Kurdistan Region of Iran (Rojhelat)
The third anniversary of the death of Zhina Amini on September 16, 2025, served as a catalyst for a widespread and severe pre-emptive security crackdown across the Kurdish regions of Iran (Rojhelat). The regime’s objective was clearly to neutralize potential civil society mobilization associated with the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement.
Arbitrary Arrests and Detentions
Across villages, towns, and cities, security forces carried out raids, seized civilians without due process, and targeted both children and adults. The month of September also marked the anniversary of Zhina Amini’s death, around which repression intensified.
The month began with news from Urmia, where a Kurdish man was ordered to serve a six-month prison sentence. Mid-month, civil activist Hamid Chapati was sent to Urmia Prison, while in Kamyaran, two Kurdish children were detained by intelligence forces. On September 12, a Revolutionary Court in Urmia handed down a death sentence to 25-year-old Nasser Bekrzadeh and ten years in prison to Shahin Vasaf on espionage charges, despite earlier rulings that had overturned their original death penalties. In Kamyaran, four children and one adult were detained in mid-September, continuing the alarming pattern of minors being targeted.
As the anniversary of Zhina Amini’s death approached, the Iranian regime escalated its campaign of intimidation and control. On September 16, twenty-two rights groups and prominent public figures issued an appeal demanding urgent medical care for long-imprisoned Kurdish activist Zeynab Jalalian. That same day, guards at the Saqqez gold mine opened fire on villagers protesting environmental damage, killing a young farmer and wounding four others. Despite threats and heavy security presence, shopkeepers in Saqqez and Diwandarah went on strike the following day to mark the anniversary, a gesture of defiance against the state’s attempts to silence public memory. In Sanandaj, security forces interrogated Nahiyeh Rahimi, the 71-year-old mother of slain protester Ramin Fatehi, threatening her for visiting her son’s grave.
The arrests did not abate. On September 18, two 16-year-old boys from Oshnavieh (Shinno), Diyar Gargol and Alan Tabnak, were detained during nighttime raids, their whereabouts remaining unknown. The following day, security forces arrested another teenager, Zanyar Shadi-Khah, along with a young man, Mohsen Dahar. That same day in Senna and Diwandarah, two Kurdish citizens, Zana Mansouri and Mohammad Salehi, were seized, again with no disclosure of where they were taken.
By late September, the repression reached rural villages. On September 23, intelligence forces descended on Selin village in Sarvabad with eighteen vehicles, raiding homes, smashing property, and arresting retired teacher Mostafa Advaei and his 23-year-old nephew Kioumars Advaei. As with so many others taken this month, their fate remains undisclosed.
Executions of Kurdish Prisoners
September 2025 witnessed a grim escalation of executions in Iran, with Kurdish prisoners among the victims of a system that continues to deploy the death penalty as an instrument of control and intimidation. Reports from the Hengaw Organization for Human Rights and the Kurdistan Human Rights Network confirm multiple Kurdish men were executed across Senna, Karaj, Ilam, Kermanshah, and Khorramabad. The cases reveal a chilling pattern: allegations of torture and unfair trials, denial of due process, and clustering of executions in Kurdish-majority provinces.
The month opened in Senna, where on 2 September, Mohammad Babaei, a 44-year-old Kurdish man from Dezli village in Sarvabad, was hanged in the city’s central prison on charges connected to a murder case. Five days later, on 7 September, Azad Moradi, a Kurdish man from Baneh, was executed in the same facility. His death came on a day when six other prisoners were executed across Iran, underscoring how Kurdish cases are folded into larger waves of capital punishment carried out in near silence.
The most politically charged case came on 17 September, when authorities executed Babak Shahbazi in Ghezel Hesar Prison, Karaj. A Kurdish political prisoner accused of espionage for Israel, Shahbazi’s case was marred by torture, coerced confessions, and the denial of a final family visit. His execution demonstrated yet again how the death penalty in Iran extends far beyond criminal law and serves as a weapon against political dissent. That same week, three other Kurdish men were executed in Ilam and Karaj, folded into a two-week spree that saw at least twenty people hanged nationwide.
