Kurdistan Region of Iran (Rojhelat)
October 2025 marked a period of escalating, systemic state violence and judicial cruelty directed at the Kurdish people in Iran. Documentation from human rights organizations such as Hengaw and Kurdistan Human Rights Network reveals a deliberate strategy by Tehran to suppress civil society, economic survival, and cultural identity through lethal border control, arbitrary detentions, and the calculated weaponization of the judicial system. The month saw the confirmed extrajudicial killing of multiple Kolbars, the imposition of draconian political prison sentences, and the tactic of enforced disappearance used against activists.
Kolbars remain under the fires of the Iranian regime
In the borderlands around Baneh, the deadly math of poverty plus militarization keeps producing the same result: Kurdish porters and small traders shot on sight. On 1 October, a father of two, Rebwar Mohammadzadeh, was killed at close range by border guards in Surkiv, documented by the Kurdistan Human Rights Network, a stark reminder that carrying goods for survival marks you as a target if you are a kolbar. Days later, guards again opened fire in the Baneh border area and killed another kolbar, sustaining the pattern of lethal force. By 27 October, border forces in Kani Seyf shot dead a 32-year-old tradesman and wounded a porter, sparking a spontaneous public outcry as relatives carried the body to the governor’s office—an emblem of a community refusing silence despite constant danger to kolbars. This is not law enforcement; it is a war on subsistence.
Arrests and enforced disappearances
Across Kurdistan’s cities, security bodies escalated raids, incommunicado detentions, and pressure tactics that turn everyday life into a corridor of fear. In Senna, 43-year-old political detainee Derkhshan Rahimi was removed from the women’s ward and taken to an undisclosed location after months without legal counsel—another Kurdish woman forced into a black hole by IRGC Intelligence. In Bukan, the Ministry of Intelligence re-arrested Abdullah Golestani and transferred him to an unknown site, denying his family any information about the detained Kurdish civilian. Civil activist Houshyar Shabani was shot three times during arrest in Baneh and then held incommunicado, a brutal pairing of bullets and silence used to break a wounded activist. Senna authorities also forcibly transferred political prisoner Feryad Qaderi from Marivan and continue to deny him furlough and lawyer access, underlining due-process collapse in Kurdish detention. At the same time, broad sweeps hit families and neighborhoods: arrests via deceptive summonses and night raids in Marivan, Bukan, and Piranshahr show how everyday Kurdish life is policed into submission through arbitrary arrests, targeted pressure on families, and serial detentions. University and cultural spaces are not spared: a Kurdish lecturer in Marivan and a writer in Tehran were detained and taken to undisclosed locations, tightening the net around Kurdish academics and writers. Environmental defender Azad Haji-Mirzaei was re-arrested in Senna, yet another signal that protecting the land is treated as subversion when the steward is Kurdish. IRGC-led operations reached into Oshnavieh, where three people—including two minors—were seized, showing how “security” in Kurdish areas routinely swallows up minors. And in Mahabad, police detained Srush Yousefzadeh to serve a six-month sentence, after earlier raids that swept up family devices—a tactic that punishes households for the endurance of a Kurdish prisoner.
Sentences, prison conditions, and denial of rights
Courtrooms across the region churned out punishments for speech, grief, and association. In Miandoab, six Kurds received three months and a day—reportedly for attending a funeral and communicating with an activist abroad—criminalizing mourning itself as “propaganda” against the state, a textbook case of weaponized judiciary. Two more, Keywan Mama-Goli and Shahab Tawan, were hit with a combined nine months for alleged “propaganda,” extending the assembly line of low-evidence convictions against young Kurds. In Mahabad, Branch 1 of the Revolutionary Court escalated repression with one death sentence and six ten-year terms on charges from collaboration with the PDKI to organizing a nationwide uprising, sharpening the blade against Kurdish political activists. Yet even within that machinery, a crack appeared: Branch 39 of Iran’s Supreme Court overturned the death sentences of five Kurdish prisoners from Bukan linked to the Woman, Life, Freedom protests, ordering a retrial on jurisdictional grounds; an exceptional pause in a system designed for maximal punishment. Individual cases expose the cruelty of long-term isolation: Mahmoud Sadeghi in Senna nears a decade without a single day of furlough despite severe psychological distress, emblematic of entrenched denial of basic rights for Kurdish prisoners. Denials of counsel and family contact also appear in the case of Ghodratollah Jawyar, a 33-year-old Ilam native sentenced by Tehran’s Military Court to 12 years on charges including “insulting the Supreme Leader” and “attempted espionage,” where due process was a casualty of a politicized case against a Kurdish employee.
