Washington Kurdish Institute May 4, 2021
By: Sirwan Renas
Although the majority of the Kurds are Muslim, Islamism is not attractive to them. What is more, Kurds in Iraq and Syria fought against ISIS. The aim of this piece is to explain why Islamism has not been attractive among the Kurdish nation. There are various factors affecting Kurdish nationalism, among which the historical context through which Kurdish nationalism has been constructed is a major contributing factor.
The foundations of Kurdish nationalism in contemporary history can be traced back to the historical transition from pre-modern empire political system to the modern state-building order in the Middle East. In regard to Islamism, what makes Kurdish nationalism different from its rival nationalisms is the contemporary historical context through which it emerged.
The Arab, Turkish, and Persian/Iranian nationalisms are state nationalisms that were constructed in opposition to Western colonialism — namely, British and France — at the beginning of the twentieth century and the domination of the United State in the aftermath of World War II. In contrast, Kurdish nationalism is a stateless nationalism aimed at the creation of the state of Kurdistan, and, thus, it emerged in opposition to the domination of Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi, and Syrian states — not the domination of Western powers. While for Turks, Arabs, and Persians, Western powers were seen as interventionists and occupiers, for Kurds the Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi, and Syrian states were perceived as occupiers. Even though Britain and France played a major role in dividing Kurdistan, for Kurds, it was their occupying authoritarian states that suppressed almost every Kurdish liberation movement throughout the twentieth century— a brutal suppression that led to all kinds of violations of human rights, from denying their fundamental rights to practice their language and culture and the possession of their homeland to mass killings, chemical bombings, ethnic cleansings, and genocides. The fact that the Kurdish national rights have been violated by the occupying states (not Western colonialists) made a significant difference in how Kurds perceive Islamism.
Kurds do not have any state of their own to identify themselves with, nor do they identify themselves with any of the pre-modern Islamic empires or with any of the modern occupying states. That is not to say that Kurds have played no active role in the Islamic empires. Saladin Ayyubi, the founder of the Ayyubid dynasty, for example, led the Muslim military campaign against the Crusaders in the Levant. However, Kurds do not identify themselves with the Ayyubid dynasty and it has not become a basis for Kurdish nationalism. On the contrary, Turks identify themselves with the Ottoman Empire, Persians with the Safavid Empire, and Arabs with many Islamic dynasties since the birth of Islam.
The transitional period from pre-modern empires to modern states in the Middle East is a crucial moment that helps us to understand how Kurdish nationalism and Islamism were affected by this historical context. It is widely believed that nationalism as a political ideology is a modern phenomenon. The same can be said about Islamism. Islamism, as a modern political ideology, emerged as a reaction to colonialism and the domination of Western civilization, and more recently, globalization. From this perspective, Islamism is a political ideology that tries to reinterpret the past to answer the existing problems of Muslim-majority societies. Islamists believe that the Islamic civilization has declined as a result of the Western colonial legacy. To Islamists, colonialists destroyed the glory and the power of Islam and Islamic empires. This perception leads to a direct confrontation with Western civilization. In short, Islamists perceive this confrontation as a war between Islamic and Christian Western civilization.
This historical context made a big distinction between Kurdish nationalism and Islamism. One of the obvious features of this difference is the role of women in the Kurdistan national movement. One can see how the Kurdish national movement presents a different and progressive image of women in contrast to what Islamists portray. This historical context, especially when it comes to the role of women in politics, has affected Kurdish nationalists to feel closer to Western values, which in turn has pushed Kurds to get closer to Western democracies in both practice and theory of politics. Even though in theory some Kurdish leftist political parties oppose the liberal-capitalist world order, they welcome it in practice.
Islamist nationalisms (whether it be Turkish, Arabic, and Persian versions of Islamism or Islamist terrorist groups) have perceived Kurds as a people whose way of life and values are different. Furthermore, the policies of authoritarian states that have severely violated the individual and national rights of the Kurds are deeply entrenched in Islamist ideologies. There are contemporary examples in which Iran, Iraq, and Turkey have invaded Kurdistan based on this perception: Khomeini’s Fatwa against Kurds in 1979-1980 and Erdogan’s invasion of Rojava were justified on such a ground. Even in cases where the state ideology has not been Islamist, the anti-Kurdish policies have been justified by Islamism. Saddam Regime’s Anfal campaign that led to the genocide of Kurds in Iraq is a clear example. Consequently, Kurds perceive Islamism as an ideology that belongs to their occupiers. Kurdish nationalism, therefore, developed against Islamist nationalisms.
At the beginning of the creation of the modern state political order in the region, Kurds became the victims of the geopolitical games of Western colonialists and were deceived by regional powers. For example, during the 1920-1923, Turks justified their rule over Kurdistan by saying that we are all Muslim, so we should stand together against colonialism, a statement that later turned out to be nothing but a disguise to deny their individual and national rights. Since then, Kurdish liberation movements have been accused by their occupying states on such grounds as not being real Muslim, not being Muslim at all, and/or the agents of Western colonialists.
One could object and point to the existence of some Islamists groups among the Kurds and even some Kurds joined ISIS. While there is some truth to this assertion, the fact is that Kurds never did so as Kurdish nationalists. That is, they did not make a connection between their Kurdishness and Islamism. Those Islamist parties that identify themselves with both Islam and Kurdishness rarely became radical, and they never became popular among the Kurdish masses.
To conclude, the historical context of the confrontation between the Kurdish stateless nationalism and its rival state nationalisms that have occupied Kurdistan and suppressed Kurds (under the banners of we are all Muslim, Kurds are not real Muslim, Kurds are the agents of Western colonialists) has led to a negative perception of Islamism and a positive perception of Western civilization among the Kurdish nation. This historical context explains why Islamist nationalisms and Jihadi groups are not attractive to the Kurds and why Kurds welcome liberal order while other nations of the Middle East typically stand against it.
Disclaimer: The views, opinions, and positions expressed by authors and contributors do not necessary reflect those of the WKI.