How do you describe the Turkish-Russian relationship in recent years? since Turkey shot down a Russian jet in 2015?
Russia and Turkey have an extremely complicated relationship. They historically have been enemies and recently were volatile towards each other after Turkey shot down a Russian jet in 2015. However, they are increasingly becoming closer and have been building a strategic relationship. The key components are energy cooperation including the Turkstream pipeline and Akkuyu nuclear power plants. This helps increase the amount of Russian gas in Europe, but also uses Russia as a source of leverage against the United States by showing the prospect that Russia could deliver for Turkey on some of its key strategic interests. Additionally, Turkey sees Russia as a potential partial partner in stopping Kurdish autonomy as well as slowing the flow of refugees from Idlib into Turkey by having Russia leverage Assad into reducing bombing campaigns. Lastly, the tech transfer of Russian S-400s to the Turkish defense sector is a prominent example of growing relations and increased Turkish independence from the West.
“Extremely complicated, for a brief period, very volatile, but now increasingly cozy. I don’t think that there is pure alignment between Turkey and Russia. Of course, historically they have been enemies. Turkey viewed Russia as its greatest strategic threat. The shoot down of Russian jet, which went straight into Turkish airspace back in 2015 that you mentioned seemed like crisis and it seemed like it might provoke a real break. Putin responded with trade sanctions and a pretty harsh line, but I think Erdogan was disappointed in the strength of the UN, the NATO response, and the U S response to that shoot down. He was already, of course, very frustrated with US policy in Syria, and felt that the U S was not sort of delivering for Turkey. Now the US of course saw things very differently. But as a result of that, Erdogan backed down when Putin had this hard line, Erdogan backed down pretty quickly and sought to patch things up with Moscow and sort of resumed building what had been the beginnings of a more strategic relationship with Russia. The key components of that are of course energy cooperation, the Turk stream pipeline, but also the Akkuyu nuclear power plants, which is presently on hold, but you know is a big part of the Turkish energy strategy. And this was all part of Erdogan’s effort to position Turkey as a sort of energy corridor, bringing Russia in and also Azeri gas to Europe to increase Turkey’s own supplies, but also to position it strategically, as particularly after the coup attempt. But, but even before, as Turkish-US relations really declined precipitously. Erdogan also began at first I think using Russia as a source of leverage against the US to try and get better terms out of the US but then beginning to take seriously the prospect that Russia could really deliver for Turkey on some of its key strategic interests.
One has been for some time, their efforts to stop Kurdish autonomy in Syria. They felt that Moscow was certainly not a full partner, but it could be a partial partner on that. Also, in stopping the refugee flow, they’ve sort of desperately tried to get Russia to reign in the Assad regime and to stop its own bombing of civilians in places like Idlib and Aleppo, which have driven millions of refugees into Turkey. Then also in Turkey’s efforts to build their own domestic defense industry and sort of get into the higher tech defense sector. the S-400 is the most prominent example of that, the missile system that Turkey is buying from Russia. But there could be more tech transfer, more purchases down the line. Overall I think Turkey is trying to chart its own independent course and at first was using Russia to play it off against the United States but then as it’s disappointment in the US grew I think began to take this relationship with Moscow more and more seriously. And now Erdogan and Putin are in regular contact and seem to have a pretty good understanding,
But at the same time, Russia and Turkey or Putin and Erdogan also disagree on many issues. For example, in Syria, the dilemma of Idlib continues and Russia also opposed the Turkish invasion of the Kurdish region. In Libya, they back opposing sides of the civil war. would this energy deal of Turkstream gas line overshadow these disagreements? or it is an irrelevant issue and limited to energy trade only?
The issues that Russia and Turkey are divisive on are hugely important, but it does not neatly translate into increased Turkish dependence on Russia. Erdogan views most issues first through the prism of regime security. Most pressing is the refugee crisis flowing from Idlib into Turkey. Turks are angry about the presence of Syrian refugees and want aggressive action by Erdogan to stop refugees from coming into Turkey as well as repatriating Syrians to Syria. Turkey has been happy to sit across the table from Russia and try to resolve their conflicts to the benefit of both countries. Turkstream is going to reshape the energy market in South Eastern Europe for decades, but Erdogan is most concerned with keeping power at home.
