Kurdistan Region of Iran (Rojhelat)
In January 2026, the Kurdistan Region of Iran (Rojhelat) became a central site of the nationwide protest wave that intensified following the late-December merchant strikes. Human rights organizations reported systematic lethal force in Kurdish cities and towns, including Kermanshah and Ilam. Additional violations included mass arrests, intimidation of victims’ families, hospital raids targeting the wounded, and restrictions on mourning and burial practices. Kurdish protesters were also killed in major protest centers outside the region, particularly in Tehran and Karaj, reflecting the significant presence of Kurdish workers and students in these metropolitan areas.
Protests and lethal repression in Kurdish areas
Throughout January, the regime repeatedly deployed live ammunition and pellet guns against demonstrators in Kurdish cities, causing fatalities and widespread injuries as security forces intensified their presence.
In Senna, eyewitnesses told the Kurdistan Human Rights Network (KHRN) that security forces fired live rounds and pellets, and that the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, the popular mobilization units, were also deployed to suppress unrest—an allegation that, if confirmed, would represent a significant escalation in cross-border security involvement in domestic repression.
The IRGC special forces and special units of Iran’s law-enforcement forces maintained a heavy presence in Kermanshah, while the country faced an ongoing nationwide internet shutdown, complicating documentation and communication from Kurdish areas.
Mass killing, hospital raids, and coerced burials
The most detailed documentation of mass fatality events in Kurdish areas centered on Eslamabad-e Gharb (Shabad) in Kermanshah Province.
In a January 23 report, at least 11 Kurdish citizens were shot dead by IRGC forces during protests on the evening of January 8 and published the verified identities of those killed (including a dentist and a nurse). The security forces pressured families in some cases to blame Kurdish opposition parties for the shootings. Simultaneously, raids on Eslamabad-e Gharb hospital—particularly on January 8–9—aimed at detaining injured protesters. According to KHRN, this drove families to remove the wounded and the bodies of the killed secretly to avoid detention. The families were often denied permission to bury relatives in the city cemetery and were forced to transfer bodies to surrounding villages for burial.
Earlier in the month, several protesters were killed and dozens injured after military and security forces opened fire on crowds, with witness accounts describing the use of live ammunition and pellet guns.
Beyond Eslamabad, Kermanshah city itself saw significant casualties documented by Hengaw Organization for Human Rights. A detailed list confirming the identities of twelve Kurds—including two children—killed in Kermanshah protests, describing multiple killings by direct gunfire and providing contextual details around several deaths. (Hengaw’s reports also highlighted the vulnerability of the Yarsan community in Kermanshah-related incidents.)
Confirmed Kurdish fatalities rose through the month as on January 20, KHRN confirmed five additional Kurdish citizens killed between January 8–9 in Kermanshah, Tehran, and Shahr-e Rey, including a 16-year-old, bringing its documented Kurdish death toll at that point to 58, including six children.
Additionally, Kurdish sources placed Ilam Province among the hardest-hit areas. The identities of two Kurdish men killed in Ilam and stated they were shot dead using live ammunition during demonstrations in the city of Ilam.
Political reactions singled out Ilam, particularly Malekshahi, as a site of severe violence. Iran International reported that Komala leader Abdullah Mohtadi condemned what he described as a “major crime” by the IRGC in Malekshahi in early January. Separately, Komala issued Statement No. 3 (Jan 5, 2026), condemning the violent suppression in Ilam, Kermanshah, and Lorestan, describing killings and mass arrests, and calling for international support and the release of detainees.
The Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) also released a statement on January 2, 2026, on the renewed wave of protests across Iran. The statement warns that Iranian security forces have killed and injured protesters and are escalating violence, with Kurds facing particularly severe repression, as seen during the “Women, Life, Freedom” movement. It also highlights widespread surveillance, repression of journalists and human rights defenders, and a sharp rise in executions—over 1,500 in 2025 alone—condemned by UN reporting as potentially amounting to crimes against humanity.
