Washington Kurdish Institute
By: Bill Rice & Yousif Isamel
June 25, 2018
Soon after U.S.-led coalition forces overthrew the dictatorial Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, the Kurdish region of Iraq’s leadership immediately rushed to enter into a collaborative government with the country’s new leadership in Baghdad. Iraqi Kurdistan’s leaders hoped that this would mark a new era for the country’s Kurdish population, an era that moved away from the authoritarianism, persecution, and human rights violations of both the Saddam era and previous Iraqi governments. The Saddam era was a most terrible time for Iraq’s Kurds and other groups in the Kurdistan region, one marked by genocide, mass killings, chemical weapon attacks, and rampant executions.
With the fall of Saddam, the people of Kurdistan were faced with two main options: to remain as part of a state that has historically oppressed them or to pursue a long-wished-for path towards an independent Kurdish state. During this time, the United States heavily pressured and discouraged Kurdistan’s leaders from this latter option. The best road for the Kurds and Iraqis overall, the U.S. and the international community insisted, was to continue on as a part of a larger Iraqi polity. Believing that the United States, the new Iraqi government, and the international government were acting in good faith, Kurdistan’s leadership agreed. And so, with an optimistic outlook, the leadership of Iraqi Kurdistan participated as significant players in the formation of a new Iraq. Yet Kurdistan was soon to discover that its new partners in Baghdad would not behave under a good faith partnership of mutual respect, accountability, and honesty.
This “new Iraq” was enshrined in its 2005 constitution, with not only an official recognition of the autonomy of the Kurdistan region and the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG) but also various provisions guaranteeing certains powers, rights, and processes to the region. Specifically, the new constitution recognized the past injustices against the Kurds and the peoples of the Kurdistan region, and thus called for a series of restorative policies to help account for these past crimes.
This new, democratically-elected government was led by Prime Minister Ibrahim al Jaafari of the Islamic Dawa Party, whose cabinet comprised Kurds and Shia Arabs (with most of the Sunni Arab population rejecting the political process at the time). Yet it was only a few months into the Jafari administration when anti-Kurdish rhetoric and policies germinated again. For example, Jafari refused to implement Article 140 of the Iraqi constitution. Article 140 calls for the restoration of citizens who were displaced from certain areas of Iraq, such as Kirkuk and other disputed territories, followed by a referendum in these disputed territories to decide on their future status (i.e. whether their people wish to remain a part of Iraqi proper, move under the purview of the autonomous Kurdistan region, or enter into some other governing arrangement).
During the 2005 budget process, Jafari decided not to begin implementing Article 140’s provisions in any substantive way, arguing that the budget allocation process should take precedent with no other distractions. In this way, Jafari left the issue for the next administration to decide. This delay served only to further entrench and exacerbate this protracted dispute, as the constitutional requirement for a referendum in Kirkuk and the other disputed territories by December 31, 2007 continued to look less and less likely. Although many Kurds were angered by this delay, there was no tangible action from Kurdistan’s leadership to pressure Jafari. Leadership decided it would be more prudent to pursue the issue for the next cabinet.
In May 2006, Nouri Al-Maliki (another Dawa Party member) became the Prime Minister of Iraq. And like his predecessor, Maliki never fully committed to implementing Article 140, despite the fact his administration passed a budget that guaranteed a percentage of funds to the Article 140 Committee. Maliki’s administration continued to delay action to restore the displaced peoples and properties of Kirkuk and the other disputed territories, and thus further delayed the constitutionally required referendum.
During this time period the Iraqi government mistreated Kurds and abused the Kurdistan region in a number of other ways. For example, the Iraqi government has refused to pay Peshmerga forces their salaries since 2003, despite the fact that these forces are an official part of the Iraqi military, and have served and continue to serve bravely to protect Iraq and its people. And in general, the Iraqi government has refused to pay the Kurdistan region its constitutionally due share of the budget since 2003. This ended up creating an economic crisis in the region at a time when Peshmerga forces were engaged in an existential fight against ISIS forces.
In addition, since 2003, the Iraqi government has refused to return the properties of Kurds and other Kurdistani peoples who were displaced and had these lands stolen from them during the Saddam era.
Although certainly not as brutal and oppressive as regimes of the past, the post-2003 Iraqi government clearly has still exhibited a problematic anti-Kurdish bias and stood against the legitimate rights and needs of the Kurdistan region. Yet during this time period, the Kurdistan leadership also failed (not only once but three times since 2005) to properly pressure the ruling Iraqi leadership to provide the basic constitutionally guaranteed rights of the people of Kurdistan.
These governments have also failed to protect and support other religious and ethnic minority groups in the Kurdistan region and the disputed territories. These groups include, but are not limited to, Yazidis, Mandaeans, Christians (Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Syriacs), Kakai, and Turkmen. While the central government of Iraq and the KRG leadership fight over important high-level issues, these minority groups are too often left in the shadows. For example, in the wake of ISIS and the inhumane, brutal crimes perpetrated against the Yazidi people, the Yazidi homeland of Sinjar still remains grossly underdeveloped and under resourced, with hundreds of thousands of people still displaced and missing across the country and the larger region. In addition, the Assyrian Christian town of Alqosh is in great need of further rebuilding and support.
But now that Iraqis have elected new government leadership, there stands a potential chance at a new experiment for Iraq — a chance for Iraq, its government, and its people to turn a new page. The May 12 parliamentary elections did have an inauspicious start, however: marked by allegations of rigging, voter fraud, and voter intimidation; a fire that broke out and burned a number of ballot boxes; and strong, persistent calls from various Iraqis for manual recounts. Despite these issues, there is still a chance for Iraq and Iraqis to progress.