”It’s hugely important, but I don’t think it translates neatly into increased Turkish dependence on Russia as is sometimes presented. There are a huge number of very important issues on the table between Turkey and Russia. For Turkey, the most pressing I think is Idlib still. This crisis has been in slow motion for, for several years, but Erdogan views most issues first through the prism of regime security. He’s concerned about holding on to his power at home. The refugee issue domestically in Turkey has become a huge problem for him. There’s deep anger among the Turkish population about the presence of the Syrian refugees. They want the government to take aggressive action to stop further flow and also to repatriate Syrians to Syria. And so the prospect of Idlib where there are 4 million people, half of whom were displaced from other parts of Syria already, and the prospect of perhaps up to a million more refugees coming into Turkey fleeing Russian bombing, Assad bombing is a political time bomb for Erdogan. He is desperately trying to stop these offensives. But he has no ability to confront Russia or the Assad regime directly in military terms. And so what he’s done, I think is put as many different sources of leverage on the table between Putin and Erdogan and try to sort of demonstrate to Russia that they can’t go too far with Turkey. They can’t push Turkey too far because then they’ll lose out on all of these other potential wins from a Russian perspective. So those include a lucrative energy market for Gazprom and for Russian gas. Those include the prospect of peeling Turkey out of the sort of NATO orbit by selling it sophisticated Russian arms and thereby eliciting a strong US response. They also include some of the deal making that Turkey is trying to get involved with in places like Libya where they’re on opposite sides from Russia in this regional cold war over the role of political Islam.
Turkey has been really happy to have to bring Russia in and to sit across the table from them and trying to resolve these conflicts to the benefit of Turkey and Russia. Not necessarily to the, to the people involved in all cases. I think it’s really this, it’s this desperate attempt by Erdogan to head off a very direct threat to his hold on power at home, but that doesn’t sort of diminish the importance of any of these discrete issues on their own. Turk stream at a strategic level is going to be reshaping South Eastern European energy markets for decades. So it’s hugely important. But right now in Erdogan’s mind is mostly revolving around trying to hold on to power at home.”
And where do the United States stance on this deal and should we be concerned about this coziness as you described earlier between Russia and Turkey?
At the first the United States did not initially mind talks of another Russian corridor through Turkey because they had this parallel effort to diversify energy sources to reduce European dependency on Russian energy. However, the US objection came after the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in Donbass. The US saw Turkstream as an effort to cut Ukraine out. The US was slightly split overall, some officials did not mind because Turkey, a NATO ally, would have influence over Russia, while others were very upset as it negatively effects Ukraine. The most important issue is the deal Turkey has with Russian S-400s. It signaled that Russia and Turkey are burgeoning a strategic relationship.
“It’s interesting. The US for many years pushed the Southern energy corridor, which was the idea that Turkey and the US should cooperate to bring basically Caspian energy resources primarily from Azerbaijan through Turkey to Europe. That was to reduce European dependence on Russian energy and then the Ukraine. So they didn’t really mind initially talks of another Russian corridor through Turkey because they had this parallel effort to diversify energy sources. I think the US objection came after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea. The ongoing conflict in the Donbass and the US began to see Turk stream what it was, which was cutting Ukraine out. I think the US government was slightly split. Some US officials didn’t really mind seeing Turkey is still a NATO ally. And seeing that Turkey would also have some influence over Russia because it would be a big market for Russian energy. So they also have some influence there. Part of the government concerned with Ukraine, very, very upset with this Russian effort to cut out Ukraine and Turkey is sort of acquiescence in that effort. I think the real concern with Turkey-Russia energy relations is the way it’s tying in increasingly to this strategic relationship. The S-400, again is the most important issue from a US perspective. The idea that a NATO ally would buy this sophisticated Russian equipment, demonstrates a huge gap in the understanding of the Russian threat. The relationship between Putin and Erdogan personally seems to be very close. And then again, their cooperation in places like Syria and in Libya have led to the feeling among US officials that this is something much more than just kind of business energy business. This is a real burgeoning strategic relationship.”
The Turkish intervention in Libya has created a new alliance between Israel, Greece, Cyprus, and even Egypt. Do you think NATO and the international community should be concerned about this intervention by Turkey and what is the United States’ position?
The US has two government policies right now, which is confusing the world. You have one emanating from the professional bureaucracy of the US government and then another from the White House and President Trump. They are often not the policy and leaves regional actors very confused on the American stance. The result is incoherence from Washington DC and the lack of concentrated US/European de-escalation efforts allow regional actors to throw their weight around in hot spots such as Syria, Yemen, and Libya, usually in part via security or military efforts.
