Security Issues facing the KRG
Thank you. It’s really an honor to be here. I will start with the many events that happened in Kurdistan and impacted the Kurdish region and the Kurdish society in the region. I think there were a number of events that mounted pressure on the Kurdistan region, in my view to the breaking point. And I’ll start with the security ones. A security event as Dr. Deniz talked about is the Turkish military in the Kurdish region. We see that especially last year, Turkey penetrated deeply into the Kurdish region in the whole province. They have set up multiple military and intelligence bases in the Kurdistan regions. That has led to the destruction of dozens of Kurdish villages and thousands of Kurdish villages have been displaced. In addition to that, we had multiple attackers by the Shia militia forces on Erbil international airport. And these attackers of course had minimal death tolls, but certainly, they created lots of dismay and concerns among the Kurdish people. And they were meant to plant the seed of uncertainty and instability in the Kurdistan region for the business committee and for the foreign investors as well. We also saw ISIS attacks on the Kurdish front lines Peshmerga forces, which led to the wounding and killing of dozens of members of the be Peshmerga forces. What is troubling is that the Iraq forces allow ISIS to operate freely in the disputed area. There is a buffer zone between the Kurdish forces and the Iraqi forces. That’s where ISIS is obviously conducting attacks, operating grouping training, and also recruiting people to launch these attackers on the Kurdish front lines.
You see that the Iraqi forces and the Shia militia forces do nothing to stop these attackers. I do not know if this is a deliberate policy approach by Baghdad. But really what are you going to call this, especially when you see Baghdad is reluctant to allow Kurdish forces to provide security in this buffer zone, not just that the Iraqi government is refusing to set up a joint military mechanism, which was in place from 2003 to 2014. Where the Kurdish and the Iraqi forces were jointly providing security forces in the disputed areas. The Arabization of Kurdistan is a really major issue. I know it doesn’t track with international headlines, but there is a really systematic approach by the Iraqi government or Shia militia forces in the disputed area, especially in Kirkuk, to seize Kurdish land and properties. I think that’s where ISIS fails to cause problems for the Kurds, that the Iraqi security forces support the Arab settlers settling in Kurdish lands. And this has manifested several times in the Dibis area, and also in Palakana village. So we can see the Kurdistan region in 2021 is territorially sandwiched by Turkey in the north and to some extent in the east and also by the Shia militia forces and ISIS in the south and the west. In general, one can argue there is a systematic, incremental effort by these powers or by these forces to chip away land from the Kurds, as much as possible on the local level. You have the partisan differences and divisions between the KDP and PUK. Within the PUK you had that white co, which led to the complete coup of the structure of the PUK, where one co-president, Bafel Talibani, and his brother, Qubad marginalized Lahur Sheikh Jangi, who was the other co-president of the PUK. These problems and divisions had negative reflections and negative impacts on the economy, on the rule of law, on the trust of the people in the government as well.
The Economy of the KRG
The state of the economy is suffering because of the lack of trust, between the KDP and the PUK. They have held people, hostage, to either of the parties’ political agenda or out of a share of personal animosity. KRG does not have money to pay on time to the civil servants. And mostly because the ruling parties really control the economy and refuse to hand over the internal revenues to the KRG treasure. Let me just be very, very clear the Kurdistan region does not have a money problem. It has a problem of lacking central authority to collect its internal revenues. So the result, on one hand, is that there’s a huge vertical inequality between common people and those who are at the close peak of power. On the other hand, you have horizontal inequality in the Kurdistan region, which is inequality between different cities and areas in the Kurdistan region. And of course, the issue of corruption, which is endemic in the Kurdistan region only enhances these inequalities. This has resulted in protests in the Kurdistan region, especially in the areas where people feel the economic inequalities most, which is the PUK area. This process of course does not threaten the system, but it is an indication of grave dissatisfaction with the government and the political parties. These internal and external factors in my view have led to sociopolitical uncertainty about the future of the Kurdistan region. Thereby acute disappointment and pessimism among the Kurds as evident by the recent wave of migrations to Europe which dominated the international headline. And I think it was a big hit to the reputation of the KRG. So we really step it into 2022 with these issues and the grievances. And to what extent we are going to see the iterations of these issues, or their improvement will really depend on how asserting the KRG is in extending its authority of the Kurdistan region, providing grand vision and planning to manage these issues, but also have the new Iraqi government, which is in process of forming a government will deal with some region we saw the were the Sadrists were the main vectors.
Lack of Grand Vision has Harmed the KRG
And we will see how they’re going to deal with the Kurdish region, the terms of finance, as well as whether they will be able to leash some of these militia forces. Sader has promised to put a hold on their destabilizing actions in Iraq. There is one more thing I’d like to point out from the past until 2017. You had a vision, or at least something people were saying was a goal. People saying we’re going to work towards Kurdish statehood after September of 2017, which the referendum did not work out as it was supposed to. There was a collapse of trust about the future in the Kurdistan region. People cannot identify themselves with a vision. You know the Kurds and the Kurdish state of Kurdish nationalism was the magnet that attracted many, many people. They had hope for the future of the region. But since 2017, there is a lack of a grand vision that can guide the Kurdish people and the Kurdish leadership. I think if it were left up to the KRG to find some solutions, it would start by gaining the trust of the people, and of course, effective governance is very, very important. Being able to provide minimal services as well as providing this grand vision so that people will have a stake in the future of the Kurdish region. The Biden administration came to power, and they put out an interim strategic foreign policy guideline.
The future of U.S. Kurdish relations
The core of this guideline was the issue of human rights, freedom of expression, and Democracy. Unfortunately, the Kurdistan region has not fared well in 2021 when it comes to these areas. We saw this with the issue of the trial of the Behdinan activists. There is a suppression of freedom of expression in the Kurdistan region if the KRG wants to really identify and try to connect with the United States and with the politicians in Washington, DC. The KRG has to really pay attention to this issue of freedom of expression as well. In addition, the Biden administration has put out a very ambitious strategic plan about how to tackle corruption, not just in the United States, but in the world as well. That’s another area where the region really should, and must try to take care of the issue of corruption in the Kurdish region, which is really a major, major issue. And going back to what Dr. Deniz said about the border closure between Rojava and the KRG, there are a lot of issues between the KRG and Rojava ideologically as well as politically. But I think to a very good extent, the U.S.-led mediation and efforts have put a hold on these differences, or at least tempered them in a way that they would not get out of control. The United States understands that the KRG is essential for its logistical support for Rojava and for its military operations and, and presence in Syria. Therefore the United States has a lot of interest in keeping these issues and tempering down between Rojava and the KRG as much as possible.
Tensions between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region are longstanding. As well there is little hope for Kurds about the new Sadrist Iraqi government.
Thank you. That’s a very good question. Actually, it’s not 19 years. I think the Kurdish delegation in 1938 would go to Baghdad and actually, ironically, they have exactly the same demands as today. The Kurdish leadership is asking Baghdad if Kirkuk is a disputed area than its budget status of the Kurdistan region as well. So, these outstanding issues have been with the Kurds and with the history and the foundation of Iraq since 1922. It’s really not new. And also, I really don’t think there will be any kind of resolution with the Sadrist government. Let’s not forget the Sadrist people were instrumental in cutting off the Kurdistan regions from their share of the budget since 2014. Previously their MPS were very unhappy about how the Kurdistan region was exporting oil, and not sharing the revenue with Baghdad. So, I’m really not hopeful about these so-called Sadrists who plan to be Iraqi Nationalists. Iraqi nationalism has always been a serious problem for the Kurds.