Kurdistan Region of Iran (Rojhelat)
Overview
In 2025, Kurdish regions in Iran faced an intensified campaign of repression by the Iranian regime, characterized by lethal force, mass arrests, and systematic rights violations. Kurdish kolbars were repeatedly shot and killed by border forces, while hundreds of Kurdish civilians were arbitrarily detained on vague security charges, often without warrants or due process. Executions surged nationwide, with Kurds disproportionately affected, including political prisoners put to death after trials involving torture and serious legal violations. Kurdish cultural and linguistic expression was heavily suppressed, with Newroz celebrations, Kurdish language use, and artistic activities treated as security offenses. Civil society actors, lawyers, journalists, teachers, labor activists, and students, were routinely targeted through arrests, dismissals, surveillance, and intimidation. Overall, the Iranian regime continued to rule Kurdish areas through militarization and fear, leaving little space for civic life or fundamental freedoms.
Kolbars and Border Killings
Kurdish cross-border porters, known as kolbars, continued to face deadly violence from Iran’s border guards in 2025. In the first half of the year alone, at least 10 Kurdish kolbars were shot and killed and 12 more wounded by direct fire from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and border forces. These porters, who traverse mountainous frontiers carrying goods to earn a livelihood, were often fired upon without warning at close range, as documented in cases like the July 23 shooting in Sarvabad that killed 40-year-old Amin Gardi and critically injured two other kolbars in Senna province. July 2025 saw a particularly lethal spike: six kolbars were killed and six injured that month, all by live gunfire, with most incidents concentrated along the Senna Province border region. Local human rights groups reported that Iran’s crackdown on kolbars intensified following a brief Iran–Israel conflict in June, after which officials falsely accused kolbars of espionage and banned the practice of kolbari outright as a “security gap.” This approach served as a pretext for extrajudicial killings of kolbars under the guise of national security. For example, in late June and July, at least three kolbars – Siwan Abdullahzadeh (20), Khaled Mohammadi (23), and Payam Ahmadi – were shot dead by Iranian forces within weeks of officials claiming kolbars were smuggling arms for Israel. In addition to shootings, Kurdish kolbars remained vulnerable to landmines and harsh conditions; on November 10 a kolbar in Kermanshah lost his leg to a landmine explosion near Nowsud. Despite government promises to formalize border trade, 2025 brought no relief. Instead, the annual toll of kolbar casualties remained high – human rights monitors recorded hundreds of Kurdish porter deaths or injuries each year – underscoring that Iran’s border policies in Kurdish areas prioritize militarization over humanitarian concerns. The systematic targeting of kolbars, a population driven by economic desperation, constitutes a pattern of state-sanctioned lethal force with impunity.
Arbitrary Arrests and Detentions
Iranian authorities carried out waves of arbitrary arrests of Kurdish civilians in 2025, often with no warrants and in violation of due process. Kurdish areas saw some of the largest crackdowns. In January alone, over 94 individuals – including 26 Kurdish activists – were detained, many targeted for participating in strikes and protests against the execution sentences of Kurdish political prisoners. Security forces routinely raided homes without presenting warrants, using violence and seizing personal belongings such as phones and computers during arrests. Detainees were frequently held incommunicado with their fates unknown for weeks. A significant surge came in late June during a security operation tied to an Iran–Israel conflict: within ten days, at least 900 people were arrested nationwide, over one-third of whom were Kurds, on vague accusations like “espionage for Israel” and “propaganda against the state.” The Hengaw Organization for Human Rights documented that by early July, among the confirmed arrests were 127 Kurds in Kermanshah and 91 in West Azerbaijan, including women and even teenage girls, as the regime swept through Kurdish cities under military rule.
Arrests continued unabated through the year. In November, 51 Kurds were detained, accounting for 45% of all recorded arrests in Iran that month, and at least 14 more Kurds were rounded up in just the first week of December. Those arrested spanned a cross-section of Kurdish society: community activists, journalists, students, former political prisoners, and ordinary residents. For example, intelligence agents in Mahabad and Oshnavieh (Shinno) detained numerous people in early December with no charges disclosed, and some detainees’ whereabouts remained unknown weeks later. Such detentions are often accompanied by reports of torture or coerced confessions, and arrestees are denied access to lawyers and family. The mass arbitrary detentions of Kurds in 2025 reflect an enduring state policy of repressing dissent and intimidating minority communities. Kurdish rights groups have verified at least 822 Kurdish individuals arrested in the first half of 2025 alone, underscoring the scope of this repression. These practices contravene Iran’s legal obligations and have created an atmosphere of fear across Senna Province and neighboring regions.
Death Sentences and Executions
Iran’s use of the death penalty surged to an alarming peak in 2025, with Kurds disproportionately affected. Human rights monitors reported that by November, over 1,500 people had been executed in Iran in 2025, the highest figure in decades, and at least 231 of the victims were ethnic Kurds.