The violence spread further west a few days later. On 21 September, three Kurdish prisoners — Saeed Ghobadi, Kazem Jamashourani, and Hadi Nowruzi — were executed at Dizelabad Prison in Kermanshah. Hours earlier, another Kurdish prisoner from Sarpol-e Zahab, Saeed Qubadi, was also hanged there. The cluster of four executions in a single Kurdish province on one weekend cast a long shadow over the region.
Violence Against Kolbars
Kolbars, Kurdish border porters, continued to face deadly violence in September. On September 25, Iranian border guards in Baneh shot dead Qasem Azizi, a 47-year-old father of two, after reportedly telling his group they were free to leave before opening fire. His body was transferred to Salah al-Din Ayoubi Hospital in the city.
On September 16, Mohammad Abdi, 37, was seriously wounded by gunfire in the Maleh Khor border area of Sarvabad. He suffered injuries to his leg and back and had to be taken to Sanandaj (Senna) for treatment. Hengaw, Sep 16, 2025. On September 23, three kolbars were wounded in Nowsud. Among them, Karwan Almasi of Salas Babajani sustained a severe hand injury, while two others remain unnamed. Hengaw, Sep 23, 2025.
Rights groups note that since January, dozens of Kurdish kolbars have been killed or injured, often shot without warning. A recent investigation described how, after the so-called “12-day war,” Iranian forces escalated their repression: seven kolbars were killed by direct fire in just weeks: a higher toll than the entire six months before, Sep 9, 2025.
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Bashur)
In the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), a long-awaited economic breakthrough was achieved. The strategic resumption of oil exports, secured through a complex agreement with the Federal Government in Baghdad, immediately addressed the crippling financial distress caused by an eighteen-month halt. 1 This development stabilized the region’s fiscal position but simultaneously shifted the political battlefield, with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) leadership pivoting their demands toward the fulfillment of long-neglected constitutional rights, particularly the passage of the federal oil and gas law.
Baghdad–Erbil Budget and Oil Accord
In late September, Baghdad and Erbil sealed a landmark fiscal deal tying Kurdish oil exports to budget payments. Iraq’s Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani announced on Sept 25 that a “historic” tripartite agreement had been signed with the KRG and international oil companies, allowing Kurdish crude to flow again under federal oversight. Under the pact, Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO) handles KRG exports (with a carve-out for local use) via the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline.
Exports restarted on Sept 27 for the first time in 2.5 years. Kurdistan’s Prime Minister Masrour Barzani hailed the deal as a “historic day,” saying oil from the Kurdistan Region will again enter global markets. SOMO’s director Ali Nizar said the KRG will deliver ~240 kb/d to SOMO while retaining ~50 kb/d for domestic consumption; loadings are marketed at Ceyhan by an independent trader using SOMO prices.
Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani also welcomed the accord as a “historic” turning point that should facilitate essential reconstruction, services, and development across the Kurdistan Region and the whole of Iraq. Talabani reinforced the strategic necessity of continued dialogue, affirming that “Through dialogue with Baghdad, we can best serve our people and our Region”.
On the companies side, eight producers representing over 90% of KRI output endorsed the restart and agreed to meet for clearing roughly $1 billion in arrears and define forward payments. Notably, Norway’s DNO has not signed onto pipeline exports yet, maintaining a local cash-and-carry model while allowing its buyers to ship through the line; debt settlement remains its key concern.
The oil accord is paired with steps on salaries and revenues. On Sept 23, Baghdad’s cabinet approved releasing July salaries for KRG public employees conditional on Erbil transferring IQD 120 billion in non-oil revenues as its federal-budget share. KRG officials say the funds have been deposited with the federal Finance Ministry, enabling July disbursements first, with August and September to follow under the interim revenue-sharing arrangement. Local outlets also reported the KRG prepared the 120 billion-IQD tranche and stood ready to transfer it to unlock payments. The KRG is hopeful that the recent agreement will permanently lift the economic embargo imposed by Baghdad since 2014.