“First, the US stance on many of these issues is deeply confused right now because you really have two US government policies, you have one emanating from the sort of professional bureaucracy of the US government and then you have one coming from the white house and president Trump and they often are not the same policy. So it’s hugely confusing for regional actors, including Turkey, including Egypt, including Russia as where the US stands. In Libya, for example, the US policy has been to support the UN-backed government, the same government that Turkey is intervening to defend. Although for Turkey’s own interest I would argue, but then Trump has sort of made eyes at Khalifa Haftar and seems to have sympathy for his kind of strongman approach and the kind of counter-revolutionary forces that support him, including Saudi Arabia and the Emirates and Sisi in Egypt. So people are confused. They don’t know where the US stands and the result of the tension between the US professional bureaucrats and the White House is incoherence. The US taking a step back because there’s no clear policy. Now in Libya the Europeans are hugely concerned about Libya as a source of instability and migrants and refugees coming into Europe. They see Turkey making this investment in the government of national accord largely as a cynical play to energy rights and to throw a wrench in what, as you said, is this emerging Eastern Mediterranean energy alliance between Egypt, Israel, Cyprus and Greece. So the Europeans are concerned about all of that with Greece and Cyprus being EU members but they really don’t have a lot of leverage. They’re not going to get militarily involved in Libya. And so they’re left to sort of condemn things and try and mediate and they keep looking to the US hoping that the US will take a more active role to temp things down in Libya. And the US is just confused and really taking a step back. So all of these regional actors see the US taking a step back, see the Europeans largely sidelined because of their lack of any sort of hard power and they start throwing their weight around. So you have the Emirates and Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Russia on one side putting mercenaries, putting drones, putting force into this equation. You see the Turks responding along with Qatar. It’s a very volatile situation and it’s not just Libya, it’s similar situation in Syria or Yemen or any of these other hot spots around the region where in the absence of any concerted US and European involvement to deescalate, regional actors are throwing their weight around and usually in part security sort of military terms.”
How much of these recent Erdogan’s foreign policies are based on the domestic issues in Turkey? also, could you elaborate on the recent splinter within the AKP party?
Erdogan’s domestic and foreign policy are almost inextricable. They are tied together, but it translates differently depending on the situation. From 2002 to 2016, there was a consolidation of the Turkish right and it translates into foreign policy by highlighting points of agreement on policy, for example, against Kurdish autonomy and regional ascension of Kurds. Per the Syrian refugee crisis, Erdogan has intervened in Syria to show his ability to take aggressive action and carve out parts of Syria to repatriate refugees. In Libya, Erdogan aims to disrupt the emerging Eastern Mediterranean energy alliance because Turkey has been cut out of it. There is also an ideological layer as Erdogan sympathizes with the Muslim Brotherhood and wants to be the protector of the Ummah to some extent. The recent AKP splinter is due to economic crisis and slowdown as well as the refugees, which has eroded Erdogan’s popularity.
“For Erdogan domestic and foreign policy are almost inextricable, they are completely tied together. Now that translates differently in different situations. From 2002 to 2016 maybe there was a consolidation of the Turkish right, Erdogan bringing smaller right wing parties in, under the AKP, buying off politicians and really uniting the religious conservative base with right wing nationalists. There have been signs in recent years that right-wing cohesion has been breaking down in the face of economic crisis and economic slowdown and the refugees. Both of which, really erode Erdogan’s popularity on the right in Turkey. Part of that has been the emergence of these new parties under [Ahmet] Davutoğlu and soon [Ali] Babajan. They are a threat to Erdogan’s hold on power because they’re not going to beat him single-handedly. But if they break a little piece of the right wing constituency off from Erdogan with the country, so deeply divided that could open the door for the main opposition and the Kurds and this sort of opposition alliance to actually win an election. So that’s his domestic situation. The way that translates into foreign policy in simple terms is Erdgoan highlights the points of agreement among the right wing to try and solidify his hold on it. There are a few things there. One is the very hard line against Kurdish autonomy and the sort of Kurdish ascendance regionally that he really had to take a hard line cause there was a threat to his domestic hold on power, with the rise of the HDP, but also because he needed to placate MHP far-right nationalist voters in Turkey.
The refugee issue. Again Idlib and Aleppo before it are deeply domestic issues for Turkey and huge threats to Erdogan’s popularity and political hold. So I think some of the interventions in Syria are a to stop Kurdish autonomy and Kurdish descendants, but also to be seen at home to take aggressive action to address the refugee crisis and to carve out these areas in which refugees could be resettled. We can get to whether or not that’s realistic, but I think it is driven to a large extent by domestic considerations. Now to Libya, finally, there may be a little bit of an effort to sort of have a nationalist rally around the flag effect to show that Turkey is a great power that are the ones willing to project Turkish power abroad. But I actually think it’s less domestic politics certainly than Syria is.