Kurdish prisoners constituted the largest share of executed minorities, followed by Lurs, Turks, and Baluchis. The majority of these executions were for drug-related or homicide charges, but a notable number were political executions aimed at silencing Kurdish dissent. In the first half of 2025, 26 prisoners were executed on political or security-related charges (such as involvement in the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests or alleged espionage), double the comparable total for 2024. Among the most egregious cases, on June 25 authorities secretly executed three Kurdish political prisoners – Idris Ali, Azad Shojaei (both from Sardasht, West Azerbaijan), and Rasoul Ahmad Rasoul (from Iraqi Kurdistan) – in Urmia Prison, accusing them of spying for Israel. The men were put to death without prior notice; their families were denied final visits and their bodies were not returned.
Additionally, early in the year, Iran’s Supreme Court upheld the death sentence of Pakhshan Azizi, a Kurdish activist from Mahabad, for alleged membership in an armed opposition group, despite clear indications that her conviction relied on torture-tainted “confessions” and other procedural flaws. The upholding of Azizi’s sentence in January sparked public outcry and local strikes in Kurdish cities, as thousands of artists, writers, and activists signed an open letter condemning the ruling. Another Kurdish political prisoner, Verisheh (Warisha) Moradi, had been condemned to death in late 2024 on similar “armed rebellion” charges; she endured five months of solitary confinement and was denied a defense at trial. In a rare piece of good news, Moradi’s death sentence was overturned by the Supreme Court in December 2025 due to serious investigative flaws and the case sent for retrial. Likewise, in October the Supreme Court overturned the death sentences of five Kurdish protesters from Boukan (arrested during the 2022 demonstrations), citing lack of due process, after a revolutionary court had originally imposed multiple death pennalties on them. Despite these reversals, many Kurds remained on death row or at risk of execution by year’s end. Rights groups noted that Tehran has “weaponized” the death penalty to cow ethnic minority communities, especially after unrest – for instance, multiple Kurds accused of espionage or protest-related offenses were hanged in the second half of 2025 with minimal transparency. The sheer scale and discriminatory pattern of executions in 2025 – averaging roughly four per day nationwid– drew condemnation from international observers as a “shocking spree” intended to instill fear and quash dissent.
Crackdown on Cultural and Linguistic Rights
Iranian authorities continued to suppress Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights in 2025, treating expressions of Kurdish identity as security offenses. The Kurdish language remains excluded from formal education, and those who promote mother-tongue instruction or Kurdish arts frequently face intimidation. In North Khorasan province (home to a Kurdish minority), security forces launched a sweeping campaign in July against Kurdish cultural activists. At least six activists, including a 14-year-old schoolgirl, were arrested in Bojnourd and Shirvan for activities like teaching Kurdish, celebrating traditional attire, or poetry recitation in Kurdish. The detention of 14-year-old Kazhal Salehi, who had publicly recited a Kurdish poem in praise of Kurdistan, sparked local outrage; villagers protested her arrest, forcing authorities to release her after three days, though her father (arrested with her) remained jailed. In tandem, dozens more Kurdish cultural figures across Khorasan and even far-off cities (Mashhad, Quchan, Borujerd) were summoned and threatened by intelligence agents, underscoring the nationwide scope of cultural repression. Officials have banned the wearing of Kurdish traditional dress at public events and targeted Kurdish artists involved in ethnic music or media – for example, a studio that produced a Kurdish music video was forcibly shut down, and multiple artists were arrested or warned simply for participating in that video (“Walat”). In Kurdistan and Kermanshah provinces, even schoolchildren and educators were not spared. In October, education authorities punished staff at a girls’ school in Javanrud after students performed Kurdish patriotic songs at a school event. Mehri Khosravizadeh, a teacher who led her students in singing Kurdish anthems, was interrogated repeatedly by the intelligence department and barred from career advancement, while the school’s principal Zaitun Kahzadi was dismissed from her post; both women were later charged with “propaganda against the state” for the musical performance. According to Hengaw, such reprisals reflect a broader pattern in recent years where Kurdish-language songs or any cultural activity in schools trigger harsh security reactions.
The most emblematic cultural showdown came during Newroz (Kurdish New Year) celebrations in March. Anticipating widespread festivities, Iranian authorities deployed heavy security to Kurdish areas to block Nowruz gatherings. In West Azerbaijan’s Kurdish districts, the IRGC set up checkpoints with machine-gun-mounted vehicles on roads to popular celebration sites, searching and intimidating travelers. IRGC commanders openly warned that no permits would be granted for “unauthorized” Newroz events – one provincial commander in Ilam declared that any celebration “not in line with our culture” must be prevented, conflating Kurdish ceremonies with a threat to Islamic values (as Newroz 2025 coincided with Ramadan. Despite this, many Kurds defied the restrictions and held Newroz gatherings, which were met with arrests: by late March, at least 21 Kurdish civilians and activists had been detained across Senna Province for participating in Newroz festivities. The crackdown on Newroz and on Kurdish language education violates fundamental cultural rights. Iranian law offers no protection for minority language use, and officials treated cultural expression as separatism – a policy line clearly at odds with Iran’s international human rights obligations to protect linguistic and cultural freedom.
