue that a peace process cannot succeed if elected politicians remain vulnerable to removal, opposition parties are targeted, and courts are used to redesign politics.
The trustee issue also remained unresolved. Although this month did not bring a major new trustee appointment, the replacement of elected Kurdish mayors by state-appointed trustees continued to stand as one of the core barriers to confidence. DEM and other Kurdish actors have repeatedly argued that no democratic peace can be credible while local Kurdish voters’ choices can be overturned through security files and administrative decisions.
Kurdish Language Rights Remain a Core Test
Kurdish language rights remained another unresolved test of the peace process. On July 24, parliament returned a DEM Party question asking why Kurdish continues to appear in parliamentary records as an “unknown language” or “X language.” The returned Kurdish-language question showed that even limited inquiries about parliamentary records can be blocked.
DEM lawmaker Celal Fırat Eren argued that the party was not even asking at that moment for constitutional mother-tongue education or official-language status, but only questioning why Kurdish is still treated in parliament as if it were unnamed or unrecognized. The incident became a symbol of the deeper problem: the state can discuss peace while still refusing normal recognition of Kurdish in its own institutions.
For Kurdish society in Bakur, language is not a side issue. It is central to identity, education, justice, and public life. A peace process that does not address Kurdish language rights risks remaining symbolic rather than transformative.