Washington Kurdish Institute February 23, 2021
The 2021 Erbil missile attacks might mark a new way for Iran to target the U.S. and the Kurds without claiming responsibility. Therefore, the U.S. must hold Iran accountable and undo former President Trump’s wrong policies toward the Kurds.
On February 15, 2021, an Iraqi Shia militia, backed by Iran, claimed a deadly rocket attack on the capital of the Kurdistan region, Erbil. The terror attack resulted in the death of a foreign contractor working for the U.S, an Iraqi citizen, and a dozen people were injured, including civilians, contractors working for the U.S., and an American service member. The Iranian-backed militias snuck into Erbil illegally and launched the attack six miles away from the Erbil International Airport, where some of the anti-ISIS U.S.-led coalition is stationed.
Why the Kurdistan Region?
March 1, 2021, will mark three decades since the first deployment of the U.S.-led coalition into the Kurdistan Region, as part of the Operation Provide Comfort (AKA No-Fly Zone), which protected the region from aggressions from the former Iraqi dictator, Saddam Hussein. Since, the area has been a safe haven for western missions, organizations, and companies. The Kurds’ wide-open arms to foreigners, mainly from the U.S., come naturally due to Iraq and the neighboring countries’ deadly campaigns that occurred throughout history. Further, the Kurds became the main allies of the U.S. and jointly fought several battles against the former Iraqi regime, Al Qaeda, and ISIS. Since 1991 and up until today, the U.S. presence has only been praised and encouraged by Kurdish leaders, parties, and people as the vast majority of the Kurds value the U.S. presence as a protection against constant existential threats from Baghdad, Tehran, Ankara, and Damascus.
While the U.S. has been facing deadly attacks in the rest of Iraq since 2003, Kurdistan keeps providing better security for foreign missions. But since 2018, the region has fallen victim to several terror attacks by the Iranian regime directory and their Iraqi proxies, particularly by some Shia factions of the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU). The Iranian attacks have lots of political aims, including but not limited to the following.
First, recent reports and speculations suggested the U.S.’s intentions to withdraw military bases and diplomats from the rest of the country to the Kurdistan Region due to continued attacks perpetrated by Iranian-backed militias on the U.S. The Iranian attacks undermine the security of the Kurdistan Region and send the message to the U.S. that even in a safe, friendly Kurdistan, Iran can target America. In the past two years, senior leaders of Iranian-backed militias openly threatened the U.S. with attacks, stating that they “will reach [the U.S.] in Erbil.”
Second, by attacking Erbil, Iran is punishing the Kurds for their friendship with the west. Indeed, the Iranian regime has long opposed a prosperous Kurdish region in Iraq and often described it as a “new Israel.’‘ By attacking its security and safety, Iran is achieving a security goal after somewhat winning the economic war on the region by pushing their proxies in the Iraqi Parliament to deprive Kurdistan of its share of the federal budget, which caused dire economic issues in the region. Despite supporting some Kurdish factions in the 1980s, the Iranian regime’s rhetoric has historically been against any establishment of a Kurdish state or a strong Kurdish region.
Third, Iran keeps targeting and undermining the role of Iraqi Prime Minister, Mustafa al Kadhimi, who enjoys the backing of regional and international powerful states, yet is challenged by these militias. Targeting Erbil will sabotage his somewhat good relations with the Kurds and will foster more tensions between the Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi military, given that the Erbil attackers used areas run by the PMUs and the Iraqi military. Al Kadhimi lost his battle in Baghdad against the militias after being unable to control them. In fairness, this was a tough battle as countless Iranian-backed militias are organically embedded in sensitive security departments of Iraq.
Lastly, as many experts expressed, Iran wants to pressure the new U.S. administration to resume negotiations over the nuclear deal and lift sanctions imposed on Iran by the former administration. Currently, Iran is like a sinking boat with immense economic issues. While the regime struggles to fund its proxies abroad, it is also facing opposition, even from its very own loyal base, known as “Mostazafin” — the poor class.