On Government formation and elections, the political impasse after the October 2024 Kurdistan parliamentary elections saw fresh motion in September but remains unresolved. In mid-August, the KDP and PUK pledged to reconvene parliament in September to elect a permanent speakership and move on cabinet formation. As of late September, senior KDP figures still caution that finalizing the cabinet may slip until after Iraq’s national elections on Nov 11, aligning timelines to strengthen bargaining positions.
High-level meetings continued: on Sept 27, President Masoud Barzani, the head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) met Bafel Talabani, the Head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) to discuss cabinet formation; the session came just as oil exports resumed and ahead of the federal vote.
Kurdistan Region of Syria (Rojava)
The September update from Rojava highlights stalled Kurdish–Damascus negotiations, with disputes over how the SDF should integrate into the Syrian army and pressures from Turkey slowing progress. Meanwhile, ISIS remains active, carrying out deadly ambushes against SDF forces, underscoring the fragility of security in Deir ez-Zor. Clashes also flared between the SDF, regime-aligned forces, and Turkish-backed militias, adding layers of instability along the Euphrates and Aleppo fronts. In Afrin, rights groups documented intensified abuses: Kurdish civilians face kidnappings, property seizures, and discriminatory decrees designed to block displaced families from reclaiming homes, reinforcing fears of demographic engineering under Turkish control.
Kurdish–Damascus talks
Political maneuvering continued around Kurdish participation in Syria. Observers reported that negotiations between Kurdish officials (led by Rojava/AANES envoys) and the interim Syrian government are ongoing, with U.S. and French backing. Rudaw cited a source saying talks are being coordinated in Paris to implement the March 2025 deal on SDF integration. Key disagreements remain: Damascus insists on integrating Kurdish fighters individually into army ranks, whereas the SDF wants to join as a unified block. France stated that despite an earlier cancellation of talks (after a Rojava unity congress), significant progress has been made and insisted that SDF units must fully integrate under Syrian command. Damascus officials, meanwhile, have publicly complained that Kurdish demands (such as decentralization or continued self-defense structures) violate Syria’s “one country” policy.
However, no breakthrough occurred in September. Reports indicated the negotiations stalled under Turkish pressure. Kurdish spokesmen emphasized the need for transparency. For instance, SDF spokesperson Ferhad Şami warned that the SDF cannot simply be absorbed if loyalist forces keep attacking its areas. The Rojava Kurdish National Council renewed calls for the Assad government to guarantee Kurdish rights and participation, but official statements from Damascus were limited to reiterating that Kurdish fighters must obey Syrian laws.
SDF counter-terror campaign
ISIS terrorists (Da;esh) insurgents remain active in Kurdish-held Syria. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) and local media reported a lethal Da’esh ambush on Sept. 24 in rural Deir ez-Zor. An IED and follow-up RPG attack killed five SDF fighters and wounded another convoy memberwelattv.net. This brought the tally of Da’esh assaults on the SDF to roughly 185 attacks since the start of 2025. The SDF stressed that the “war against Da’esh is not over” and urged continued U.S.-led support to secure hundreds of detained militants and prevent escape.
Clashes with Turkish-backed forces
Sporadic skirmishes persisted between the SDF and Turkey’s Syrian proxies along the front lines. For example, on September 10 Turkey’s Suleiman Shah Brigade (an exiled opposition unit now nominally in the Syrian Army’s 62nd Division) exchanged artillery fire with SDF forces in Maskanah (Aleppo countryside), though no casualties were reported. Around the same period, the SDF and the new Syrian regime-aligned rebel factions clashed near bridges east of the Euphrates. On September 20 heavy shelling around Dayr Hafir (Aleppo Province) by regime/affiliated forces wounded at least three civilians, according to SOHR. Days later, SDF units reported thwarting an attempt by “rogue elements” of the Syrian Army to seize control in Aleppo’s Sheikh Maqsoud district.
