Kurdistan Digest is a monthly report delivering sharp analysis and curated updates on political, social, and security developments across the Kurdish regions across Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey.
Kurdistan Region of Iran (Rojhelat)
In the first weeks of July 2025, Iranian authorities intensified a sweeping crackdown on the Kurdish population in Iran (Rojhelat). Security forces and courts are targeting Kurds with secret executions, mass arrests, harsh sentences, and lethal force, under the pretext of national security following the recent Iran–Israel conflict ceasefire. Since July 1, dozens of Kurdish activists, cultural figures, and ordinary citizens have been detained or killed, amid accusations of “espionage” and armed rebellion.
Secret Executions and Surging Death Sentences
Just days after the late-June ceasefire, Iran carried out the secret execution of three Kurdish political prisoners on June 24, 2025, in Urmia Central Prison. The men – Edris Ali, Azad Shojaei, and Rasoul Ahmad Rasoul – were accused of “espionage and collaboration” with Israel and hastily hanged without final family visits or prior notice. Iranian judiciary media claimed they smuggled equipment for an Israeli plot, but human rights groups revealed the three were merely kolbar traders coerced into false confessions under torture. Their executions were confirmed only after the fact, and authorities refused to hand over the bodies to their families, drawing outrage from Kurdish communities.
In early July, Iranian courts dramatically escalated death sentences against Kurds involved in last year’s “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests. On July 7, Branch 1 of the Revolutionary Court in Orumiyeh sentenced five Kurdish men from Bokan to a staggering 11 death sentences (some men receiving two or three each) along with long prison terms. Judge Reza Najafzadeh imposed multiple capital charges – including “armed insurrection” (baghi) and “enmity against God” (moharebeh) – while also accusing the men of links to banned Kurdish parties (Komala, PAK) and even “espionage for Israel.” The verdict cited alleged possession of satellite devices and collaboration with Mossad as evidence. Rights organizations note the trial ignored compelling indications of torture and forced confessions during detention, proceeding with sham convictions despite lack of credible evidence. These mass death sentences – 12 in total across the case – mark a sharp uptick in the regime’s use of the death penalty to terrorize Kurdish dissent.
Wave of Arrests, Torture and “Disappeared” Activists
Alongside executions, Iranian intelligence agencies have unleashed a wave of arrests across Kurdish-majority areas. In the weeks following the Israel-Iran conflict, over 330 Kurdish civilians and activists have been detained by the IRGC Intelligence and Ministry of Intelligence in provinces including West Azerbaijan (Urmia), Kurdistan, Kermanshah, Ilam, Tehran, and even North Khorasan. Most were taken without warrants or formal charges, and many remain incommunicado, denied access to lawyers or family contact while held in secret detention centers. Dozens more have been summoned and interrogated for hours, as authorities cast a wide net of intimidation.
Tehran’s crackdown has even targeted the families of exiled Kurdish opposition members. On July 10, intelligence agents raided a home in Mahabad and arrested 69-year-old Khedr Rasouli and his daughter Klara Rasouli, the father and sister of exiled PDKI activist Karo Rasouli. Both were reportedly severely tortured in custody and coerced into videotaped “confessions” admitting to espionage for Israel. Leaked reports indicate the footage – obtained under duress – will be used in state media to smear the Rasouli family as Israeli spies. Khedr Rasouli, a former political prisoner who has undergone two heart surgeries, has been left in alarming condition by the abuse. Kurdish sources say the sole “crime” of this family was their relation to a dissident leader – a pattern of collective punishment now common in Iranian Kurdistan.
Meanwhile, Iranian authorities are cracking down on Kurdish civil society and environmental activism. On July 21, security forces in Saqqez arrested at least five Kurds, including village head Latif Moradi and lawyer Mozaffar Moradi, for protesting the operations of a gold mining company. The villagers had been demonstrating against destructive mining that was ravaging local orchards, roads, and mountains near Mirgeh Nakhshineh. Despite a grassroots petition and peaceful gatherings, the regime responded with arrests and prosecution of the protest organizers – underscoring that even environmental and economic grievances are met with repression.
