Washington Kurdish Institute
July 31, 2018
Part III of a series on Turkey’s future
The history of religion and its institutions in Turkey is seemingly cyclical. Today’s Republic of Turkey, now approaching its centenary, was once the center of the Ottoman Empire, an Islamic empire – Islam was the state religion and the leader of empire, the Sultan, also bore the title of caliph (i.e., successor to the prophet Mohammed). Islam was central to identity within the Ottoman empire, the population of which included numerous ethnic groups speaking a variety of languages. The conflict between modernity and tradition has always been noticeable in what is now Turkey, a state that sits both geographically and culturally between West and East. This conflict has created fault lines within Turkish society which have been consistently apparent throughout the modern history of the nation. Even prior to the founding of the Republic of Turkey, these divisions were pronounced, and had a strong impact on political dynamics of the country.
Until quite recently, the modern Republic of Turkey, founded in 1923 following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, was dominated by a legacy of secularism, known in Turkish as laiklik, derived from the French, laicité. More than anyone else, one man, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, was behind the rise of secularism following the dissolution of the Islamic Empire that had endured for centuries. In founding a nation-state, the Republic of Turkey, on the ashes of Ottoman Empire, Ataturk immediately took drastic steps to enforce a secular order – he pursued reforms which abolished religious courts, dismantled the caliphate, and ostensibly included provisions for the rights of non-Muslim minorities in the new constitution and in various amendments put forth. This an attempt to force a push for “modernity,” modeled on a conception of the European nation-state. In Ataturk’s new nation-state, ethnic Turkish identity was the glue that held together the new republic – and the identities of the various minorities (e.g., the Kurds) within Turkey’s borders were disregarded, or even denied altogether, and the primacy of Turkish ethnic identity and the Turkish language aggressively and forcibly promoted. Ataturk suppressed the voice of the Islamic community, and enforced regulations and rules many found difficult to understand, or even distasteful. The script of the Turkish alphabet was changed from a modified version of the Arabic alphabet (used by many non-Arab majority Muslim groups) to a Latin script. The language used in the Muslim call to prayer was even changed from Arabic to Turkish, though this change rolled back in 1950. To some, the Kemalist reforms would be hailed as the hallmark of Turkish progress, while to others it would be a retreat from the classical values of the Turkish people, in favor of a foreign ideology. Urban, educated, pro-Western Turks in favor of Ataturk’s reforms would become known as White Turks. Conversely, the traditionally working class – rural, religious Anatolians, many of whom opposed the reforms, were labelled Black Turks. This socio-economic and cultural divide permeates Turkish society, and has stood as the background to many major religious policy discussions of the past hundred years. The precedent set by Ataturk would face challenges on many different occasions, however it would not be until the turn of the 21st century that political Islamists would be able to fully undermine Kemalist secularism in the highest echelons of government.
The dominance of the White Turkish, secular nationalists prevailed until the 2002 elections, conducted on a backdrop of collapsing coalition governments and a grave financial crisis, in which Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) swept the general elections, receiving 66% of seats in the assembly. This event marked a radical departure from the norm in Turkish politics. The newly formed AKP was an amalgamation of several moderate to farther right factions, including the Virtue Party (FP), an Islamist party which had been banned by the state for violating the rigid secularism of the Turkish constitution. Erdogan himself became a symbol to Turkey’s religious population after being sentenced to 10 months in jail for “inciting hatred” after reciting a religious and nationalistic poem replete with military imagery at a rally during his tenure as mayor of Istanbul. The lack of faith in the ruling secular government coalition affected a swing towards new parties and new visions. While the rise of the AKP was welcomed by some as representing a refreshing slide away from an older, more inflexible position on religion rooted in the ideals of the past, Erdogan’s party continuously pushed the boundaries of the established secularist order for nearly two decades in government, transforming Turkey and its core ideology. Buried in larger reform packages, Erdogan has loosened the restrictions on religious expression and participation in politics including a controversial ban on headscarves for government officials, subtly undermining longstanding practices and institutions. The weakening of the secular Turkish state that had existed for decades did not happen overnight, but rather occurred one small step at a time. It has been driven by fanning the flames of Turkish nationalism, while dousing the secular principles which were historically the foundation of the Turkish nation-state. This process is ongoing, and is clearly one of the most important macro-developments in Turkish society during the 21st century, and has resulted in significant volatility.
