Washington Kurdish Institute
February 12, 2020
Syrian refugees suffer empty promises from Erdogan as he uses them to exert political pressure and plans to relocate them to Kurdish lands in what is called the “safe zone.”
“I can imagine that we can provide German funds for this humanitarian action,” said German Chancellor Angela Merkel with regards to Erdogan’s request for financial aid after the latter complained about the increasing number refugees entering Turkey from Idlib, Syria, which currently faces brutal attacks from the Syrian regime backed by Russia and Iran. Of course, Merkel ignores the fact that German contributions will fund Erdogan’s plan to build settlements in Syria’s Kurdish region instead of providing relief for Syrians fleeing the carnage in Idlib.
In addition to oppressing Turkey’s domestic Kurdish population, Erdogan has launched three military campaigns in Syria to stop Kurds from obtaining basic rights and achieving self-governance. The Turkish military invasions facilitated a witches’ brew of criminals, jihadists, former ISIS (Da’esh) elements, and al Qa’ida-linked groups. Likewise, Erdogan’s ethnic cleansing ambitions were revealed when Turkey, through its 2018 attack on Afrin, killed hundreds of civilians and displaced over 400,000 Kurds who were eventually replaced with Turkish-backed jihadists and their families. The Afrin invasion, dubbed Operation Olive Branch, decreased the Kurdish population in the area from 99% to 20% and also displaced a large community of Christians and Yazidis, while Turkish-backed jihadists continue to murder, extort, and kidnap Afrin’s remaining Kurds and religious minorities. Prior to Operation Olive Branch, Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield in 2016 and seized al Bab city and a number of surrounding towns and villages, including Jarablus. Though Turkey claimed its incursion into al Bab was meant to combat Da’esh, it actually cut the Kurdish region in two and inflicted significant hardships on the region’s Arab population. Erdogan, bolstered by a lack of meaningful opposition to Turkey’s 2016 and 2018 Syrian incursions, continued his anti-Kurdish rhetoric and in October 2019, launched a military invasion of northeastern Syria. The incursion, ironically labeled Operation Peace Spring, killed hundreds of Kurdish civilians, displaced nearly 300,000 people, and raised the ire of most of the international community. That said, the torrent of international anger sparked by Turkey’s invasion and occupation of northeastern Syria failed to convince Erdogan to reverse course or cease his anti-Kurdish rhetoric.
Erdogan’s strategy, keeping in line with the Turkish policy towards the Kurds since the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, utilizes demographic change to destroy Kurdish regions that may achieve a degree of self-governance in order to ensure that they do not eventually inspire Turkey’s Kurds to push for greater rights or statehood. In northeastern Syria, this entails forcibly resettling Syrian refugees in the unstable Kurdish region. Max Hoffman, the Associate Director of National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress (CAP), describes Erdogan’s initiative as, “A terrible plan that is illegal and will unlikely work. The people he aims to resettle are not from there and this sort of demographic engineering has historically led to instability and violence down the line.”
Ironically enough, Erdogan once attempted to portray himself as a champion of Syrian refugees by instituting open door policies and calling for those in Turkey to be granted Turkish citizenship. In July 2016, Erdogan said, “We regard you as our brothers and sisters. You are not far from your homeland, but only from your homes and your land … Turkey is also your homeland.” At the same time, however, at least one Turkish expert described Erdogan’s public support for Syrian refugees in Turkey as little more than a scheme to improve his domestic political position.
Granted, Erdogan also views the Syrian refugees as a bargaining chip to be used against Europe, often threatening to “open gates for Syria refugees to go west” if European nations fail to support his “safe zone” project in northeastern Syria. Concurrently, the Syrian refugees have been a reliable cash cow for Erdogan and his supporters, as the European Union (EU) continues to accord foreign aid to Turkey in response to Erdogan’s threats and had given at least 3 billion euros (3.3 billion US dollars) as of March 2018.
Erdogan’s “Kurdophobia” created more Syrian refugees
Since 2015, Erdogan has officially waged war against Turkey’s Kurds in a campaign motivated by his own anti-Kurdish sentiment and a desire to win Turkish ultranationalist votes and the support of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Thus far, Erdogan has jailed thousands of Kurds, including political leaders, while tens of towns and villages have faced destruction at the hands of the Turkish military.
Simultaneously, Erdogan launched an assault on the Syrian Kurds over his fears that their democratic project would inspire Turkey’s Kurdish population. Despite ostensibly pursuing an anti-Syrian regime policy and assisting the Syrian opposition, Erdogan actually helped divide the Syrian opposition and diverted it towards attacking the Kurds. Erdogan accomplished this by turning a blind eye towards Da’esh fighters transiting through Turkey, supporting al Qa’ida-linked groups who eventually cannibalized the secular opposition groups, and forcing Turkish-backed Syrians to fight the Kurds instead of the Assad regime.