Kurdish cultural and language activists have also been swept up. In Shirvan (North Khorasan province), plainclothes IRGC agents arrested Mostafa Rahnama, a 47-year-old Kurdish athlete and cultural figure, on July 21 while he was in town near a university square. He was taken without any warrant, and his family’s inquiries about his whereabouts or charges have been met with silence. His detention is part of a broader campaign of intimidation against Kurdish-language teachers and cultural associations even in areas outside Iranian Kurdistan. Similarly, in West Azerbaijan, the whereabouts of Kurdish theater artist Amin Karimi remain unknown over three weeks after his arrest on July 1 at the Sarv border crossing. Karimi, who was returning from Turkey, was detained by border agents and has effectively disappeared into custody since then. Such enforced disappearances have left families in anguish and fear for the fate of their loved ones.
Iranian security forces are also using lethal force against Kurdish civilians with impunity. On July 23, police in Holeylan (Ilam province) shot and killed two young Kurdish men, Arman Beyglari and Pezhman Badri, following a minor altercation in a park. The two had gotten into a dispute with others and left on a motorbike, when they were pursued by officers and fatally gunned down. This incident – unrelated to any organized protest – exemplifies the regime’s hair-trigger response and disproportionate violence toward Kurdish individuals.
Kolbars Targeted as “Spies” and Border Crackdown
One of the most intense aspects of the repression has been directed at Kurdish kolbars: the semi-legal porters who carry goods across the western borders to earn a livelihood. In the wake of the ceasefire, Iranian officials openly labeled kolbars a national security threat, using accusations of espionage to justify deadly force. At least three kolbars have been shot dead by Iranian border guards in the past month alone. Documented victims include 20-year-old Siwan Abdullahzadeh (killed June 28 in Baneh), 23-year-old Khaled Mohammadi (killed July 8 in Baneh), and Payam Ahmadi (killed July 15 in Sarvabad). Many others have been grievously wounded – for example, on July 4, a kolbar from Bukan, Rezgar Mohammadi, suffered critical injuries after IRGC forces ambushed him near the Baneh border, leaving him with severe kidney damage. In another incident on July 23, border guards in Marivan not only shot a kolbar but savagely beat the wounded man, identified as 23-year-old Ata from Sarvabad, after accusing him of smuggling. Such brutality has spread terror among the impoverished kolbar communities along the frontiers.
Iran’s government has explicitly tied these acts to espionage claims. On July 1, a senior Iranian MP, Hossein-Ali Haji Deligani, referred to kolbars as a “security gap” and urged immediate measures to stop the purported transfer of “espionage and military equipment” via unofficial western crossings. Following the war, authorities banned the practice of kolbari outright, effectively cutting off the primary income source for thousands of Kurdish families overnight. This militarization of border policy has led to an alarming toll: at least 10 kolbars were killed and 12 injured by direct fire from IRGC and border forces in just the first half of 2025. Rights monitors note that Tehran is using trumped-up security pretexts to legitimize what is in reality the extrajudicial killing of unarmed Kurdish laborers. The pattern of shootings, followed by smear campaigns painting victims as “smugglers” or spies, points to a systematic effort to intimidate and subjugate the Kurdish border population.
Kurdistan Region of Iraq (Bashur)
A major development this month was the resolution of a months-long budget standoff between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and Baghdad that had halted salary payments to Kurdistan’s public employees. In late May, Iraq’s federal finance ministry suspended all budget transfers to the KRG – including funds for some 1.2 million public sector salaries – accusing Erbil of exceeding its allotted 12.67% share of the federal budget and failing to deliver the agreed volume of oil to the state oil marketer (SOMO). The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the region’s largest party, blasted the move and in early July gave Baghdad a “final opportunity” to resolve the dispute through dialogue. KDP officials, including Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, engaged with Baghdad leaders and reported back that Iraqi authorities promised to soon send the Kurdistan Region’s overdue funds.
By mid-July, Erbil and Baghdad reached a new understanding on both oil and finances, breaking the deadlock. The Iraqi Council of Ministers approved an agreement and on July 22 decided to resume salary disbursements to KRG civil servants after nearly three months of freeze. KRG leaders insist they have “fully implemented all obligations” under the budget law – including transferring non-oil revenues, providing salary payroll lists, and cooperating to export all Kurdish oil via SOMO. They urged Baghdad to fulfill its side by promptly sending the Region’s financial dues, noting it is a “constitutional and legal right” of Kurdistan’s employees to be paid. The new deal allowed Baghdad to release around 975 billion IQD (≈$737 million) to cover KRG May salaries, which the KRG Finance Ministry confirmed receiving on July 24. However, this agreement covers only May’s payroll – Baghdad’s future payments for June and July will depend on both sides adhering to the deal going forward.