The pattern of repression stretches far beyond prisons and courtrooms. A Kurdish teacher unionist, Jahangir Rostami, was arrested and transferred to Evin, a reminder that labor organizers remain squarely in the crosshairs when they are Kurdish teachers. University-related pressure intensified with additional detentions and summonses across campuses, as authorities targeted students and lecturers to mute a generation’s dissent. The climate is shaped by heavy deployments and live-fire postures in Kurdish areas, conditions captured in a detailed militarization report that helps explain why protests and border livelihoods are met with bullets rather than lawful crowd control. Cultural expression is punished as sedition: after elementary students in Javanrud performed the revolutionary Kurdish anthem “Rey Khebat,” the principal, Zaitun Kahzadi, was dismissed and her salary slashed, turning a school celebration into a case study in state hostility to Kurdish identity. The social toll is visible in the unthinkable: a Kermanshah case of a three-month-old reportedly sold amid “extreme poverty,” a gut-level snapshot of how repression and deprivation grind Kurdish families. Meanwhile, armed tension persists: an attack on an IRGC base in Sarvabad with a reported grenade left two dead and at least three injured; no Kurdish party claimed responsibility, but such incidents are routinely used to justify blanket repression in Kurdistan. Parallel reports track a steady stream of arrests and intimidation in multiple towns, from fresh crackdowns in Senna and Piranshahr to pressure in Marivan and Bukan; snapshots of a conveyor belt of arrests, summonses, home raids, and “security” operations that pull entire communities into the dragnet. The list lengthens: additional detentions in Senna and Kermanshah underline the reach of the crackdown across towns large and small, with newly recorded cases of targeted arrests, pressure on civilians, and more intimidation of Kurdish residents. Even cross-border dynamics are weaponized domestically: Adnan Tawfiq, a Kurdish man with Iraqi nationality, has been held for months without charge in Senna after being swept up during the twelve-day Israel–Iran flare-up, another life stalled in legal limbo. And in Sarvabad and surrounding districts, intimidation spikes after security incidents, producing yet more summonses and rolling sweeps presented as “precaution,” which Kurdish neighborhoods experience as permanent siege.
Executions and lethal punishments
The month’s most aggressive act was the secret execution of Saman Mohammadi Khiyareh after sixteen years behind bars, carried out at dawn in Ghezel Hesar Prison without a final family visit or public notice. The file bears the hallmarks of forced confessions and torture allegations familiar to Kurdish political prisoners. Additionally, dozens of Kurdish and non-Kurds were excused in the month of October on criminal and drug-trafficking related charges.
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Bashur)
October in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) unfolded as a month of hinge-moments: the first full month after the resumption of oil exports through Ceyhan, an election campaign that set the tone for Iraq’s November polls, and renewed bargaining over salaries and revenues that shaped daily life. Security currents also shifted as the PKK announced a withdrawal from Turkey to northern KRI, while the KRG showcased incremental steps on governance and rights. The result was a landscape where economics, ballots, and borderland security intertwined.
