Washington Kurdish Institute August, 5, 2015
By: Michael Knights @Mikeknightsiraq
Analyzing the daily security incidents in northern Iraq with my friend Alex Mello, we first detected the signs that Da’esh was going to attack the Kurdistan Region of Iraq on July 22-24, 2014.
The terrorists had begun to aggressively patrol into the Shabak and Christian areas east of Mosul, and they were creeping up on Mosul Dam from both the east and west banks of the Tigris. The signs of a coming attack were unmistakable.
By August 1-3 the world knew what we knew: that Da’esh was no longer content to maintain a ceasefire with the Kurdistan Region. Zummar, Sinjar and Jalula fell: then Makhmour, Til Kaif and Qara Qosh. Da’esh was within forty kilometres of Erbil by the time U.S. bombs stopped their advance.
At that awful moment I felt terribly sorry for my Kurdish friends. All of them were rightfully proud of the Peshmerga for their record of resistance against Saddam and their protection of Kurdistan since the fall of the Baathist regime.
Da’esh victories would be a terrible shock to my friends. Many young Kurds tried to push the blame for the loss onto political parties other than their own. At first the attacks sometimes divided Kurds instead of uniting them.
In some cases pride came before the fall: some of my Kurdish friends, even cabinet ministers, had seemed glad that Da’esh had destroyed the federal Iraqi Army in the north: now they saw their own armed forces falling back and would regret their uncharitable words.
For the minorities living under Kurdish protection the advance of Da’esh was perhaps the greatest blow of all: the Peshmerga had effectively protected many of these communities for over a decade but now they watched the Kurdish forces leave. Would they ever fully trust the Kurds again?
Out of this darkness came a tremendous story of recovery against the odds. Kurds did unite; cooperation was forged with the Iraqi government; and territory was recaptured.
Peshmerga comeback
One of the first things that struck me after Da’esh attacked was the speed and determination of the Peshmerga counter-offensive. In less than a week Peshmerga forces were pushing towards Sinjar Mountain and in twelve days the Peshmerga were back in control of the Mosul Dam.
Down in Jalula, where the Peshmerga had been fighting Da’esh without pause since June 2014, the counter-attack started just as quickly even if it took longer to bear fruit.
In the months that followed we saw the Peshmerga relieve Sinjar Mountain, recapture Makhmour and Zummar, secure Jalula and expand the Kirkuk security perimeter in successive well-organized offensives.
All the Kurdish armed forces played a role in these victories: the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs’ Regional Guards Brigades; Dizha Tiror – the Counter-Terrorism Group; the Zerevani; the Yakray 70 and 80 forces of the main political parties; other Peshmerga volunteers; the Asayesh, Parastin and Zanyari intelligence services; the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan or PKK); and the Yezidis, Christians, Turkmen, Shabak and Kakai.
A new stronger frontline
Today the Kurdish frontline with Da’esh is heavily fortified. The two sides skirmish from parallel defensive lines in Sinjar, Kisik, Aski Mosul, Bashiqa and especially in Kirkuk with its multiple defensive belts. In other places such as Makhmour, Daquq, Tuz and the lands around Lake Hamrin the frontline is less well-defined and more open to infiltration.
Kurdish forces are now far better equipped than they were in August 2014 thanks to 370 planeloads of munitions from international supporters. Forty Milan long-range anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) systems are located at strategic points of the frontline and eight hundred Milan missiles have been supplied for them. Just under sixty thousand shorter-ranged anti-tank rockets have been provided to the KRG for close-in defence. Nearly 700 mortars with 74,000 rounds of ammunition have also been provided.
Coalition airpower is a powerful aid to the Kurds. The deep military bond between Kurdistan and the United States has become even closer over the last year, resulting in more permissive rules of engagement for strikes in support of the KRG armed forces. Coalition special forces are right on the front lines in Kurdistan, unlike in federal Iraq where they must remain on bases due to security concerns and the sensitivity of Shia militant groups. This has allowed coalition airpower to watch over the Peshmerga, especially at night.
Now most Da’esh attacks on the KRG frontline are broken up before they even reach the Kurdish outposts. Airpower and long-range missile systems smash Da’esh vehicle concentrations and suicide truck bombs. Even when Da’esh gets close to the Peshmerga positions, as they often do in places like Sinjar and Kirkuk, the Peshmerga can call on “danger-close” air support that lands with enough precision to spare the lives of Kurdish forces.
