Kurds’ next coalition partner will be the next Iraqi government
Washington Kurdish Institute
August 28, 2018
Since the US invasion in 2003 until its withdrawal in 2011, Iran’s goals in Iraq have been relatively consistent: keep Iraq from developing into the regional rival it had been during the 8 year-long Iran-Iraq war, but not so unstable as to cause any violent or chaotic spillover across the border into Iran. Ideally, Iraq would be an Iranian ally, or rather a subordinate partner to Iran in its machinations throughout the wider region. The tactics used to achieve this end varied with the changing situation.
During the invasion of Iraq by U.S.-led coalition forces in 2003, Iran’s military forces were vigilant, but not active. While the Iranian regime did encourage Iraqi dissidents in Iran and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq’s (SCIRI) Badr Brigades to return to Iraq, Iran advised them to keep a low profile for the time being and not to antagonize the Americans. However, Iran did send its intelligence agents throughout Iraq.
The presence of U.S. troops in Iraq was a roadblock to that plan. So Iran remained still and quiet, not wanting to provoke a military invasion of its own country, while still employing intelligence agents throughout Iraq.
For the first two years, Iran was not an active problem in Iraq, but by the end of 2006, the Iranian intelligence in Iraq had effectively infiltrated Iraqi groups, made local connections, and established a framework from which Iranian influence could operate. Iran’s biggest play was the indiscriminate backing/promoting of armed groups, some even oppositional to each other. It provided weapons, money, intelligence, training, and other forms of support to Shias and Sunnis, and others factions so that they could obtain resources and territory.
By 2006, it was clear that the U.S. vision for Iraq was not going according to plan. Rather than forming a democratic government, it seemed to be descending into a free-for-all civil war, each group claiming what it could get. While this chaotic situation was not ideal for Iran, they adapted to the political reality. To ensure that whoever came out on top would have close ties with Iran, they supported any Iraqi group that would accept it, especially Shia groups, betting on them as the most likely winners.
As the spillover from battling militias in a fracturing Iraq spread to other parts of the Middle East, so did the attention of the U.S. military, decreasing the likelihood of it invading Iran, emboldening the Islamic Republic’s ambitions in Iraq.
With the aim of driving out the U.S. in the region, upending governments not friendly to Iran and instead bring to power groups obligated to the Islamic Republic, Iran armed and funded Shia groups specifically to target the U.S in Iraq and across the Middle East.
The two largest and deadliest groups were Khata’ib Hizballah (KH) and Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH). Khata’ib Hizballah, funded and trained by Iran’s Quds forces, fought against American invasion forces in the Iraq War but came to greater prominence in 2007 for putting videos of their attacks on American forces on the internet. As of 2009, KH was classified as a terrorist organization for the numerous uses of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), rocket-propelled grenades, and sniper operations. IEDs alone killed upward of 200 American troops and injured over 800.
Asaib Ahl al-Haq, also funded and trained by Quds, used to be a part of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, or Jaesh al Mahdi (JAM) but began operating separately from it. Even after Sadr signed a peace agreement in 2004, AAH kept fighting. AAH was the largest Iranian backed militia in Iraq (with a membership of 3,000 fighters and receiving $5 million a month in cash and arms) and was responsible for over 6,000 attacks on American and Coalition forces, including the assassination of an American military commander, the assault on Camp Falcon, kidnapping a Department of Defence civilian employee, and, most infamously, raiding the US army base at Karbala which resulted in the killing of a soldier there and the kidnapping others.
In addition to willing partners like the AAH and KH, Iran also exerted its influence on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, especially along the border. Iran not only flooded the region with spies, but it also bombarded Kurdish villages if the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) did anything the Islamic Republic did not approve of, putting the KRG in a very delicate position, especially as U.S. troops pulled out.
It was not just Americans that the Iranian-backed militias targeted, but also its coalition partners and any locals who supported the Americans. Kurdish and Iraqi leaders who went against Iran were assassinated as a part of Iran’s goal of holding influence over those in power in Iraq.