Oil exports: a fragile reopening ripples through salaries and politics
After oil flows restarted on Sept. 27 via the Iraq–Turkey Pipeline (ITP), October became the first test of the deal’s durability. Analysis noted that flows resumed under a U.S.-facilitated understanding among Baghdad, Erbil, and IOCs, placing SOMO at the center of exports and setting cost recovery at around $16/bbl for operators. Early October assessments emphasized that the arrangement remained fragile and renewable in short intervals, making October’s continuity a meaningful data point rather than a guarantee. Mid-month, Iraq’s marketer sketched ambitions to double throughput next year if the framework holds.
The political economy of the restart was immediately visible in Erbil–Baghdad bargaining. The KRG cabinet on Oct. 15 publicly pressed Baghdad to disburse overdue public salaries, tying compliance with the new oil framework to fiscal entitlements. By Oct. 21, the KRG said it had deposited 120 billion IQD to the federal account as part of its obligations, then, on Oct. 23, urged full salary releases after meeting conditions. These steps underscored how October’s “oil normalization” fed directly into the domestic social contract, salaries, services, and political credibility.
Election campaign in Kurdistan for Iraq’s parliament
Iraq’s parliamentary election campaign kicked off on Oct. 3, and KRI’s parties moved quickly to frame narratives that would resonate both locally and nationally. The KDP and PUK’s high-visibility mobilization, including a large Duhok launch mid-month following a splash in Kirkuk, aimed to project momentum in Kurdish strongholds and disputed areas alike.
Meanwhile, national think-tank analysis through Oct. 21–27 warned that turnout could be low across Iraq, putting a premium on organizational muscle and elite deal-making rather than broad persuasion, a context that shaped Kurdish strategies inside the federal game.
In practice, October’s campaign rhythms in the KRI revolved around coalition arithmetic and resource promises. Parties blended national positioning (security, federal power-sharing) with local deliverables (salaries, services, and oil revenue stability). The calendar mattered: with elections set for Nov. 11, October was the window to lock in endorsements, demonstrate street strength, and, importantly, signal who could actually deliver public paychecks on time.
Beyond podiums and posters, October was about pay. Local media reported mid-month that many public employees still awaited August–September salaries even as exports restarted, fueling protests’ embers and forcing the cabinet’s Oct. 15 message. By month’s end, the KRG highlighted progress on MyAccount, its financial-inclusion program, announcing that nearly 550,000 civil servants and pensioners would receive August salaries digitally—a technocratic move intended to rebuild predictability amid political flux. The juxtaposition defined October: macro agreements at the pipeline; micro legitimacy at the ATM.
Security and borderlands: PKK’s move and regional signaling
On Oct. 26, the PKK announced it was withdrawing fighters from Turkey to KRI, describing the step as part of a peace trajectory. Reporting from regional and defense outlets detailed the redeployments toward Qandil and other rear areas. For the KRI, the October development introduced a paradox: fewer cross-border clashes inside Turkey might reduce spillover, yet the concentration of militants in northern Iraq can intensify Turkish airstrikes. October thus closed with new uncertainties for Erbil’s tightrope: balancing federal sovereignty, neighbor security demands, and the safety of local communities.
Kurdistan Region of Syria (Rojava)
October in Rojava was dominated by two interconnected tracks: stepped-up political talks between Kurdish authorities and Damascus, with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) publicly flagging a preliminary integration formula, and a sustained counter-ISIS campaign across Deir Ezzor and Raqqa carried out by the SDF, often with Coalition backing. At the same time, Turkish-backed factions in Afrin escalated coercive practices during the olive harvest, reviving long-standing protection-racket dynamics that squeeze Kurdish civilians. Together, October 2025 exposed the fragility—and the leverage—of Rojava’s position between national bargaining, security imperatives, and borderland pressures.
