Webinar: Washington Between a Turkish State Problem and a Kurdish Solution
I like to begin by thanking the Washington Kurdish Institute and particularly remembering my dear friend, knowledgeable Najmaldin Karim. Phillip, you cited more than three decades of involvement in Kurdistan, particularly Iraqi Kurdistan. That is because of Najmaldin Karim, who sought me out in 1987 after I’d done a report for the Senate foreign relations committee that had mentioned the destroyed villages and he introduced me to this issue and became a friend for literally half my life. I’m happy that in the dynastic traditions of Kurdistan that his sons are continuing this effort. That’s really terrific, such a talented and wonderful person who has such a talented and wonderful wife and a family.
Does Biden have a Kurdish policy?
I like to actually first sort of address the broader question. When I worked for the Senate foreign relations committee, it was a bit like the United nations every country, particularly every small country, and every group would come to see me, and they would say, ‘ could the committee pay more attention to us?’ and I’d say, no, no, you don’t want us to pay attention to you because we pay attention to places where their problems, where their conflicts. You’d be quite happy off of our radar. That is absolutely true about any administration’s foreign policy. No matter how you talk about some shifts here, you can’t escape the part of the world where there are problems. So the Biden administration is not going to be shifting away from the Middle East, nor has any previous administration.
The administration’s policies
I like to actually first sort of address the broader question. When I worked for the Senate foreign relations committee, it was a bit like the United nations every country, particularly every small country, and every group would come to see me, and they would say, ‘ could the committee pay more attention to us?’ and I’d say, no, no, you don’t want us to pay attention to you because we pay attention to places where their problems, where their conflicts. You’d be quite happy off of our radar. That is absolutely true about any administration’s foreign policy. No matter how you talk about some shifts here, you can’t escape the part of the world where there are problems. So the Biden administration is not going to be shifting away from the Middle East, nor has any previous administration. Because this is this part of the world and I’m speaking to you from Beirut is where so many of the problems are. Second, I always enjoy the strategists who love to talk about oh, we’re going to take on, and we have the strategic competition with China. In the 1980s, Japan was the rising issue and Russia. I think it’s a sort of full employment for strategic thinkers. But the reality is people are not overwrought about what China’s going to do. Yes, they can spend a lot of money on the belt and road or in Africa, but they’re not gonna be settling Chinese there. They’re not gonna be settling Chinese in Istanbul. They’re not going to communize with them. They’re not going to make military allies. But there is a shift that the Biden administration is taking, and it’s a shift dictated by the nature of the problems we have.
It’s not a competition with China or Russia. It is the need actually to cooperate with China, Russia, and the European Union to deal with global problems. First and foremost is climate, the pandemic, the global economy, and a problem that is semi-regional, which is nuclear non-proliferation. That’s where the priorities are. Really on all of those, yes, there’s competition, but for all of those big issues, it is going to require cooperation and frankly, the future of the planet depends on it.
Now switching to a Kurdish policy. First and here simply I will repeat what Henri Barkey said. Biden has emerged as a revolutionary, radical , major figure on the domestic stage. I think he enjoys potentially being a figure domestically like FDR [Franklin D. Roosevelt] and LBJ [Lyndon B. Johnson] in terms of accomplishments. Personally, I very much hope he succeeds at that. I do think this will keep him focused, but he is a person who is deeply knowledgeable about the Middle East, cares a lot about it deeply. So he’s not going to be absent from it even as he perhaps has his legacy in the domestic programs that he’s undertaking. But beyond that, this is somebody who cares, who deeply cares about the Kurds. I know because I worked with him on this, certainly at the beginning in 1988, he was a strong supporter of the prevention of genocide act of 1988 that unanimously passed the Senate to impose stiff sanctions on Iraq for using chemical weapons. Which incidentally was opposed to even cutting aid to Iraq was opposed by the Reagan administration is too extreme of a response to Saddam’s gassing of the Kurds. But Biden was there in August of 1990, days after the invasion of Kuwait is when he first met the Kurds.
I know because I introduced him to Jalal Talabani, Hoshiar Zebari, Sami Abdulrahaman, and of course, Najmaldin Karim. He’s been deeply involved. He held hearings, his three-state solution I think, was actually 2005, but he held hearings in 2003. And again, I know I testified where this issue was discussed. He went to Kurdistan in 2002 before the invasion addressed the KRG parliament. He certainly understands as do the people in this administration, that sooner or later, Iraqi Kurdistan will be an independent state. This is incidentally something that’s basically recognized by Turkey as well. Kanan Afran, before he died, said “of course there’s going to be an independent Kurdistan,” the same man who had protested intensely in 1988 when Larry Pope the office director for Northern Gulf affairs, had met with Jalal Talabani and Najmaldin Karim among others. So there’s an understanding that this will happen sooner or later.