Meanwhile, Turkish military movements added tension. Toward month’s end, SOHR noted that on Sept. 27 highways between Aleppo and Raqqa were closed by Turkey-backed fighters coinciding with Turkish military convoys entering northern airbases. Turkish officials continued to issue warnings: in mid-September, Ankara’s defense ministry accused the SDF of failing to implement the March integration deal and of undermining “Syria’s unity,” and Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan threatened the Kurdish forces.
Afrin rights violations
In the northwest (Afrin), occupied by Turkey’s forces and allied militias, Kurdish civilians reported systematic abuses. A Syria-based documentation center reported at least 14 Kurds abducted in early September across Afrin and other rebel areas – part of a larger wave (some 190 people since January) of arbitrary arrests and kidnappings of Kurds by armed groups. Witnesses described raids on homes, looting, and detentions. In addition, new decrees have targeted Kurdish property rights. On September 18, Afrin’s Turkish-appointed administration issued Circular No.6, imposing onerous conditions on displaced Kurds seeking to reclaim land or housing. The Kurdish National Council (KNCS) denounced the decree as “unjust,” saying it effectively bars rightful owners from returning. The rule forces claimants to navigate complex paperwork, pay high fees and prove ownership, while failing to penalize the occupiers of their homes. KNCS activists noted that these legal barriers are unique to Afrin and violate citizens’ rights. Compounding this, on Sept 4 the Syrian Justice Ministry transferred out all remaining Kurdish judges from Afrin’s courts, eliminating local legal recourse. Human-rights groups warn that these policies aim to cement demographic changes and prevent Kurds from returning.
Kurdistan Region of Turkey (Bakur)
September 2025 concluded a month of profound contradiction in Turkey, where the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) navigated a delicate and politically expedient dialogue with Kurdish forces while simultaneously intensifying repression and hardening its aggressive stance toward Kurdish self-administration across the border in Syria. The fragile “Peace and Democratic Society Process,” initiated following the declaration by jailed leader Abdullah Öcalan in February 2025, faced critical tests this month, exposing the cynical calculation driving Ankara’s engagement: tactical maneuvering for political gain rather than genuine commitment to structural reconciliation.
Imrali: Symbolic Contact Versus Substantive Dialogue
The current phase of dialogue is less a visionary effort for peace and more a reflection of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s domestic political necessity. Following significant setbacks in the 2024 local elections, the government finds itself in need of parliamentary support to achieve constitutional changes that could potentially extend Erdoğan’s rule beyond 2028. The support of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) has become potentially decisive, creating a temporary and deeply fragile alignment of short-term interests between historically adversarial entities.
The contradictory nature of the state’s approach was immediately visible concerning the status of Abdullah Öcalan. After years of stringent isolation on Imrali island, a landmark moment occurred on September 15 when Öcalan was permitted to meet his legal team for the first time in six years.
During this rare interaction, Öcalan sent a crucial message intended to challenge Ankara’s minimalist interpretation of the process. He stated clearly that the “process of peace and democratic society has reached the stage of a legal solution” and insisted that Turkey must establish a legal framework for the disarmament of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). This statement placed the responsibility firmly upon the Turkish parliament to move beyond procedural military steps and deliver concrete legal guarantees commensurate with the PKK’s earlier announcements of dissolution and disarmament.
Yet, Ankara’s commitment to substantive dialogue dissolved immediately following this high-profile meeting. The Turkish Grand National Assembly’s “Commission for Democracy, Brotherhood, and National Support,” established in July to provide a legal basis for the peace process, was drawing its hearings to a close in preparation for the submission of its final report. On September 24, Commission Chair Numan Kurtulmuş, who also serves as Speaker of Parliament, publicly clarified that the critical issue of meeting with the imprisoned leader had been explicitly withheld from the commission’s agenda.