A unity message among Iranian Kurds came also by a joint statement by seven leading Kurdish parties of Iranian Kurdistan on January 6. The statement framed support for nationwide protests and condemnation of “crimes of the regime.” The signatories included Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran; Komala Party of Iranian Kurdistan; PJAK; Komala (Kurdistan Organization of the Communist Party of Iran); Revolutionary Komala of Toilers of Iranian Kurdistan; and the Kurdistan Organization of Khabat.
Outside Rojhelat, the security forces killed two Yarasani Kurds in Tehran during protests, naming Behzad Abbasi Gurajubi (from Qasr-e Shirin) and Mahan Mardani Garsadafi (a student), and noting uncertainty around the return of at least one body and the possibility of funeral restrictions.
The Hengaw Organization also identified multiple Kurdish individuals killed in protests in Tehran and Karaj, including a 19-year-old killed in Karaj and several killed in Tehran-area protest locations, and described practices such as families facing pressure connected to burial and retrieval of bodies. See Hengaw’s detailed identification report on eight Kurds killed during protests in Tehran and Karaj.
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Bashur)
January 2026 in the Kurdistan Region was defined by two linked political tracks: Baghdad’s federal government formation (with Kurds again central to the Iraqi presidency and prime-minister selection), and Erbil’s own stalled KRG cabinet formation. At the same time, the Region became the most active Kurdish platform for mobilizing humanitarian and political support for Rojava, as the Syrian regime’s escalation and siege conditions triggered a major solidarity response—from official diplomacy to mass fundraising and aid convoys.
Baghdad government formation: Maliki nomination and Kurdish positioning
The most significant federal development of the month came when Iraq’s Shiite Coordination Framework nominated former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, a controversial figure, as its candidate to form the next cabinet. The decision followed weeks of internal negotiations and came as the political process continued to await the election of a president, who will formally task the largest bloc with forming a government.
Reactions from Kurdish leadership appeared across multiple channels. On the KDP-led side of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), senior leaders offered congratulations, including the Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani spoke by phone with al-Maliki to congratulate him on the nomination.
KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani also extended his congratulations, emphasizing the importance of serving all Iraqis and resolving Erbil–Baghdad disputes on a constitutional basis. KDP leader Masoud Barzani likewise welcomed the Coordination Framework’s decision to nominate al-Maliki.
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) welcomed the nomination and urged the swift completion of constitutional procedures while calling for broader cooperation toward forming a “strong, service-oriented cabinet,” Bafel Talabani said in a statement.
The nomination also drew a sharp response from U.S. President Donald Trump, who warned that reinstating Maliki would lead Washington to withdraw its support from Iraq. Writing on social media, Trump argued that during Maliki’s previous tenure the country “descended into poverty and total chaos,” adding that without U.S. assistance Iraq would have “zero” chance of success.
The Iraqi Presidency and Erbil’s Internal Track: Kurdish Split, Competing Candidates, and Parallel Negotiations
January underscored how Kurdish unity in Baghdad remains a decisive lever in federal government formation, even as intra-Kurdish negotiations in Erbil continued to shape the Region’s political trajectory. Early in the month KDP and the PUK advanced separate candidates for Iraq’s presidency, with the KDP backing Fuad Hussein and the PUK nominating Nizar Amedi. The presidency has traditionally been held by a Kurdish figure under Iraq’s post-2003 power-sharing framework, raising the stakes of Kurdish coordination in Baghdad.
By late January, parliament’s scheduled session to elect the next president was postponed amid continued disagreement between the Kurdish parties over a unified nominee, leaving multiple candidates in contention and extending uncertainty around the federal timeline.
While the Baghdad process stalled, the Region’s governance file showed signs of movement, though without a tangible breakthrough, on a separate but closely linked track. Delegations from the PUK and the KDP met in Erbil to discuss three core priorities: establishing a unified Kurdish negotiating position in Baghdad, forming the KRG’s tenth cabinet, and resuming the work of the Kurdistan Parliament.
Rojava solidarity: diplomacy, aid convoys, and public mobilization
January’s most visible public mobilization inside the Kurdistan Region was directed outward toward Rojava, amid siege conditions and widening humanitarian need linked to the Syrian regime’s escalation.
