Washington Kurdish Institute
By: Bill Rice & Yousif Ismael January 14, 2020
After intense statements from both Iran and the United States in the aftermath of the assassination of Iranian General Qasim Soleimani, Iran eventually responded by firing more than a dozen ballistic missiles against two U.S. military bases in Iraq, sites that hosted a number of Iraqi forces. As evidenced by the absence of American casualties, the missile attacks were more a symbolic, face-saving show of force by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who was very close to Soleimani. The Trump administration seemed to recognize these attacks as such as the President’s reaction was relatively measured and calm, with no further violent responses. In addition, Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif released a statement further demonstrating an intent for de-escalation, saying “Iran took & concluded proportionate measures in self-defense; Zarif added that “[w]e do not seek escalation or war, but will defend ourselves against any aggression.” In the midst of this it is noteworthy to recognize that an Iranian-backed militia leader in Iraq, Qais al-Khazali, still threatened to retaliate for the death of Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who was killed along with Soleimani.
While there appears to be calm in the short term, this is most likely the calm before a slow-moving storm. Unlike the U.S., the Iranian government, as has been the nature of its brutal regime, has retained long-term aims and clear plans for more than four decades. Iran has been building and funding armed militias in Iraq ever since the U.S. invasion of that country in 2003. Their goal and vision in this is clear: to do whatever they are able to stop U.S. projects from working in Iraq and to eventually drive the U.S. forces out of the country. As a part of this, Iran has been hindering the blossoming of a successful Iraqi democratic government for years, especially for fear that such a “democratization project” may spill over into Iran itself. The flames of this regional conflict date back even further as there has been long-standing animosity between the Iranian regime and the United States since theocracy’s establishment in 1979.
Iraq: Stuck Between America and Iran
It is no secret that Iraq has been suffering from Iranian intervention for many years now. In fact, Iran had a leading role in the establishment of every Iraqi government since 2003, and more visibly so after Iraq’s constitution was written in 2005. For example, no prime minister of Iraq has been appointed without Iran’s blessing, including the current Prime Minister Adel Abdul-Mahdi. These Iranian-influenced Iraqi governments have not only helped shape the foreign policies of the region but also have taken advantage of the financial benefits of Iraq’s wealth. Iran has been able to blatantly break the U.S. sanctions against it primarily through utilization of Iraq and the Iraqi government, with Turkey’s assistance coming in second. Iran has also wielded a huge amount of influence militarily in Iraq, having built up proxies that became so powerful that they were even able to obtain support from Iraqi Shia rivals simultaneously. For example, Iran supported both Muqtada al-Sadr and his rival Qais al-Khazali; they supported both the Badr Organization as well as its rival Hezbollah. One could argue that garnering such support isn’t that surprising as these are all radical Shia entities — while that may be true, the rivalry and animosity that exists between such groups is dramatic.
Iran has pursued a similar strategy among Iraqi political parties, for instance both supporting former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his rival political party the Islamic Supreme Council, then-headed by Ammar al-Hakim. Prior to large numbers of the Iraqi population getting fed up with Iranian influence in Iraq, the far majority of the Shia population at the time supported political parties with strong ties to Iran — over that of parties more closely tied with the U.S. or other regional powers. Much of this was a reaction against years of Sunni-led government and Sunni persecution against Shiites for generations. Thus post-Saddam Iraq in 2003 was a new and long-awaited beginning for the Shiites of Iraq.
However, this all changed dramatically after the dominant Shia parties failed to deliver basic services and security throughout the country. Such results aren’t much of a surprise as Iran never primarily sought a well-functioning, democratically-responsive Iraqi government in the first place. This has led to a new movement of people in Iraq, especially among young Shiites. The majority of the people are now asking for change, with a new generation of Shiites no longer accepting the current system or the rule of the political elites. The U.S. role in Iraqi politics and society has not been as strategic or extensive, although the U.S. has provided immense military aid (hundreds of billions of dollars) and conducted security operations throughout the country since overthrowing the Baathist regime 2003. U.S. presence in Iraq received either animosity or apathy from the majority of Iraq’s political parties during this time, with the exception of the Kurdish-led political parties. While the Shia parties mostly spurned the U.S. and grew closer to Iran, a large portion of Sunni Arab society in Iraq was actively engaged in military conflict and insurgency against U.S. forces and presence for most of this time. It wasn’t until the rise and defeat of ISIS and the experience of an aggressively Shia sectarian Iraqi government that relations between the Sunni Arab population in Iraq and the U.S. has evolved.
Today Iraqis views have changed from this prior time period. From animosity towards the U.S. more Sunni and some Shia now view the U.S. as a necessary guarantee of stability in their country. While others merely fear the potential turn of U.S. policy towards sanctions and animosity towards Iraq. Many Shia now view Iran as a destabilizing influence that will only bring more crises to Iraq. At the same time, there remain Iraqis, Shia and Sunni, who stand opposed to both, calling on these two powers to leave Iraq alone. Needless to say Iraqi politics has grown even more complex, with a variety of viewpoints. However, one trend is clear: negative views towards Iranian influence and the Iraqi political establishment have grown significantly.