Iran did not have the same level of influence between 2003-2011. When Iraq’s government was functional, Iran did not have room to maneuver there. In 2008, after the U.S. deployed 30,000 more troops and the Iraqi people voted overwhelmingly for more secular parties, the government reasserted its authority effectively sidelining Iran. This did not last long, however, and in 2010 during elections, once again voters chose largely secular parties unallied with Iran: with Iraqqiya getting 91 seats and Prime Minister Noori Maliki’s State of Law Coalition getting 89. Maliki did not accept his loss. The ambiguous Supreme Court ruling that followed crippled Iraqi politics and Iran seized the opportunity to reassert itself in Iraq. There is an inverse relationship between the strength and efficacy of the Iraqi government and the ability of Iran to influence it.
After a few months Iraq’s Supreme Court finally settled the May Parliamentary elections. Since then the two largest hubs that formed the new Iraqi government have been in a race for power against each other. On the one side are a U.S.-backed group, which includes pro-Iranian parties and who fought against U.S. forces but may be friendlier to the Western forces today (e.g. Al Sadr) and on the other side are pure Iranian proxies, with armed militias like AHH, Badr, and former Prime Minister Al-Maliki.
The Kurds will be one of the key blocks to determine what kind of government will be formed, as both the US and Iran have asked the major Kurdish parties to join their respective blocks to form the government.
The Kurds played a major role in the formation of the new Iraq. Kurdish leaders like Jalal Talabani, Massoud Barzani, and Nawshirwan Mustafa were major players in demanding Kurdish rights be included in Iraq’s 2005 constitution. Because of this Kurdish leaders then thought the new Iraq would guarantee the rights for which they had fought for almost a century in a written constitution. However, the Kurdish parties, who were a vital part of the new Iraq, soon realized that, since 2003, the stronger Baghdad became the weaker Erbil became. For example, in 2008 the U.S.-backed Maliki refused to implement constitutionally required processes in order to protect and ensure various rights of the Kurdish people in Iraq. Between 2008 and 2014, Maliki’s cabinet was composed of mainly Shia majority parties and major Sunni factions, refused to make any progress towards normalizing traditionally Kurdish areas that had suffered forced demographic changes and other violence during the Saddam era, despite the fact that Article 140 of the new Iraq’s constitution required the rightful return of wrongfully displaced persons as well as proper compensation for their suffering. During the time period, the Federal government was dominated by the Al-Dawa Party and also included major Shia parties like Sadr’s party and Ammar Al-Hakim’s party (in addition to smaller groups like Badr). Sunni powers like Ayad Allawi’s party and Osama Al-Nujaifi’s party were also a part of this government. During this time period the Iraqi government represented Iraq, but at the same time it suffered strong disagreements between Sunni and Shia factions.
Yet there was one issue on which the Shia and Sunni parties were strongly united: their resistance to Kurdish rights. Most notably, when the Kurdish region held an independence referendum on September 25, 2017, Iraq’s Shia and Sunni parties stood together with the Iranian and Turkish governments to fight and humiliate the Kurdistan region militarily, economically, and politically. Despite the fact that this referendum was held not in order to immediately break away from Iraq but to push for serious negotiations, the Iraqi government, headed by U.S.-backed Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi, ordered Iranian-backed militias to attack the Kurdistan region. These actions were gross violations of Iraq’s own constitution. After the referendum, the Kurds realized that their friendship with the West, especially the U.S., was based on the condition of support for a strong centralized and united Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. Despite a long-standing partnership between the U.S. government and the Kurdish parties of Iraq, the policymakers within the Trump administration agreed with regional powers like Iran and Turkey to crush the Kurds. This was a shocking turning point for many Kurds. However, many Kurds also put blame on the Kurdish leadership and their naive overestimation on ties with the West for future security and rights.