Sadr, as the biggest winning block, announced two separate alliances: the first with Hadi Al-Ameri of the Fateh List and the second with current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. It is not clear whether they will form a government focused on illiberal majority rule of the Shia population or a government focused more on inclusivity, diversity, and true democracy. However the newly-elected coalition between Muqtada al-Sadr’s list and the Iranian-influenced Fatah List marks a historic and unique alliance in Iraqi politics. If these two forces are successful in attracting more allies and forming a government, it will mark the first time since 2003 that a non-Dawa party member holds the position of Prime Minister. The Kurds have a dark past with the Dawa party, especially with its exclusive Shia-based Iraqi nationalism.
However this doesn’t mean that the new Sadr-Fateh alliance will be an easy and automatic utopian improvement for the Kurds and the Kurdistan region. For, Sadr-Fateh, although never having held this much political power, were a part of these past governments which exhibited animus towards the Kurdistan region. What this means is that Kurdistan’s leadership will need to take a more proactive approach for championing the rights and privileges of their people. They will need to embark on a different strategy with these new Iraqi leaders.
Unity among Kurdistan’s leaders and political parties is essential to this new strategy. However, as it stands now Kurdistan’s leadership remain fractured, with many internal problems. Only a united Kurdistan can best work to gain the rights due to its people from the central government in Baghdad.
One of the key demands of a united Kurdish leadership should be that the new Iraqi government live up to the words and spirit of its own constitution and work immediately to address the status of Kirkuk and the other disputed territories. Many of these disputed areas, such as Kirkuk, remain under martial law, with lax security. In Kirkuk, security should be returned to the local policy and the KRG and the Iraqi central government should work together to return displaced persons.
The KRG should present a roadmap for how to resolve the Article 140 issue. This plan should acknowledge the importance of resolving this dispute and recognize its essentiality in addressing larger conflicts between the KRG and the Iraqi central government. It should both include the involvement of the international community as well as rely on sincere cooperation with and democratic input from the local communities in these disputed areas.
Kurdistan’s leaders should also demand reparations and compensation to individuals and families whose homes and other property were damaged and burned down by Iranian-backed militias in the disputed territories during the events of October 2017.
Furthermore, KRG leadership must demand that the Iraqi government engage in a cooperative process with the Kurdistan region and the international community, to produce a written agreement guaranteeing the KRG’s fair share of the Federal budget (one based on an accurate population assessment of the Kurdistan region) and specifying how these payments will be made.
In return, the KRG should demonstrate a realistic willingness to transparently work with Baghdad on issues like energy exports. Kurdistan’s leaders have already shown such willingness for cooperation, having handed over control of their regional airports to the control of the Iraqi government.
The KRG and the Iraqi government must also productively work together to address the plethora of humanitarian issues facing the Yazidis and other minority groups in the disputed territories who suffered greatly during the rise of ISIS. Not only do the displaced need to be quickly returned to their homes and properties, but they also need to be provided with proper medical access (including mental health resources) and employment opportunities. As it currently stands, Sinjar is in dire need of doctors and other medical personnel. Areas like Sinjar and Alqosh should be properly invested in and developed so the numerous internally displaced peoples can leave the insecurity of flimsy tents for the stability of real, secure housing.
In addition, the KRG and Iraqi government must work with the international community to establish adequate security and policing in these minority-dominant areas. There will be no one-size-fits-all solution to the question of security and policing in these areas — what works for some won’t work for others. The key will be to listen to and work with the local communities: some may prefer KRG personnel, others Iraqi forces, still others a joint patrol of these various forces. All of these communities will most likely desire some level of local force involvement in any patrols, and some communities may even ask for some type of regional or international force deployment for protection. These concerns and suggestions should be listened to and evaluated on an individual basis to determine the best situation for each community.
The Iraqi government must also work with the KRG to track down the thousands on thousands of Yazidis and other religious minorities who remain missing after ISIS invaded their lands, sold many of their young girls and women into sex slavery, and conscripted many of their male children and young men into the jihadist terror cult. Tracking down these people and restoring them to their families and communities must be a priority of the new Iraqi government.
In order to achieve all these aims, however, the KRG will need a strong partner in the United States. As it currently stands, the United States is facing a potentially problematic future relationship with the new Iraqi government, based on America’s history with the two winning parties. Both the Sadrists and the militias aligned with the Fateh Alliance have denounced the U.S. presence in Iraq and openly fought and killed U.S. forces. In fact, as recently as the defeat of ISIS in Iraq during this past year in most of the country, various Hashd Al-Shabi militias have threatened U.S. forces and demanded they leave the country.
Therefore, if these groups continue this antagonistic stance against the U.S., it will present a great challenge for U.S. interests and goals in the region, as well as a sure victory for Iran and its proxies. Before this most recent Iraqi election, the U.S. government bet heavily on Abadi retaining power, and thus it abandoned its strong support for the Kurdistan region. The U.S. subsequently lost this bet and is now left to deal with new, unanticipated Iraqi leaders, with whom they have a confrontational history.
It is thus clear that, in the coming years, the U.S. and the people of Kurdistan will need each other more than at any other time in the past. The people and leaders of Kurdistan need U.S. support in strengthening their autonomous region and in pursuing their long-desired goals of receiving fair, timely Federal funding and implementing the demands and spirit of Article 140 in good faith. Meanwhile, the U.S. needs a reliable partner within Iraq to help further its interests and ward off further Iranian influence. But not only would a strong U.S.-Kurdistan relationship be good for just these two parties, they would also be good for Iraq as a whole.
Disclaimer: The views, opinions, and positions expressed by authors and contributers do not necessary reflect those of the WKI.