Washington Kurdish Institute
July 24, 2018
Part II of a series on Turkey’s future
This week’s report, the second in our series on today’s Turkey, discusses the modern Turkey’s long history of military coups, often executed with the stated goal of preserving the secular state envisioned by modern Turkey’s founding father, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Following the most recent coup attempt, the failed effort of July 15, 2016, and the subsequent expansion of the Turkish president’s powers both in practice and in law, the role of the military and strength of the institution has radically changed.
A timeline of Turkey’s military coups
1960:
During his ten-year rule, Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and his ruling Democratic Party (DP) grew increasingly authoritarian and departed from Kemalist principles by loosening secular laws. The ruling party created a committee (composed entirely of Democratic Party loyalists) with broad powers to investigate the opposition’s activities. For three months, when the committee was due to produce its report, no political activity (outside the assembly) was allowed and press activity was severely restricted.
Law professors from prominent Istanbul and Ankara universities decried the commission as unconstitutional, but this denunciation was considered ‘political activity’ and disciplinary action was taken against them, resulting in student protest. The government used the army to suppress the student demonstrations and closed down the universities, and the press was still banned from reporting these events. The use of the military to put down the protests led to a silent demonstration by War Academy cadets. On May 27, 1960, at three o’clock in the morning, the army took over Ankara and Istanbul’s government buildings, arrested Democratic Party deputies and ministers, and even Prime Minister Menderes and President Celâl Bayar. The symbolic head of this coup, General Cemal Gursal, assumed power.
The National Union Committee was formed, though its members and purpose was ambiguous, despite being essentially being in control of policymaking. A period of purges followed, including 147 university professors, but outcry against this saw them reinstated to their positions. A new constitution was written which created a new system of government that would, in theory, prevent one party from obtaining a monopoly on power, as the Democratic Party, which was official dissolved in September 1961, had done. Intending to counter-balance the national assembly with other institutions, the new constitution created the senate and require all legislation to be passed through both chambers. The senate would be elected, and an independent constitutional court created to determine the constitutionality of legislation, universities and media were granted autonomy, and a bill of civil liberties was drafted and included in the constitution. Also, the National Security Council (MGK) was created, guaranteeing the military a strong role in government.
1971:
Known as the “Coup by memorandum,” the 1971 coup was preceded by an economic recession, instability, and violence by the left and right. Then Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel led a party that was fracturing into splinter groups, losing the parliamentary majority and leaving the legislative process paralyzed and ineffective. Having lost control, unable to curb the increasing violence in the streets or pass financial legislation to combat the crisis, the government was given an ultimatum by the armed forces on March 12, 1971: end the anarchy and create a strong and credible government in the Kemalist spirit or the army would perform its constitutional duty and take over. Prime Minister Demirel instantly resigned. The head of the caretaker government installed by the generals was Nehat Erim from the right wing of the Republican People’s Party (CHP). Erim put together a cabinet of technocrat outsiders, hoping to pass social and economic reform, but efforts were met with opposition. Meanwhile instability continued and on April 27, the National Security Council proclaimed martial law in all the major cities and in 11 provinces. Erim’s right wing government using this enhanced power to persecute the oppositional left, or anyone with liberal or progressive tendencies. 5,000 journalists, professors and other leading intellectuals were arrested along with all the leading membership of the Workers’ Party of Turkey, which was shut down after supporting the ‘democratic aspirations of the Kurdish people.’ Erim’s cabinet made the constitution less liberal, changing 44 articles, limiting the civil liberties of Article 11, ending the autonomy of the universities, television, and radio, restricted freedom of the press, and the powers of the constitutional court. Furthermore, the National Security Council was given the power to give unsolicited advice to the cabinet. The political structure gradually regained power because of the military’s reluctance to assume power outright itself.