In Libya, It is this attempt to throw a wrench in what was this Eastern Mediterranean emerging energy Alliance between Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, Greece, all of which are hostile towards Turkey. And Turkey looked at this emerging strategic picture and said, we’re getting cut out of this entirely. And a guy like Erdogan when he sees himself being sidelined from something, his first instinct is to kind of disrupt it, to flip the table over. If I’m not at the table, I’m going to flip it over. So I think that is, you know, to a large extent what’s going on in Libya. Then finally there is also a layer of ideology. I mean Erdogan does a really sympathize with the Muslim brotherhood aligned groups in the region. He also feels as if he should be the protector of the Ummah [Islamic nation] to some extent. So when he sees his brothers as he sees it in danger, there is a desire to do something, even if it’s really not in Turkey’s national interests necessarily.”
Going back to the refugee crisis in Turkey, Erdogan’s invasion of the Kurdish region resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Kurds. Now he’s planning to replace the Kurds with Syrian refugees who are not from there. In other words, he is changing the demographics of the area. Is this plan realistic? Would it be ideal to solve the refugee crisis by creating another issue in Syria?
It is a terrible plan that is illegal and will unlikely work. The people he aims to resettle are not from there and this sort of demographic engineering has historically led to instability and violence down the line. The reality of the situation is that there are 3.7 million refugees in Turkey and a large number of them will remain in Turkey. The Turks have violated all sorts of human rights and Turkey has played the whole of disruptor. Future actions are highly unlikely to bring any stability to Syria. Turkey has dealt with the brunt of the Syrian refugee crisis and is angry that the West has not done more to support them. There is a lot of blame, but Turkey’s approach to the land taken from the SDF is very unlikely to result in long-term stability or peace.
“It’s a terrible plan. In addition to being illegal if there’s any forced resettlement that constitutes refoulement, the violation of UN charters, it’s also unlikely to work in my assessment. I think most experts opinions as you say, the people he wants to resettle in these newly seized areas are not from there. So this sort of demographic engineering historically has led to instability and violence and worse effects down the line. The reality of the situation is there 3.7 million refugees in Turkey. A large number of them, if not majority strong majority are likely to remain in Turkey. That’s a fact of life. It’s hugely politically dicey for Erdogan to acknowledge that. And so some of this may just be political messaging to try and sort of get through the next election by saying we’re going to solve this problem, they’re all going to go back to Syria. But in the past he’s acted on some of this political rhetoric. In Afrin they’ve aggressively resettled people in what were mainly Kurdish areas. They’ve seized property. There’ve been all sorts of human rights abuses. So certainly there is huge risk of that moving forward in the areas that they seized in Northeastern Syria. The other issue here though, Turkey has played a disruptor. It’s acted aggressively. It’s unlikely to bring more stability. It’s likely to result in human rights abuses, but also the international community has really neglected its responsibilities, not just to stop the Turkish incursion and to care for help stabilize these areas that were taken back from ISIS by primarily Kurdish fighters with Arab allies and US backing, but also to help Turkey deal with the refugee crisis.
In short Turkey backed to the rebellion against Assad, but many of the international coalition partners did so as well. Turkey is worn the brunt of the sort of spillover from the Syrian war. And I think reasonably feels that it hasn’t received the support it should have received from the West. And certainly under Trump, the US has completely abdicated its responsibility to help care for refugees, to take more refugees itself, to support UN efforts to care for people. There’s a lot of blame to go around, but certainly Turkey’s approach in these parts of Northeast Syria they’ve taken from the SDF is very unlikely to result in longterm stability or peace.”
Brings me to ask another question about the domestic policies of Turkey. Almost all of the opposition parting parties agreed on the Turkish invasion to Syria, which brings the Kurds in Turkey once again to be between a rock and a hard place. How should they approach Turkish politics in future elections? What’s the solution for the Kurdish parties? Even the opposition is in agreement with Erdogan’s when it comes to the Kurds.
Turkish politics is extremely nationalist, particularly when it comes to the Kurdish issue or anything to do with the Turkish military. The government controls much of the traditional media and the population has a warped sense of reality in Syria. There are ties between the PYD and PKK, but there were no attacks coming from Northeast Syria into Turkey. Despite the PYD largely defeating ISIS and liberating people from the Caliphate, Turkey paints Syrian Kurds as equals to the PKK, and therefore, as terrorists.
“Unfortunately Turkish politics is extremely nationalistic. Especially on the Kurdish issue, especially on anything to do with the Turkish military. When Turkish soldiers are involved, there’s huge pressure as in any country, but particularly in Turkey to sort of rally around the flag. Because the government, the AKP, controls so much of the traditional media there is a pretty warped sense of the reality in Syria. Undoubtedly the PYD [ Kurdish Democratic Union Party] shares the same leftist Kurdish nationalist outlook as the PKK [Kurdsitan Workers’ Party]. Undoubtedly, there are ties, but the reality of the situation in Northeast Syria was there weren’t attacks coming from Northeast Syria into Turkey. These were people from Syria who had taken up arms against ISIS, had taken back these areas, liberated them from the worst terror organization we’ve seen. And we’re trying to build a better life.
