Washington Kurdish Institute
By: Yousif Ismael August 17, 2020
President Trump’s personal decision to withdraw from Syria last October worsened the situation in the country on many levels. It instantly empowered various parties in Syria, including the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), the various other Turkish-backed jihadist groups in Syria, the Syrian regime, Russia, and Iran, many of whom are enemies with one another and all of whom are at odds with the US. While the US incurred a massive loss of influence within Syria, the consequences on the ground were felt primarily by the Kurds of Syria along with members of Syria’s various Christian groups and others who were working with the Kurds in the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES).
Assessing the damage
Immediately following President Trump’s decision to withdraw, Turkey invaded a large swath of territory in northern Syria in close coordination with various radical Islamic jihadist groups, primarily targeting Girê Spî (Tel Abyad) and Serêkaniyê (Ras al-’Ain). The Turkish military and their jihadist proxy militias committed well documented atrocities against civilians, and their unprovoked invasion displaced hundreds of thousands from these formerly peaceful areas, and both the US and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) lost more strategic land and political leverage to be benefit of not only Turkey and their jihadist allies, but also Russia, the primary backer of the Syrian regime, who seized newly-vacated US bases and established a presence in Manbij, Raqqa, Tabqa, and elsewhere. In addition, Assad’s forces established themselves in the area alongside Iranian militias. Meanwhile, ISIS terrorists, who were struggling after the defeat of their territorial so-called “caliphate” by the SDF and US-led coalition forces, were thrown a lifeline and were able to regroup and launch attacks in the region with more flexibility than before, as ISIS and the other Turkish-backed jihadist groups have a similar ideology and a common enemy: The Kurds. After the damage was done, pressure on President Trump by Americans prevented a complete withdrawal, and the US maintained a scaled down presence in certain parts of Syria. This reduced US presence has kept certain areas relatively safe, though the future clearly remains uncertain. The Syrian Kurds, having defeated ISIS and presided over the most stable part of the country through the AANES, remain official unrecognized on the global stage and uninvited to the international Geneva peace talks on Syria. They nonetheless continue to fight the remnants of ISIS and guard tens of thousands of ISIS captives and their families, including thousands of foreign citizens.
How Erdogan has Trump’s ear
The constant phone calls between President Trump and Turkey’s President Erdogan are evidence of a strong personal connection between the two leaders. President Trump has praised Erdogan more than one occasion for being “sharp”, and it did not take long for Erdogan to find ways to influence Trump despite Erdogan’s anti-American rhetoric and anti-US policies, including his close coordination with various radical Islamist jihadist groups. Erdogan’s direct connection to Trump is a golden ticket allowing him to block all the US institutions’ criticism of or actions against his government, and he has used this to his advantage time and time again. For example, under Erdogan Turkey has worked against the US interests on almost every single matter including partnering with Russia, supporting terrorist groups, invading territory controlled by US allies, threatening and working against European nations, breaking sanctions on Iran, supporting Venezuela’s dictator Maduro, fanning the flames of radical Islamic fanaticism worldwide, and committing countless human rights violations inside and outside Turkey. Under Erdogan, Turkey has become increasingly authoritarian and is perceived as untrustworthy. Turkey has lost America as a friend, not only in the eyes of the public but to institutions such as the Department of Defense and, to a certain extent, the Department of State. Furthermore, Turkey lost the confidence of the US media and many think tanks that have covered Turkey’s transition to a dictatorship under Erdogan. Of course, despite increasing unpopularity in Washington, Erdogan has the one friend who matters most, President Trump. The warming friendship started a few months after Trump’s inauguration, and became more clear with the Turkish military invasion of Kurdish regions in Syria. Erdogan enjoys a direct line to Trump and uses it to further his own agenda, one that is diametrically opposed to US regional and global security interests. This friendship has proven fruitful, with the US dropping federal charges against Erdogan’s guards who assaulted protestors on US soil in 2017, helping Erdogan with financial schemes, and most importantly, remaining relatively quiet as Erodgan engages in military adventurism throughout the Middle East and in the Mediterranean.
The Kurds – watching the US elections and Russian games
Since the Turkish invasion of Kurdish areas of Syria in early 2019, the Kurds live in a limbo of sorts. After being abandoned once the US, no one knows what President Trump would do if he wins the upcoming elections in November 2020, though it is also difficult to say what he will do if he loses these elections as he will remain in office for months as commander in chief of the US armed forces, presumably maintaining his close relationship with Erdogan, who has no near term limit to his own term in office. In either case, the future is uncertain and presents few promising options for the Syrian Kurds.
It is no secret that once President Trump decided to allow Turkey to invade northern Syria, the Syrian Kurds were forced to consult with the lesser evil and pursue talks with the Syrian regime of Bashar al–Assad and his Russian backers. Since then, several rounds of talks have taken place between the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), the SDF, and Kurdish politicians with both Russia and the regime. The talks have ended in a deadlock because Assad and Russia do not want a recognized Kurdish entity to exist in Syria that is not under the full control of the Syrian regime. For example, Russia demanded that the SDF become a part of the Syrian army, officially known as the Syrian Arab Army (SAA), as a new “Division 5”, and have offered nothing in the way of autonomy or decentralization. On the contrary, according to my information, during one round of talks with the Syrian Kurds in Moscow, the Russians told the Syrian Kurds they have to go back to the pre-2011 era, as if nothing has happened since then. In return, the Kurdish politicians will be granted an “amnesty” regarding any future trials by the Syrian regime. Russia has also been vocal in their rejection of US presence in Syria and US backing of the SDF. Since October, Russia and the Syrian regime have tried on several occasions to break up the SDF by creating issues in the region. On top of all that, Russia has now established itself as an essential ally of Turkey and indeed delivered the Kurds to Turkey without any hesitation in 2018 by opening the airspace above Afrin and allowing the Turkish military to launch an unprompted invasion of the region. The invasion of Afrin by Turkey, which led to an occupation that remains in place today, remains the one of the most tragic events in recent Kurdish history. The weakening of the Kurds has also helped Iran, a long-time ally of the Syrian regime who have committed various atrocities during the Syrian civil war both directly and via proxy militant groups.