1980:
The economy continued to stagnate following the previous coup, inflation soared and import substitution industrialization left Turkey’s foreign reserves dangerously low. There was a quick succession of 11 prime ministers, and violence was at an all-time with an average of 10 political assassinations a day. After months of consideration on how to proceed, the National Security Council headed by General Kenan Evren, announced a coup d’état on September 12, 1980. The National Security Council dissolved parliament, the government (including all mayors and municipal councils), political parties and suspended the constitution. With their eight-point plan, the generals ostensibly expressed a desire to return to a democratic political system, but did not specify a time by which that should come about. The generals stated that they were saving democracy from the politicians. The most visible result shortly following the coup was economic. Largely attributed to Turgut Ozal (who would eventually become prime minister and later president) the Turkish lira was allowed to float freely, and foreign investment was encouraged along with the general liberalization of the Turkish economy. Politically-motivated violence had also decreased by more than 90%, but at the cost of human rights. Not only were terrorists arrested, but also teachers, university professors, trade unionists, journalists, lawyers, and in general anyone with openly leftist (or sometimes Islamist) opinions. At the height of the purges, 122,600 people had been arrested, and, even two years after the coup, 80,000 were still imprisoned. Fifty people were executed, and hundreds died suspiciously or under torture.
The National Security Council created an assembly to rewrite the constitution. This version essentially reversed the 1960 constitution, handing more power back to the executive, limiting freedoms for the press, trade unions, and of individuals. The new constitution was put to a referendum, which required parliamentarians to vote or lose their voting privileges for five years and pay a fine. A decree banning criticism of the new constitution preceded the referendum, the results of which were 91.4 percent in favour. Only the Kurdish majority region in Turkey’s southeast had a majority of “no” votes.
1997:
Known as the “postmodern coup” the National Security Council sent a memorandum to Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the Islamist Welfare Party. On February 28, the National Security Council gave the cabinet ‘unsolicited advice’ (read: demands) to curb Islamists’ influence on the economy, education and on state institutions. Importantly, it demanded eight years of compulsory education in state schools, aiming to prevent students from attending religious schools (which produced far more students than it could absorb back into religious institutions) and thereafter entering the state’s secular institutions. The cabinet officially agreed, but in practice did very little, and after six weeks of increasing tension between the army and the Welfare Party, the National Security Council put forth an ultimatum. Erbakan withstood a vote of no confidence, but his party started to hemorrhage members after several days of pressure by judges, trade unions, and the army’s dismissal of Islamist officers. On June 18, Erbakan stepped down. A new government was formed and, to a degree, implemented the reforms the army had demanded. Attempts to suppress Islamists continued, banning Erbakan and the Welfare Party, and arresting one of its members, Recep Tayyip Erdogan (the current president of Turkey), the mayor of Istanbul, for inciting religious hatred.
Meanwhile, Islamists regrouped, forming the Virtue Party which then took the largest number of seats in parliament. It would eventually meet the same end as the Welfare Party, and for the same reasons. Out of the Virtue Party, and the newest financial crisis, came Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, which won an absolute majority in the country’s parliament in 2002.
(For even more information on modern Turkey’s history, see works by Erik Zurcher and Carter Vaughn Findley, used as references for this section.)
2016:
On the night of July 15, 2016, shots rang out across Turkey as a faction of the military launched a coup attempt to remove the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The rebelling officers styled themselves as the ‘Peace at Home Council’, and cited the erosion of secular democracy and the tarnishing of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s legacy as the reasons for their putsch. Erdogan’s government insisted the officers were acting on orders of Islamist cleric and one-time friend of Erdogan, Fethullah Gulen. Regardless, the result was a failed coup, prevented by loyalist police and military forces with broad support from pro-Erdogan citizens in the streets. The surprise was not that the coup was attempted, but that it failed. The events of July 15-16 left 265 dead, 2,185 wounded, 15,000 detained, and Erdogan, who survived the attempt, with a broad mandate for suppression. The failed coup was a watershed moment for Erdogan’s Turkey, with the president famously calling it “a gift from God” which would allow him to build a “New Turkey”. This new Turkey would be built in Erdogan’s image and his vision of a Turkish state, significantly divorced from the ideals laid out for it by Kemal Ataturk.