Political Repression of Civil Society
Kurdish civil society and political activism in Iran remained under intense pressure in 2025. Security agencies systematically targeted Kurdish human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists, educators, union organizers, and community leaders, using arrests, prosecutions, and even extrajudicial violence to stifle independent voices. Dozens of Kurdish civic activists were among those arbitrarily arrested over the year (as noted, Kurds made up nearly half of recorded political detentions in some months) and many were slapped with trumped-up national security charges. Courts handed down prison terms to Kurdish activists for offenses like “propaganda against the regime” or “assembly and collusion” – vague charges often used to criminalize peaceful dissent.
A climate of fear was fueled by incidents such as the suspicious death of Khosrow Alikurdi, a prominent Kurdish human rights lawyer, in December. Alikurdi, who had defended numerous political prisoners and frequently criticized state abuses, was found dead in his office on December 5 under murky circumstances. Authorities claimed he suffered a heart attack, but colleagues observed unusual injuries (unexplained bleeding) and noted that security forces swiftly removed CCTV cameras and restricted the family’s access to the scene – raising credible suspicions of state involvement in his death. Alikurdi had long endured official harassment: he served prison time earlier in 2025, had been barred from academia and legal practice, and was under travel bans and surveillance due to his rights work
Throughout 2025, Kurdish journalists and media workers also faced persecution, for instance, reports emerged in October that Iran’s intelligence agents were threatening the family of Asaad Obeidi, a Kurdish media activist, in an effort to intimidate him into ceasing his reporting. Labor and teacher activists in Kurdistan encountered reprisals as well: over a dozen Kurdish teacher-union members were fired or suspended for union activities, as documented in an August special report, reflecting the regime’s broader crackdown on organized civic action. Even student activists and minors were targeted (52% of the 38 students under 18 arrested in Iran by September were Kurdish), indicating that the state’s repression extends to every layer of Kurdish society.
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Bashur)
Overview
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) faced persistent economic challenges in 2025, largely stemming from disputes with Baghdad over budgetary entitlements. Under Iraq’s federal budget law, Baghdad is obligated to provide the KRI with a share of national revenue to fund public services and salaries. However, in 2025 the federal government failed to transfer several months’ worth of KRI budget funds, exacerbating a fiscal crisis in the region. Kurdish officials accused Baghdad of deliberately withholding roughly three months of public-sector salary payments – a move seen not as a technical lapse but a political tactic.
Fiscal Strain and Oil Disputes Between Erbil and Baghdad
The funding gap has kept the financial relationship between Erbil and Baghdad strained and unresolved. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) relies heavily on federal budget transfers (alongside its own oil revenues) to pay its employees. By mid-2025, KRG leaders warned that Baghdad’s ongoing delays in disbursing funds were fueling economic instability and undermining trust, with Kurdish parties arguing that such actions violate the spirit of partnership under Iraq’s constitution. The fiscal friction became a central political issue in 2025, as Kurdish officials demanded sustainable solutions to prevent Baghdad’s budgetary leverage from crippling the region’s economy in the future.
Beyond the budget dispute, In mid-July, a series of drone attacks targeted five Kurdish oil fields, temporarily halting production of around 220,000 barrels per day – roughly 70% of the region’s output. Kurdish officials blamed Iran-aligned militias for the attacks, linking them to broader political tensions with Baghdad over oil control. The Iranian-backed militias have attacked the same refinery on multiple occasions. The destruction of energy infrastructure and the ensuing loss of revenue compounded the KRG’s fiscal shortfall at a time when federal budget payments were also suspended. Human Rights Watch cautioned that deliberate damage to vital oil facilities could severely impact public services in the KRI, as oil revenues fund essential sectors like health and education. In sum, 2025 was marked by economic adversity in Iraqi Kurdistan, with budgetary rifts and attacks on oil infrastructure converging to create a perfect storm of fiscal strain. This underscored the urgency for a durable financial agreement with Baghdad and improved protections for the region’s economic assets.
Oil Exports and Baghdad–Erbil Revenue Disputes
Control of oil exports remained a flashpoint between the KRG and Iraq’s federal government throughout 2025. The year began under the shadow of a halted export pipeline: since March 2023, the vital Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline through Turkey had been shut down due to legal disputes, cutting off the KRI’s main route to international oil markets. This suspension, which dragged on for two and a half years, cost the KRI and Iraq billions in lost revenue. In 2025, negotiations intensified to break the deadlock. By mid-year, Baghdad, Erbil, and international oil companies reached an interim oil revenue-sharing deal aimed at restarting exports.