On the official diplomatic front, the Kurdistan Region Presidency issued a public statement expressing alarm at the armed confrontation involving the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), warning of broader instability and ISIS risks while describing continuous contacts with regional and international actors to push for an end to hostilities and revive a political process.
President Nechirvan Barzani also hosted Mazloum Abdi in Erbil on January 17, where discussions focused on the necessity of establishing peace, ending military tensions, and restoring stability in areas affected by clashes, while emphasizing dialogue as the only path toward coexistence in a unified Syria.
In parallel, Masoud Barzani, the leader of the KDP convened a high-level meeting that included U.S. Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack alongside Abdi to address deteriorating security conditions, protect Kurdish rights, and promote stability following renewed violence in Aleppo.
On the humanitarian front, hundreds of aid trucks were dispatched to Rojava as the crisis deepened, reflecting a large-scale mobilization aimed at addressing urgent civilian needs. At the same time, authorities in the Kurdistan Region signaled the need for centralized coordination. Officials warned against uncoordinated individual attempts to transport aid to Rojava, emphasizing that such efforts require prior logistical preparation and formal approvals to ensure safe and effective delivery.
Rojava-related tensions also spilled into domestic media policy. In late January, Rudaw reported that Erbil’s Culture Ministry instructed multiple broadcasters to halt certain “foreign and Arabic channels,” arguing that specific outlets were causing social disruption and “disrespect toward the Kurdish nation,” and linked the move to coverage of developments in Rojava.
Finance and rights: salaries, budget pressure, and federal entitlements
The Region’s internal political track in January remained inseparable from the long-running salary and budget dispute with Baghdad. The KRG Council of Ministers meeting said the cabinet pressed Baghdad to release salary payments and argued there was “no legal or constitutional basis” for withholding them, calling salaries a lawful right of public employees.
The KRG’s Department of Media and Information published a January briefing asserting that the Kurdistan Region received only 41% of its federal entitlements across a multi-year period and referenced continued salary obstructions even after oil-export developments described in the statement.
Kurdistan Region of Syria (Rojava)
January 2026 witnessed one of the most concentrated waves of military attacks against Syrian Kurds in years, centered on Aleppo’s Kurdish neighborhoods and spreading across Kobani and the wider northeast. The offensive included heavy shelling, and drone strikes in civilian districts, siege tactics that cut off fuel and medicine, renewed frontlines after “integration” talks stalled, and field executions alongside the killing of fleeing families. The period ended with the announcement of an “agreement,” pending real implementation.
Aleppo: Sheikh Maqsoud & Ashrafiyeh under direct assault
The defining escalation began on January 6, when Damascus-regime forces launched extensive bombardment on the Kurdish neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh using heavy artillery and drones. The assaults were the culmination of months of pressure and siege conditions. The attacks included those on hospitals, including Osman Hospital and Khaled Fajr Hospital, describing this as a major civilian-protection breach.
A detailed report described the Kurdish neighborhoods as long-standing sanctuaries with a combined population estimated at 100,000–200,000. It stated that the January assault involved repeated shelling and drone strikes, damage to hundreds of homes, and the targeting of the area’s only functioning hospital. RIC reported civilian deaths and dozens of injuries, adding that tens of thousands of residents fled under siege conditions.
In early coverage of the first wave of fighting, a live update reported that shelling on the Kurdish neighborhoods had killed at least seven civilians and injured 52, while local officials described indiscriminate attacks by Damascus-aligned factions.
By mid-month, a senior SDF commander publicly framed the assault as politically driven, tied to external interference and repeated violations of earlier understandings meant to protect the neighborhoods. In that account, the commander described harassment at checkpoints, arrests tied to movement in/out of the neighborhoods, and the use of siege tactics as pretext for escalation.
Reports highlighted the medical toll, with hospitals treating more than 100 injured people and warning that civilians in the affected districts continued to face emergency conditions.