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Erdogan declared a state of emergency and embarked on a punitive campaign of purges, arrests, and dismissals from the military, press, civil service, academia, and business sector. The purge would chiefly target the military, under the pretense of removing the Gulenist and anti-government elements responsible for the coup. Despite the Turkish government claims, outside observers have cast doubt on Gulen’s role in the coup. The EU’s intelligence sharing body (IntCen), in a leaked document, were revealed to have concluded that the coup was hastily organized by disparate elements of the military to pre-empt a planned purge of military officers by Erdogan. Irrespective of the truth of the matter, Erdogan succeeded in removing his opponents and their supporters from the echelons of the military. About 40% of Turkey’s military leadership was dismissed for alleged ties to Gulenist and anti-government groups.
The effects of the attempted coup and the subsequent purges cannot be understated, however the true consolidation of power for Erdogan came 2 years to the day after the failed coup. After proposing massive changes to the Turkish governmental system, including a centralization of power in the president, and winning the subsequent presidential election conducted concurrently with these purges, Erdogan engaged in sweeping reorganization of the Turkish military and its leadership. Erdogan appointed former Chief of the General Staff and noted loyalist, General Hulusi Akar as his defense minister, while simultaneously putting the General Staff under control of the defense ministry, and restructuring the semi-autonomous Supreme Military Council (SMC) of Turkey. The SMC was a committee of ranking generals and admirals which determined promotion and assignment of military leadership; it will be now be an appointed council of ministers and generals, chaired by the President. The new status of the SMC breaks with a longstanding tradition, and concentrates military decision making and promotions under the aegis of Erdogan and his supporters. With Akar as defense minister and Erdogan’s son-in-law as finance minister, a position which will enable him to sit on the new military council, the military leadership of Turkey is now securely under the thumb of the president. Coupled with the dismissals of dissident and rival leaders, this consolidation of power in the hands of Erdogan neuters the Turkish military’s potential to resist the strongman’s changes, and begs the question: what will the future bring?
Per law and practice, the Turkish military has lost its ability to act as a check on the countries government. Speculation in a time of such of upheaval is always difficult, however the future of Turkey’s military will without a doubt be an integral component of the future of the entire nation. The question becomes whether or not this recent trend of executive dominance over military leadership will become normalized. The continued push for a military totally loyal to Erdogan and his agenda will have a noticeable effect on the composition and quality of the armed forces, with increasing emphasis being placed on loyalty and subordination to the country’s head of state and ideology. Already, NATO Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti has remarked that the cull of secular pro-Western officers in the organization’s Turkish staff has “degraded” the quality of the alliance, by removing those with “a great deal of experience”. The replacement of experienced officers with longstanding ties to the West by far less experienced junior servicemen not only weakens the overall quality of the military, but also undermines the bond between NATO and its easternmost member. This destabilizes an already fraught relationship between the increasingly authoritarian state and NATO, as Turkey courts the idea of closer ties with Russia. Once lauded as one of the most modernized and skilled militaries in the Middle East, Erdogan’s purges have left the Turkish armed forces a shell of its former self. The rabid pursuit of total loyalty within the armed forces selectively purges those with conflicting ideologies. The homogenization of the Turkish armed forces not only limits the pool from which soldiers can be selected, but in the long term, will contribute to Erdogan’s vision of an Islamist military.
The future is anything but certain, however the severe undermining of the Turkish military’s quality and autonomy suggests, in the long run, Erdogan will have limited obstacles to maintaining his control over the security apparatus of the state. The rising generation of military leaders is younger, less experienced, and more eager to prove themselves. They have come to power in the shadow of Erdogan and his purges, a constant reminder of what happens to those who challenge the strongman. While the Turkish military has long been used for cross-border attacks against Kurds (e.g. Operation Northern Iraq in 1992, Operation Hammer in 1997), the Turkish armed forces, once the guardian of Turkey’s official secularism, are now fighting alongside radical Islamist militias against Kurds in northern Syria. With loyal henchmen in key positions of power, successful elimination of dissident elements and expanded dominion over security decision making, sovereignty unconditionally belongs to Turkey’s president, and the military will continue to kill and shed blood in Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and perhaps elsewhere to forcibly promote his Islamist agenda beyond Turkey’s borders.