Washington Kurdish Institute
May 29, 2023
Since 2003, Erdogan has exerted a dominant influence over Turkish politics, dismantling the traditional ultra-nationalist parties, particularly those associated with Turkey’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Initially seen as a “reformist” due to Turkey’s economic challenges and corruption, Erdogan’s narrative shifted once he gained control over the country’s institutions. Over the course of two decades in power, Erdogan has become the most authoritarian leader in Turkey’s history.
Similar to many nations, Turkey’s political landscape is characterized by a multitude of parties, making it challenging for any single player or party to secure a majority. Nevertheless, Erdogan defied conventional norms and shattered established alliances in numerous elections, securing over 50% of the votes. Admittedly, he experienced his first setback to this majority in 2015 when the Pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) emerged victorious. However, Erdogan swiftly responded by launching a campaign against the Kurds, imprisoning their politicians, and occupying Kurdish territories in Syria and Iraq. These actions enabled him to regain popular support, rallying the nation around a common cause and forming an alliance with the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP).
In the most recent presidential and parliamentary elections, the previously fragmented Turkish opposition managed to unite under the leadership of Kemal Kilicdaroglu’s Republican People’s Party (CHP). However, despite their efforts, Kilicdaroglu faced defeat once again in the runoff against Erdogan, receiving 47.84 of the votes compared to Erdogan’s 52.16. Unfortunately, as has been observed in recent Turkish elections, the runoff was marred by unfair practices, including allegations or documented instances of intimidation and violence, voter suppression, ballot stuffing, Media bias, and results manipulation. It is worth noting that many of these tactics are disproportionately targeted against the Kurdish population.
Economy Irrelevant for Conservatives and Nationalists
Despite the factors that give Erdogan an advantage, it is important to recognize that he still enjoys natural and significant support among religious Turks, and nationalists, particularly since 2015 when he initiated conflicts with the Kurds. This support persists despite the severe inflation and the historical depreciation of the Turkish Lira. Over the years, the Turkish Lira has experienced a loss of 18.5% of its value against the US dollar since 2006. Furthermore, the country is grappling with high unemployment rates and the repercussions of recent earthquakes. According to the pro-government Statistical Institute, unemployment stands at nearly 10%. These circumstances demonstrate that ideological beliefs have overshadowed economic concerns. Additionally, contrary to previous assumptions that Kurdish votes were decisive in determining election outcomes, ultra-nationalist votes have emerged as significant, with the stance on the Kurdish conflict taking precedence over other issues. For instance, the far-right presidential candidate Sinan Ogan, who secured over 5% of the vote in the first round, promptly endorsed Erdogan with the condition of preserving the “Turkish” identity in the constitution and excluding “terrorists” (referring to Kurds) from future discussions. Consequently, due to the rise of nationalism and Islamism, conservatives and nationalists make up 50% of the new Turkish parliament.
Weak Kilicdaroglu Echoing Erdogan’s Racist Views
The voices opposing authoritarianism find themselves in a complex situation where Kemal Kilicdaroglu, leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), has become the de facto opposition leader after receiving endorsements from six parties that excluded the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) from their coalition. However, Kilicdaroglu has proven to be a weak leader with limited support beyond his own base, lacking the vigor and vision needed in a united but divided opposition. The coalition backing him includes far-right parties like IYI as well as conservative groups such as Felicity and Deva parties. Consequently, the “social democratic” aspect of the CHP has become diluted among five other parties with ideological differences. Moreover, while the issue of Syrian refugees dominated the election discourse among ultra-nationalists, Kilicdaroglu adopted an even more right-wing stance on Syrians, propagating numerous anti-refugee messages. To compound matters, in his misguided attempt to counter Erdogan’s alliance with Ogan, Kilicdaroglu aligned himself with another ultra-nationalist leader named Umit Ozdag. This already fragile alliance, combined with Kilicdaroglu’s lackluster approach, further deteriorated when he signed an anti-Kurdish protocol with Ozdag, calling for the removal of elected Kurdish mayors—a practice initiated by Erdogan since 2015. Consequently, Kilicdaroglu lost the support of millions of Kurdish voters who had initially backed him, despite the CHP’s long history of violence against Kurds.
Kilicdaroglu or Erdogan: Kurds Persist as Targets in Turkey
Ultimately, the election presented a choice between two individuals with contrasting personalities but a shared vision. Erdogan offered a continuation of the existing status quo, while Kilicdaroglu promised change, albeit without specific regard for the rights of Kurds. Despite a century-long history of oppression against Kurds in Turkey, Erdogan’s rise to power instigated a new wave of animosity towards them, this time driven by conservatives who had previously faced persecution from nationalists. However, the alternative to Erdogan in Kilicdaroglu represented a similar policy towards Kurds. Kilicdaroglu’s actions, including his alignment with far-right figures and the utilization of hate speech during the elections, alienated the Kurdish population in the second round. Initially, Kurdish support for Kilicdaroglu stemmed from a perception of choosing the lesser evil, as they questioned, “What else is there to lose?” since Erdogan had committed actions unprecedented by any other Turkish leader apart from Ataturk. The reality is that Kilicdaroglu’s victory would have yielded similar outcomes for Kurds both domestically and regionally. This is evident in his prior endorsement of Erdogan’s three invasions into Syria’s Kurdistan (Rojava). Furthermore, even in the event of Erdogan’s defeat, Kilicdaroglu would have continued Turkey’s expansionist policies, particularly those targeting Kurds, as Erdogan’s party still controlled the parliament and military authorization stemmed from there.
What Should Kurds Do?
Since 2013, Kurds have made sacrifices in their struggle against Erdogan’s authoritarian regime. The HDP, unlike any other Turkish party, has strived to establish a democratic country, and yet many nationalist Kurds criticize them for not aligning with Erdogan early on, as they believed he would offer more concessions, especially when peace talks were initiated in 2013. However, the HDP has fought for a democratic Turkey that grants Kurdish rights after a century of oppression. With Erdogan’s re-election, it is evident that he will intensify his crackdown on Kurds.
At this juncture, Kurdish leaders would be best served by returning to their core principles and launching a new movement that focuses on the Kurdish struggle for freedom. They should only engage with Turkish parties that loudly and openly support their rights, including advocating for constitutional changes and an end to warfare. Otherwise, recent history has shown that regardless of Kurdish support for either the opposition or ruling parties, the rights of the Kurdish nation remain irrelevant in their political calculations. Kurds have been used by the opposition in recent times and by Erdogan in the past. This realization should not discredit the HDP’s decision to support the opposition in the recent elections or their past support for the peace process with Erdogan. Instead, it should serve as a reality check for the challenges they will face in the upcoming era, marked by the rise of political Islam and ultra-nationalism.