“integration” Talks Fail, Frontlines Widen
The escalation followed the collapse of negotiations over how Kurdish-led institutions and forces would be integrated into Damascus-controlled structures. An early-month meeting broke down without agreement, and the failure was soon reflected on the battlefield, with fighting spreading from Aleppo across multiple fronts.
At the same time, a regime offensive recaptured significant territory previously held by Kurdish-led forces in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, driving large-scale displacement and further eroding trust between local communities.
On the ground in Deir ez-Zor, regime forces moved into areas vacated by Kurdish units, illustrating how political “handover” dynamics and military pressure unfolded simultaneously.
As control shifted, growing concern emerged over security at detention facilities and camps holding ISIS-linked detainees and their families. As Syrian regime forces moved into parts of northeast Syria, taking control of areas and facilities previously guarded by the Kurdish-led SDF, security around ISIS detention sites became an immediate flashpoint. During the transition, hundreds of ISIS terrorists escaped along with members of their families, exploiting gaps created by shifting command structures and overstretched guards. The chaos triggered urgent sweep operations and accelerated contingency planning, including U.S.-led efforts to move detainees out of Syria amid fears that further breakdowns could enable additional mass escapes.
After control changed hands at al-Hol camp, unrest spread inside the facility, creating conditions that allowed individuals linked to ISIS to slip into surrounding communities. U.S. officials have stated that Washington is seeking to relocate approximately 7,000 ISIS detainees and affiliated family members to Iraq as part of a broader security strategy.
Kobani: siege conditions, child deaths, and a humanitarian corridor battle
Kobani became the emblem of siege pressure on Kurdish civilians. A Kurdistan24 report cited the Kurdish Red Crescent saying five children (including an infant) died amid extreme cold, lack of heating fuel, and shortages of essential medical supplies, describing the deaths as directly tied to siege conditions and blocked aid routes.
International institutions echoed the access problem. A UN briefing said humanitarian partners were alarmed because roads connecting to Kobani were closed, with outages affecting basic services.
Kurdish monitoring also stressed the city’s isolation and the risk of further infant deaths in freezing temperatures. Roughly 150,000 civilians trapped under siege-like conditions, describing severe disruptions to electricity, water pumping, and supply entry.
Humanitarian entry became a political fight. The United Nations dispatched a first convoy of food and fuel supplies to Kobani (24 trucks), calling it urgent for survival amid cut water/electricity/internet.
Ceasefire on paper: repeated violations reported by Kurdish forces
A fragile ceasefire violated by Damascus-affiliated armed factions. An official SDF press statement said that despite the ceasefire entering into force, Damascus-affiliated factions continued attacks across Jazira and Kobani regions, listing locations and asserting casualties and ongoing hostilities.
The SDF stated that even after the ceasefire started, Damascus-affiliated factions carried out multiple attacks including shelling and clashes around several fronts, with incidents continuing into the next day. Likewise, there were multiple ceasefire violations in Jazira and Kobani, while the SDF claimed continued commitment to de-escalation.
Internationally, the ceasefire extension prompted calls for restraint and adherence. A Reuters report said the UK, US, France, and Germany publicly supported the 15-day extension and urged all sides to observe it.
Civilian killings and “execution” reports: families targeted while fleeing
One of the most disturbing threads in attacks against the Kurdish civilians, especially families trying to flee the violence, were attacked or killed during the regime’s advance and the associated chaos. A case involved a Kurdish family who were stopped while trying to escape toward Hasakah; as they fled under fire, six members were killed and six were wounded, and the episode became emblematic of the broader suffering civilians faced amid collapsing security and shifting fronts.
In another incident in Deir ez-Zor, a Kurdish family was killed in a reported massacre that highlighted how vulnerable fleeing civilians were in contested zones. A Rudaw account of that killing described how members of the family were shot as they attempted to move through areas where control had just changed hands, drawing outrage from Kurdish communities and reinforcing a pattern of civilian deaths tied to the regime’s offensive and the breakdown of protections for noncombatants.
