Washington Kurdish Institute
By: Kevin T. Mason December 17, 2018
On 12 December at the Turkish Defense Industry Summit in Ankara, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced plans to invade territory in the north of Syria governed by the Self-Administration of North and East Syria (SANES). Despite SANES administered territories being locally governed, and arguably the most stable and secure in all of Syria, Erdogan said, “We are determined to turn the east of the Euphrates into a peaceful and livable place for its true owners just like the other areas we have made secure in Syria.”
The other areas Turkey has made “secure” being Afrin and the Azaz – Al-Bab – Jarabulus Euphrates Shield triangle. Both areas are replete with theft, kidnapping, extortion, and violence against women. Any activist reporting corruption and human rights abuses and any Kurd, Yezidi, or Christian is subjected to harassment, arbitrary detention, and forced displacement. The Turkish occupation of Afrin, once the safest region in all of Syria and host to tens of thousands of internally displaced people, has only exacerbated regional instability. The areas under Turkish control and influence are not models worth replicating, in SANES administered territory or elsewhere.
Nearly 1,000 km from Erdogan’s sabre rattling, the men and women of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are risking their lives – 481 having given them, so far – to clear the final ISIS pocket east of the Euphrates River in and around the town of Hajin. The operation to clear the Hajin pocket began in earnest in mid-September but was halted in late-October due to Turkish cross-border shelling before the renewal of the offensive in early-November.
The fighting to clear ISIS’s last significant holdout has been bloody. Besieged and with nowhere left to retreat, the estimated 2,000 ISIS fighters in the Hajin pocket are making a last stand. Sandstorms and periods of thick fog have led to ISIS counterattacks, the worst of which occurred on 24 November. This particular counterattack resulted in ISIS temporarily retaking the town of Gharanij, killing dozens of SDF fighters, and taking at least 30 prisoners, one of which was beheaded. According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, in addition to the 481 SDF fighters killed in action, ISIS has lost 827 fighters and 308 civilians have been killed.
A Turkish-led invasion of North Syria would give these desperate ISIS fighters a reprieve and put at risk the progress the SDF and Coalition partners have made. Most of the SDF units likely to leave the Hajin front in order to counter a Turkish attack will be from the YPG and the YPJ, the People’s Protection Units and Women’s Protection Units respectively, both of which have been referred to by Erdogan as “Kurdish terrorists”. This will effectively halt the push to clear the final ISIS pocket.
In the inevitable chaos that will accompany a Turkish invasion and with a weakened frontline, it is likely that ISIS fighters hunkered down in a desperate last stand will attempt to flee. In such a situation, it is unavoidable some will escape.
This is not just a threat to the people of North Syria or the US, French, and British military personnel in the region but to any country targeted by ISIS. Since the isolation of the Hajin pocket over a year ago, dozens of international fighters have been apprehended trying to escape across the border with Turkey. If the region is thrown into chaos by a Turkish invasion, it will be easier for the international ISIS fighters still in the pocket to escape encirclement and make their way to Europe, the United States, and elsewhere.
The danger of ISIS fighters making their way back home isn’t restricted to those viciously defending the Hajin pocket. There are over 1,500 internationals – 900 men and 600 women – suspected of ISIS membership being detained in three camps in North Syria. They, too, could take advantage of a distracted SDF already stretched thin by years of conflict. In what would be a major crisis for the SDF, the reallocation of forces to confront a Turkish invasion would provide ample opportunity for these prisoners to attempt escape. There is even the possibility that suspected ISIS sleeper cells in North Syria might attempt to break them out. Such a scenario is hardly farfetched. On 13 December 2018, twenty-one prisoners, most of them members of IS, broke out of Sosa Prison in Iraq.
The US has repeatedly attempted to balance its relationship with its NATO ally, Turkey, and local partner force, the SDF. However, the ultimate goals of the US align more closely with those of the SDF, despite bending over backwards for Ankara. Recent events have forced the US to do slightly less bending. After the operation to clear the Hajin pocket was stalled in October due to Turkish cross-border shelling, the US, against Ankara’s wishes, constructed a series of observation posts along the shared Turkey-SANES border in an attempt to ease tensions (or at the least to prevent further Turkish shelling) and continue the Hajin operation.