Oil exports formally resumed in late September 2025, ending the long hiatus. Under the agreement, roughly 180,000–200,000 barrels per day (bpd) of KRI crude started flowing via Turkey’s Ceyhan port again. The agreement with Baghdad highlighted in the following table:
Metric | Current Status / Figures |
Current Exports (Late 2025) | ~200,000 bpd |
Local Consumption | 50,000 bpd |
Agreed Export Target | 230,000 bpd |
Pre-2023 Export Levels | 400,000+ bpd |
Kirkuk Exports | 0 bpd (directed to local refineries) |
Total Sales (Sept–Dec 2025) | 13 million+ barrels |
Total Revenue (Sept–Dec 2025) | ~$750 million |
Public Sector Salary Crisis and Human Impact
One of the most pressing human rights and governance issues in 2025 was the plight of public-sector employees in Iraqi Kurdistan, who bore the brunt of political disputes. As Baghdad withheld budget transfers, the KRG struggled to pay the salaries of civil servants, teachers, medical staff, and security forces on time. By mid-2025, thousands of Kurdish teachers, doctors, and other workers had gone months without pay, prompting demonstrations and deepening public discontent. In June, the KRG openly condemned Baghdad’s actions as unconstitutional, noting that salary and budget payments had been suspended since May as leverage in the oil revenue dispute. Kurdish officials and activists warned that employees were effectively being held “hostage to political bickering,” unable to cover everyday expenses due to this impasse.
By year’s end, the salary crisis was only partially alleviated. After the oil export deal in late July, Baghdad did release funds covering the KRG’s May payroll, which were then disbursed to employees. However, salaries for November and December (and other arrears) remained outstanding. Even as the KRG paid October salaries following a fresh transfer from Baghdad, officials noted that the backlog had not been fully cleared. The Secretary-General of the Kurdistan Socialist Party lamented in December that three months of KRI salaries for 2025 were never provided by Baghdad, calling it evidence of Baghdad’s lack of will to resolve disputes.
The persistent uncertainty over paychecks has inflicted hardship on ordinary Kurds and shaken confidence in both governments. Kurdish leaders have urged that salary cuts not be used as a “political weapon” against the region’s population, insisting that basic livelihoods should be insulated from high-level disputes.
2025 Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Kurdish Turnout and Results
National parliamentary elections were held across Iraq on November 11, 2025, and the autonomous Kurdistan Region played a prominent role in this democratic exercise. Voter turnout surged in 2025, with the Independent High Electoral Commission reporting 56% participation nationwide – a sharp rise from the 43% turnout in the 2021 elections. In the Kurdistan Region, citizen engagement was especially robust: Erbil and Duhok provinces recorded over 70% turnout, the highest in the country. High participation in Kurdish areas was attributed to intense campaigning by Kurdish parties and a populace determined to secure representation in Baghdad amid ongoing disputes. Women voters were also notably active; for instance, in Duhok nearly 47% of voters were female, the highest female voting rate in Iraq.
Kurdish parties emerged from the 2025 elections with strengthened political clout in Baghdad. According to final results from Iraq’s Independent Electoral Commission, no single bloc won a majority in the 329-seat Council of Representatives, meaning coalition-building will be necessary. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) achieved a landmark victory, securing over one million votes nationwide, the most of any single party in Iraq. In terms of seats, the KDP won 26 seats in the new parliament, making it one of the largest blocs. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) obtained 18 seats, maintaining its position as the second-largest Kurdish faction. Other Kurdish lists and movements also gained representation, including the New Generation Movement, Kurdistan Islamic Union, and smaller parties, bringing the total Kurdish contingent to around 60 seats when combined.
Article 140 Stalemate: Kirkuk and Disputed Territories
Despite the political changes in Baghdad, little progress was made in 2025 on resolving the status of Kirkuk and other disputed territories between the KRG and federal Iraq. Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution, which mandates a referendum to determine the administrative fate of historically Kurdish-majority areas like Kirkuk, remains unimplemented – now nearly 18 years past its 2007 deadline. The failure to enact Article 140 has perpetuated a tense status quo in these regions, where Kurdish, Arab, and Turkmen communities vie for influence under a heavy security presence. Throughout 2025, Kirkuk province continued to be administered by the federal government, with Kurdish authorities largely sidelined since the events of 2017. Kurdish leaders consistently raised Article 140 in discussions, insisting that the new government in Baghdad prioritize this long-delayed constitutional obligation.
On the ground, the stalemate in disputed territories led to periodic flare-ups of tension. A notable incident occurred in June 2025 in the town of Altun Kupri (Prde) on the Erbil–Kirkuk boundary. When a Kurdish official was appointed as the local municipality director, Turkmen Front supporters – bolstered by armed members of the Iranian-backed militias and the Badr Organization militia – staged angry protests and road blockades. Demonstrators stormed a government building and briefly shut the Kirkuk–Erbil highway, demanding that key posts in the town be allocated to Turkmen instead of Kurds.
Since federal forces and Shi’a militias took control of Kirkuk in 2017, Kurdish residents have complained of militarization and discriminatory policies. Kurdish officials in 2025 accused “criminal militias on the Iraqi government payroll” of destabilizing the region – a reference to rogue Iranian-backed PMF units believed to be behind attacks like the summer drone strikes on KRI oil fields.
Militia presence has also been cited in preventing the return of displaced Kurdish populations to some areas and in intimidating Kurdish voters and officials in places like Kirkuk and Khanaqin.