Kurdistan Region Government Formation Stalemate
Even as budget issues dominated headlines, internal Kurdish politics saw movement toward ending a long impasse. The Kurdistan Region’s last parliamentary elections were held in October 2024, but nine months on, no new government has been formed due to wrangling between the two main ruling parties. On July 14, KDP leader Masoud Barzani hosted PUK leader Bafel Talabani for high-level talks in Erbil. Both sides brought draft proposals for a power-sharing agreement to form the KRG’s 10th cabinet, and afterwards reported “closer positions” on contentious issues. PUK spokesperson Saadi Ahmed Pira struck an optimistic tone, calling the meeting a “positive step.”
The PUK is insisting on more meaningful participation in the next cabinet after feeling sidelined. Reportedly the PUK seeks control of influential posts like the Interior Ministry or Security Council, though they are open to alternatives. The KDP – which will retain the presidency and premiership – appears ready to offer concessions. Both parties agree on the need to pass a long-overdue regional budget law in 2026 and pursue decentralization reforms. Crucially, the recent Erbil-Baghdad deal also required KDP-PUK cooperation, with a united Kurdish front helping secure the salary payments. The July meetings suggest momentum toward finally seating the new cabinet.
Drone Attacks Target Oil Infrastructure
A worrying security development unfolded in July as a wave of drone attacks targeted critical oil fields in the Kurdistan Region, threatening its economy and workers. Starting in early July, unidentified militants launched explosive-laden drones at facilities almost daily, forcing production halts. On July 15–16, drones struck Tawke, Peshkabour, and Ain Sifni, with prior attacks on Khurmala and Sarsang. The Kurdistan Region’s Ministry of Natural Resources confirmed output was slashed by 140,000–150,000 barrels per day, about half of production. Companies like DNO and Gulf Keystone halted output and evacuated staff.
KRG officials blamed Iran-backed militias, citing evidence that drones were launched from Dibis in Kirkuk, where Iran-aligned groups operate. KRG Chief of Staff Aziz Ahmed confirmed this. In response, Iraq’s military began a wide-scale inspection operation in Nineveh and Salahaddin. The U.S. and U.K. condemned the attacks, warning they jeopardize Iraq’s economic stability and demanding Baghdad protect energy infrastructure and foreign investors. The strikes stopped by late July but exposed Kurdistan’s vulnerability to regional proxy conflicts.
PKK Fighters Signal End to Armed Struggle
In a turn of events, PKK fighters burned their weapons in Dukan, Sulaimani province, on July 11 — marking what they called an end to over 40 years of armed struggle for Kurdish rights in Turkey. The rare act followed a message from imprisoned PKK founder Abdullah Öcalan, stating that “the time for armed struggle has passed.” Officials and observers from Turkey, Iraq, and the KRG attended the symbolic bonfire.
International Pressure and the Iran Factor
The Region’s fragile situation drew top-level attention. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio called Iraqi PM Sudani on July 22 to stress accountability for the drone attacks, consistent salary payments to the KRG, and reopening of the Iraq-Turkey pipeline (ITP).
Behind the scenes, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio pressed Iraqi PM Mohammed Shia al-Sudani to resolve the KRG’s budget and salary crisis, while warning against a controversial bill to formalize the PMF (Popular Mobilization Forces) as a permanent institution. According to The New Arab, Iran’s Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani was reported to have ordered the salary freeze through pro-Iran militia intermediaries, in retaliation for the KRG’s energy agreements with Western companies. Kurdish analysts warned that the bill to institutionalize the PMF would erode the Kurdistan Region’s autonomy and deepen Tehran’s influence in Baghdad, raising alarm in both Erbil and Washington.
Kurdistan Region of Syria (Rojava)
Ongoing Talks with Damascus Over Rights and Future
After Syria’s previous government fell in late 2024, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) opened negotiations with the new transitional government in Damascus. In March 2025, interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi signed a landmark agreement to integrate the Kurdish-led administration’s civilian and military institutions into the Syrian state. This U.S.-backed deal formally committed to guaranteeing Kurdish rights – ensuring Kurdish representation and equal participation in Syria’s political transition as an integral part of the country. Many in Syria hailed it as a step toward unity and an end to conflict, as the agreement included a ceasefire and recognition of Kurdish identity within a unified Syria.