The aftermath of these events included the extensive punishment of Kurdish people, including the shutting down of the Kurdistan region’s airspace, various border closings, and the mass displacement of Kurds in the disputed territories. The U.S. tried, unsuccessfully, to talk Baghdad into a speedy and complete cessation and reversal of these punishments against the Kurds. However, Abadi (or “Our Man,” as many U.S. officials describe him), took about six months to reopen the Kurdistan Region’s airports and several months to send small shares of Kurdistan’s allocated budget. Despite the failure of the KRG to establish solid economic plans for the region, Baghdad is also to blame for its continuing refusal to send proper, legally-required funding to the Kurdistan Region since 2014.
The KRG managed to survive this time period despite being attacked from all sides after the referendum and despite the region’s loss of more than 40 percent of the disputed territories to Baghdad on October 16-18, 2017. In addition, the KRG has had little to say in the regional politics and is often pressured to obey the regimes of Iran and Turkey.
Today, both Iran and the U.S. are lobbying the Iraqi political parties to form its next cabinet. It appears that the Kurdish parties, especially the two ruling parties (KDP & PUK), will go either way: whether it is a pro-Iranian government or a government that is more friendly to the U.S. The parties don’t want to risk the repercussions of opposing Iran and Turkey, a lesson they learned post-referendum. Despite the fact that the U.S. still providing Peshmerga forces with aid, the Kurds cannot truly rely on the U.S. post-referendum regarding any issues of Kurdish rights. The Kurdish parties learned that disagreements with Iran and Turkey will very well jeopardize the Kurdish region of Iraq. The parties learned that the U.S. will choose to remain silent and ally with the central governments of these countries in such circumstances (as they’ve been doing throughout history). For example, in 1946 the U.S. allied with the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran against the short-lived independent Kurdistan Republic of Mahabad. Meanwhile, in Turkey, the U.S. consistently sided with the Turkish state since its inception and never did much to raise an issue on minority rights within the post-Ottoman state. In Syria, after using the Kurds to fight ISIS, the U.S. stood aside while the Turkish military and its jihadist proxies attacked and occupied one of the most long-standing Kurdish regions on the planet — Afrin. In Iran, the U.S. does not base its foreign policy on human rights or minority rights based issues or regime change but rather on containing and reducing the regional influence of Iran. Thus, for the Kurds, not much has changed for them in regards to U.S. policy.
While the Obama administration supported the eventual implementation of Article 140 of Iraq’s constitution there was never a follow-up or any sort of pressure on Baghdad. Today, the current administration is on the same path but they also pressure the Kurds indirectly to choose what the U.S. wants (e.g. Abadi) but without any guarantee that the U.S. will also pressure Baghdad in the future to deliver on Kurdish rights issues.
It will make a great scene if the U.S. could win against Iran in Iraq after losing since 2003 and forming a more friendly cabinet toward the West. The Kurds have always chosen America’s side but post-referendum the perspective has changed. For the U.S., winning against the Iranian regime and its terrorist proxies would not take much. The U.S. should target key anti-Western Iranian figures through economic, political, and military means.
The Kurds will without a doubt join a U.S. led Iraqi block if they receive insurances that they will not be left alone to the whims of Iran and Turkey like was done on October 16, 2017. For example, working on assurances that the Iraqi government will send Kurdistan’s allocated budget and employees’ salaries would be a good start. Also, ending martial law in the disputed territories and implementing joint security committees between the Iraqi forces and the Peshmerga forces would be a welcome policy. Encouraging serious talks over the disputed territories between Baghdad and the KRG would be even better. The U.S. should also mediate between Baghdad and Erbil regarding energy exports.
Without such action from the U.S. the Kurds will turn to Iran and its proxies to get at least some of their demands addressed since Iran and its proxies are more reliant on the Kurdish parties for the formation of the Iraqi cabinet.
To decrease Iran’s role in Iraq, if the U.S. is serious, there are countless ways to do so — starting with the targeting of the heads of various Iranian-backed militias who were involved in the killing of U.S. troops and the pressuring of Iraqi politicians who are currently cooperating with the Iranian regime.