Opening of the U.S. Consulate in Erbil: Strategic Significance
In December 2025, a major milestone in international engagement with Iraqi Kurdistan was reached: the United States officially opened its new Consulate General in Erbil, a sprawling compound that ranks as the largest American consulate in the world. The ribbon-cutting ceremony on December 3 was attended by senior U.S. diplomats and Kurdish leaders, underscoring the event’s importance. The vast consulate complex – built over 206,000 square meters at a cost of nearly $800 million – is a concrete symbol of Washington’s long-term commitment to the Kurdistan Region. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources Michael Rigas, who led the inauguration, stated that the facility “is a testament to the value of the relationship between the United States and the Iraqi Kurdistan Region.” He highlighted that the U.S. is proud of its deep partnership with the people of Kurdistan and sees the region as an effective security partner and a trusted voice in Iraq.
Kurdish officials hailed the opening of the new consulate as a “clear political message” about the importance of Erbil and the KRI to the United States. In his remarks, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani noted that the diplomatic center reflects the decades-old bond between American and Kurdish people, forged through shared struggles against tyranny and terrorism.
During the inauguration of the new U.S. Consulate in Erbil on December 3, 2025, Qubad Talabani, Deputy Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), described the event as a “historic step” and a sign of the enduring strength of the U.S.–Kurdistan relationship.
Politically, the timing of the Erbil consulate inauguration is significant. It comes as the U.S. is repositioning its regional posture – under an Iraqi parliamentary mandate, U.S. combat forces formally transitioned out of other parts of Iraq, yet hundreds of American troops remain in Kurdistan as trainers and counterterrorism support, operating from bases in the KRI with Baghdad’s agreement. The new consulate thus doubles as a strategic foothold, reaffirming that the U.S. intends to maintain a lasting presence in Iraq’s north even as its role elsewhere in Iraq evolves.
Unity: The Sole Path Forward
As the Kurdistan Region prepares for the critical formation of the new Iraqi government in early 2026, it has become irrefutably clear that the only viable path toward securing Kurdish constitutional rights and ending the “economic siege” is the establishment of a singular, unified front in Baghdad. The fragmented approach of previous years, characterized by the internal rivalry between the KDP and PUK, has provided federal authorities and militia-aligned blocs with the leverage necessary to exploit Kurdish divisions, leading to the withholding of civil servant salaries and the stagnation of Article 140. For the KRI to navigate the challenges of 2026, including the permanent resolution of oil export costs and the protection of the Region’s fiscal autonomy, Kurdish political parties must subordinate their domestic disputes to a collective national strategy. A unified bloc representing over 60 seats in the federal parliament would not only hold the balance of power in cabinet formations but would also create an unbreakable shield against the “unjust policies” of the Ministry of Finance, ensuring that the Kurdistan Region negotiates from a position of sovereign strength rather than financial desperation.
Kurdistan Region of Syria (Rojava)
Overview
In 2025, Kurdish-majority areas of northern and eastern Syria under the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) faced a fragile transition shaped by stalled talks with Damascus, continued Turkish pressure, and ongoing operations against Da’esh. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) remained the United States’ main partner against Da’esh, but military cooperation was not matched by firm political guarantees for Kurdish rights, including language, local self-administration, and equal citizenship. A March integration framework promising ceasefires and recognition of Kurdish rights was not implemented, while Kurdish leaders rejected an interim constitution they warned would recentralize power as Damascus continued its authoritarian ruling. Armed clashes near Kurdish neighborhoods in Aleppo and persistent abuses in Turkish-controlled Afrin reinforced fears of a rollback of Kurdish rights. Throughout the year, Kurdish actors stressed that Syria’s transition cannot succeed unless Kurdish identity and self-governance are protected as constitutional rights rather than temporary concessions.
Negotiations with Damascus and the constitutional dispute
The main Kurdish political question in 2025 was not whether Syria should remain a single country, but what kind of state could prevent the return of repression. Four days after the March integration framework, the Kurdish-led administration rejected the interim authorities’ constitutional declaration and called for it to be rewritten as it was a new form of authoritarianism that failed to reflect Syria’s diversity. The Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), an AANES-aligned political body, also reiterated in 2025 that Syria needs decentralization and warned against repeated violations of the March agreement.
Rights organizations expressed parallel concerns. Human Rights Watch warned that the transitional constitutional declaration granted sweeping authority and endangered rights protections in the absence of strong checks, rule-of-law safeguards, and inclusive political mechanisms. Kurdish criticism in 2025 often emphasized that constitutional language is not a technical detail; it determines whether Kurdish-language education, women’s institutions, and local councils can exist without fear of reversal.
Kurdish politics also sought legitimacy through broad-based messaging. In late April, at a major gathering in Qamishli of Kurdish parties and representatives that called for a democratic, decentralized Syria that guarantees Kurdish ethnic rights and equal citizenship, while explicitly rejecting secession. The gathering’s message was direct: Kurdish rights can be secured inside a united Syria only through decentralization and constitutional recognition.
Throughout 2025, Kurdish civil society repeatedly returned to language and identity as the litmus test of sincerity. Kurdish advocates called for formal recognition and protection of Kurdish-language rights within Syria’s constitutional order, arguing that decentralization without cultural rights is hollow. Kurdish demonstrations and civic statements during the year tied these demands to broader principles: pluralism, equal citizenship, and protections against renewed exclusion under a new ruling center.