Making the Peshmerga’s gains into permanent strength
One day when Da’esh is less of a threat the coalition air forces may leave and many KRG leaders are concerned that the military gains they have made are only temporary.
The anti-tank weapons that the Peshmerga have received are either older technology, like the Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs), or are older ATGMs in short supply. These are fine for defeating Da’esh but may not suffice in the future, especially if the Kurds face renewed threats from regional states including the central government in Baghdad. Iraq now has F-16s and Kurdistan has no air defences.
Where are the tanks, the attack helicopters, the surface-to-air missiles and the cutting edge technology that other states have?
One option is to try to procure such systems, with or without the West’s help. Russia, which would usually be an ideal option, is too invested in selling weapons to federal Iraq to provide Kurdistan with the necessary hardware. The Kurdish lobby in Washington DC has backed legislation that would legally permit direct U.S. arming of the Kurds, a first step towards more advanced and longer-term U.S. arms deliveries to the KRG. The European Union has given its member states discretion in how they arm the Kurds. The KRG has intensively courted the Gulf Arab states and Jordan.
Weapons alone do not make a great army, however, and the KRG may have as much to gain from quiet workmanlike programmes that gradually build up the professionalism and international relationships of the KRG armed forces. The newly formed Kurdistan Training Coordination Center (KTTC), a joint initiative led by the Dutch, Italian, British and German governments, is up-skilling 100-man company units and starting to train multiple companies to work together in more formal 500-man battalion-scale operations.
As KTCC instructors are well aware, many of the Peshmerga taking the courses have more combat experience than their trainers will ever accumulate. But the point of the training is to add to the strengths of the Peshmerga – bravery, aggression, determination – with other skills such as spotting and defusing bombs, combat first aid and maneuvering under fire in a way that will minimize casualties.
In addition to saving lives this training is making the Peshmerga a more effective force and building long-term relationships with multiple NATO partner nations. Offensives in Aski Mosul, Kirkuk and Jalula have been carefully planned alongside coalition advisors and supported with heavy airpower. The results have been tremendous: successful operations that resulted in permanent recapture of terrain with minimal casualties for the Kurds and heavy losses to Da’esh. When Da’esh counter-attacks the Peshmerga and coalition are ready for them and the terrorists are crushed.
A new way of war is paying off for the Kurds.
Depoliticizing the Peshmerga
The issue of Peshmerga unification – taking all the political party Peshmerga and merging them into the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs’ Regional Guards Brigades – is a controversial issue but should be pushed forward.
In the long-term the Peshmerga will get greater international assistance and more advanced weapons if the Kurdish military forces are seen to be united under one ministry. There will be no more questions about where weapons go, who gets them, and whether the distribution is fair to all parties. No-one will ever call the Peshmerga a militia again if they are under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs. The minorities of Kurdistan – the Christians, Yezidis, Turkmen, Shabak, Kakai – will trust a cross-party ministry and send more of their sons to serve in it, rebuilding trust within Kurdistan.
This war was a last chance for many of the older Peshmerga commanders to remind their people why they still lead most of the institutions of the fast-growing Kurdish state. Some commanders fought well and will be remembered for it: others did not, as is the case in any country and in any war. But either way the time is coming when a new generation of Peshmerga commanders needs to take over. The war against Da’esh, not the war against Saddam, is the defining experience for these new commanders. Only the most capable should be allowed to lead. Greater interaction with NATO countries and increased participation in professional military education and training will bring the best Kurdish leaders to the forefront.
Just one year after the darkness of Da’esh’s attack the Iraqi Kurds have an unprecedented opportunity. The United States and a range of European coalition partners are arming and training Kurdish forces in the Kurdistan region and in the donors’ home countries. U.S. and European combat aircraft, Apaches, and drones are based in Erbil and other parts of Kurdistan. Coalition airpower is watching over Kurdistan’s frontier. A major multi-nation military training centre is based in the KRG. Kurdistan is the most convenient and safe basing environment for the anti-Da’esh coalition anywhere in the region. Over half the senators in the U.S. Congress voted to directly arm the Kurds.
All in one year.
Imagine what the next five years might look like.
Dr. Michael Knights is the Lafer fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He has worked in every province in Iraq and most of the hundred districts. Dr Knights regularly visits Kurdistan and Kirkuk, visiting government officials and security force units.
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