Why choose the US over Russia?
Despite the one-man show in the White House, for now, when it comes to fateful decisions about Syria and the Kurds, we have seen other US institutions and the American people stand up for the Syrian Kurds and condemn Turkish military aggression. For example, the outcry by Americans, both liberal and conservative alike, pushed the House of Representatives to pass a bill punishing Turkey for its acts in Syria. The bill was backed by a united front of US lawmakers, with 403 votes in favor versus only 16 against. In addition to almost the entire Department of Defense, tens of national security experts, religious leaders, and former officials, some of whom were strong supporters of President Trump, vocally criticized the Turkish invasion and spoke in support of the Kurds. Those factors led to a reversal of the withdrawal decision and also mitigated some of the US losses in the region.
Within Russia, there is no such democratic framework. For example, in 1998 when Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan was on the run from Turkey, the State Duma (the lower house of the Federal Assembly of Russia) voted 298 votes to none to call on President Yeltsin to give him asylum. However, the Russian Government refused the Duma’s request and Ocalan was forced to flee elsewhere, and was later illegally abducted in Kenya by Turkish forces backed by various international intelligence agencies, and subsequently sentenced to death in Turkey, a sentence later commuted to life in prison. While the Kurds have no history of enmity with Russia, Russia nonetheless left Ocalan to be pursued by Turkey and, decades later, gifted Afrin to Turkey. In light of these historical facts along with Russia’s dealings in Aleppo, it is clear that Russia is not a trustworthy partner.
During the emergence of ISIS, following a strong Kurdish resistance against the well-armed terrorist group, the US helped the Kurds defend their lands. Of course, the US chose this course after failing to find another viable alternative. Nonetheless, mutual interest gave way to mutual respect on the ground, the same as a partnership was built between the Iraqi Kurds and the US over the last few decades. The US helped establish the SDF and provided them with training and weapons, spending billions to develop a formidable force that defeated the so-called “caliphate” of ISIS that once held land in both Syria and Iraq.
Russia, on the other side, did not help the Kurds or contribute with anything to the Kurdish region. Indeed, Russia barely fought ISIS, as ISIS often focused on fighting groups opposed to the Syrian regime.
Kurdish losses are not Russia’s gains
The worst-case scenario is that President Trump repeats his mistake and falls for Erdogan again. In that case, the Kurds of Syria would face another humanitarian disaster. If the US withdraws completely, it is likely that Russia would give Kobani, Qahtania, and other bordering villages and towns to Turkey, though likely not give up major cities, knowing that the ISIS-like jihadists supported by Turkey would take control, as has occurred in Afrin. Russia would most likely demand that Assad regime, backed by Russian forces, take control over the other major cities currently under SDF control such as Deir ez-Zor, Hasakah, and Qamishlo. The self-administration authority (AANES) would be eliminated as a real decision-making body, ending Syria’s first real democratic experiment, and robbing many communities of having any voice in governing themselves. However, such a scenario will also backfire on Russia. The region will see chaos, and Russia would not be willing to deal with it. Russia also does not want more issues in Syria, and are currently experiencing difficulties with Assad himself and with Turkey over Idlib. The majority of the Arab tribes in the region are divided, with some loyal to ISIS, some loyal to the Assad regime, and others working with SDF. Syria’s Christian communities will certainly be in peril if the AANES disappears, and face great danger if their future is in the hands of Turkey and Turkish-backed jihadists. Since the Kurds are the most organized group in Syria by far, Russia would still need to work with the Kurds, even though it would be under conditions very different from those in place now. Additionally, the Kurds, who have sacrificed so much to establish and protect an autonomous area in their ancestral homeland, have made it clear that they would not give up their dream of self-governance and are willing to resist occupation forces, even at great cost.
While Russia is the major power-broker in Syria, the role of Iran cannot be ignored. Iran has weathered an economic crisis for many years, and is surely eying resource rich northern Syria. Iran is a historical ally of the Syrian regime and Iranian militias have been played a major role in Syria since the beginning of the civil war. Russia and Iran are not always on the same page in Syria, and Iran is increasingly desperate to control any source of income to fund terror groups throughout the region and blunt the impact of economic sanctions. Of course, neither the Arab allies of the US nor Israel will accept increased Iranian influence in Syria.
Conclusion
The Kurds have recently experienced serious setbacks in both Iraq and Syria as a consequence of policies by the current administration. The recent Turkish invasion of northern Syria was a consequence of a personal decision taken by President Trump concerning foreign policy, and not one made with any measure of consensus within or across US institutions. Indeed, various American institutions, such as Congress and departments of the US government, along with the voices of the American public, played an important role in minimizing the disaster resulting from the moves made by the President. It is imperative, for the survival of the Kurdish project of autonomy in Syria, that the Kurds maintain their partnership across all levels of the US government, just as it is of paramount importance for US security interests that the Department of Defense and Department of State coordinate with the Kurds of Syria to preserve the nascent institutions established by the Kurds and their allies there which give a voice to the peoples of the region and protect the lives of all, including endangered religious minorities such as Christians and Yazidis. A strengthened bond between the Kurds of Syria and the US will be mutually beneficial, while the US abandonment of the Kurds will only strengthen America’s enemies, at the cost of the closest friends and allies: the Kurds.
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