Kurdistan Region of Iran (Rojhelat)
February 2026 was marked by Kurdish political unity in Rojhelat, alongside continued arrests, pressure on detainees, and security force intervention at memorial gatherings linked to the protest wave.
During the month, Kurdish opposition parties announced the formation of a new alliance, describing it as a coordinated political front. At the same time, human rights organizations and local Kurdish outlets documented arrests across multiple cities in Rojhelat as well as the use of force during memorial ceremonies tied to January’s fatalities.
Kurdish Parties Prepare for the Fall of the Regime
A show of unity among Iranian Kurdistan’s Kurdish opposition parties hardened into a formal alliance on February 22, 2026, when five major movements announced what they called the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan, a unified front intended to reshape Kurdish strategy against the Islamic Republic and to consolidate what they describe as a historic political moment in Rojhelat.
The coalition brings together the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI, also commonly known as KDPI), the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK), the Kurdistan Organization of Khabat (Khabat), and the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan (Komala). The announcement and full text of the agreement were published by the parties, including on the PDKI’s official platform.
The statement opens with a blunt political assessment: the Islamic Republic has, in their words, lost legitimacy among the Iranian public, yet remains in power because opposition forces have remained fragmented. That fragmentation, the parties argue, has prevented a coherent national alternative from taking shape. The new coalition is presented as the corrective. Unity, they say, is no longer optional but necessary.
The document lays out three principal objectives. First, the overthrow of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Second, the Kurdish people’s right to self-determination. Third, the establishment of what they describe as a national and democratic entity in Eastern Kurdistan (Rojhelat) based on the political will of the Kurdish nation.
The coalition also places strong emphasis on cooperation beyond Kurdish ranks. It declares readiness to coordinate with other “nations of Iran” and with democratic forces opposed to the current regime, provided that any future framework formally recognizes national rights, democracy, and a break with authoritarian governance. The statement repeatedly invokes the idea of a transitional period, suggesting the parties are looking beyond protest mobilization toward structured post-regime planning.
The five parties formally committed to coordinating political and organizational efforts under a shared framework, described as one of the most comprehensive attempts at unity in recent years among Rojhelat-based parties.
The coalition’s governance vision inside Rojhelat calls for free elections, protection of political and civil rights, equality between women and men, environmental stewardship, and guarantees for the rights of all national and religious communities living in the region. At the same time, it reiterates a commitment to building a democratic and secular political system in Iran as a whole.
A notable feature of the statement is its appeal to Kurdish society directly. The parties describe the coalition not merely as an agreement among organizations but as an invitation to the broader Kurdish public, urging citizens, civil organizations, and activists to join what they present as a collective national project.
For decades, Iranian Kurdish politics has included multiple parties with differing political programs and strategies, including armed activity and civil political engagement. The new coalition brings several of these parties together under one framework, though some parties are yet to join, including the Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan led by Abdullah Mohtadi.
In reaction, Reza Pahlavi, the son of the former Iranian dictator, has drawn sharp Kurdish criticism after reacting against the newly formed Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan by accusing unnamed “separatist groups” of making “baseless and contemptible claims” against Iran’s unity and warning that territorial integrity is a red line. Kurdish parties answered that his language sounded less like democratic opposition politics and more like a return to the same security-driven threats long used against Kurdistan. In a blistering statement, the coalition said Pahlavi had again targeted Kurds with “insulting” rhetoric, revived the smear of separatism, and even threatened military repression against the Kurdish rights movement, arguing that such remarks expose a mindset still rooted in coercion rather than recognition of Kurdish national and democratic rights.
In his own response, Abdullah Mohtadi pushed back by stressing that Kurdish forces are “completely united” in the struggle against the Islamic Republic and that participation in “this or that coalition” does not change that “fundamental solidarity.” He also warned that Pahlavi’s rhetoric only “divides and destroys” solidarity among Iran’s peoples by spreading hostility and repeating the regime’s old accusations. Taken together, the Kurdish response cast the new united front not as a danger to a future Iran, but as a legitimate and long-overdue assertion that any real democratic alternative must respect Kurdistan’s voice, rights, and place in shaping what comes next.