Iran’s denial of new and dangerous types of terrorist attacks
Iran soon denied its involvement in the Erbil attacks, even though the group claiming the attack is backed, trained, and equipped by Iran. The terrorist group, named Saraya Awlia ad Dem (Guardians of Blood Companies), is part of Hezbollah’s Iraqi branch, which has been attacking the U.S. in Iraq since December 2019. Prior to this attack, Iran overtly and proudly would announce its hits against the U.S. However, neither Baghdad nor Erbil has been able to publicly declare Iran’s responsibility in this attack. Baghdad’s refusal to hold Iran accountable for the attack is due to the powerful political backing Iran enjoys by the Shia parties, which often pressure Prime Minister Al Kadhimi to avoid any anti-Iran move. Meanwhile, Erbil fears dire consequences from Iran in the Kurdistan Region, especially due to uncertainty and unclear U.S. policies toward the Kurds. For example, the Kurds learned a harsh lesson when the former administration allied with Iraqi forces and indirectly with Iranian-backed militias, and allowed both forces to attack the Kurds as an aftermath of the independence referendum held by the Kurds in the fall of 2017. If Iran is not held accountable by the U.S, Iraq, and the international community, it will be perceived as a free pass and a blessing to further launch attacks in Iraq by proxies, not only against the U.S. but against anyone opposing Iran’s regional expansionism.
Resurrection of the 2015 Iran deal: Playing Iran’s separation game could lead to a successful deal
On Thursday, February 18, the U.S. administration took the first step in rejoining former President Obama’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear agreement, after the former administration withdrew from it. The negotiations will be held in between the U.S., the P5+1, and Iran. Many cheered for the deal in 2015, as it was labeled as a new era of peace. But as a result, the U.S. and the west lost that deal as the Iranian regime had taken advantage of the billions it received to empower its proxies across and strengthen its terror corridor in the region. The deal did not stop Iran from pursuing its attempts to develop nuclear weapons either. Meanwhile, Iranian people did not receive any tangible benefits from the Iran deal as unemployment and poverty continued to rise in the country, which later resulted in mass anti-government protests. This time, the U.S. should approach the deal realistically. As Professor David Romano explained during an online discussion hosted by the Washington Kurdish Institute (WKI): “[The Obama administration] were dreaming in colors when they said the Iran nuclear deal needed to include issues not related to nuclear weapons and enrichments, such as Iran’s conventional military capabilities and support for groups like Hezbollah.”
The reality is that Iran did not want any other topic but the nuclear program to be discussed. The government especially didn’t want to talk about human rights, Iran’s support for terrorist groups, and attacking the U.S. and its allies. “The problem is that while Iran separated these issues when negotiating the Iran nuclear deal with the Obama administration and would not concede to any notion of including non-nuclear related conditions in the deal, the Obama administration, which included Biden, acted as if other issues were indeed linked, acted as if they were linked in a way that favored Iran.” said Romano.
The U.S. and the international community should separate the nuclear deal from the regime’s other behaviors since Iran seems to be enduring its expansionism in the region and its attacks against the U.S. and allies, the latest being the Kurds. For example, the maximum pressure imposed by the former administration has worked to slow the regime down in funding their proxies. That should remain in place, or at least, sanctions on personnel and organizations linked to the Iranian regime and their vital institutions, such as the revolutionary guards, must continue based on Iran’s acts of terror in the region.
The U.S. should make it clear that it won’t tolerate any attacks against them in Iraq, especially in the Kurdistan Region, the last safe place for the U.S. in Iraq. At the same time, the U.S. should retaliate for the Erbil attack by targeting the terror group responsible for the attack, which Iran would have no right to oppose since it has denied its involvement.
The U.S. can use the same anti-ISIS coalition capacities to target Iranian-backed terrorists in the future as these groups threaten U.S. national security. The best defense being offense, Iranian-backed militias will think twice before attacking again. For example, several PMU branches in the west of Iraq were evicted, fearing U.S. retaliation after the White House said it “reserves the right to respond in the time and the manner” of its choosing.
The Iran deal should not stop the U.S. from defending Human Rights in Iran and from sanctioning those involved in the killings of protesters. At the same time, the new U.S. administration should reopen its doors to Iranian opposition groups, since it has stopped meeting them following the 2015 deal, a policy continued under the Trump administration. If the U.S. plays by Iran’s separation tactic, then a deal with Iran over its nuclear program could be successful. Otherwise, Iran will gain back the power it held in 2015 and will impose additional long-term threats against the region, the U.S., and the world.