But in the Turkish media, it’s all YPG equals PKK equals terrorist. And there’s very little sort of nuance to any understanding, sociological understanding of what’s happening. So the pressure on the opposition parties is huge to just conform. Where that leaves the Kurds? I think the HDP has to hope for a deescalation in Syria that things at least temporarily calm down and that when the next Turkish election does come round, they can repeat in the face of huge repression. And the illegal arrest and detention of many of their leaders repeat their feat of the last whatever it is, four elections, five elections, which is to still organize, to turn out their voters, and to play a role in this opposition Alliance against Erdogan and the AKP and the nationalists. Again, hope that some of these splinter parties on the right weekend Erdogan and that an opposition Alliance can win, can fill that gap and then guide the country back to a more moderate policy vis-a-vis the Kurds.
Perhaps back to the parliamentary system, back to some checks and balances, some rule of law and just reverse this autocratic move that Erdgoan is overseeing. I really think that’s the near term and midterm. This is the only option for the Kurds in Turkey right now. That does for the time being table their hopes for more local autonomy for more control over their affairs. It’s certainly not a fair or a perfect solution. You would hope that as citizens of Turkey, they would be able to exercise their fundamental rights freely. But we’re so far from that reality today that I think sort of incremental steps are needed, at least for the time being.”
Could you talk about the current administration’s role or absence in bringing a Turkey and the Kurds closer? or at minimum, supporting the Turkish opposition against an authoritarian leader?
The Trump administration has abdicated traditional US leadership abroad on many issues. The US has badly mistreated their Syrian Kurdish and Arab allies, the partners on the ground who did most of the fighting and dying against ISIS, and they really owe more to them. The US is severely limited to moderate the Turkish-Kurdish conflict as for the past five- or six-years Turkey and US have many disagreements and there are anti-American sentiments throughout the country. There is total strategic incoherence from the US and the only option I see is to try and hold the line a little bit longer with the Kurds with the SDF and allow them to negotiate with the regime, allowing them to get the best deal they can get with Assad, with US support.
“The Trump administration has abdicated traditional US leadership abroad on a hundred different issues. Now in their defense, the ability for the US to play a role of the role of moderator in the Turkish Kurdish conflict, certainly within Turkey was/is severely limited after really almost five or six years of very strong disagreements between the US and Turkey of this aggressive right wing nationalist anti-American line from all of the government controlled press. Also the coup attempt and the Turkish public’s view that the US is somehow involved, or many Turks view. There’s just no trust in the US there’s huge anti-American feeling in Turkey. I doubt that the US role in supporting the Turkish opposition or trying to mediate between the Turkish government and the Kurds domestically would have anything but a sort of counterproductive effect in the near term. Where that’s not necessarily true is in Syria where the US could have, I think taken a more clear line, not sort of hid behind the counter ISIS campaign entirely, but said, actually, no, we’re here to fight ISIS, but also when we’ve beaten ISIS, we’re going to help the local people in these areas set up their councils and we’re going to support them against the Assad regime in making demands for autonomy. We’re going to hold the Euphrates and we’re going to build something better.
We’re not just going to hand things back over to the regime or the Russians or the Iranians. That would have been a difficult undertaking, would have taken a long time. It might not have worked. Certainly it would have concerned Turkey, but it also I think would have held out the long-term prospect for more of a grand bargain if, Turkey got used to the Kurdistan region in Iraq over time. At first, they went from Barzani went from sort of terrorist to everyone’s best friend over a period of decades. So these transitions take time, but they’re possible, but they require clarity and sustained attention from the US and that’s been totally lacking. Where that leaves us today? I think the US has badly mistreated their Syrian Kurdish and Arab allies, the partners on the ground who did most of the fighting and dying against ISIS and they really owe more to them.
But the only last resort at this point with Trump having sacrificed so much leverage by these now two withdrawal announcements that are subsequently walked back. The total strategic incoherence, the only option I see is to try and hold the line a little bit longer with the Kurds with the SDF and allow them to negotiate with the regime and allow them to get the best deal they can get with Assad, with US support. And that’s horrible to say because Assad it as a monster and a war criminal. But at this point, absent massive long-term US engagement which seems impossible politically, I don’t see a better option on the table. It’s a sad situation, but I think that’s where we are.”