The Camel in the Tent
There is a story of a camel and its owner travelling in the desert. One night, as the owner was sleeping inside his small tent, the camel, who had been tied up outside, asks if he might warm his nose inside the tent, as it is a cold night. The man agrees and goes back to sleep. A bit later, the camel asks if he might rest his head inside the tent. The owner, seeing that there is enough room for the camel’s head says yes, and goes back to sleep. Slowly, the camel eventually asks for more and more space inside the tent until it is entirely inside, crowding the owner completely out. The camel, who gradually crept inside, was impossible to move back out again once it was there.
At first, the loosening of the strict laws aimed at enforcing secularism, e.g., letting women with headscarves attend university, were applauded, and Erdogan was praised worldwide for being a role model for the establishment of democracy in a Muslim-majority country. As Erdogan gained popularity and power, he more confidently steered Turkey towards political Islam, and showed increasing disregard for democratic checks and balances on his own authority.
In 2014, following the introduction of new school entrance exams, thousands of students were placed in religious imam hatip schools, whether they wanted to be there or not. In the five years leading up to this change, the number of imam hatip schools increased by 73 percent, many of these have been by transforming normal schools into religious ones, limiting secular education and creating, by force, more religiously educated graduates. But now, the government is going one step further. The Ministry of Education has drafted a new school curriculum to be enacted September 2018 which eliminates classes on evolution and even on Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inonu (another founding figure of secular Turkey), exposing the new administration’s religious agenda. Despite lagging behind other similar countries in terms of test scores, the Ministry of Education’s new goals for the proposed curriculum are geared toward moral values and a national mindset.
The time has passed where one could hope that breaking down the strict secular rules would provide an opportunity for religious freedom in Turkey. It is increasingly plain that Erdogan’s Turkey dislikes pluralism. From his treatment of the Kurds (often labelled as nonbelievers due to their opposition to his policies) to his heightened general rhetoric on a moral ‘us’ versus an immoral and/or foreign ‘them’ on topics ranging from economic to foreign policy, he is openly leading Turkey down the path to an institutionalised state religion, stoking concerns of a rise of a neo-Ottoman sultanate.
This ideological distance of newly Islamist Turkey from the west does not necessarily mean diplomatic distance as well – Saudi Arabia’s economic and diplomatic ties to the West are quite strong – but together with uncertainty over Turkey’s economy, its military role in Syria and its evolving relationship with Russia, Turkey’s position in the world political and military dynamic could permanently change. Indeed, NATO member Turkey, once considered a steadfast ally of the US on the periphery of the Middle East, now seems to be moving increasingly close to Russia as well as Iran.
Like a camel’s nose in a tent, it was notable but perhaps not entirely alarming to allow Islamism to slip into the state apparatus by repealing a number of draconian secularist measures. These reforms eventually allowed Erdogan back into government. Years of incremental changes and an increase in the number of religious schools, followed by the introduction of a new curriculum in mainstream schools, will lead to a populace with a religious and nationalistic education. This populace will continue to fill more and more public sector jobs, including the military, once a bastion of Turkey’s secular democracy.
Erdogan’s Islamist camel will push its way into the tent, forcing out Turkey’s founding principles just as they intend to push them out of the curriculum. Black Turks are now part of the ruling elite, leaving secularist intellectuals with fewer places in the public sphere, their voices increasingly suppressed under a populist wave that will be extremely difficult to oppose. Ataturk was at the helm of a radical revolution to implement secularism at the country’s founding, and took drastic, brutal actions to enforce its new secular laws. Step by step, the country moves implacably and irreversibly towards a new Turkey with Erdogan as its founding father who has replaced Kemalist republicanism and secularism with Islamism, and promoted nationalism and taken populism to a new level. Where Kemalism espoused revolutionism, Erdoganism, despite the seemingly sudden actions following the 2016 failed-coup, has effectively used gradualism to secure a place in government that is now nearly impossible to oppose. Meanwhile, the Kurdish ethnic minority within the country, which endured decades of oppression under Turkey’s secular political and military elite, now see their cities razed and elected leaders and activists arbitrarily detained by the judicial authorities and security forces controlled by Turkey’s new Islamist establishment. The founding secular order of the Republic of Turkey may be nearly finished, but the Kurdish people, who were for decades victimized by an order that enforced secularism and Turkish ethnic primacy, unfortunately have no reason to expect any respite from violent subjugation at the hands of the Turkish state.