Iraqi Kurds remain committed to independence
I have to say with great respect to Nilufer, I’m sorry, but it’s not true that the Kurds are settling for autonomy. The Iraqi Kurds had a referendum in which 97% voted for independence, and the moment the opportunity arises, and Iraq has a wonderful history of creating opportunities, they’re going to go for independence. I don’t think anybody doubts that it’s true that in Rojava that’s not what they’re seeking. They are seeking to continue their rather very interesting social experiment.
So what is the policy? Well, obviously, the policy toward the Kurds is very much related to the policy toward the countries where they’re involved. So in Iraq, the US policy is very much to be supportive of the Kurds to have a strategic relationship. A great deal of US operations are run out of Iraqi Kurdistan but also to try to smooth things between Erbil and Baghdad to help solve some of the outstanding issues. In Rojava is something that the Trump administration did not accept. But the notion is that the United States, the Biden administration, and Biden as somebody who is a humanitarian at his heart who has a good moral compass. Yes, the United States has an obligation to the allies in Rojava. A moral obligation who lost more than 10,000 people in the fight against the Islamic State, a struggle in which I think five servicemen lost their lives. Of course, not only is that a moral obligation, and again, Biden is somebody for whom that is important and who shouldn’t dismiss morals as something that’s not part of how a leader thinks. But also strategically, if you don’t stand by your allies, the next time you have to fight, you might have to do it yourself. I suppose the US wouldn’t have taken 10,000 casualties if it had fallen, but it would have taken several thousand. So there is an appreciation.
So what does that mean in practical terms? Certainly, through the Biden administration, there is going to be a US commitment to Rojava, but perhaps it’s a time that also Rojava might be looking to negotiate its future within Syria. On the one hand, the US has obviously supported both Baghdad and Erbil, wanting to solve the problems between the two. With regard to Syria as a whole, the US has a very dim view of the Assad government. That said, it also has some other concerns beyond wishing not to have trouble between Syria, the government in Damascus, and the Northeast.
US-Turkey relation
The second concern is to be supportive of our European allies, who don’t wish to have any more Syrian refugees coming into Europe, and indeed hoping that some will be able to return home. That may not mean the US will lift sanctions or participate in reconstruction but may accept that that will go forward and not be objective because it makes no sense to continue a war or military action once that the outcome is decided. Clearly, the war in Syria, the outcome has been decided. With regard to Turkey, they are an ally. I think Erdogan is a bit on the back foot with Biden. He got away with a lot under Donald Trump. He’s not getting away with as much, and this has made him more cautious.
He also has his own internal problems. I think a lot of people view him as a short-timer. Maybe he’ll surprise people that he is a short-timer. I don’t subscribe to the view that whatever he may say that Turkey is realistically thinking of annexing the territories of the former Ottoman empire—reattaching the Valley of Mosul. But it’s interesting, Turkey under Erdogan at the first decade of Erdogan, as Henri referred to it actually had a very enlightened policy toward the Kurds. On language schooling, local autonomy, so much so that Masoud Barzani went up to Diyarbakir and campaigned with Erdogan. He received Masoud Barzani as if he were ahead of the state.
It’s shifted in the second decade, particularly following Kobani, but what Turkey, as Erdogan at least saw it initially, was that the good relations with the KRG [Kurdistan Regional Government] which remain an extension of Turkish influence and extension, if you will, of a Sunni defined world as against the Shia dominated Iranian influenced, Baghdad. Post Kobani, there have been some shifts, but nonetheless, good relations have remained with Erbil. I I don’t see, and certainly one goal of a Biden policy is to make sure that to the Kurds that Erdogan does not do anything further reckless in Rojava. That the status quo remains. I think Erdogan pretty much noticed that doing something major would be a problem.
Finally, the Biden administration is going to be very keen on ISIS, not reemerging. That of course, means stability in Rojava. It means stability in the KRG, and I suppose, stability in the rest of Iraq. That means that Turkey does not cause additional problems. That means we have to face a simple fact every foreign terrorist who entered, who joined ISIS, got there through Turkey. WhenTurkey attacked in October of 2019, the one group of ISIS people who escaped or the detainees in Ain Essa where they went was Turkey. So there’s going to be a Turkey on notice and that it’s going to have a have to take a harder line than it was tolerated during the previous administration that the current administration certainly is expected to have a harder line on terrorism and on the access that terrorists had to Syria.