Washington Kurdish Institute
January 21, 2020
It took three months after Syria’s recent invasion for Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to launch a new military intervention into Libya. This time under the pretext of backing the Libyan government that is facing rebels. Erdogan’s ambitions to control Libya’s energy has faced rejection by regional and international powers. At the same time, the relationship between Erdogan and the Russian leader Vladimir Putin is warming up more after the two leaders integrated a dual natural gas line of what is called TurkStream. The recent Turkey-Russia partnership is one of many that has been taking place in recent years including Turkey’s purchase of Russian defense systems and agreements on international issues like Iran and Venezuela. On Syria and Libya, the two sides differ but not to a point that can change their partnership.
After the invasion of a large swath of the Kurdish region of Syria, Erdogan is attempting to resettle Syrian refugees in the Kurdish areas while the Turkish troops continue to have joint patrol with Russian soldiers on the Turkish-Syrian borders.
Domestically, Erdogan continues his authoritarian rhetoric against the Kurds and the Turkish opposition parties thought he is facing a new crisis as many of his former colleagues have left his Justice and Development Party (AKP).
To learn more about these issues and Turkey under Erdogan, the Washington Kurdish Institute (WKI) hosted Max Hoffman, the associate director of National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress (CAP). Hoffman is focusing on Turkey and the Kurdish regions; U.S. defense policy; and the intersection of climate change, human migration, and security concerns. He has received his M.A. in history from the University of Edinburgh in Scotland.
Brief of the interview:
On the Russian-Turkish relationship
“Russia and Turkey have an extremely complicated relationship. They historically have been enemies and recently were volatile towards each other after Turkey shot down a Russian jet in 2015. However, they are increasingly becoming closer and have been building a strategic relationship. The key components are energy cooperation including the Turkstream pipeline and Akkuyu nuclear power plants. This helps increase the amount of Russian gas in Europe, but also uses Russia as a source of leverage against the United States by showing the prospect that Russia could deliver for Turkey on some of its key strategic interests. Additionally, Turkey sees Russia as a potential partial partner in stopping Kurdish autonomy as well as slowing the flow of refugees from Idlib into Turkey by having Russia leverage Assad into reducing bombing campaigns. Lastly, the tech transfer of Russian S-400s to the Turkish defense sector is a prominent example of growing relations and increased Turkish independence from the West.”
Turkey-Russia Disagreements
“The issues that Russia and Turkey are divisive on are hugely important, but it does not neatly translate into increased Turkish dependence on Russia. Erdogan views most issues first through the prism of regime security. Most pressing is the refugee crisis flowing from Idlib into Turkey. Turks are angry about the presence of Syrian refugees and want aggressive action by Erdogan to stop refugees from coming into Turkey as well as repatriating Syrians to Syria. Turkey has been happy to sit across the table from Russia and try to resolve their conflicts to the benefit of both countries. Turkstream is going to reshape the energy market in South Eastern Europe for decades, but Erdogan is most concerned with keeping power at home.”
The US stance on the energy deal between Russia and Turkey
“At the first the United States did not initially mind talks of another Russian corridor through Turkey because they had this parallel effort to diversify energy sources to reduce European dependency on Russian energy. However, the US objection came after the annexation of Crimea and the ongoing conflict in Donbass. The US saw Turkstream as an effort to cut Ukraine out. The US was slightly split overall, some officials did not mind because Turkey, a NATO ally, would have influence over Russia, while others were very upset as it negatively effects Ukraine. The most important issue is the deal Turkey has with Russian S-400s. It signaled that Russia and Turkey are burgeoning a strategic relationship.”
Turkey’s intervention to Libya and the US position
“The US has two government policies right now, which is confusing the world. You have one emanating from the professional bureaucracy of the US government and then another from the White House and President Trump. They are often not the policy and leaves regional actors very confused on the American stance. The result is incoherence from Washington DC and the lack of concentrated US/European de-escalation efforts allow regional actors to throw their weight around in hot spots such as Syria, Yemen, and Libya, usually in part via security or military efforts.”
Erdogan’s foreign policies are based on the domestic issues in Turkey
“Erdogan’s domestic and foreign policy are almost inextricable. They are tied together, but it translates differently depending on the situation. From 2002 to 2016, there was a consolidation of the Turkish right and it translates into foreign policy by highlighting points of agreement on policy, for example, against Kurdish autonomy and regional ascension of Kurds. Per the Syrian refugee crisis, Erdogan has intervened in Syria to show his ability to take aggressive action and carve out parts of Syria to repatriate refugees. In Libya, Erdogan aims to disrupt the emerging Eastern Mediterranean energy alliance because Turkey has been cut out of it. There is also an ideological layer as Erdogan sympathizes with the Muslim Brotherhood and wants to be the protector of the Ummah to some extent. The recent AKP splinter is due to economic crisis and slowdown as well as the refugees, which has eroded Erdogan’s popularity. ”
Erdogan’s plans to resettle Syrian refuges in the Kurdish region
“It is a terrible plan that is illegal and will unlikely work. The people he aims to resettle are not from there and this sort of demographic engineering has historically led to instability and violence down the line. The reality of the situation is that there are 3.7 million refugees in Turkey and a large number of them will remain in Turkey. The Turks have violated all sorts of human rights and Turkey has played the whole of disruptor. Future actions are highly unlikely to bring any stability to Syria. Turkey has dealt with the brunt of the Syrian refugee crisis and is angry that the West has not done more to support them. There is a lot of blame, but Turkey’s approach to the land taken from the SDF is very unlikely to result in long-term stability or peace.”
Domestic policies of Turkey and the Kurds
“Turkish politics is extremely nationalist, particularly when it comes to the Kurdish issue or anything to do with the Turkish military. The government controls much of the traditional media and the population has a warped sense of reality in Syria. There are ties between the PYD and PKK, but there were no attacks coming from Northeast Syria into Turkey. Despite the PYD largely defeating ISIS and liberating people from the Caliphate, Turkey paints Syrian Kurds as equals to the PKK, and therefore, as terrorists. ”
The role of the current administration between Turkey and the Kurds
“The Trump administration has abdicated traditional US leadership abroad on many issues. The US has badly mistreated their Syrian Kurdish and Arab allies, the partners on the ground who did most of the fighting and dying against ISIS, and they really owe more to them. The US is severely limited to moderate the Turkish-Kurdish conflict as for the past five- or six-years Turkey and US have many disagreements and there are anti-American sentiments throughout the country. There is total strategic incoherence from the US and the only option I see is to try and hold the line a little bit longer with the Kurds with the SDF and allow them to negotiate with the regime, allowing them to get the best deal they can get with Assad, with US support.”