Washington Kurdish Institute
By: Yousif Ismael & Bill Rice
In many ways the post-Saddam central government of Iraq, since its inception in 2003, has been following some of the same policies of that brutal regime, resulting in a continual perpetuation and escalation of a number of the major socio-political issues facing the country. Most notably among these policies is the continual oppression and discrimination against Iraq’s Kurdish population, which has suffered historical tragedies of epic proportions.
After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial rule, the Kurds chose to return to Baghdad and help build a new, democratic Iraqi state. The Kurds chose this option even in light of some seven decades of war and domestic oppression. Certainly the Kurds may have faced limited choices immediately after the fall of the Hussein regime, with the prospect of declaring and sustaining independence unlikely. Yet at the same time, the Kurds were the most vital element in the establishment of this “new Iraq” — especially in the absence of the Iraqi Sunni parties and population in political participation coupled with the need to establish legitimacy in the newly-formed Shia dominant central government immediately after the fall of Hussein; this also all occurred during a time where the United States desperately wanted to show the world the “democratization” of the new Iraq, which would include all ethnicities, religions, and sectors of society.
Yet the U.S.’s attempted “One Iraq” policy has been a failure in respects to true democratization or sincere respect for human rights. Since its inception in 2003, this policy has led to an implicit alliance between the United States and the major non-Kurdish Iraqi political powers to stifle Kurdish rights in the country, in many cases resulting in policies that have caused death and persecution for many Kurds in Iraq.
Perhaps the most blatant recent example of this reality is the aftermath of the Kurdistan region’s holding of an independence referendum on September 25, 2017. After this referendum, U.S. policymakers gave the Iraqi military, the Iranian government, and Iranian government proxy militias the green light to attack the Kurdistan region, as tens of Peshmerga forces were killed and thousands of civilians were displaced.
In the early stages of the post-Saddam Iraq, it appeared that the various political factions in Iraq agreed to resolve the issue of disputed areas of control between the Kurdistan region and the Iraqi central government. Many of these areas had suffered massacres, forced demographic changes, and mass displacements of Kurds and other ethnic and religious minority groups from their ancient homelands. Some of these areas were rich in oil, like Kirkuk; other areas had unique history and minority populations, like that of the Yazidi people in Shingal or the Shia Kurds of Khanaqin.
Article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution requires the Iraqi central government to completely “normaliz[e] and [conduct a] census” in “Kirkuk and other disputed territories.” In addition, this provision requires a referendum to be held in these areas in order “to determine the will of their citizens,” regarding issues of administration by the central government, the Kurdistan Region, and some form of self-rule autonomy.
And yet 14 years later the Iraqi ruling parties have yet to move an iota towards fulfilling this explicit constitutional duty. In fact, they appear to have done the opposite, further complicating these areas and stifling any form of democratization or self-rule.
Today a place like Kirkuk is suffering security, political, and economic instability due to 14 years delaying implementation of Article 140, and continuing to allow these outstanding issues to fester.
Since 2005, the Iraqi government has failed to provide one of the basic duties of all governments: the duty of security for its people. The Iraqi central government has discriminated against Kikurk and prevented the area from receiving proper security support — specifically denying the provisioning of adequate equipment and the proper staffing and hiring of competent security forces. For example, after police officers in Kirkuk were killed and wounded, the Iraqi Minister of Interior often failed to replace these officers with new staff. This issue continues today as these local police forces are facing an increase of terrorist attacks.
On the political side, the central government has failed to address or solve the political issues facing Kirkuk, including failing to properly compensate Kurds who lost property (land, homes, and businesses) during the Saddam regime’s Arabization campaigns. Instead, the central government simply began to reinstitute some form of these prior Arabization campaigns. For instance, the government encouraged Sunni Arab populations that fled their homelands because of terrorism from ISIS and similiar jihadist gorups and/or persecution from sectarian militias (like the Hashd al-Shaabi) to resettle in Kirkuk and other disputed territories. Such governmental orchestrated demographic change purposefully dilutes the political power of Kurds and other long-standing local minority groups in these lands. And these policies have only deepened the ethinc and religious tensions in the region.
Certainly these two aforementioned issues contributed greatly to a lack of economic prosperity in Kirkuk and the disputed territories. Yet there are even more reasons for these regions’ lack of economic success. Baghdad has failed to deliver Kirkuk’s proper allocated federal funding since 2005. While in 2011 Kirkuk did see a temporary allocation of these funds, Baghdad stopped sending this money after two years.
The government also purposefully neglected the economic potential of these areas. While most southern Shia populated provinces saw government-supported developments in their energy sectors (like the establishment of refineries), Kirkuk and other disputed territories that are rich in oil and natural resources were excluded from any such governmentally-supported economic development projects.