Protests and memorial gatherings met with gunfire and arrests
Mid-month memorial ceremonies marking 40 days since deaths in the January crackdown became flashpoints in Ilam Province, especially in Abdanan. Reuters reported that security forces opened fire on mourners gathered at a cemetery in Abdanan, and cited Hengaw as saying at least three people were injured and nine arrested.
The Hengaw Organization for Human Rights repeatedly reported that arrests in Abdanan and nearby Sarableh coincided with a memorial ceremony for Alireza Seydi, described as a 16-year-old from Abdanan killed during the January protests. Hengaw said nine residents of Abdanan were detained on February 17, 2026, and reported that security forces opened fire on attendees, injuring at least three people; Hengaw said the arrests were warrantless and involved violence, and that families received no clarity on charges or detention sites.
Later in the month, Abdanan again appeared in reporting as a protest site after the arrest of a teacher. Hengaw reported that Yaqoub Mohammadi, a teacher in Abdanan, was arrested on February 21, 2026, and that protests followed; Hengaw said he was released on February 22. Reuters also reported demonstrations in Abdanan after the arrest of a teacher, describing chants against Iran’s Supreme Leader.
Arrest wave across Kurdish cities
Arrest reporting in February repeatedly centered across Rojhelat’s major cities, including Senna, Mahabad, Shino, Bukan, and Eslamabad-e Gharb (Shabad). Hengaw described a continuing wave of detentions spanning multiple locations. In a February 15 report, the organization listed arrests in six cities and said authorities often presented no warrants; some accounts described violence during raids and the beating of relatives.
In a separate February 12 report, Hengaw detailed arrests in Miandoab, Abdanan, and Bukan, including a case in which a detainee was taken during a nighttime home raid and reportedly subjected to severe violence and beatings. The report also stated that several arrests were carried out without warrants and were followed by uncertainty about the detainees’ whereabouts.
Ilam Province: prolonged uncertainty and incommunicado detention
Ilam Province reporting in February emphasized extended lack of information and families cut off from detainees.
Between January 8 and February 3, at least 13 Kurdish citizens in Ilam Province were reportedly arrested “violently” and without judicial warrants. Some were said to be held in undisclosed locations, with no official information provided to their families for periods ranging from days to weeks. Sources also described intense security pressure and heavy interrogation, raising concerns about attempts to obtain forced confessions.
On February 22, it was further reported that two individuals were detained in Abdanan and Darreh Shahr on February 17–18. Both were allegedly taken without warrants, and no information was available regarding their location or status. They were also reportedly denied access to legal counsel and contact with their families.
Additional reporting described multiple arrests across Ilam Province between February 1 and 22, including detentions in Asemanabad (involving two brothers), Ilam city, and Abdanan (in a case involving a teacher). Several of these cases were described as being followed by a lack of information about the detainees’ whereabouts or condition.
Targeting of women activists and children
Hengaw reported the arrest of Novin Zarei, identified as a Kurdish women’s rights activist from Senna, detained by Ministry of Intelligence agents on February 12, 2026, and taken to the city’s intelligence detention facility; Hengaw said no official information was published about charges.
At least nine arrests of minors across Iran, including four Kurdish children, with Kurdish cases listed in Asemanabad, Darreh Shahr, and Dehloran (all tied to Ilam Province). Hengaw said the children remained in a state of uncertainty.
Prison pressure, torture allegations, and hunger strikes
On February 2, 2026, 19-year-old Karo Manbari was reportedly violently detained in Senna by forces affiliated with the Ministry of Intelligence. Security forces raided his family home, caused property damage during a search, confiscated mobile phones, and threatened family members. At the time of publication, no information was available regarding his location or condition.
In a separate case, prolonged uncertainty was reported regarding Ebrahim Rostami of Kamyaran. Following his detention, he briefly contacted his family and reportedly described severe pressure and torture at the Senna Intelligence detention center, as well as the start of a hunger strike. Communication was subsequently cut off, and he was reportedly denied access to a lawyer and family visitation.
In another case, Foad Fathi, a Kurdish labor activist and political prisoner from Senna, began a hunger strike on February 14, 2026, in Evin Prison. The action was described as a protest against what was characterized as targeted harassment of political prisoners, and his health was reported to have deteriorated.