Implementing the deal, however, has proven challenging. Key details were left for later talks, and disagreements soon emerged over how exactly the SDF would be incorporated. Damascus insists that no independent armed units can remain outside the national army’s command, rejecting any “separatist” arrangements or preconditions that threaten state unity. For its part, the SDF refused to disarm or dissolve in the light of the presence of dozens of terrorist organizations and armed groups under al-Sharra’s leadership. SDF spokesperson Farhad Shami stressed that the group’s weapons are a “red line”, calling them “Syrian arms that cannot be handed over,” and he insists SDF fighters should integrate as a single unit rather than being broken up and absorbed individually. “Our negotiations are not a surrender but a dialogue between equals,” Shami said. Kurdish sources indicate the two sides have floated a compromise to retain the SDF as a separate formation within the national army. But so far, mistrust runs high as the Syrian side has shown little will to truly share power or address Kurdish demands so far. Tensions have flared in recent weeks with heated rhetoric, arrests of Kurdish activists in Damascus.
Mazloum Abdi’s Visit to France and International Mediation
France and the United States have stepped in as key mediators to keep the SDF–Damascus dialogue on track. In late July 2025, SDF commander Mazloum Abdi traveled to Paris for high-level talks. On July 25, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot met with Abdi in Paris – after conferring with Syria’s foreign minister Asaad al-Shaibani and U.S. envoy Thomas Barrack – to salvage the negotiations. The French Foreign Ministry said this meeting confirmed plans for a new negotiation session in Paris between the Syrian Transitional Government and the SDF as part of implementing the March 10 agreement, under joint French-American sponsorship. During the talks, Minister Barrot reiterated France’s support for a peaceful, negotiated solution to Syria’s conflict that would unify the country while including the northeast in the political transition – and critically, protecting Kurdish rights. French President Emmanuel Macron has also personally urged Syria’s interim leadership to prevent further violence against civilians and to engage in “good faith” dialogue with the SDF. In a call with President al-Sharaa, Macron stressed that reunifying Syria must go hand-in-hand with respecting the rights of all its citizens, calling for sincere negotiations with the SDF and accountability for any sectarian bloodshed.
Paris was set to host a new round of talks in late July, with the US, France, Britain, and Germany all reportedly involved in the effort. However, that meeting was postponed at the last minute, underscoring the fragility of the process. The official reason was not given, but mutual distrust and a dispute over SDF’s armed status played a major role. Notably, just before the planned talks, Syrian state media blasted and attacked the Syrian Kurds for “attempts to preserve armed formations” and any call for an “independent identity” as unacceptable, insisting the only path forward was for the Kurds to fully return to the fold of the state with no conditions. Despite this setback, French and American officials are continuing behind-the-scenes diplomacy to bridge the gap. Abdi’s consultations in France were aimed at securing Western guarantees and keeping Damascus committed to the March framework.
Intensified Anti-Dae’sh Operations in Northeast Syria
Even as political talks continue, the SDF and its partners are grappling with a resurgent Dae’sh insurgency in eastern Syria. Islamic State (Da’esh) cells have stepped up attacks in SDF-held areas of Deir ez-Zor, taking advantage of the country’s turbulence. In fact, 114 Dae’sh attacks have been recorded in Deir ez-Zor canton since the start of 2025, ranging from ambushes and roadside bombings to hit-and-run assaults on checkpoints. These attacks have killed at least 22 SDF fighters and 9 civilians and injured dozens more so far this year. The SDF’s media center warns that Dae’sh is exploiting the ongoing chaos in Syria to reorganize and try to sow terror, even as SDF units, local Asayish security forces, and the US-led Coalition carry out joint operations to stamp out the sleeper cells. Indeed, the pace of Dae’sh activity has been escalating in recent months.
Late July saw a flurry of Dae’sh attacks in eastern Deir ez-Zor: on July 25, Dae’sh fighters launched coordinated assaults on SDF targets, including an attack on an SDF military vehicle in al-Zir that killed one fighter and wounded another. Almost simultaneously, Dae’sh gunmen opened fire on an SDF post in Diban and on an internal security checkpoint near al-Busayrah, though those attacks were repelled without SDF casualties. The SDF responded by sweeping the area for the attackers, and officials say search operations are ongoing to prevent Dae’sh from regrouping.
Facing this threat, the SDF has intensified its counter-terrorism operations across northeastern Syria. In addition to defensive actions, SDF special forces have been conducting proactive raids to dismantle Dae’sh cells before they can strike. For example, on July 5, the SDF captured a four-member Dae’sh cell inside Raqqa city that was actively planning new terror attacks. In the raid, SDF units seized a large cache of weapons and 500 kilograms of TNT explosives that the cell had received from extremist networks in Turkish-occupied areas of Syria.