Sources also documented detention-related abuses amid the post-offensive chaos, including the killing of detainees under torture in regime-linked holding facilities. According to Hawar News Agency, four people from Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh were tortured to death in detention centers run by opposition-aligned authorities after being arrested during recent attacks, with their families forced to sign death certificates before burial.
After mounting international pressure, the Syrian regime agreed to extend a 15-day ceasefire that was first reached in late January, as part of a broader understanding aimed at halting hostilities and beginning the implementation of a negotiated settlement with the SDF.
Under the terms announced, both sides committed to maintaining the ceasefire across northeast Syria, pulling back from front-line clashes, and laying the groundwork for a gradual transition of administrative and security control over contested areas. The agreement also outlines steps toward integrating SDF forces into Syrian state institutions and transferring control of border crossings, oil and gas fields, and detention facilities to Damascus—a framework reflecting the shifting balance of power after intense fighting earlier in the month.
However, in the aftermath of repeated ceasefire breaches and escalating clashes around Kobani and the Jazira Canton, a cautious calm has settled along the frontline contact lines, even as the broader security situation remains tense and unstable.
On January 30, the Syrian regime and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) agreed to a ceasefire that included a phased process to integrate military and administrative structures between the two sides. Under the agreement, military forces will withdraw from front-line positions while security forces affiliated with Syria’s Interior Ministry will enter the centers of Al-Hasakah and Qamishli, beginning the merger of regional security units. The agreement also calls for the creation of a military division composed of three SDF brigades, as well as the formation of a Kobani brigade within a division tied to Aleppo province. Additionally, institutions belonging to the Autonomous Administration will be incorporated into official Syrian state bodies while maintaining the positions of civilian employees. The agreement further addresses the civil and educational rights of the Kurdish population and guarantees the return of displaced residents to their homes.
The Save the Kurds Act
Two US Senators, Lindsey Graham and Richard Blumenthal, introduced the Save the Kurds Act in response to repeated attacks by Syrian government forces on the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The legislation would impose sanctions on Syrian government officials, financial institutions, and any foreign individuals who provide military or financial support to the Syrian government. The SDF played a major role in the U.S.-led effort to defeat Islamic State, ultimately controlling northeastern Syria after the fall of the caliphate. However, following the ousting of Bashar al-Assad, Syria’s new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, has launched a campaign against the Kurdish-led forces under the justification of national unity, with evidence suggesting coordination and assistance from Turkey. The SDF-controlled region houses ISIS prisons guarded largely by Kurdish forces and is home to roughly 1,000 U.S. troops, making continued attacks a threat to regional stability, American personnel, and relations with the new Syrian government while increasing the risk of an ISIS resurgence. Lawmakers argue that protecting reliable allies is critical to U.S. national security and preventing extremist groups from regenerating. Graham emphasized bipartisan support for safeguarding the Kurds, noting their sacrifices in the fight against ISIS and warning that attacks on them could damage U.S. credibility and Syria’s future, while Blumenthal stressed the need for immediate action to shield Kurdish partners from retaliation. The Save the Kurds Act would formally recognize the SDF’s contributions, redesignate Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, require congressional review before removing Syria’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, grant the president authority to suspend sanctions if attacks cease, and include a snapback provision to immediately reinstate penalties should the Syrian government resume hostilities.
Despite a tentative and fragile agreement between Damascus and the SDF, the Kurdish diaspora and advocacy groups in Washington continue to press for the Save the Kurds Act to help ensure accountability and prevent crimes against Kurds in Syria.
Kurdistan Region of Turkey (Bakur)
January 2026 unfolded like a single, connected story: Rojava under assault by the Syrian regime, Kurdish anger and solidarity rising across Turkey’s Kurdish region, and a fragile peace-track that stayed trapped between public promises and a shrinking democratic space.