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Bashur)
February 2026 in the Kurdistan Region was defined by continued efforts to form the tenth KRG cabinet, the unresolved Iraqi presidency and federal cabinet timeline in Baghdad, and sustained U.S. engagement with both major Kurdish parties, alongside the month’s most tangible governance step: expanding digital salary payments amid renewed disputes over funding transfers and pension entitlements between Erbil and the federal government.
Barrack Engages KDP and PUK Leaders in High-Level Kurdistan Visit
The United States Ambassador to Türkiye and Americas and the Envoy to Iraq and Syria, Tom Barrack, visited Iraqi Kurdistan this week with back-to-back meetings in Erbil, where he sat down with Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani and later met KDP leader Masoud Barzani in Pirmam, in talks also attended by Prime Minister Masrour Barzani. According to official statements, the discussions focused on U.S. relations with Iraq and the Kurdistan Region, developments in Syria, and the wider political situation in both Baghdad and Erbil, underscoring Washington’s continued engagement with the Kurdistan Democratic Party leadership at a sensitive regional moment.
The US envoy then traveled to Sulaymaniyah, where he met PUK President Bafel Talabani in Dabashan, with senior PUK figure and Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani. Reports said the Sulaymaniyah meetings centered on Iraq’s stalled government formation, the need for Kurdish unity in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region, and regional developments tied to Syria, including follow-up on the January 29 agreement involving the SDF and Damascus. Together, the Erbil and Sulaymaniyah stops highlighted an effort by Barrack to engage both the KDP and the PUK as the United States navigates a delicate political and security file spanning Iraq and Syria.
KRG cabinet formation: caretaker pressure and repeated “no final deal” messaging
At the start of the month, the deadlock was framed internally as a governing limitation, not a procedural delay. In a meeting with the British ambassador, Qubad Talabani described the current administration as a “caretaker government” and said it was not suited to the current stage and could not effectively address citizens’ problems.
Mid-month, party messaging emphasized forward movement without an agreement. On February 14, press briefing quoted a PUK spokesperson describing the latest KDP–PUK meeting as “very positive,” while also stating that no agreement had been reached on the regional cabinet or the federal formation track.
On February 16, a KDP source told Rudaw that the Prime Minister Masrour Barzani and Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani met as heads of their parties’ delegations to discuss the tenth cabinet, and that the parties’ political bureaus were expected to convene with Masoud Barzani overseeing the meetings. The same account described disagreement over the structure and distribution of posts as the central obstacle to finalizing a cabinet.
Baghdad track: the presidency file remains tied to Kurdish coordination
On February 9, Kurdish parliamentary figures described planned meetings between KDP and PUK delegations to discuss three linked files: Iraq’s presidency, Iraq’s federal cabinet formation, and the Kurdistan Region’s tenth cabinet. It also cited comments that decisions on convening a parliamentary session to elect a president are driven by political agreement outside parliament.
Two days later, a denial quoted a KDP source rejecting claims that a final agreement had been reached with the PUK on an Iraqi presidency nominee after a high-level meeting in Pimram. A parallel update reported the same day’s messaging from the PUK side, also dismissing reports of an agreement on the presidency or KRG formation at that stage.
Salaries and entitlements: January payroll executed in February, with disputed gaps
The month’s most specific official salary update came through the KRG’s Ministry of Finance and Economy. In an official statement, the ministry said 680,131 public-sector beneficiaries would receive January salaries through MyAccount payment method, publishing a province breakdown. The same statement said more than 900,000 beneficiaries had registered for bank accounts under MyAccount and that nearly 550 ATMs had been deployed across the Region.
Financial transfers linked to the salary mechanism remained part of public reporting during the month. A February 5 report said the KRG transferred 120 billion IQD in non-oil revenue to Baghdad for January salaries, describing the transfer as deposited into a federal Finance Ministry account at the Central Bank branch in Erbil.