While elements of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) clashed with the Assad regime in Hama Province in August 2016, Erdogan commanded other FSA factions to occupy Jarabulus town, where they faced little or no resistance from Da’esh. Though Erdogan has repeatedly claimed Turkish forces are fighting Da’esh in northern Syria, they have instead attacked the Kurds, occupied Kurdish lands, and forced groups like the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to reallocate resources and manpower dedicated to combating Da’esh towards countering Turkish aggression. The Assad regime exploited this situation by eventually seizing Hama Province and dealing a significant blow to the Syrian opposition. The Syrian government was then able to build on this momentum and further exploit Erdogan’s focus on the Kurds by seizing additional areas of strategic importance, including Aleppo city. Following the Assad regime’s successes, which resulted in millions of additional refugees fleeing into Turkey, Erdogan increasingly began to recognize Vladimir Putin as Syria’s kingmaker and, often at the expense of the Syrian opposition, sought closer cooperation with Russia in Syria and beyond. Increased Russian-Turkish collaboration has so far resulted in Russia’s greenlighting of Turkey’s 2018 Afrin invasion and Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system.
Naturally, the Syrian opposition deserves its own share of the blame, as it allowed itself to be diverted away from fighting Assad and became sold on Erdogan’s animosity towards the Kurds. Turkish-backed jihadists have committed mass killings against Kurds, occupied their homes, and set up criminal rackets in Kurdish territory. On the other hand, the Kurds, unlike the Syrian opposition, have received thousands of internally displaced people (IDP) from Syrian cities like Hama, Aleppo, and Raqqa. SDF General Commander Mazloum has even welcomed large numbers of IDPs from Idlib and called for armed Syrian groups to join with the SDF in an attempt to rebuild the Syrian opposition into a viable force.
On the other hand, Erdogan now finds himself asking for help from the US and the EU to stop the Russian and Iranian-backed Syrian regime assault on Idlib. Of course, Erdogan, in making this request, conveniently ignores his own empowerment of terrorists and the irreparable damage his policies inflicted on the Syrian revolution and the Kurds.
Imagine: Turkey, Kurds, and Syrian opposition united against the Syrian regime
Uniting the Kurds and the Syrian opposition against the Syrian regime would have been beneficial to Turkey’s national security and economic interests. Such a course of action would have also potentially precluded a slew of negative developments, including:
- The cannibalization of the more moderate, secular Syrian opposition groups by Islamists, which decreased the chances of an opposition victory, as the presence and eventual rise to dominance of Islamists reduced or eliminated the chance Western governments would provide game-changing support like MANPADs or air cover to anti-Assad forces.
- A loss of economic opportunity for Turkey, as the disunity of the Syrian opposition and attacks on the Kurds prevented them from seizing large amounts of Syrian territory and potentially overthrowing Assad, which would have created ample opportunities for Turkish companies to acquire reconstruction contracts at the expense of potential rivals like Russia and Iran.
- A lack of security on the Turkish-Syrian border, as the SDF had previously secured the border and taken steps to ensure cross-border attacks could not be planned in northeastern Syria. The Turkish invasion resulted in the SDF appropriating fewer resources to the border or internal security, ensuring a higher likelihood of cross-border raids into Turkey.
- Most importantly, the Syrian Civil War has resulted in a humanitarian disaster that has claimed over 500,000 lives, created over six million refugees, and internally displaced at least six million, one hundred nineteen thousand more. Had the Syrian opposition retained a more secular character and engaged in greater cooperation with the Kurds, a quicker resolution to the Syrian conflict may have been achieved, which would have greatly mitigated the humanitarian crisis fueled by the continuing Syrian conflict.
Today Syrian refugees face hate crimes, racism and death in Turkey while they await being forced to either settle in recently seized Kurdish lands or remain in Turkey to continue bearing the brunt of Erdogan’s anti-refugee sentiment. While Erdogan is unlikely to halt his campaign of ethnic cleansing directed at Syria’s Kurds, the moderate Syrian opposition now has a chance to rethink its policies and forge a new relationship with the Kurds. Such a course of action will naturally require significant support from the United States, EU, and the UN to have any chance of achieving success. Sadly, however, such an outcome does not appear forthcoming and, at least for the foreseeable future, Idlib’s civilians will continue to be displaced by Erdogan’s policies, Assad’s brutality, and Turkish-backed terrorists.