The United States: enabling counter-Da’esh operations
In 2025, the United States continued to play a significant role in northeastern Syria, particularly through its long-standing partnership with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). According to the U.S. Congressional Research Service reporting, the SDF remained the principal U.S. partner in operations against the Islamic State (Da’esh)— a role that dates back to the early stages of the anti-Da’esh campaign. U.S. forces continued to provide military assistance, advising, logistical support, and coordination as part of the broader Global Coalition to Defeat Da’esh The U.S. was also involved in supporting detention and camp management efforts for Da’esh fighters and their families, with the SDF controlling approximately 9,000Da’eshdetainees and camps housing more than 30,000 people.
The longstanding strategic logic for America’s presence in Syria has been clear: defeating Da’esh and preventing its resurgence by sustaining local partner forces capable of holding territory and securing key infrastructure. Despite ISIS’s territorial defeat in 2019, remnants of the group continue to carry out attacks and maintain cells across eastern Syria and Iraq, keeping the SDF relevant in ongoing counterterrorism efforts. This continued partnership is framed as essential to preventing the kind of security vacuum that could enable the group’s return.
Nonetheless, criticism of U.S. policy has grown as Washington’s approach has remained overly focused on counter-Da’esh operations at the expense of broader political and human rights issues, particularly regarding the Kurdish population and broader minority protection. The U.S. appears to pursue a narrow security agenda, encouraging the SDF to integrate into Syrian state structures without adequately securing protections for Kurdish autonomy or minority rights. This reflects a broader pattern in which the Kurdish-U.S. relationship has been largely defined through the context of fightingDa’esh rather than advancing a comprehensive political settlement for Syria’s complex ethno-political landscape.
This critique echoes Kurdish concerns that U.S. diplomacy and European partners have not pushed hard enough to ensure constitutional guarantees for Kurdish rights, including language rights, political participation, and local governance protections. Within the context of the broader Syrian transition, cursory U.S.
In this context, the U.S. role in Syria in 2025 can be seen as a mix of continued operational support against Da’esh and occasional de-escalation efforts, but also as characterized by strategic limitations. While the United States has maintained cooperation with the SDF and encouraged integration agreements aimed at preventing renewed conflict, it has not substantially shifted diplomatic pressure toward ensuring inclusive political guarantees that address Kurdish and other minority rights concerns, a shortcoming that reflects broader historical trends in Western policy toward Syria.
Damascus Attacks on Kurdish Areas
The fragility of Syria’s political track was repeatedly exposed on the ground, with Kurdish civilians paying the immediate price. In Aleppo, the predominantly Kurdish neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyah became focal points of Kurdish fears that civilian areas were being instrumentalized during unresolved political disputes. During early October, clashes erupted in and around these neighborhoods, with residents reporting heavy shelling, sniper fire, and prolonged insecurity. Civilian displacement, shortages of basic supplies, and widespread fear were seen, while Kurdish representatives stated that the neighborhoods were effectively being encircled and pressured. Kurdish officials rejected portrayals of the violence as isolated or accidental, emphasizing that the escalation was directly tied to disputes over implementing the March integration agreement and the absence of binding security guarantees for Kurdish-populated areas.
These October events followed earlier armed friction that had already cast doubt on the viability of the political process. In August, Kurdish reporting cited SDF statements confirming clashes with Syrian government forces in Aleppo province, describing the incident as another warning sign that political disagreements were repeatedly spilling into military confrontation rather than being resolved through negotiations. Later that same month, further clashes resulted in fatalities, reinforcing Kurdish concerns that the political track lacked credible enforcement mechanisms. Kurdish messaging throughout these confrontations was consistent and explicit: Kurdish civilian neighborhoods cannot be treated as leverage in negotiations, and security arrangements must be rights-based and durable rather than improvised ceasefires that collapse under pressure.
East of Aleppo, along the eastern Euphrates, tensions carried a different but equally dangerous set of risks. The SDF continued to confront persistent Da’esh insurgent activity while simultaneously managing political pressure and the threat of escalation with state or state-aligned forces.The SDF fighters were killed in Da’esh attacks during August, underscoring that Da’esh cells remained active and capable of inflicting significant harm despite years of counter-terrorism efforts. Kurdish analysts warned that forcing the SDF to divide its focus between counter-Da’esh operations and internal Syrian confrontations directly weakens security across the region, increasing risks to civilians, detention facilities, and displacement camps.
Throughout 2025, Kurdish political actors and civil society voices repeatedly stressed that Syria’s transition cannot succeed if it destabilizes the very forces that prevented Da’esh from re-establishing territorial control. Kurdish commentary highlighted a persistent imbalance in international engagement: while external powers continue to rely on the SDF to contain Da’esh, they have failed to exert meaningful pressure on Damascus to recognize Kurdish rights or provide constitutional guarantees.
