Webinar: Is the expansionism policy Erdogan’s or Turkey’s?
Highlighted remarks by Alan Makovsky
Turkish Public Support for Erdogan’s Policies:
“I think regarding support for Erdogan’s policies, particularly some of his signature policies, I think the reaction of the Turkish public has been very mixed, which is heartening really. I base a lot of this on recent polling. I’m an avid poll follower and I follow Metropole. And, also, I would recommend it to anyone who’s not familiar with it, Kadir Has University in Istanbul does an annual survey of foreign policy perceptions. They usually conduct it in the Spring, and this year they conducted it in April. I don’t like to overemphasize polls, but I mean, they do give an important snapshot, and I’ll try to put it in some context. First of all, as I said, many of his signature policies, there’s very mixed feelings, The general issue of cross border operations, Turks favor them only by 41 to 35 percent, overseas bases; only 37 to 36 in favor, in both cases, 20% of AK Party voters are opposed.
When you ask Turks, or when Turks were asked in the spring, what is your preferred approach in Syria? The number one answer, 38% was stay out, remain neutral. By 36 to 32, Turks favor meeting with the Assad government, which goes completely counter to the approach Erdogan has taken. And that, by the way, for most of these questions, the breakdown is that those who vote for AK party and for MHP, are on the aggressive side of the issue. And CHP, HDP, and Iyi party with some mixed reactions on the other side. But actually the issue of meeting with Assad, it’s pretty much the same by every party, right down the line. There’s a slight majority of AK party [Party of Justice and Development] voters against it, and a slight majority of CHP voters in favor of it.
On the issue of Hamas, approve or disapprove, Pew research has been polling this question for many years, going back to the beginning of the century. And I think many people who follow Turkish policy would be astonished to learn that by overwhelming numbers, Turks, disapprove of Hamas, 80 to eight in the most recent one that I could find, which was from 2014 or 2015, 2014, I believe, but it’s consistent enough over the years. The early part of the century when AK party first took over, the disapproval was in the nineties, sometimes well into the nineties. So, I think we can say that Hamas itself does not evoke great love, on the part of the Turkish people. The Palestine issue does. There’s high disapproval of Israel, but Hamas itself, no.”
What are the future possibilities for the Kurdistan Regional Government to mediate between the Kurds and Turkey?
“I don’t think that right now Turkey is very interested in mediation with the PKK. As your extremely well-informed audience knows, Turkey has been pursuing intense military operations in Kurdistan, in the KRG, against the PKK. And it set up a number of semi, I mean, actually, dozens of semi-permanent military installations there. And none of this suggests that Turkey is particularly interested right now in mediation. Moreover, look, it’s a long discussion, but I think Erdogan feels that the peace process did not work out. I don’t think he feels that he’s primarily blameworthy. He’s not exclusively blameworthy. The PKK also shares a significant amount of blame for that. But what Erdogan found when he reversed course, is that, that was a political win for him. And now that alliance with the MHP, which is a significant part an anti-Kurdish, certainly anti PKK alliance, I think that’s something he’s going to hold onto dearly. So, I’m not as aware of the KRG undertaking very intensive efforts of mediation, but I think, they’re not likely to bear much fruit if they do. I don’t think that’s where Turkey is going right now.”
Is a new Turkish invasion, possibly in collaboration with Russia and Iran, feasible in the near future?
“First of all, I completely agree with Gallia that Russia plays a double game. Russia, surely doesn’t want to cut off its ties with the Kurds, specifically with the YPG. So, I don’t think Russia will welcome the Turks to just come in and take over, what they haven’t so far, as a matter of fact, the Turks originally understood that their agreement with Russia would allow them to go up to the Iraqi border. The agreement that they made, following their agreement with the US, following the October invasion, that hasn’t happened because of Russian restraint. Now, regarding the transition in the US, yes, that is a time when people, if there is a transition, we don’t know that yet. Obviously, President Trump could win a second term.
It is a time when others can kind of catch the US unaware. In this case, however, I think if Trump were to win, there’s more likelihood that the US will pull out of Syria entirely, and I think then that your chance to raise awareness in Washington, is confined to Congress. And there’s a lot that can be done in Congress but it’s an animal that moves very slowly.”
