Webinar: Is the expansionism policy Erdogan’s or Turkey’s?
Highlighted remarks by Gallia Lindenstrauss
Turkish attitude towards the world around it
“The coup attempt is basically the operating manual of today’s Turkey, clearly Erdogan and his circle of advisors see certain regional actors, be they the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and different Kurdish actors, as being part of this coalition against Turkey and hence should be stopped. From the other regional actors’ perspective, Turkey is seen as conducting an aggressive foreign policy that if not contained, will only expand. Examples of this are plentiful, and you mentioned a few. Turkey’s three military interventions in the war in Syria, it’s persistent yet expanding intervention in Northern Iraq and its bases. Its involvement in Libya. Its direct confrontation with Greece and Cyprus. Each new action in this direction only makes the regional actors more concerned. The fact that other actors have been able to form closer relations in recent years, and we see a de facto alliance between Israel, Cyprus, Greece, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, only reinforces Turkey’s threat perception and makes it even more assertive.
Many explain the current timing of the normalization between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Israel, and especially the timing of it that they, because, this was also a message to Turkey and the global Muslim Brotherhood movement that they have gone to far. Part of Turkey’s assertive actions, also derived from the fact that in today’s international system, it looks as if more assertive actors seem to be able to get away with it. Of course, this is not a completely new development and has been true also in earlier periods, but yet the move from a unipolar system to multipolar system is clearly a strong consideration in the moves of Erdogan and Alan referred to this and this manifests itself first and foremost, in its attempts to expand Turkey’ self-reliance in the defense industry and Alan elaborated on that, both the drones and the carrier, but this also manifested itself in the repeating of the slogan that the world is bigger than five.”
What are the future possibilities for the Kurdistan Regional Government to mediate between the Kurds and Turkey?
“I agree that mediation is not very likely, but there is a question whether Turkey and the KRG can return to the relations before the referendum, which significantly caused a crisis between them. And I think there are indications that things are moving more towards a normality or, I mean that the sides are again discovering what brought them together, before the referendum. But again, a major development would be if the U S would decide to withdraw its forces to the KRG. And then I think we would hear the, maybe not exactly the same, same, level, but we will hear the same rhetoric that we’ve heard, about US cooperation with Kurds in Syria. We might also hear about U S cooperation with the KRG, which might complicate matters.”
Is a new Turkish invasion, possibly in collaboration with Russia and Iran, feasible in the near future?
: “I would say two things. I understand the concerns. Of course, you have more intimate data on what is happening, and so the concerns must be very high. I would say two things. One is that I think the Russians, as we know, are playing a double game. It’s not so clear that the Russians would allow Turkey to do things. They have their issues in Idlib. They have other concerns regarding Turkey. I’m not sure it will be that simple for the Turks. The other issue that was related to international attention in general, you see that the world is basically preoccupied by the coronavirus pandemic, and it’s hard to raise awareness to other issues. But looking backwards, basically Turkey conducted three operations in Northern Syria. And you did see that the last operation did cause quite a lot of outcry in the international arena. And they did stop the offensive. That was before Corona, so I don’t know if you can raise the same attention, but, if there will be fears for what you are describing, I think it is possible to make the international community somewhat accountable.”
Where could Erdogan make potential concessions?
“It doesn’t seem that he was blocked by a major state actor. You could say the red line that Sisi gave him in Libya, was a way of blocking him and for now the ceasefire is holding. I think the most interesting development in terms of foreign policy and a little bit of hesitation on the Turkey side has been the decision to not make the S-400 active. I mean, they probably tested it but they decided not to, make it active, and that was the most, I think, significant, postponing decision. Greece, for now, we have a little bit of a relaxation of tensions because the ship went back. But it’s already preparing to go again, to what it perceives as its economic zone. So in this respect, I would not be so hopeful.”
Is the US truly opposed to Turkey’s expansionism?
“I completely agree with Alan that it’s a mixed picture and part of it is Trump’s style. Part of it is Trump’s personal relationship with Erdogan. But part of it is also US tendency to try to withdraw as much as it can from the Middle East. And it started with Obama. It’s not just Trump. I also suspect that, if there will be a new administration. The things that come into play with US-Turkish relations, which is, Turkey has a vital location. You always try to do some sort of reset with Turkey, there’s the difficulties, and that stays the same. Alan gave many examples of the US ambivalent position. I will just add two. He mentioned the US support of Israel, Greece, Cyprus relations. And it also came with the fact that the US did nothing to improve Israel-Turkey relations, which was exactly the opposite of what the Obama administration tried to do. That’s one example. And another example, again, is this brokering of the UAE-Israel and Israel-Bahrain agreements, and this is profoundly something that Turkey sees with resentment and is in a way a drawing of a red line for Turkey.”
How much of an Islamist is Erdogan?
“I agree that in his heart, these things definitely matter to him and that, also in his policy, you see an aspect of that, but you should also look at the whole picture, which also means that he’s promoting a very nationalist Turkish agenda. I would say sometimes more, even more nationalist than Islamist. And, also you should add that regional developments have also in a way pushed, Turkey to be basically the leader of today’s global Muslim Brotherhood movement, and that is of course a source of concern for all the other countries, because they see it as an internal threat in their countries. And that’s something, I mean, I think part of it was what happened with the fall of Morsi and the rise of Sisi, but it’s true that in today’s Turkey, you cannot really conduct feely. So if these things are happening on Turkish ground and, well, a source of concern is Hamas operating freely, on Turkish ground. And the fact that Turkey gave Hamas operatives citizenship and passports.”