US policies toward the disputed territories
Although the U.S. “One Iraq” recognized the rights of Kurds on paper, the reality has been very different. The U.S. has had many opportunities to pressure Baghdad from 2005-2011 to overcome its disputes with the Kurds. But no real action on this front has been taken: only mere toothless lip service arises from time to time. For example, in December 2009, the White House released a statement saying: “The United States reiterates its strong support for the Iraqi people and their elected government, and reaffirms its respect for the Iraqi constitution, including Article 140, which addresses the dispute over Kirkuk and other disputed internal borders.” Yet nothing came of this statement — it did not translate into any action.
When Iraqi forces and Iranian-backed militias attacked Kirkuk on October 16, 2017 (many of them with US-made weapons), the U.S. administration did nothing, and stood by as the Kurds were left in shambles. Certainly there are legitimate arguments to be made over whether the timing of the referendum for the Kurdistan region was “right” or not, but this line of argument usually ignores mentioning the unjustified war crimes that were committed against the Kurds as a result of going through with this referendum. Assessing the political utility of referendum in the face of grave human rights violations and mass displacement seems to be missing the point: the efficacy of the former in no way justifies the latter.
A new Iraqi government with the same old story
The strategy of “divide and conquer” was readily utilized by the late dictator Saddam Hussein — his regime used it in Kirkuk and other areas in order to create and exacerbate ethnic and sectarian tensions. And, sadly, there are many examples of how the post-2005 Federal government of Iraq has followed down a similar path. For example, the Saddam regime forcibly replaced the Kurdish people of Kirkuk with non-indigenous Shia Arabs. The Saddam regime granted these Shia Arabs free land and a certain amount of cash assistance to help them start a new life in Kirkuk. While prior to this Arabization campaign there were little issues between Kurds and Shia Arabs, this forced demographic change policy created huge sectarian tensions between the two groups.
Instead of attempting to rectify this wrong and normalize the situation, the post-Saddam government of Iraq, one dominated by major Shia political parties, decided not to undertake any action to normalize these regions or facilitate the return of displaced Kurds and other ethnic and religious minorities to Kirkuk and the disputed territories. Instead the government, especially the sectarian Shia militias, followed a similar policy agenda to that of the Saddam regime, but this time with Sunni Arabs. The government allowed and encouraged Sunni Arabs to leave their homelands (formerly ISIS occupied territory) and resettle in the Kurdish region.
And these egregious policies towards Kirkuk and the disputed territories since 2005 have not been exclusive to one political party. All major parties have engaged in it, including Sunni Islamic parties with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. In the aftermath of the Kurdistan Independence Referendum, the Sunni Islamic and Nationalist political parties had essentially the same stance, if not worse, as the Shia parties loyal to Iran. Since most of the Sunni parties did not have militias, they stuck to statements and blessings of the military operations against the Kurdish population.
In addition, the leadership of the Kurdistan region is also to blame in all this, most notably for not putting enough pressure on Baghdad in order to implement change, fulfill Article 140, and normalize and allow for more democracy in Kirkuk and the disputed territories.
Going forward
There are a few options for moving forward in Kirkuk and the other disputed territories:
- Option 1: Implement Article 140 and allow the people of these disputed territories to vote. This will most likely result in Kirkuk joining the Kurdistan Region.
- Option 2: Allow Kirkuk and the disputed territories to remain under Baghdad’s administration. Under this framework, no oil share revenue will be provided, Arabization will most likely continue, locals will continue to be hampered in seeking employment as hiring in government jobs is done primarily on a sectarian bassi, and Kirkuk and the disputed territories would continue to be deprived of their proper share of Iraq’s federal budget and constitutional rights.
- Option 3: Support Kirkuk’s status as an independent and/or autonomous region for a temporary amount of time before normalization can take place. Later the people will decide the area’s fate by holding a referendum on deciding whether to join the Kurdistan region or fall under Baghdad’s control or remain to be an independent, autonomous political entity.
These are some long-term actions. Regardless of where Kirkuk and the disputed territories end up in the long-term, there are some short-term priorities that need to be addressed in these areas, especially in Kirkuk:
- End the martial law imposed by Baghdad since October 16, 2017
- Return security administration of the area to local police
- Refocus the Iraqi military (and even Shia militias) that are active in Kirkuk towards fighting and preventing the reemergence of ISIS in neighboring areas, especially Hawija District.
- Remove military influence in Kirkuk, specifically in civilian life and affairs.
- Reinstate the pre-2014 security arrangement, where Peshmerga forces were stationed north of the city.
- Hold provincial elections in Kirkuk free of security forces interference. These elections should be held in coordination with the Iraqi central government, the Kurdistan Regional Government, and the United Nations.
Whether in the long-term or short-term, one thing is clear: the current path, the status quo is unsustainable. Iraq, the Kurdistan Region, and Kirkuk and the disputed territories require a policy change in order to avert all out disaster. And steps need to be taken as soon as possible to do so.
Disclaimer: The views, opinions, and positions expressed by authors and contributors do not necessary reflect those of the WKI.