A reminder of U.S. policy toward the Kurds
You cannot look at the tensions between Iran and the U.S. since 2019 without linking them to the aftermath of Kurdistan’s independence referendum, held on September 25, 2017. Further, as an aftermath of this referendum, the Iraqi forces and Iranian-backed militias attacked the Kurds on October 16, 2017, which resulted in mass losses, including the Kurds’ loss of about 45% of their lands.
The areas the Kurds were removed from are known as “disputed territories” and include the oil-rich province of Kirkuk. However, the U.S.’s silence and the fact that it took Baghdad’s side dramatically empowered Iran and its militias, as the country took control of oil fields and financial resources, and physically became closer to the Kurdistan Region. Other than the Kurdish losses, the U.S.’s miscalculation hurt its security. For example, the U.S.-backed the former Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al Abadi, an Islamist Shia leader from the Dawa party — a pro-Iran party that is ideologically against the U.S. Sadly, former President Trump and his team chose Prime Minister Abadi over the Kurds. As a result, Abadi failed to secure a win despite all the backing from the west.
The Erbil attackers indeed used easy access to Erbil from both Kirkuk and Nineveh plains, which were lost to the militias during the October 16, 2017 events. Even the U.S. killing of the Iranian Quds Force leader, Qasim Soliemeni, came as a retaliation of Iranian-backed militias attacking Americans in Kirkuk, which would have never happened if the area had remained under the control of the Peshmerga forces, or if the Peshmerga were working together with the Iraqi forces in Kirkuk.
What can the new U.S. administration do to minimize such attacks?
Under President Trump, the Kurds suffered the most dramatic losses since their liberation movement, initiated about a century ago. For example, the Kurds lost most of what they controlled in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as aforementioned. Furthermore, the Kurds lost half of their territories in the Kurdish region of Syria after President Trump greenlighted the Turkish invasion into Syria in 2019 and remained silent during the first Turkish invasion into western Syria, in the Afrin region, in 2018. These three major losses for the Kurdish nation were as significant as the dismantlement of the first Kurdish republic in Iran, in 1946, if not more. Indeed, it will take them decades to recover.
These events are often considered to be a U.S. betrayal of the Kurds, but professor Amy Austin Holmes argues otherwise. “To refer to it as a betrayal of Kurds actually minimizes the issue. It makes the issue appear smaller than in fact it is, because this U.S. withdrawal from Syria, in October 2019, was a gift to Bashar al-Assad, Putin, and Tehran. So, it was actually in violation of the U.S. national security policies.”
The Kurds are optimistic about the new administration, especially given that President Biden enjoys significant knowledge of the issues and is somewhat friends with the Kurds. However, the new administration should aim to undo the wrong policies by:
- Being clear with the Kurds about their long-term goals in Iraq.
- Pledging to the Kurds that events like those of October 16, 2017, caused by Iraq and Iran, would not be repeated under the U.S. watch.
- Ensuring that Iran and Turkey do not threaten the Kurds.
- Normalizing the security and political situation of the “disputed territories.” On the security aspect, the U.S. should pressure Baghdad and work with the Peshmerga to return to Kirkuk and join U.S.-led operation commands with the Iraqi security forces. This will result in a positive outcome for the U.S. and the Kurds as the Peshmerga forces will easily contain the movements of the militias. This arrangement was done in the past and is now known as a pre-2014 arrangement. As for the political aspect, the US and the UN should ensure that all Kurdish parties are presented and part of the administration in Kirkuk since the acting Governor of Kirkuk, who was imposed by Baghdad, has restored the Arabization policies and deprived the Kurds of their shares.
- Continuing to encourage Baghdad to deliver the allocated federal budget of the region — despite not having much political leverage on Iraqis. The Kurdistan Region also lost its financial leverages in recent years, in part due to the loss of Kirkuk.
- Preserving the U.S. programs of training the Peshmerga forces since it has worked to strengthen the security of the region, especially against ISIS terrorists. Further, the U.S. helped the Kurds overcome their political differences by forming a new division consisting of both Peshmergas of the KDP and the PUK.
If not stopped, the future attacks on the Kurdistan Region could jeopardize the U.S. national security in both the short and long term, and will significantly hurt the Kurds and put them in a vulnerable position that might lead them to unwanted concessions to their enemies.