By mid-month, the funding dispute sharpened into a public claim of incomplete transfers. A February 12 report quoted a KRG Finance Ministry statement saying more than 36 billion IQD was deducted from January salary funding and not transferred, linking the gap to pension payments owed to civilian and military retirees and certain categories of disabled individuals. The same report described correspondence dated Jan. 27, 2026 and Feb. 12, 2026 requesting the transfer of the disputed amounts, and said Iraq’s Finance Ministry replied that differences would be addressed when preparing the 2026 federal budget tables.
On the negotiation track, a report by K24 described a high-level technical and financial delegation that was expected to visit Baghdad to negotiate the Kurdistan Region’s share of Iraq’s 2026 federal budget and address salary funding, naming Finance Minister Awat Sheikh Janab as the head of the delegation and listing senior budget and accounting officials as participants.
The salaries of public employees in the Kurdistan Region remain a pressure point used by the federal government in Baghdad against the Kurdistan Region.
Kurdistan Region of Syria (Rojava)
February 2026 in Rojava centered on three connected realities: ISIS activity rising in newly reconfigured security zones around Raqqa and the Euphrates corridor, Kobani remaining under siege with deepening shortages, and Damascus–Kurdish talks moving forward in formal meetings while core Kurdish demands stayed unresolved in practice.
Mazloum Abdi and Ilham Ahmed at the Munich Security Conference
At the Munich Security Conference (Feb. 13–15, 2026), Mazloum Abdi, Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Ilham Ahmed took part as senior Kurdish representatives from northeast Syria, joining a set of meetings that placed the SDF and the Autonomous Administration’s diplomacy directly into the conference’s core Syria discussions. They joined a joint session with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, focused on the integration track and counter-ISIS priorities. On the sidelines, they met Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, while Abdi also held talks with Germany’s foreign minister and U.S. lawmakers, including figures linked to the “Save the Kurds Act.”
Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—and Ilham Ahmed —Co-Chair of the Department of Foreign Relations
ISIS attacks in Raqqa and the Euphrates corridor after the security transition
ISIS used this month to declare a “new phase” and pair messaging with operations. In a recorded statement and accompanying claims, the group said it had begun a “new phase” of operations, and claimed attacks including a pistol attack in Mayadin and machine-gun fire targeting personnel in Raqqa.
The clearest battlefield signal came west of Raqqa, where multiple reports described repeated strikes on checkpoints and internal security positions. On February 23, a checkpoint attack was reported as killing four internal security personnel west of the city. Another account tied the same pattern to a sequence of attacks and counter-operations, describing raids and arrests linked to an ISIS cell after attacks west of Raqqa.
A U.S.-based analytical brief described the same period as a short, concentrated spike: it said the rate of ISIS attacks on Syrian government forces increased significantly in the days immediately after the “new phase” message, and referenced attacks in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor in that window.
Parallel to this, U.S. forces continued anti-ISIS operations during the month. A February 14 official release said U.S. forces conducted 10 strikes against more than 30 ISIS targets in Syria between Feb. 3–12, describing the targets as ISIS infrastructure and weapons storage.
February also moved the ISIS-family camp file, relevant to Kurdish security because these camps were historically inside the SDF-administered space and because security vacuums around them have repeatedly fed ISIS regeneration.
On February 22, al-Hol was emptied as the final convoy departed, describing transfers to another camp in Aleppo province and repatriations to Iraq. Separately, a Washington Post analysis column cited a U.S. intelligence assessment saying 15,000 to 20,000 people were at large after escaping from al-Hol in February, describing the escape as a major potential accelerator of ISIS regeneration.
This month also featured visible movement in the U.S. footprint. According to a Reuters report, in February. 23, U.S. forces began to pull out of their largest base in northeast Syria (Qasrak, Hasakah), while also describing the base’s role as a hub for coalition operations against ISIS alongside Kurdish forces. A separate February account described convoys leaving and relocations toward Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, in the context of U.S. posture changes and the ISIS detainee file.