Interrogations revealed that these militants had already carried out lethal attacks on local security personnel and had fled to safe havens in Turkish-held territory to regroup. The detainees admitted to plotting further bombings against SDF and civilian targets, and to receiving arms and support from jihadist hubs across the border. SDF commanders say such operations are part of a wider campaign to eliminate Dae’sh sleeper cells and protect the fragile stability of the northeast. They are working closely with the US-led Coalition, which continues to provide intelligence, air surveillance, and occasional precision strikes against high-value Dae’sh targets.
Kurdistan Region of Turkey
July 2025 in Turkey has unfolded as a period marked by profound contradictions for the Kurdish people. On one hand, there have been significant, albeit fragile, overtures towards a renewed peace process, notably highlighted by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) symbolic disarmament and crucial meetings involving their imprisoned leader, Abdullah Ocalan. These developments have ignited cautious hope for a political resolution to a conflict that has spanned decades and claimed tens of thousands of lives. Yet, concurrently, the Turkish state has maintained, and in some instances intensified, its systemic repression against Kurdish communities and their political representatives. This dual approach, where dialogue on armed conflict proceeds amidst a crackdown on civic and political life, reveals a deeper strategy by Ankara. The Turkish government appears to be engaging in peace talks primarily to manage the armed conflict, aiming for disarmament on its terms, while simultaneously maintaining a firm, unyielding grip on Kurdish political and cultural expression through repressive measures. Despite these challenges, the Kurdish people and their political representatives, particularly the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), continue their unwavering pursuit of democratic rights, emphasizing that genuine peace necessitates comprehensive legal and constitutional reforms.
Abdullah Ocalan’s Enduring Influence
On July 26, when a delegation from Turkey’s pro-Kurdish DEM Party visited Abdullah Ocalan in Imrali prison. This marked their first meeting since the PKK’s ceremonial disarmament earlier in the month. During the three-and-a-half-hour meeting, Ocalan conveyed his expectation that the parliamentary commission being formed would make “important contributions to peace and democracy through a comprehensive and inclusive approach.”
Ocalan’s influence remains central to the peace efforts. His consistent appeals since February 2025 for the PKK to dissolve, lay down arms, and pursue a political path to securing Kurdish rights in Turkey have been a primary catalyst for the current initiatives. This directive led to the PKK’s 12th Congress in May, where they formally announced the end of their armed struggle. The global resonance of Ocalan’s call for peace through democratic politics was further highlighted by the “Insisting on Freedom” international youth delegation, which met with DEM Party officials and demanded Ocalan’s immediate physical freedom, recognizing his symbolic importance for progressive movements worldwide.
PKK’s Symbolic Disarmament and Conditions for Peace
A highly symbolic moment transpired on July 11, when 30 PKK fighters disarmed by burning their weapons in Jasana Cave, Sulaimani province, northern Iraq. This act, a direct response to Ocalan’s appeal, was presented as a gesture of goodwill and a symbolic rejection of the increasing global arms proliferation.
However, the PKK has made it clear that further disarmament depends on Turkey enacting substantive legal reforms to address systemic discrimination. Cemil Bayik, co-chair of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), explicitly warned that “unless the Kurdish issue is removed from the realm of war,” the struggle would inevitably persist. The PKK has rejected the idea of amnesty, instead demanding fundamental constitutional changes aimed at political democratization. They assert that their armed struggle was a forced response to Turkish state policies, and that genuine peace requires a transformation of these policies and the constitution itself.
Ankara’s Parliamentary Commission: A Step or a Stalling Tactic?
On July 25, the Turkish parliament formed a 51-member commission to oversee peace talks. The commission includes 21 members from the ruling AKP, 10 from the CHP, and 4 each from the DEM Party and MHP. The ultranationalist IYI Party refused to participate.
The DEM Party insisted that the commission must ensure “legal and political guarantees for the disarmament process.” President Erdogan praised Ocalan’s support, framing the effort as a move toward a “terror-free Turkey.” However, concerns among PKK fighters in Duhok province suggest deep mistrust remains, with many reluctant to return to Turkey without guarantees of safety.
The Kurdish side, including the PKK and DEM Party, seeks a transformation of state-Kurdish relations through constitutional change and recognition of identity. Meanwhile, Ankara’s narrative centers on “full disarmament within months” and a “terror-free Turkey,” signaling a focus on security without addressing the root causes of the conflict.
A report from Turkish Minute noted the continued detention of Kurdish politician Selahattin Demirtaş, despite rulings from the European Court of Human Rights.