Soleimani and the Kurds
Soleimani and Iran also played an active role in the Kurdish region of Iraq. Like Soleimani’s strategies towards other groups, his focus towards the Kurds remained one of divide and conquer. This is a complicated relationship, however, as Iran has provided support to the Kurds of Iraq in certain ways. For example, when ISIS was on the verge of moving towards Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, US, Turkey, and the European nations refused to immediately intervene. While the U.S. preferred that Erbil not fall to ISIS, bureaucratic limitations and domestic concerns stood in the way of the U.S. and its allies quickly forming a coalition to act. Iran, on the other hand, was quick to take the fight to ISIS the Sunni Takfiri extremist group quickly began gaining territory in Iraq.
But while Iran did help the Kurds in the fight against ISIS, at the same time the theocratic regime did what it could to contain and stifle Kurdish power and influence. For, it was also Iran and Soleimani who engineered a war against the Kurds in October 2017 to take away territory and power from the Kurds of Iraq. These actions came about as a result of Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence referendum, which Iran strongly opposed. Soleimani, under direct orders from Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, rallied Iraqi forces and militias to push Kurdish forces from the disputed city of Kirkuk as well as from other disputed territories in the country. During this conflict, the U.S. stood on the sidelines, in effect giving clearance to the Iranian proxy incursion against Kurdish forces — even despite reports of war crimes being committed by these forces against the Kurdish population, many of whom were displaced. Since this time the disputed territories in Iraq have witnessed an increase in ISIS attacks and activities, with martial law having been imposed on the local population. This has had implications for U.S. interests in the region as well; for instance, there was a recent attack against Kirkuk’s K1 base that resulted in the death of an American and the injury of several service members.
Soleimani’s actions against the Kurds, crushing any attempt at gaining political power or self-determination, are merely a continuation of a longstanding policy of the Iranian government against the Kurdish people in the region at large. For instance, in 1946 the Kurds attempt at declaring and administering an independent state (the Republic of Mahabad) was eventually put down by the Iranian government. Each time Kurds pursued self-determination or independence, the Iranian government has been active in preventing such aims from being achieved. Again in 1975, the Algiers Agreement between Iran and Iraq resulted in a push to end the Kurdish revolution and independence movements in Iraq.
So the Kurds in Iraq are now stuck between Iran, with whom it has a blood history and continuing confrontational relationship, and the United States, who has been the Kurds’ partner in the region since 1991 but recently has become a reliable and inconsistent ally.
The Way Ahead: What are the Kurds Options in Iraq?
Kurds cannot afford to lose their partnership with the U.S., even despite America’s recent failed and unreliable policies towards them. The same can be said for the U.S. regarding its relationship with the Kurds: it’s in America’s essential interests to support and grow its relationship with the Kurds. At the same time, Iran remains attached to the Kurds geographically and politically in many ways. Therefore the Kurds choosing a potentially unreliable partnership with the U.S. may be a gamble. And the Kurds calling for a de-escalation between the U.S. and Iran in the region does not come about because of any love for the Iranian regime, but mostly out of fear of an escalation of violence wherein they would be caught in the middle, with an unclear view of how supportive or protective the U.S. would be towards them.
Recently some commentators have suggested that U.S. troops should simply pull out of the rest of Iraq and move to the autonomous Kurdistan region since it’s safer and more pro-American. Yet this view is ill-advised. Sure the Kurdistan region is safer than the rest of Iraq (often times called “the Other Iraq”), but that has not prevented Iranian attacks against U.S. facilities in Erbil nor in other Iranian actions and influence in the Kurdistan region. This attack itself was a veiled message to the Kurds: “do not choose the side of the U.S.”
In addition, the U.S. “One Iraq” policy is still alive as well as it was in 2003. This policy stands strongly against Kurdish independence and in favor of Kurdish enmeshment within a larger Iraqi national identity and political entity. Yet if the U.S. wants to move all its Iraq-based forces into the Kurdistan region, then why shouldn’t Kurdistan demand its independence from Iraq at this point? The U.S. is already recognizing the area as a separate polity from the rest of Iraq. While the rest of Iraq may be against U.S. presence in the region the Kurdistan region welcomes U.S. forces.
Another option, one that was recently expressed by President Trump, would be for a larger role for NATO in the region. NATO could serve as the stability guarantee for Iraq and reliable ally to the Kurds in substitution for the U.S. It could also serve to stave off any harmful Iranian presence and expansion in the country. For example, if NATO agrees to replace the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, this may serve as an effective compromise position for Iraqi officials: they can stave off Iranian influence in their country while at the same time meeting calls against American military presence in the region. NATO’s mission in this case would be the same as what the U.S.-led coalition’s is currently: to fight off the remaining ISIS forces. This will be beneficial to European powers as well as a way to ensure their national security, regional interests, and help prevent creating conditions for a larger refugee crisis across the region. A major issue with such an agreement, however, would be Turkey’s membership in NATO. A further Turkish presence in Iraq would be controversial and problematic for the Kurdish population of Iraq. Yet this all may still be manageable with U.S. and European presence and mediation.
Whatever way forward, however, the Kurdistan region’s leadership must prepare and plan a strategic, long-term policy, with concrete goals in anticipation of potential U.S. and Western countries’ absence from Iraq. Without such planning the Kurds in Iraq would be left with no agreement or understanding with Iraq if the U.S. leaves the country. As such they will very likely end up being the losers in all this, as evidenced by Iran’s and its Iraqi allies’ actions in October 2017. That is, Iran and its Iraqi partners still seem focused on expanding Shia dominance in Iraq while clamping down on any Kurdish aspirations for further self-determination, autonomy, or independence.
Disclaimer: The views, opinions, and positions expressed by authors and contributors do not necessary reflect those of the WKI.