Political talks with Damascus—and the U.S. roleBetween October 11–16, SDF commander Mazloum Abdi told multiple outlets that Kurdish authorities had reached a “preliminary agreement” with Damascus on a mechanism to integrate the SDF into Syrian state security structures. The statements, careful in scope but notable in tone, underscored that integration would be as cohesive formations, not atomized enlistments. Reporting during the same window stressed that the United States (and France) were acting as mediators/guarantors, an important signal that Washington sought to keep a hand on the de-confliction throttle as details moved from headline to committee work. The October messaging did not resolve core questions, jurisdiction over internal security, chain-of-command, and civil administration, but it clarified a pathway: stepwise institutional integration contingent on security calm east of the Euphrates and assurances against unilateral moves by adversaries.
SDF campaign against ISIS: raids, arrests, and pressure on desert cells
On the ground, October 2025 brought an unmistakable tempo of joint SDF–Coalition operations that combined precision raids with area security sweeps. Early in the month, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) documented coalition training with the SDF in Al-Hasakah aimed at storming ISIS positionsan indicator of renewed emphasis on unit-level readiness as talks with Damascus advanced. Mid-month, ISIS cells attacked SDF positions in Al-Bahra and Al-Shaafah on October 15, using RPGs before melting back into the riverine networks of eastern Deir Ezzor. Two days later (Oct. 17), suspected ISIS gunmen torched a civil council building in Al-Bahra and struck an SDF post—classic intimidation designed to disrupt governance and recruitment pipelines.
By month’s end, the initiative largely swung back to the security forces. On October 30, SDF and Coalition units conducted a joint raid in Gharanij (eastern Deir Ezzor), detaining four on suspicion of ISIS ties. The next night (Oct. 31), a Raqqa-countryside sweep netted an ISIS cell member in Ratlah after a convoy of SDF vehicles, backed by Coalition assets, fanned out across the area. The arc of October thus showed ISIS still able to stage harassment attacks while SDF/Coalition raids disrupted networks and arrested operatives—incremental but important friction against insurgent regeneration.
Afrin: Turkish-backed groups’ violations intensify during the olive harvest
Inside Afrin, October coincided with the start of the olive season, historically the peak period for extortion, seizures, and crop theft by Turkish-backed factions. SOHR recorded a steady drumbeat of incidents: on October 23, militias imposed levies and looted crops across Afrin city and countryside, with residents reporting robberies and blackmail by armed groups dominating local checkpoints. On October 30, SOHR detailed how fighters from the Hamzat Division and affiliated “general security” elements stripped olives from thousands of trees in Bolbol district and nearby villages, demanded in-kind payments from farmers (e.g., “250 bags per farm”), and damaged trees during mechanical harvesting—hallmarks of systemic predation rather than isolated abuses. For local Kurdish households, the effect is compound: direct income loss, price distortions in the local olive market, and coercive dependency on factional gatekeepers for safe passage and basic services.
Friction points: drones, deterrence, and negotiations under fire
Even as political messaging trended positive, the security picture remained fragile. On October 9, a drone attack attributed to Damascus-aligned formations that killed an SDF member and injured more than ten, including civilians, near Deir Ezzor, prompting counter-fire by the SDF across the Euphrates. The SDF and Coalition kept visible force-protection and readiness drills running through October, signaling capacity to contain ISIS even as political tracks moved forward.
October 2025 brought a tentative convergence: talks with Damascus edged from abstractions toward mechanisms, with U.S. involvement framing guardrails and a modicum of reassurance to local stakeholders. On the security front, ISIS remained a disruptive but containable threat, with SDF/Coalition raids and arrests punctuating the month in Deir Ezzor and Raqqa. And in Afrin, Turkish-backed groups exploited the harvest cycle to expand economic predation against Kurdish civilians, abuses meticulously logged.
Kurdistan Region of Turkey (Bakur)
October in Bakur revolved around three interlocking tracks: Abdullah Öcalan’s centrality to a durable settlement, concrete steps in the peace process capped by the PKK’s Oct. 26 withdrawal announcement, and visible DEM Party–government contacts that kept parliamentary politics tethered to the negotiating table. Each move sharpened the month’s basic dynamic: progress rests on legal guarantees for reintegration, clarity on Öcalan’s status, and sustained political channels in Ankara.