This calculated refusal by Ankara to formalize any dialogue with Öcalan, the central figure in the conflict, confirmed fears that the government seeks to manage the consequences of the conflict—namely disarmament—without addressing its causes or recognizing the political status of the Kurdish movement. For the DEM Party, this represented a fundamental flaw in the process. Saruhan Oluç, a DEM member of the commission, responded by stressing that without placing the meeting with Öcalan on the agenda, the entire political resolution remains “fraught with risks,” emphasizing its absolute necessity for achieving lasting stability.
The month culminated in a sharp warning from Imrali itself. On September 30, messages relayed from Öcalan via the DEM Party directly confronted the state’s tactics, accusing the AKP of trying to create the “illusion” of a military defeat. Öcalan reportedly denounced the government’s “manipulative approach” and rejected its “deceitful discourse,” asserting unequivocally that Kurdish political actors have alternatives should a just settlement fail to materialize. The implication was stark: “Kurds will no longer remain without status in this new century”.6 The continuation of the process, therefore, rests on Turkey providing concrete legal guarantees, including revising counterterrorism laws, ending the practice of government-appointed trustees replacing elected mayors, and recognizing fundamental Kurdish language rights.
The Enduring Shadow of Judicial Weaponization
The narrative of peace in Ankara proved deeply hollow when measured against the persistent political persecution documented throughout September in the Kurdish regions. The state apparatus continued its systematic campaign against democratic Kurdish politics, confirming the fears that repression is structural and entirely independent of any ongoing diplomatic process.
The crackdown extended beyond political parties to the media, a critical pillar of Kurdish advocacy. On September 22, Turkish authorities blocked access to the pro-Kurdish Firat News Agency (ANF), citing national security concerns. This recurring tactic of media suppression underlines that the state views independent Kurdish journalism as an existential threat, regardless of any proclaimed commitment to a “democratic society”.
Furthermore, Turkish judicial actions are increasingly reaching beyond its borders to target Kurdish activists globally. On September 25, journalist Heval Arslan, who works for Medya Haber TV, was detained in Belgium. Arslan, who had sought asylum after being denied a passport by the Turkish consulate, faces the real danger of extradition to Turkey, where she is subject to numerous active cases and arrest warrants related to her professional activities. Reports indicate that during her detention in Belgium, she was subjected to a strip search and intimidated with the threat of being handed over to Turkey.
Regional Enmity: The Invariable Threat to Rojava
If the domestic peace process remained highly conditional, Ankara’s position regarding Kurdish gains in North and East Syria (Rojava) was unequivocally hostile. September confirmed that the Turkish state maintains a zero-sum approach to the Kurdish question, viewing the political and military achievements of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) as an unacceptable strategic threat.
The Turkish Defense Ministry delivered a hardline statement on September 4, explicitly characterizing the SDF as a “terrorist” group. The ministry claimed that the SDF’s “failure to integrate into the army harms Syria’s integrity” and poses a significant threat to Turkish national security. This rhetoric frames the very existence of Kurdish self-administration in Rojava as a fundamental act of regional destabilization.
These aggressive statements are set against a backdrop of increasing Turkish influence in post-Assad Syria. Following a security agreement in August, Turkey is now deepening its security and military cooperation with the new Syrian administration. This shift in geopolitical alliances has created an unprecedented pressure point for the SDF, leading to implicit threats that Turkey may resort to military action if the required disarmament and integration are not achieved by December.
The events of September 2025 demonstrate that the current “peace process” is being used as a strategic tool by the AKP to manage political risk while avoiding deep, painful structural reform. The landmark meeting with Abdullah Öcalan was rendered largely symbolic by the simultaneous refusal of the Parliamentary Commission to engage with him politically. This symbolic gesture was further exposed by the consistent, unyielding continuation of the campaign of repression against the Kurdish nation.