In response to Erdogan’s 12 December statement of a coming cross-border operation, Department of Defense Spokesman, Commander Sean Robertson, told CNN, “Unilateral military action into northeast Syria by any party, particularly as US personnel may be present or in the vicinity, is of grave concern. We would find any such actions unacceptable.”
The US presence and the Pentagon’s sharp rebuke of Turkish plans may stymy Ankara for the moment, but Erdogan has made the Turkish position clear: Turkey views a multi-religious, multi-ethnic, self-governing democratic movement a greater national security threat than the Islamic State. The construction of a towering wall along the entire 500 km Turkish-SANES border – only put in place after the area was liberated from ISIS – is a manifestation of this position.
Rather than balancing its relationships with Turkey and the SDF, the US should work towards normalizing relations between Turkey and the SDF. It can do this by acknowledging its relationship with the SDF and SANES as long-term and strategic, rather than temporary and tactical.
Preventing the re-emergence of ISIS requires more than just regional security and stability. In the short-term, security and stability will suffice. However, without repairing the long-standing and deeply-rooted social animosities that led to the current situation, old grievances are sure to resurface. Only through a system of governance that fosters cooperation between, and inclusion of, all ethnic, religious, and gender elements of society can long-term security, stability, and prosperity be achieved.
Turkey has demonstrated an inability to achieve even short-term stability in the areas under its control. Allowing a Turkish invasion of North Syria would destabilize a large swathe of stable Syria – creating a new wave of hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs – give breathing room and an opportunity to escape to the last ISIS holdouts, and unnecessarily endanger the lives of countless civilians.
Rather than attempting to balance its relationships with Turkey and the SDF/SANES, the US should work toward normalizing relations between its two allies. So long as Turkey believes the relationship between the US and the SDF is temporary, they will persist in their attempts to force the US to pick between them. Throughout US and Turkish engagement in Syria, Turkey has responded to US political concessions as an opportunity to press for more. Given the current state of Turkish diplomatic discourse, the US might be unable to assuage Turkey’s fears regarding the SDF. Should Turkey continue escalating the matter, the US must communicate to Turkey, in no uncertain terms, that they will protect the SDF with lethal force if necessary. If Turkey were less certain that the US will eventually side with them in a conflict with the SDF, they may de-escalate tensions and adapt to the new reality.
UPDATE: After the completion of this article and before publication, the US reportedly informed the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SMDK) and the Free Syrian Army that, “Any participation by the Syrian National Coalition or the Free Syrian Army in any way is an attack on the United States and the Coalition Forces, and it will lead to direct confrontation with Coalition Forces and the United States of America. That will fully destroy the relations between the United States and the Syrian National Coalition and the Free Syrian Army.”
Similarly, Federica Mogherini, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, expressed concern over “the statements of a possible Turkish military operation in northeast Syria”. In the released statement, Mogherini said, “We expect the Turkish authorities, therefore, to refrain from any unilateral action likely to undermine the efforts of the Counter-[ISIS] Coalition or to risk further instability in Syria.”
Although overdue, the move by the US to clearly state their support for the SDF and SANES is an important step in easing tensions in North Syria. Sufficiently deterred (hopefully), the US’s next step should be attempts at rapprochement between Ankara and SANES.
If successful, talks between Ankara and the SDF/SANES can provide an opening for renewed peace talks between Ankara and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the predominantly Kurdish political and militant organization which has fought an armed conflict with the Turkish state since 1984. Originally in pursuit of a Kurdish state, the focus of the PKK in that fight has evolved to aim for equality under the law and local autonomy within the Turkish state. There would remain the risk that Turkey uses rapprochement with the SDF/SANES as a cover for its continuous campaigns to criminalize Kurdish culture (much in the same way it uses its relationship with the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq). However, this is a risk worth taking, as it would do little to exacerbate an already catastrophic situation in Southeast Turkey but has the potential to restart the peace process.
Sadly, I have my doubts about the US’ ability to get Ankara back to the negotiating table, in no small part because I doubt Ankara’s willingness to sit at one.
Mr. Mason is a member of the Representation Office of the Democratic Federation of North Syria in Benelux. The office can be reached at ext.relations@rojavabenelux.nl.
Disclaimer: The views, opinions, and positions expressed by authors and contributors do not necessary reflect those of the WKI.