On the UN report released in September 2020 regarding human rights violations in Turkish-occupied Syria.
“It’s very damning and there’ve been. Turkey, which got a lot of credit and deserves a lot of credit for all of the refugees, that it admitted in the early years of the war has essentially closed that border, since 2016. And there’ve been a lot of reports of people trying to get into Turkey, who have been handled very brutally and even shot by Turkish border guards. I know some of the Christians you referred to, as well as Kurds who live in that area. And I know there is a lot of paranoia as you suggest. One positive development, I think that the U S has been able to affect a certain degree of rapprochement between the PYD and the KNC parties. At least there is some beginning to an all-party government, which I think is vital, a must have if there is going to be some stability in that area. There has been some progress of course. It remains to be seen, whether it will work out. The US was late, I think, in getting involved in that regard, but at least now has been actively involved in mediating among the Kurdish parties. And it’s going well.”
Potential NATO deployment in Northern Syria (aside from Turkey and US)
“I think if we’re talking about whether it’s under a NATO rubric or not, if we’re talking about the immediate area of the Turkish borders which is Kurdish predominantly, yes, I think Turkey would be the likely state to step in. I’m not sure it would be necessarily under a NATO rubric. Now there are, of course, other NATO States that have participated in this coalition, the French, the Brits, and others. But without the US there, I think, there would not be much of a NATO operation, a very effective one against ISIS.”
Is the US truly opposed to Turkey’s expansionism?
“I tried to allude to this a bit when I said that Erdogan’s expansionism has taken place mainly during this period of what I call, US benign neglect, by which I basically mean that Trump for the most part, has been very indulgent of Erdogan’s moves. Now, there are some exceptions. The Trump administration has certainly strongly supported the Israel, Greece, Cyprus, alignment. It has been critical of Turkey, particularly, I think, in the Hellenic arena. But in other areas it has really been neglectful. Look, in Libya, I would say there were many policymakers, who were pleased by Turkey’s intervention because, and there are even some who feel that Turkey’s intervention was done with the US’ blessing, because it was seen by many as counterbalancing Russia’s involvement with Haftar.
But in Syria, it seems to me the US has, not taken a strong stand. And I think actually one of the, more shameful and less publicized chapters in recent foreign history, US foreign policy history that is, involved the October invasion. Three times the US secretary of defense Esper had said it was unacceptable for Turkey to cross the border. And yet, when it came right down to it and Turkey told president Trump that it was going in, the response was for the US to move its troops out of the way and let the Turkish troops come in. So, yeah, I think a more activist U S approach, would make a difference. I think another thing, another element of this is human rights. The Trump administration does not raise human rights issues. And, I think human rights issues, aside from their intrinsic ethical dimension, are also an element of putting pressure on Turkey in other areas.”
How much of an Islamist is Erdogan?
“Sure. Well, I think its obvious, he has strong sentimental, if not organizational ties with the Muslim brotherhood, he supported Hamas for one thing. I quoted those opinion polls, there’s no public demand for support for Hamas. There’s his intervention in Libya. I think there was at least a component of Muslim brotherhood concern that was clear, with the Morsi government in Egypt, his special focus on it. And to this day, his unwillingness to repair relations with Egypt, which is a key country. The fact that Turkey houses in Istanbul so many exiled Muslim brotherhood members from around the Arab world, and actually allows Egyptian Muslim brotherhood members to telecast on the internet from Turkey. I think, yeah, Erdogan sees himself as the leader of the Muslim world. He wants to be seen that way. He wants the street to see him that way if governments don’t. And yes, I think that’s very important too.”
Is the US still able to mediate between the Syrian Kurds and Turkey? Is Turkey ready for relations with Syrian Kurds?
“I don’t think that Erdogan is ready to make peace with the Kurds of Syria. I think the US is trying, I think one key step in that regard would be for some sort of all-party government to emerge in the Kurdish area. And of course Turkey initially opposed the KNC coming to a rapprochement with the PYD, but it seems it’s backed off of that. The US has also, and more about this Sinam than I do anyway, there is an American oil company involved there. I think there’s a certain hope that Northeastern Syria can follow the paradigm that the KRG followed where an energy relationship with Turkey can soften Turkey and bring it along to some kind of acceptance.”