The Syrian regime’s offensive becomes Turkey’s Kurdish political weather
The clearest Kurdish political line inside Turkey came from the DEM Party’s Central Executive Board, which condemned the Syrian regime attacks on Aleppo’s Kurdish and neighborhoods and described civilian killings and mass injuries during tank, artillery, and drone fire. The statement framed the assault as unacceptable and demanded an immediate halt. In Turkey’s Kurdish cities, the wording landed like a verdict: peace inside Turkey cannot be separated from Kurdish survival in Rojava. In an interview, DEM Co-Chair Tülay Hatimoğulları warned that massacres in Rojava were draining Kurdish faith in any renewed solution process in Turkey—because Kurdish communities were being asked to trust “peace” while watching Kurdish civilians targeted across the border.
And when Ankara and its allies tried to reframe the crisis as a “Syria file” separate from Turkey’s domestic question, DEM Co-Chair Tuncer Bakırhan responded the opposite argument: if Syria had been used for years as an excuse, then developments this month removed that excuse—concrete steps were now the only honest measure of intent.
DEM carried its parliamentary presence to Nusaybin, facing Qamishli, explicitly as a protest against the attacks on Rojava. The message was simple: the border is a line on a map, not a wall between Kurdish lives.
Large demonstrations flared in Nusaybin after developments in Rojava, and clashes followed. In the aftermath, Turkish authorities opened sweeping investigations, 356 people investigated, dozens detained/arrested, treating the uprising of Kurdish anger as a public-order problem rather than a political cry.
Additionally, a Kurdish man was tortured by police after being linked to footage of a Turkish flag being taken down during Kurdish protests on Jan. 20 in Nusaybin, Authorities detained 14 people following the demonstration, and videos later surfaced showing the Kurdish man being mistreated; he suffered life-threatening injuries including spinal and skull fractures, internal bleeding, and organ damage, yet was discharged from the hospital despite objections from his lawyers, who argued the decision violated medical ethics and human rights protections.
Moreover, during Rojava-solidarity protests in the Kurdistan region of Turkey, journalist Nedim Oruç was detained while covering events in Şırnak; accounts described him being beaten and taken away with his equipment. Days later, in Nusaybin, five journalists were detained while covering marches about attacks against Kurds in Syria with documentation noting physical violence and detention extensions.
International press-freedom groups also tracked the arrests and legal accusations against journalist. The practical result was obvious: solidarity with Rojava was treated as suspect and covering that solidarity was treated as dangerous.
The “peace process” in January: talk, commissions, and a crisis of trust
On paper, January still carried the vocabulary of a renewed process, dialogue, disarmament, commissions, reconciliation. On the ground, Kurdish politics spent the month insisting that peace cannot be reduced to security choreography.
Bakırhan described the track as stuck in a “trust crisis,” saying that beyond a parliamentary commission, there had been no meaningful step:” not a single practical step other than the commission” while the state poured energy into Syria and border control. The same theme surfaced repeatedly: you cannot demand calm while Kurdish neighborhoods burn in Rojava.
Concurrently, on January 17, DEM’s delegation traveled to meet Abdullah Öcalan. The delegation’s official statement afterward said the meeting lasted roughly two and a half hours and that Öcalan reaffirmed commitment to the Peace and Democratic Society Process, stating the “February 27 perspective” remained valid and urging that necessary steps be taken to advance the process. Multiple Kurdish sources emphasized that developments in Syria were the central agenda item and that Öcalan framed the clashes as an attempt to sabotage the process, insisting on dialogue and negotiation.
Censorship and Bans
Pro-Kurdish outlets saw their presence restricted on social media—Mezopotamya Agency and Jin News X accounts blocked—and access bans hit Kurdish news sites and journalist accounts amid Syria-related content and protests. Authorities also moved against Kurdish political mobilization in formal ways: a planned DEM rally in Diyarbakır was blocked by the governorate, ban on rally calling for Öcalan’s release amid Syria tensions, and later the Mardin governorate imposed a sweeping province-wide assembly ban from Jan 27–31.
Meanwhile,a familiar Kurdish grievance: elected Kurdish representation kept colliding with the trustee system. In early January, the Interior Ministry extended the mandate of the state-appointed trustee in Mardin despite court developments around the elected mayor—trustee term extended—keeping one of the most politically symbolic Kurdish-majority municipalities under appointed governance.