Washington Kurdish Institute
October 26, 2021
With the lowest voter turnout since 2003, Iranian and Turkish proxies lost, and the country will get into a darker era if election winners don’t work together, mainly Baghdad and Erbil.
Two years ago in the month of October, thousands of Iraqi youth across the country, mainly in Baghdad, rose against the political system that had created poor living conditions, unemployment, lack of primary services, and above all, maintained the most corrupt government worldwide. The far majority of the protesters were non-partisan and unsupported by any political party; nor did they accept adoption by any party. But they were faced with brutal attacks by various forces. Many young demonstrators were killed and shot by Iranian-backed militias; ideological Iraqi Shia proxies created by Iran and funded by the Iraqi government known as “Popular Mobilization Units” or “PMUs.” However, the powerful presence of the protestors led to some concessions and change in the government, including the resignation of the cabinet in 2019, reforming election laws, and holding snap elections. But little had changed since the interim government led by Mustafa al Kadhimi, who is not part of Iran’s circle but faced regional and internal challenges and was not efficient enough to heed the entire demands of the protestors. After two years of a status quo, inclusive government, the snap election took place on October 10, 2021. The results were announced by the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), but the outcome was both disappointing and promising.
According to the IHEC, the voter turnout was 43 percent, which is the lowest since Iraq’s liberation from the dictatorship of Saddam Hussien in 2003. The disappointment and the loss of confidence in both the political elite and the government since 2003 have significantly laid their shadows in the recent election turnout. Major issues facing Iraq include essential services such as electricity, water, unemployment, infrastructure, and above all, the security threats by both ISIS (Da’esh) and some factions of the Iranian-backed PMUs. The results somewhat mirrored constituents’ frustrations toward the Iranian militias, political entities, and politicians for the destruction they caused to the country. For example, the Iranian-backed blocs lost dramatically in the elections, a sign of punishment by voters for the violent behaviors they practiced across the country since their official formation in 2014.
Among the biggest losers from the election is the Fateh bloc led by Hadi al Ameri, the Iranian-backed successor of Abu Mahdi al Muhandis, who was killed alongside Iranian General Qasem Soleimani. The Fateh bloc lost two-thirds of parliamentary seats, from 48 seats in 2018 to 15 in 2021. Ameri has long been accused of assassinating Sunnis since 2003, and his faction is frequently accused of destroying Sunni areas after the liberation from Da’esh, as well as oil smuggling. The Fateh bloc also includes Qais al-Khazali, an infamous extremist leader involved in numerous attacks, including attacks against civilians. Moreover, significant losers included Falih al-Fayyadh, the most senior Iraqi government official that was sanctioned by the US for human rights abuses. Al-Fayyadh was sacked by Prime Minister al Kadhimi and could only win four seats in the elections. Former Prime Minister Haider al Abadi, who was backed by the US from 2016 to 2018, was also among the losers with his new partner, the Shia clerk Ammar al Hakim. The two leaders won four seats in comparison to the 60 seats they had in 2018.
Likewise, Turkish-backed blocs also performed poorly, including the Turkmen Front, which used to enjoy the support of Turkmen minorities, especially in Kirkuk. Instead, The Turkmen Front decreased in votes and lost a seat in Kirkuk. Ankara also supported a Sunni bloc backed by Khamis al Khanjar, a controversial businessman involved in corruption and close ties with Turkey’s authoritarian President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Al Khanjar could only win 13 seats in the Sunni region and significantly lost to his Sunni opponent Mohamed Al-Halbousi, who is the current parliament speaker and won most of the Sunni votes at 37 seats.
Despite the low turnout, the winners had unsurprisingly good results due to the discipline among their constituents, with the Shia Cleric Muqtada al Sadr winning 72 seats, and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP) winning 33 seats in the Kurdistan Region. Both KDP and Sadr supporters remain loyal to their ideologies, helping them to be non-competitive. For example, in the second Shia bloc, the unexpected winner was the former Iraqi Prime Minister, Noori al Maliki. Maliki won 35 seats, which is two seats less than half of what Sadr had won. The KDP won more than half of what the second place winner, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), won with 16 seats. Additionally, the Amtidad (Expansion) bloc, which enjoyed support from the 2019 protestors, gained 9 seats, which is a good performance for a newly established political party. The Amtidad movement also announced “understandings” with many of the independent winners, who are mostly secular Shias and are not backed by any political entity.
The majority of the Iraqis celebrated the loss of Iranian proxies since suffering the atrocities by the Iran-backed militias. However, the losers of the election, under the pact “Coordinating Framework”, rejected the results. They held protests across the country on October 18, accusing “foreign powers” of intervening and rigging the election. The “Coordinating Framework ” parties are mainly Iranian-backed groups, armed factions, and includes al Maliki, despite their surprising gain of 37 seats. Although al Maliki won the second most seats among the Shia powers, he has no hope in facing al Sadr to gain a majority control in the next cabinet election or to be selected as prime minister. Instead, communicating with the Iranian-backed blocs will grant him a better chance to be a “compromise” candidate between al Sadr’s nominee and the Iranian-backed candidate. The third option for Maliki is to stay as an opposition power and attack the next cabinet’s performance until a future election.
Will we see the same people running the country?
Though real dialogue has yet to form, the next government has not started its term, as the IHEC needs to confirm the results. The competition, as always, will primarily be on the prime ministership, the speaker, and the presidency. The current Prime Minister al Kadhimi, enjoys western and regional backing, and aims to be reelected to the post, especially after not running in the elections due to promises by al Sadr to retain him for another four years. But al Sadr’s position on al Kadhimi is not clear, and he might change his opinion as he has done with others in the past. The current Speaker, al Halbusi, is also aiming to stay in his position after his de facto win in the Sunni region. Meanwhile, the President Barham Saleh, a Kurd of the PUK, has less of a chance to retain his position despite western backing for many reasons, including KDP’s major wins in the election and the party’s aim to win the presidency, especially after failing in that regard in 2018.
Logical questions have been circulating among activists: if al Kadhimi, al Halbousi, and Saleh all remain in power, then why did Iraq hold elections in the first place, and what has changed? How far can the same people push against Iranian proxies, especially after being tested and failing in that regard? Additionally, can Sadr be trusted to stand against Iranian proxies given that he has vacillated on the issue so many times in the past?
The election results are indeed gloomy given its low voter turnout, but it could be promising if the winners deliver on what the people have demanded. But for the Kurds, it will be the same question, will the new Iraqi Government be the same old story? The answer is most likely yes, unless the Kurds demand their constitutional rights as a united front. Those rights include liberating and normalizing the disputed territories from material laws imposed by Baghdad, delivering the allocated budgets for the Kurdistan Region, and solving the outstanding issues outlined in the constitution that every elected cabinet has failed to do since 2005.
The threats against the US by Iranian proxies and the uncertainty of Sadr should only make the US support the Kurdistan region more in the upcoming talks to form the elected government. The US policymakers should make up for the failed policies on the Kurds, including the October 16, 2017 betrayal, when Washington turned a blind eye to Baghdad, Tehran, and Ankara attacking the Kurds. The change of US policy toward the Kurds would be quite easy, given that the US support of all previous prime ministers has backfired, including support for Abdai and al Maliki.