SDF anti-Da’esh operations with U.S. support
Throughout 2025, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) remained the core ground partner for the U.S.-led coalition’s counter-Da’esh mission in Syria, sustaining operational pressure on Da’esh cells while also guarding detention facilities and displacement camps that the international community has been slow to responsibly resolve. Early in the year, CENTCOM confirmed that SDF forces, enabled by U.S. support, conducted a Defeat-Da’esh operation near Dayr az-Zawr that resulted in the capture of a Da’esh attack-cell leader, demonstrating continued partner-led disruption capability even amid regional instability.
Official oversight reporting also underscored the coalition’s continued operational partnership with the SDF and its measurable effect on the threat environment. The Lead Inspector General report for Operation Inherent Resolve covering April through June 2025 stated that U.S. defense reporting assessed coalition efforts as achieving “significant successes” in denying Da’esh territorial control and disrupting networks, while noting that Da’esh-claimed attacks remained at historically low levels during the period.
By late 2025, CENTCOM publicly detailed the tempo and outcomes of partner operations in Syria. In a November 2025 release, CENTCOM stated it advised, assisted, and enabled more than 22 operations against Da’esh with partners in Syria.
Beyond raids and capture operations, the SDF’s 2025 achievements also included the ongoing containment of Da’esh’s most dangerous human legacy: detention and camp security. A U.S. Congressional Research Service report noted that the SDF continued to detain approximately 9,000 Da’esh prisoners, described in U.S. defense reporting as the largest concentration of Da’esh fighters globally.
Afrin in 2025: atrocities, extortion, and the Kurdish right of return
Afrin remained the most painful human rights dossier for Syrian Kurds in 2025. Under Turkish-backed armed control, rights organizations and monitoring groups continued to document patterns of detention, extortion, and property seizure that Kurdish displaced families say block safe return and undermine any credible notion of post-war justice.
In May, Human Rights Watch reported that Turkish-backed Syrian National Army factions continued to detain, mistreat, and extort civilians in northern Syria, with abuses remaining largely unchecked. Kurdish displaced families and activists repeatedly pointed to such reporting as evidence that Afrin’s violations are not isolated incidents but a continuing system that requires accountability mechanisms and international scrutiny.
Syrians for Truth and Justice (STJ) reported in July that returnees to Afrin faced property seizure and financial extortion, including demands that could reach enormous sums to recover homes or stop harassment.
SOHR’s incident-level reporting in 2025 documented a sustained pattern of everyday violations against Kurdish civilians in Afrin’s Olive Branch areas. Across dozens of reports during the olive harvest season, SOHR detailed how Turkish-backed factions and individuals linked to them repeatedly seized Kurdish property and livelihoods. In October, SOHR reported that former commanders associated with Turkish-backed structures confiscated a Kurdish civilian’s home and looted olive harvests in Afrin’s countryside. In November, further reports described how Turkish-backed factions and protected displaced individuals stole olive crops belonging to Kurdish families, imposed forced levies, and damaged olive trees across multiple villages, deepening economic hardship for residents. It’s evident that the violations were not isolated incidents but part of a broader, systematic pattern targeting Kurdish land ownership and agricultural survival during a critical harvest period.
Turkey’s posture and the pressure on Kurdish rights
Turkey remained a decisive factor in 2025 because it combined diplomatic pressure with the continued presence of Turkish-backed armed groups in formerly Kurdish areas and persistent hostility toward Kurdish-led armed structures. Ankara continued to describe the SDF and its YPG core as tied to the PKK and insisted that any Damascus deal must dismantle Kurdish-led military structures rather than integrate them as a coherent regional force.
In May, Turkey expected Kurdish-led forces to fulfill the Damascus agreement and integrate into Syria’s armed forces, arguing that a unified armed force is essential for stability. By late December, Reuters reported Turkish officials accusing the SDF of failing to advance integration and warning of possible military action, while reiterating Turkey’s designation of the SDF as a terrorist group.
Turkey’s posture in Syria in 2025 also reflected a longstanding historical pattern of opposition to Kurdish political rights across the region, not a context-specific security concern. Ankara has consistently opposed Kurdish self-rule beyond its borders, including its efforts in the 1990s and early 2000s to block or weaken the emergence of federalism in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Despite later economic engagement with Erbil, Turkey repeatedly used military pressure and cross-border operations to assert influence and limit Kurdish political space. A similar pattern has unfolded in Syria since 2016, where Turkey has launched multiple military operations against Kurdish-held areas, dismantling local self-administration and replacing it with proxy governance structures aligned with Ankara.
Kurdistan Region of Turkey (Bakur)
Overview
In 2025, Bakur lived through a year of sharp contradiction: a renewed, Öcalan-centered “peace” track advanced in public view, while state pressure on Kurdish democratic politics and cultural expression continued at high intensity. The year opened with new contacts between the DEM Party and Abdullah Öcalan on İmralı, framed by Kurdish actors as a chance to move from conflict management to rights-based normalization. At the same time, Kurdish municipalities faced trustee takeovers and prosecutions, and Kurdish-language art remained vulnerable to bans and criminalization. What emerged by year’s end was not a settled “solution,” but a contested process: Kurdish society and representatives pushed for dignity, political recognition, and language rights, while Ankara pursued disarmament-focused outcomes without matching democratic guarantees on the ground.