Kobani under siege: shortages, blocked access, and public-health collapse warnings
Local reporting described the siege as continuous through the month, with roads closed and basic services collapsing. An early-month field report said Kobani entered its 20th day under a “suffocating siege”, describing severe shortages of medicines and basic supplies and reporting electricity and internet cutoffs, while estimating about 600,000 civilians and displaced persons affected. Another report described thirty days under siege, saying roads remained closed and food and medical supplies were barred from entry, with hospitals operating at minimal capacity due to shortages, especially for chronic illness and emergency cases. A further medical-focused report described a gradual collapse of the health sector, stating that food, medical supplies, and fuel were barred, and that pharmacies were running out of essential medications.
An aid convoy of 25 trucks was also being blocked from crossing into Kobani, saying the convoy was turned back after being denied permission at the Suruç crossing. A multi-organization appeal urged Turkish authorities to open the Mürşitpınar Border Gate for humanitarian access to Kobani and surrounding areas.
Inside the city, accounts described pediatric deaths and chronic medicine gaps. A Feb. 24 report quoted a pediatric specialist in Kobani saying three children had died due to lack of medication, describing overcrowded general hospitals, shortages of clean water, and the absence of medications for chronic illnesses (including diabetes and high blood pressure).
Damascus–Kurdish talks: meetings held, key Kurdish demands still pending
February included formal political movement on the Damascus track, including Kurdish National Council (KNCS) meetings and SDF–Defense Ministry talks, but Kurdish messaging late in the month continued to link “talks” to concrete demands: lifting the Kobani siege, detainees, and Kurdish-language education.
On February 3, a meeting was described by the KNCS as focused on constitutional guarantees for Kurdish rights and democratic reform. On the security/integration channel, reports described Syrian military leadership meeting an SDF delegation to discuss steps for integrating SDF units into army brigades and related deployment arrangements.
European-level political language also appeared as a document from the European Parliament called on regional actors, including Türkiye, to refrain from military action that could undermine the ceasefire and civilian protection in northeast Syria, and it criticized Turkish military intervention and attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure in Kurdish-majority areas along the border.
Afrin: “return” language collides with property seizure and settler occupation
Afrin remained one of the clearest Kurdish rights files because it is measurable: who can return, who has their house, who controls property records, and whether settlers leave since its occupation by the Turkish forces and their Syrian proxies. On February 16, 400–500 families would return in a first phase to Janders, Mobata, and Shia.
But late-month reporting emphasized blocked returns because homes remained occupied and properties seized. A Feb. 21 report said seizure of properties was hampering the return of about 400 displaced Kurdish families to Afrin, describing many homes as still occupied by Arab settlers. A Feb. 22 report said a delegation of Afrin notables planned to visit Aleppo’s governor to demand the expulsion of Arab families residing in homes belonging to displaced Kurdish residents, framed as a step to facilitate returns after nearly a decade of displacement. SOHR reporting in February also described Afrin as caught in a long-running structure of coercion and control tied to the post-2018 order.
Kurdistan Region of Turkey (Bakur)
Bakur moved through a familiar contradiction. The Turkish state kept speaking in the language of a “new threshold” and a “terror-free” horizon, while Kurdish politics kept pressing one simple test: if this is truly a political path, then the democratic space in Kurdish cities must stop being treated as a temporary privilege that can be suspended at will.
Rojava stays inside Bakur’s political conversation
Kurdish leaders spent the month refusing the idea that Syria is a separate “external file.” In a widely shared interview, DEM co-chair Tülay Hatimoğulları argued that Ankara’s Syria posture was undermining trust in any renewed solution track inside Turkey, because Kurdish society watches Kurdish realities across the border and then is asked to believe the state is acting in good faith at home.
DEM’s meetings with other parties were reported as covering both the peace process and Kurdish expectations connected to Syria, including demands around humanitarian access and border crossings. The point was consistent: Bakur’s Kurdish question cannot be insulated from the regional Kurdish reality by decree.
In reaction, President Erdoğan publicly described a Damascus–SDF agreement as easing pressure on Turkey’s internal peace process, and again repeated the state demand that the SDF must disarm and dissolve. What Kurdish politics heard in that statement was not reassurance. It was a reminder that Turkey’s attempts to erase the Kurdish identity remains active, and that Kurdish actors in Syria are still treated as a problem to be neutralized, not as a legitimate political reality.