Öcalan, İmralı, and the ‘right to hope’ debate
Mid-month, a public appeal attributed to Öcalan pressed for Turkey to adopt a “right to hope” framework—review mechanisms for aggravated life sentences recognized in European jurisprudence—framing it as essential to any lasting peace architecture. The call, reported on Oct. 17, linked prison-law reform to wider democratization steps that would underpin disarmament and societal reconciliation. Separately, early October brought renewed attention to pro-Öcalan slogans in parliament after criminal complaints were filed on Oct. 9, underscoring how symbolics around the İmralı file remain politicized even as formal channels expand.
Peace process milestones: from symbolic steps to operational moves
The month’s anchor event came on Oct. 26, when the PKK announced it would withdraw its fighters from Turkey to northern Iraq, presenting the redeployment as a second-stage step after earlier de-escalation moves and explicitly tying the gesture to Öcalan’s roadmap. Major outlets emphasized that the decision aimed to transition toward “democratic politics”—provided Ankara enacts the legal and political frameworks to allow it. Coverage also noted security caveats: spoilers and localized violence could still test implementation.
In the immediate aftermath, reporting highlighted that senior PKK figures publicly framed Öcalan’s freedom/conditions as “crucial” for the process to function, making his status a practical (rather than purely symbolic) variable in October’s discourse. The emphasis on İmralı dovetailed with calls from Kurdish political actors for parliamentary action on legal reforms that would normalize demobilization and reintegration over time.
Political signaling intensified in Ankara. On Oct. 30–31, President Erdoğan hosted a DEM Party delegation for a third round of talks this year, with both sides presenting the encounter as a working session on next steps for the process. Pro-government and independent outlets converged on the same timeline, while DEM’s own messaging cast the PKK withdrawal as opening a “new chapter” and urged all actors to shoulder responsibilities. The optics—leaders shaking hands on the parliament floor earlier in the month and then reconvening at the presidential complex, kept party-to-executive channels firmly open through October’s end.
Substantively, DEM figures and allied voices continued to push for a legal framework to accompany disarmament, echoing spring proposals but now situated in the concrete context of the Oct. 26 redeployment. The party’s line in October stressed legislative guarantees for speech/association and clear pathways for return to civilian life, while reiterating that Öcalan’s communication and review of his sentence are central to credibility with Kurdish constituencies.
State narrative and committee work
Coverage during the month also tracked the government’s “terror-free Türkiye” rubric and the parliamentary committee architecture attached to it. October pieces described the process as iterative and committee-driven, with meetings paced by the executive while security institutions monitored compliance and potential provocations. In this framing, the PKK withdrawal is treated as a confidence-building measure that unlocks space for legislative discussion, rather than an endpoint.
Even with dialogue advancing, October exposed pressure points likely to shape November: (1) legal reforms—especially around the right to hope—that would align practice with the expectations set by negotiators and Kurdish parties; (2) messaging discipline on all sides to avoid spirals from symbolic flashpoints (e.g., parliamentary slogans or high-profile statements about İmralı); and (3) security choreography to prevent clashes that could be leveraged by spoilers opposing normalization. The month’s media cycle repeatedly linked these three strands, reflecting an implicit consensus that law, politics, and security must move in step if October’s gains are to hold.
How October looked from Bakur
By month’s end, the withdrawal announcement, Erdoğan–DEM contacts, and Öcalan-focused legal debate together created the clearest pathway yet toward a formalized process since talks collapsed a decade ago. The tests are immediate: converting withdrawals into verifiable demilitarization benchmarks, codifying rights protections and reintegration law, and clarifying Öcalan’s legal horizon to match the expectations now woven into the political narrative. October did not settle these questions, but it narrowed the field of necessary decisions and tied them to visible, dated steps—giving stakeholders a synchronized clock as they move into November.