Öcalan talks return to the center of politics
The first quarter of 2025 was defined by the reappearance of İmralı as a political address. In January, Kurdish reporting highlighted DEM’s delegation visits and the effort to carry Öcalan’s messages into parliamentary politics, presenting this as an opening for dialogue rather than a security-only frame. Coverage emphasized that Kurdish representatives sought a process anchored in democratic legitimacy and public support, not secrecy. Parallel reporting also underlined the tension of “talks” occurring while trustees and prosecutions persisted, a contradiction DEM figures repeatedly flagged as incompatible with genuine peace.
February’s historic call and the new language of “disarmament”
On February 27, 2025, Öcalan called on the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve, with the message conveyed through Kurdish political intermediariesFor Kurdish politics in Turkey, the significance was not only the call itself, but what Kurdish actors argued must follow: a rights package that ends the criminalization of Kurdish identity, restores elected mandates, and opens political space for legal Kurdish work. The disarmament talk was supposed to be a substitute for democratic reform; the Kurdish question, in this view, is fundamentally about equal citizenship, language, and political status, not merely weapons.
Ceasefire and the PKK’s disbandment declaration
In early March, reporting noted a PKK ceasefire announcement following Öcalan’s call, and the year then moved toward the group’s May 12, 2025 declaration that it would end the armed struggle and dissolve after a congress. International analysis stressed the scale of the moment and the uncertainty of implementation, especially without credible guarantees and political reforms inside Turkey. Kurdish-facing coverage treated the move as a potential gateway to a democratic settlement, while warning that Kurdish society cannot be asked to accept symbolic milestones while elected Kurdish governance is dismantled through trustees and court cases.
By mid-year, the state sought to institutionalize the track through a parliamentary mechanism. In August 2025, the launch of a parliamentary commission intended to oversee disarmament and prepare legal regulations. Kurdish sources treated the commission as meaningful only if it addressed the core democratic deficit: the removal of trustees, the persecution of legal Kurdish politics, and restrictions on Kurdish language and culture. Later reporting described confidentiality rules and limited transparency as a vulnerability of the process, because durable peace requires public trust and visible guarantees, not closed-door management. The year closed with continued references to commission activity and contact with Öcalan, presented as progress but not a settlement.
DEM Party under pressure: trustees, prosecutions, and mass detentions
While the “process” advanced, 2025 also saw continued pressure on Kurdish democratic representation. Kurdish municipalities and DEM officials faced removals and arrests, with independent reporting documenting repeated trustee appointments and criminal cases tied to broad “terror” allegations. Trustee reporting in places like Van and Siirt, alongside protests and heavy policing around municipal buildings, scenes that Kurdish society read as the state’s refusal to respect Kurdish votes. In February, Reuters and AP reported a nationwide sweep detaining 282 people in operations targeting alleged PKK links, including politicians and journalists, reinforcing Kurdish claims that repression continued even during “peace” signaling. Kurdish critics argued the message was unmistakable: Ankara demanded Kurdish concessions while maintaining tools that hollow out Kurdish political life.
Another central Kurdish demand in 2025 remained the release (or at minimum, rights-compliant legal treatment) of Kurdish political prisoners whose continued incarceration Kurdish society views as political, not judicial. In November, Medyascope reported that Devlet Bahçeli made remarks calling for the release of Selahattin Demirtaş, contextualized around the evolving process and rights debates. Kurdish audiences interpreted such developments as proof that the “untouchable” category of Kurdish political prisoners is a political choice, not an inevitability, and that any real settlement must include legal normalization for Kurdish political actors.
Culture and language: bans, prosecutions, and Kurdish resilience
Cultural repression remained one of the most visible daily fronts in 2025. In January, a court sentencing a musician for performing Kurdish songs, demonstrating how Kurdish language and folklore can still be prosecuted through expansive propaganda laws. Through the year, bans and last-minute cancellations continued to signal that Kurdish culture is treated as “conditional” in the public sphere. Bianet reported that authorities barred groups from participating in the Munzur Culture and Nature Festival in Dersim, showing how governorates can shape cultural life through prohibitions. In December, the cancellation of Koma Amed’s İstanbul concert only hours before showtime, another case Kurdish society reads as administrative censorship rather than security necessity. Rights reporting also tracked prosecutions of artists, including prison sentences on “terror” charges that Kurdish circles describe as punishment for political identity and dissent.
What 2025 proved, and what it did not
By the end of 2025, the year had delivered historic signals such as Öcalan’s call, ceasefire language, a PKK dissolution announcement, and the creation of a parliamentary commission. At the same time, Kurdish society continued to experience the familiar architecture of repression, including trustees overriding Kurdish electoral outcomes, sweeping detentions, prosecutions of Kurdish expression, and administrative bans on cultural life. The Kurdish position, reflected across Kurdish-aligned and rights reporting, remained clear: disarmament milestones do not resolve the Kurdish question unless they are matched by enforceable democratic guarantees, including restored elected governance, language rights, political freedoms, and an end to treating Kurdish identity as a security issue. While 2025 opened doors, it did not yet deliver the rights-based settlement that Kurds in Bakur continue to demand.