As the month progressed, Erdoğan’s Syria language mixed “integration” praise with continued supervision and conditions. He said Turkey was pleased with steps toward integrating the SDF into Syrian state structures and that Ankara was monitoring implementation and offering guidance. That was paired with a second track of messaging: warning that Turkey will act beyond its borders “wherever there is a threat,” language that keeps the option of cross-border operations permanently open.
İmralı returns to the center
The most concrete indicator of movement was the return of İmralı to the center of the public storyline. The DEM Party’s İmralı delegation met Erdoğan in Ankara and described the process as reaching a decisive phase. Not long after, the same delegation resumed talks with Abdullah Öcalan on İmralı Island.
The political importance of these steps increased because of a public event planned for the end of the month. DEM said it would hold a press conference in Ankara, where Öcalan’s new message would likely be read out, along with an update on how the process is progressing.
The Kurdish leader,Abdullah Öcalan, was also allowed to see his family during a visit on the island. He met with his brother, Mehmet Öcalan, and his nephew, Ömer Öcalan. Other prisoners were also permitted to receive family visits. The meetings were viewed as a notable development, given the long-standing restrictions on contact.
“Right to Hope” becomes a hard line, not a rumor
Kurdish political actors and legal advocates have renewed calls for the implementation of the “Right to Hope,” arguing that international human-rights standards require a legal pathway for life-term prisoners, including Abdullah Öcalan, to have the prospect of release.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan rejected the idea of any person-specific legal arrangement for Öcalan, stating publicly that no special regulation would be introduced under the “Right to Hope” framework. His remarks were reported by the pro-Kurdish outlet Kurdistan24.
Meanwhile, nationalist figures signaled that Öcalan’s legal status could be debated within the broader political process. Kurdish observers view these discussions as tightly controlled, with clear political limits set by the state.
The parliamentary “roadmap” passed, but DEM recorded its rejection of the state narrative
A parliamentary commission overwhelmingly approved its final report outlining legal reforms to support the ongoing peace process, including proposals on political freedoms, frameworks for reintegration of former militants, and alignment with rulings from Turkey’s Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights. The document was adopted with 47 votes in favor, two against and one abstention.
Coverage of the report highlighted its framing of a “terror-free Turkey” as a formal objective. Members of the pro-Kurdish DEM Party registered formal objections to that language, arguing that the Kurdish question cannot be reduced to a terrorism problem but should instead be treated as a complex issue involving political, social, cultural and historical rights.
The report’s recommendations are substantive: proposals span expanded protections for freedom of expression and assembly, prison law changes affecting sick and elderly inmates, and pathways for reintegration tied to legal compliance with high court decisions. Kurdish representatives supported advancing the process through the legislature while stressing that legal reforms should not be subordinated to security-heavy language and that the state’s wording must not redefine Kurdish political claims as merely a “terror file.”
Repression continued despite “process” language
Even as political dialogue expanded , security operations continued. Police detained 96 people in coordinated raids across 22 provinces targeting political groups, unions and media outlets. The Interior Ministry described the operation as part of an investigation into the MLKP.
Human-rights monitors documented ongoing prosecutions tied to Kurdish language and reporting. In Diyarbakır, a café owner remained on trial after announcing his business would serve only in Kurdish. A writer affiliated with Xwebûn newspaper continued to face membership-related charges. In Mardin, journalists went on trial over a report on torture allegations, accused under provisions related to “targeting” individuals involved in counterterrorism.
CPT Report on Ongoing Turkish Military Expansion in Iraqi Kurdistan
A report by Community Peacemaker Teams – Iraqi Kurdistan (CPT IK) on February 24, 2026 described the peace process as fragile, noting that although there had been nearly six months without Turkish bombardments following peace negotiations, Turkish forces resumed attacks and continued to expand their military infrastructure in northern Iraq. The report found that, despite ceasefire developments, at least 1,192 villages remained affected by Turkish operations through displacement, restricted access and property damage, with only five villages (about 0.4 percent) seeing any positive outcome in terms of return for displaced residents. CPT IK warned that expanded military roads, bases and deforestation were reinforcing a military presence that hindered civilian returns and urged both Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to take more serious steps toward demobilization and withdrawal from civilian areas.